

**Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554**

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| In the Matter of |) | |
| |) | |
| July 1, 2017 |) | WC Docket No. 17-65 |
| Annual Access Charge Tariff Filings |) | |
| |) | |
| Ameritech Operating Companies |) | Transmittal No. 1859 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 2 |) | |
| |) | |
| BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC |) | Transmittal No. 129 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 |) | |
| |) | |
| Nevada Bell Telephone Company |) | Transmittal No. 300 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 |) | |
| |) | |
| Pacific Bell Telephone Company |) | Transmittal No. 552 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 |) | |
| |) | |
| Southwestern Bell Telephone Company |) | Transmittal No. 3443 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 73 |) | |

**AT&T’S OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS OF LEVEL 3 AND SPRINT CORPORATION
TO REJECT OR TO SUSPEND AND INVESTIGATE AT&T TARIFF FILINGS**

Pursuant to Section 1.773(b) of the Commission’s Rules,¹ Ameritech Operating Companies, BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, Nevada Bell Telephone Company, Pacific Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (collectively, “AT&T”) file this reply in opposition to the petitions of Level 3 Communications, LLC (“Level 3”) and Sprint Corporation (“Sprint”) to reject and to suspend and investigate² AT&T’s June 16 tariff filings

¹ 47 C.F.R. § 1.773(b).

² Petition of Level 3 to Reject or Suspend and Investigate (filed June 23, 2017) (“Level 3 Petition”); Petition to Reject, or in the Alternative Suspend and Investigate, Of Sprint Corporation (filed June 23, 2017) (“Sprint Petition”).

implementing aspects of the Commission's transition of tandem switching charges to bill-and-keep.³

Level 3 and Sprint's only contention is that AT&T's tariffs do not properly implement Rule 51.907(g)(2), which requires a certain subset of tandem switching and transport rates to transition to \$0.0007 by July 1, 2017. AT&T's tariff changes in fact fully comply with that rule by adopting that rate for traffic where the Price Cap local exchange carrier owns both the tandem and the end office (referred to in the tariff as "Terminating to Telephone Company's own end office"). Level 3 and Sprint argue that the rule also requires AT&T to apply that rate to tandem services where a price cap LEC hands the traffic off to an affiliated wireless carrier or CLEC.

As explained below, both Petitions are untimely, because they challenge aspects of AT&T's tariffs that were established in its June 7, 2017 filing and which have already gone into effect. In all events, Level 3 and Sprint's substantive challenges are unfounded. Their argument has been vetted in the industry and before the Commission staff, and AT&T's tariff filings have followed the Commission's informal guidance. The Commission's guidance represents the most reasonable interpretation of the rules, and the Commission should therefore deny the Petitions.

I. Level 3 and Sprint's Petitions Are Untimely.

Level 3 and Sprint's petitions purport to challenge AT&T's tariff changes as inconsistent with the Rule 51.907(g) access charge transition rules.⁴ These substantive challenges are incorrect, as will be explained further below. But even under their theory of the access charge rules, their

³ Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, *Connect America Fund*, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, ¶¶ 800-01 (2011) ("*USF/ICC Transformation Order*").

⁴ See Level 3 Petition at 2; Sprint Petition at 6.

petitions are untimely as they are challenging a tariff change made in AT&T's June 7 tariff filing. Such a challenge was due on June 14, 2017. The petitions should therefore be dismissed.⁵

AT&T filed revisions to its tariffs on June 7, 2017 in which it explained that it was bifurcating "terminating tandem rate elements to reflect traffic terminating to the Telephone Companies own end office and traffic terminating to non-Telephone Company 3rd party locations based on call recordings."⁶ The June 7 tariff was filed on 15 days' notice, giving parties seven (7) days to file a petition to suspend or investigate the tariff under Section 1.773(a)(2)(iii) of the Commission's rules.⁷ One party (CenturyLink) did file a timely petition challenging AT&T's June 7 tariff. The Commission allowed the June 7 tariff to go into effect.

On June 16, 2017, AT&T transmitted its 2017 Annual Filing. AT&T revised its tariffs to reduce the tandem charges for traffic terminating to the Telephone Companies' own end office to \$0.0007 as appropriate under Rule 51.907(g). AT&T did not change the rates for tandem services terminating to non-Telephone Company Third Party locations.⁸

Level 3 filed a petition to reject or suspend and investigate the tariff on June 23 and has attempted to argue that it could only challenge the June 7 tariff revisions in light of the June 16 tariff filing. That position is untenable for two reasons.

First, Level 3's main justification for the late filing is that the June 16 transmittal is the first time AT&T established specific rates for the classes of traffic described in the June 7

⁵ See, e.g. *United & Central Telephone Cos. Revisions to Tariff F.C.C. No. 1*, 10 FCC Rcd. 1700, ¶ 3, n.3 (1994) (late-filed request for Commission action on a transmittal dismissed as untimely); *AT&T; Revisions to Tariff F.C.C. No. 4*, 5 FCC Rcd. 1093, ¶ 5 (1990) (late filed challenge with no "persuasive explanation for the delay" dismissed as untimely filed).

⁶ See, e.g., Ameritech Operating Companies Description and Justification, Transmittal No. 1859, at 1 (June 7, 2017).

⁷ 47 C.F.R. § 1.773(a)(2)(iii).

⁸ See, e.g., Ameritech Operating Companies (Ameritech), 2017 Annual Filing, Description and Justification, at 34 (June 16, 2017).

transmittals.⁹ That is not true. Level 3’s challenge is focused on the rates for tandem services terminating to non-Telephone Company Third Party locations. AT&T established the rates for those services in the June 7 filing; it did not *change* them in the June 16 filing. The Section 204 tariff filing process and the Commission’s rules provide only for challenges to a “new or revised tariff filing.”¹⁰ The rates Level 3 is challenging were established in the June 7 filing and have already gone into effect. There are no “new” or “revised” tariff provisions with respect to tandem charges terminating to Third Party locations to “reject” or “suspend.”¹¹

Second, despite Level 3’s claim that it was “only possible to determine whether AT&T’s rate restructuring complies” by reviewing the June 16 transmittal,¹² that is also not true, given that CenturyLink did in fact grasp the significance of AT&T’s filing and challenge it as an alleged violation of Rule 51.907(g).¹³ Indeed, CenturyLink challenged AT&T’s June 7 transmittal on exactly the same grounds that Level 3 is challenging AT&T’s June 16 transmittal. The Commission should dismiss Level 3’s Petition as untimely.

Sprint’s Petition is not only untimely for the same reasons, it was also not properly served. Section 1.773(a)(4) requires that “[p]etitions seeking investigation, suspension, or rejection of a new or revised tariff made on 15 days or less notice shall be served either personally or via facsimile on the filing carrier.” *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.773(a)(4). AT&T did not receive service copies by either means, and Sprint’s petition is subject to dismissal on this ground as well.

⁹ Level 3 Petition at 4-5.

¹⁰ *See* 47 U.S.C. § 204(a)(1) & (3); 47 C.F.R. 1.773(a)(1).

¹¹ Level 3 of course agrees with the tariff revisions in AT&T’s *current* filing, which reduce the tandem rates terminating to the Telephone Companies’ own End Office to \$0.0007.

¹² Level 3 Petition at 5.

¹³ *See* Petition of CenturyLink Communications, LLC to Reject and to Suspend and Investigate AT&T Tariff Filings (filed June 14, 2017) (“CenturyLink Petition”). AT&T explained in its June 7 filing that tandem traffic terminating to the Telephone Company’s own end office would transition to \$0.0007 in July, as required by Section 51.907(g)(2) of the Commission’s rules, whereas traffic terminating to non-Telephone Company 3rd party locations would not.

II. AT&T's Tariffs Comply With Rule 51.907(g).

Level 3 and Sprint contend that AT&T's tariff violates Rule 51.907(g)(2) because it assesses the \$0.0007 rate only for tandem services that are terminated via a price cap carrier's end office.¹⁴ Both parties misread the rule, and AT&T's tariff is consistent with the Commission Staff's informal guidance.

As AT&T has previously explained, Rule 51.907(g) applies to "Price Cap Carriers" that are also "the terminating carrier" – *i.e.*, the carrier that is actually terminating the call to the end user and thus owns the end office switch.¹⁵ In context, the phrase "the terminating carrier" in subsection (g) makes sense only if it is a reference back to the "Price Cap Carrier." In other words, the rule requires a Price Cap Carrier to phase out its tandem charges when it is "the terminating carrier" and, as such, owns the end office.¹⁶

Level 3's argument is based entirely on statutory and other definitions of "affiliate," *see* Level 3 Petition at 5-8, but this misses the point.¹⁷ The issue is not the meaning of "affiliate," but who the rule deems to be the "terminating carrier." The rule requires the Price Cap Carrier to phase out its tandem charges when the "terminating carrier or *its* affiliate" – *i.e.*, the terminating carrier's affiliate – owns the tandem. As AT&T has previously explained, if the "terminating

¹⁴ Level 3 Petition at 5-12; Sprint Petition at 2-3.

¹⁵ *See* AT&T's Opposition to CenturyLink's Petition to Reject and to Suspend and Investigate AT&T's Tariff Filings, at 4-5 (filed June 20, 2017) (attached); *see also* *Connect America Fund*, WC Docket No. 10-90, *Comments of AT&T In Opposition to CenturyLink Petition for Stay*, at 11-15 (filed May 4, 2017). Rule 51.907(g)(2) (which governs this tariff filing) provides that "[e]ach Price Cap Carrier shall establish, for interstate and intrastate terminating traffic traversing a tandem switch that the terminating carrier or its affiliates owns, Tandem-Switched Transport Access Service rates no greater than \$0.0007 per minute." 47 C.F.R. § 51.907(g)(2).

¹⁶ *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 1312 (Rule 51.907 "includes the transition for transport and termination within the tandem serving area where the *terminating carrier* owns the serving tandem switch," but not "where the tandem owner does not own the end office" (emphasis added)).

¹⁷ Level 3 repeatedly misstates AT&T's position as "carving out" exceptions to the definition of "affiliate" that are not in the statute. *See, e.g.*, Level 3 Petition at 6, 7. AT&T's (and Commission Staff's) interpretation of the rule does not limit who can be an "affiliate," but they must be an affiliate of a price cap LEC terminating carrier.

carrier” could be a carrier *other* than the Price Cap Carrier (such as a CMRS carrier), then the rule would already address – and unreasonably pre-judge – many of the difficult issues on which the Commission separately sought comment in the *USF/ICC Transformation Order’s FNPRM*.¹⁸ The better reading of the rule is that the term “affiliate” comes into play only when the “*terminating*” Price Cap Carrier that owns the end office has an affiliate that owns the tandem.

In its Petition challenging the June 7 tariff, CenturyLink effectively conceded that this aspect of the rule – how to interpret “terminating carrier” – is ambiguous. Indeed, CenturyLink repeatedly argued that the end office owner should be “defined broadly” to include non-Price Cap Carriers like CMRS providers. *See, e.g.*, CenturyLink Petition at 9 (“with ‘affiliated’ and end office defined broadly”), 10 (“an end office owner (defined broadly – e.g. ILEC, CLEC, CMRS provider)”). Choosing this “broader” interpretation, however, would have the effect of interfering with, and pre-judging, the *FNPRM*. The narrower interpretation of limiting the end office owner to a “Price Cap Carrier” is thus more consistent with the *USF/ICC Transformation Order*, and neither Level 3 nor Sprint attempts to answer this point.¹⁹

¹⁸ Indeed, applying the plain-vanilla Rule 51.907 transition to these very different scenarios in which the Price Cap Carrier has no tariffed end user would effectively prejudge the *FNPRM* and impose *de facto* bill-and-keep and network edge rules on such traffic, which could distort competition with no real opportunity for the Commission to consider the possible consequences. For example, if Rule 51.907(g) were read to apply to a situation in which a CMRS carrier was the “terminating carrier” and its “affiliate,” a Price Cap Carrier, owned the tandem, such a reading could have substantial unintended consequences. Applying Rule 51.907 to this scenario would be destabilizing, because price cap LECs would have no means of recovering tandem costs through a CMRS affiliate’s end user customer charges, and fierce price competition from CMRS carriers that do *not* have price cap LEC affiliates, such as T-Mobile and Sprint, would preclude them from doing so in all events. *See, e.g.*, Ryan Knutson and Joshua Jamerson, *Verizon Customers Defect As Competition Ramps Up*, The Wall Street Journal (Apr. 20, 2017), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/verizon-for-first-time-loses-core-wireless-customers-1492691308> (reintroduction of unlimited data plans has set off a “bruising price war”). These are precisely the sorts of issues that the Commission must carefully consider and resolve in the *FNPRM*.

¹⁹ Level 3 does claim that its reading of the rule is “clear” and, therefore, the *FNPRM* does not actually seek comment on the traffic at issue. Level 3 Petition at 11-12. Level 3 has it backwards. The rule is at best ambiguous, and the fact that the Commission clearly sought comment on how to deal with the traffic at issue in the *FNPRM* should be dispositive in resolving whatever ambiguity exists in the rule. *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶¶ 1306-10, 1312-13 (Rule 51.907 “includes the transition for transport and termination within the tandem serving area where the terminating carrier owns the serving tandem switch,” but it “does not address the transition in situations where the

Nor does Level 3’s interpretation of the rule further the policy objectives of the *USF/ICC Transformation Order*. Cf. Level 3 Petition at 7-8. To be sure, the Commission established an overall goal of transitioning to bill-and-keep. In the *USF/ICC Transformation Order*, however, the Commission was not yet prepared to initiate that transition for all types of traffic, and it sought comment on more difficult scenarios (like the traffic at issue here) in the *FNPRM*. As AT&T has previously noted, the ultimate rules governing these more difficult cases will depend heavily on a variety of policy choices that the Commission has not yet made, including where to set the network edge.²⁰ The proper course for resolving these lingering issues, as AT&T has repeatedly urged, is to complete the *FNPRM* expeditiously – not to misconstrue and misapply Rule 51.907(g).²¹

tandem owner does not own the end office,” and the Commission thus sought comment on both the transition and “the appropriate end state” for such intermediate tandem switching services).

²⁰ *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 1310 (“As we move to a new intercarrier compensation system governed by a section 251(b)(5) bill-and-keep methodology, we invite parties to comment on the existing and future payment and market structures for dedicated transport, tandem switching, and tandem switched transport.”); *id.* ¶¶ 1315-21 (seeking comment on points of interconnection and the “network edge” in a full bill-and-keep system).

²¹ *Connect America Fund*, WC Docket No. 10-90, *Comments of AT&T In Opposition to CenturyLink Petition for Stay*, at 14, n.14; AT&T’s Opposition to CenturyLink’s Petition to Reject and to Suspend and Investigate AT&T’s Tariff Filings, at 5, n.11; *see also* Petition of AT&T Services, Inc. for Forbearance Under 47 U.S.C. § 160(c), at 3, WC Docket No. 13-363 (filed September 30, 2016).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should allow the tariff changes to take effect as scheduled and reject the Petitions to reject or suspend and investigate AT&T's tariff submissions.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James P. Young

James P. Young
Michael Hunseder
Sidley Austin LLP
1501 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000 - telephone
(202) 736-8711 - facsimile

Keith M. Krom
Christi Shewman
Gary L. Phillips
David L. Lawson
AT&T Services, Inc.
1120 20th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-3090 - telephone
(202) 463-8066 - facsimile

June 27, 2017

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James P. Young, do hereby certify that on this 27th day of June 2017, the foregoing
OPPOSITION TO PETITIONS OF LEVEL 3 AND SPRINT CORPORATION TO
REJECT OR TO SUSPEND AND INVESTIGATE AT&T TARIFF FILINGS was served
on the following parties by e-mail:

Kris Monteith
Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554
Kris.monteith@fcc.gov

Pamela Arluk
Chief, Pricing Policy Division
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554
Pamela.arluk@fcc.gov

Best Copy & Printing, Inc.
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554
fcc@bcpweb.com

Thomas Jones
Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP
1875 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
tjones@willkie.com

Charles W. McKee
Vice President, Government Affairs
Federal and State Regulatory
900 7th Street NW, Suite 700
Washington, DC 20001
Charles.W.McKee@Sprint.com

/s/ James P. Young_____

ATTACHMENT

**Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554**

| | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| In the Matter of |) | |
| |) | |
| Ameritech Operating Companies |) | Transmittal No. 1859 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 2 |) | |
| |) | |
| BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC |) | Transmittal No. 129 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 |) | |
| |) | |
| Nevada Bell Telephone Company |) | Transmittal No. 300 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 |) | |
| |) | |
| Pacific Bell Telephone Company |) | Transmittal No. 552 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 |) | |
| |) | |
| Southwestern Bell Telephone Company |) | Transmittal No. 3443 |
| Tariff F.C.C. No. 73 |) | |

**AT&T’S OPPOSITION TO CENTURYLINK’S PETITION TO
REJECT AND TO SUSPEND AND INVESTIGATE AT&T TARIFF FILINGS**

Pursuant to Section 1.773(b) of the Commission’s Rules,¹ Ameritech Operating Companies, BellSouth Telecommunications, LLC, Nevada Bell Telephone Company, Pacific Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (collectively, “AT&T”) file this reply in opposition to CenturyLink Communications LLC’s (“CenturyLink”) petitions to reject and to suspend and investigate² AT&T’s June 7 tariff filings implementing aspects of the Commission’s transition of tandem switching charges to bill-and-keep.³

CenturyLink’s principal contention is that AT&T’s tariffs do not properly implement Rule 51.907(g)(2), which requires a certain subset of tandem switching and transport rates to transition

¹ 47 C.F.R. § 1.773(b).

² Petition of CenturyLink Communications, LLC to Reject and to Suspend and Investigate AT&T Tariff Filings (filed June 14, 2017) (“Petition”).

³ Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, *Connect America Fund*, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663, ¶¶ 800-01 (2011) (“*USF/ICC Transformation Order*”).

to \$0.0007 by July 1, 2017. AT&T's tariff changes in fact fully comply with that rule by adopting that rate for traffic where the Price Cap local exchange carrier owns both the tandem and the end office (referred to in the tariff as "Terminating to Telephone Company's own end office"). CenturyLink argues that the rule also requires AT&T to apply that rate to tandem services where price cap LEC hands the traffic off to an affiliated wireless carrier or CLEC. CenturyLink's argument, however, has been vetted in the industry and before the Commission staff, and as CenturyLink acknowledges (at 5 n.16), AT&T's tariff filing simply follows the Commission's informal guidance. As explained below, the Commission's guidance represents the most reasonable interpretation of the rules, and the Commission should therefore deny the Petition.

CenturyLink's Petition concerns Rule 51.907(g) and its companion, Rule 51.907(h), which governs next year's filing.⁴ Those two rules apply to "Price Cap Carriers" that are also "the terminating carrier" – *i.e.*, the carrier that is actually terminating the call to the end user and thus owns the end office switch. From the Commission's perspective in 2011, Price Cap Carriers in this situation presented the simplest and most straightforward scenario for the initial transition to bill-and-keep as the default compensation system, because such carriers have end user customers that take services pursuant to tariffs and from whom they can recover the costs of both tandem and end office switching via the tariffs. Rule 51.907 thus established a gradual transition in which a Price Cap Carrier's switching charges are slowly phased out, beginning with the end office charges and ending, in Years 6 and 7, with such a carrier's tandem charges. Consistent with the notion of bill-and-keep as the default mechanism, such a carrier would be in a position to "bill" its end user

⁴ 47 C.F.R. § 51.907(g)-(h); *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 1312. Rule 51.907(g)(2) (which governs this tariff filing) provides that "[e]ach Price Cap Carrier shall establish, for interstate and intrastate terminating traffic traversing a tandem switch that the terminating carrier or its affiliates owns, Tandem-Switched Transport Access Service rates no greater than \$0.0007 per minute." 47 C.F.R. § 51.907(g)(2). These transitions also apply to CLECs that benchmark their rates to price cap carriers. *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶¶ 801, 807, 866; 47 C.F.R. § 61.26.

customers via tariffs to recover the tandem costs and “keep” that recovery without charging the IXC.⁵

The Commission issued a further notice of proposed rulemaking, however, to establish a separate bill-and-keep transition for all *other* price cap LEC tandem charges, including, *inter alia*, situations in which the price cap LEC performs tandem functions for a CMRS carrier that terminates the call over a wireless network, and that offers services via contracts, not tariffs. In 2011, the Commission reasonably concluded that the transition for tandem charges when the price cap LEC does *not* own the end office switch, and thus has no end user customers, presented very different issues. Indeed, the *FNPRM* specifically noted that commenters had “express[ed] concern with the end state for tandem switching and transport for price cap carriers when the tandem owner does not own the end office. . . .” *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 1312. The Commission explained that Rule 51.907 “includes the transition for transport and termination within the tandem serving area where the terminating carrier owns the serving tandem switch,” but it “does *not* address the transition in situations where the tandem owner does not own the end office.” *Id.* (emphasis added). The Commission thus sought comment on both the transition and “the appropriate end state” for such intermediate tandem switching services. *Id.* ¶¶ 1306-10, 1312-13. Moreover, as the Commission noted, many of those issues are “closely related” to the issue of how to establish the “network edge” for purposes of a bill-and-keep default rule applicable to such

⁵ *Cf.* 47 C.F.R. § 51.713. Another aspect of the Commission’s initial, partial transition was its adoption of the Access Recovery Charge (ARC), which is a “transitional recovery mechanism” from certain end users (or the CAF Fund) that helped offset the loss of revenues “reduced as part of this Order.” *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 847. The Commission allowed “incumbent LECs” – either price cap LECs or rate of return LECs – to recover the ARC from specified end users, but not CMRS carriers. *Id.* ¶ 864 n.1668. Although the ARC was never intended to be revenue neutral, the fact that the Commission provided for a partial transitional recovery mechanism for price cap LECs and rate of return LECs, but not CMRS carriers, undercuts the view that Section 51.907(g) or (h) apply when the terminating carrier is a CMRS provider.

tariffed tandem services, another issue on which it sought comment in the *FNPRM*.⁶ In 2011, the Commission thus concluded that the rules for how bill-and-keep will work for such intermediate tandem charges, and where the network edge is established, would have a substantial and perhaps far-reaching impact on how those services are purchased and provided, and the Commission was not ready to resolve those issues based on the record it had accumulated at that time.⁷

In light of the discussion of these considerations in the *USF/ICC Transformation Order* and the *FNPRM*, the Commission's informal guidance represents the most reasonable interpretation of Rule 51.907.⁸ The phrase "the terminating carrier" in subsections (g) and (h) is necessarily a reference back to the "Price Cap Carrier" – *i.e.*, a Price Cap Carrier must phase out its tandem charges when it is "the terminating carrier" and, as such, owns both the end office and tandem switches.⁹ If the "terminating carrier" could be a carrier *other* than the Price Cap Carrier (such as a CMRS carrier), then the rule would already address many of the more difficult

⁶ *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 1310 ("As we move to a new intercarrier compensation system governed by a section 251(b)(5) bill-and-keep methodology, we invite parties to comment on the existing and future payment and market structures for dedicated transport, tandem switching, and tandem switched transport."); *id.* ¶¶ 1315-21 (seeking comment on points of interconnection and the "network edge" in a full bill-and-keep system).

⁷ Consistent with the discussion in the *FNPRM*, the *USF/ICC Transformation Order* makes clear that the initial transition applies to CMRS services only insofar as the CMRS carrier itself provides reciprocal compensation, and affects CLEC charges via the pre-existing CLEC benchmark rule, which requires CLECs to conform their own tandem and end office switching charges to their benchmark price cap LEC. *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 806 ("[a]lthough CMRS providers are subject to mandatory detariffing, these providers are included [in the *USF/ICC Transformation Order* transition] to the extent their reciprocal compensation rates are inconsistent with the reforms we adopt here"); *id.* ¶¶ 807-08, 866 ("[a]pplication of our access reforms will generally apply to competitive LECs via the CLEC benchmarking rule.").

⁸ *See, e.g., Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC*, 555 F.3d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("The context is key," and the Commission "[u]nderstandably . . . looked to the context. . ."); *Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC*, 131 F. 3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("textual analysis is a language game played on a field known as 'context.'"); *Ctr. For Commc'ns Mgmt. Info., EconoBill Corp., and On Line Mktg., Inc. v. AT&T Corp.*, 23 FCC Rcd. 12249, ¶ 11 (2008) ("To ascertain how best to interpret [a Commission rule], we must examine the rule's text, history, purpose, and structure.").

⁹ *USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 1312 (Rule 51.907 "includes the transition for transport and termination within the tandem serving area where the *terminating carrier* owns the serving tandem switch," but not "where the tandem owner does not own the end office" (emphasis added)).

intermediate situations about which the Commission sought comment in the *FNPRM*.¹⁰ Indeed, applying the plain-vanilla Rule 51.907 transition to these very different scenarios in which the Price Cap Carrier has no tariffed end user would effectively prejudge the *FNPRM* and impose *de facto* bill-and-keep and network edge rules on such traffic, which could distort competition with no real opportunity for the Commission to consider the possible consequences.¹¹

The approach adopted by AT&T also eliminates any ambiguity with respect to the term “affiliate” in the two rules.¹² The rule requires the Price Cap Carrier to phase out its tandem charges when the “terminating carrier or *its* affiliate” – *i.e.*, the terminating carrier’s affiliate – owns the tandem. As discussed above, however, the “terminating carrier” can only be a Price Cap Carrier that owns the end office. Accordingly, the term “affiliate” comes into play only when the “*terminating*” price cap carrier that owns the end office has an affiliate that owns the tandem. The *USF/ICC Transformation Order* does not address why the phrase “or its affiliates” was added to the text of the two rules,¹³ but it was most likely designed either (1) to prevent a LEC from trying

¹⁰ Although CenturyLink claims it has the “plain language” reading of the rule, it effectively concedes the rule is ambiguous when it repeatedly claims that the end office owner must be “defined broadly” to include non-Price Cap Carriers like CMRS providers, even though CMRS providers, strictly speaking, do not have “end offices.” *See, e.g.*, Petition at 9 (“with ‘affiliated’ and end office defined broadly”), 10 (“an end office owner (defined broadly – e.g. ILEC, CLEC, CMRS provider)”). Choosing the “broad” understanding of an end office owner, however, has the effect of interfering with, and pre-judging, the *FNPRM* – which provides a powerful argument for choosing the narrower interpretation of limiting the end office owner to a “Price Cap Carrier.”

¹¹ For example, if (as CenturyLink seems to suggest) Rule 51.907(g) or (h) were read to apply to a situation in which a CMRS carrier was the “terminating carrier” and its “affiliate,” a Price Cap Carrier, owned the tandem, such a reading could have substantial unintended consequences. Applying Rule 51.907 to this scenario would be destabilizing, because price cap LECs would have no means of recovering tandem costs through a CMRS affiliate’s end user customer charges, and fierce price competition from CMRS carriers that do *not* have price cap LEC affiliates, such as T-Mobile and Sprint, would preclude them from doing so in all events. *See, e.g.*, Ryan Knutson and Joshua Jamerson, *Verizon Customers Defect As Competition Ramps Up*, The Wall Street Journal (Apr. 20, 2017), <https://www.wsj.com/articles/verizon-for-first-time-loses-core-wireless-customers-1492691308> (reintroduction of unlimited data plans has set off a “bruising price war”). These are precisely the sorts of issues that the Commission must carefully consider and resolve in the *FNPRM*.

¹² *Cf.* Petition at 8-9.

¹³ *Cf. USF/ICC Transformation Order* ¶ 801 & Figure 9 (omitting the phrase “or its affiliates”). CenturyLink acknowledges (at 5-6, 10-11) there is a conflict between the *USF/ICC Transformation Order* and the text of the rule, insofar as the *Order* “only discusses the Years 6/7 bill and keep transition as applying to traffic flows handled by tandem and end office facility combinations where the terminating carrier owns the tandem switch” with no mention

to evade the tandem transition by transferring its tandem assets to an affiliate, or (2) to cover situations where a price cap LEC's end user is served by the tandem of a neighboring affiliate. As explained above, however, the Commission cannot reasonably read the rule to treat the Price Cap Carrier as the "affiliate" of a *non-price-cap* carrier that terminates the call to the end user.

Finally, CenturyLink notes (at 7) that the language in AT&T's tariffs applies the \$0.0007 rate when the same Price Cap Carrier owns the tandem and end office, whereas the Description and Justification ("D&J") is worded more broadly, suggesting that the rate will apply when the traffic is terminated "to its own or any other Price Cap ILEC End Office owned by the same Holding Company." The discrepancy is immaterial. AT&T does not have any situations in which one of its operating companies would be terminating a call to an end office owned by a different operating company owned by the same holding company. Accordingly, the tariffed language is adequate and complies with the rule. The fact that AT&T inadvertently included broader language in its D&J that encompasses scenarios that are not applicable to AT&T does not constitute grounds for rejecting or suspending the tariff.

of affiliates. AT&T's reading of the rule, however, *minimizes* that conflict, whereas CenturyLink's more expansive reading of the rule creates a concomitantly broader conflict with the order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission should allow the tariff changes to take effect as scheduled and reject the Petition to reject or suspend and investigate AT&Ts tariff submissions.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ James P. Young

James P. Young

James P. Young
Michael J. Hunseder
Sidley Austin LLP
1501 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 736-8000 - telephone
(202) 736-8711 - facsimile

Christi Shewman
Gary L. Phillips
David L. Lawson
AT&T Services, Inc.
1120 20th Street, NW
Suite 1000
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 457-3090 - telephone
(202) 463-8066 - facsimile

Dated: June 20, 2017

Counsel for AT&T

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James P. Young, do hereby certify that on this 20th day of June 2017, the foregoing
OPPOSITION TO CENTURYLINK'S PETITION TO REJECT AND TO SUSPEND AND
INVESTIGATE AT&T TARIFF FILINGS was served on the following parties by e-mail:

Kris Monteith
Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554
Kris.monteith@fcc.gov

Pamela Arluk
Chief, Pricing Policy Division
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554
Pamela.arluk@fcc.gov

Best Copy & Printing, Inc.
445 12th Street SW
Washington, DC 20554
fcc@bcpiweb.com

Timothy M. Boucher
CenturyLink
Suite 1230
931 14th Street
Denver, CO 80202
Timothy.Boucher@CenturyLink.com

/s/ James P. Young