Federal Communications Commission FCC 18-42
STATEMENT OF 
COMMISSIONER BRENDAN CARR
Re: Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain Through FCC 
Programs, WC Docket No. 18-89
Americans benefit from world-leading communications networks thanks to our country’s 
exceptional commitment to the free market.  To be sure, the government has a role in promoting network 
deployment by reducing regulatory barriers and auctioning spectrum.  But it was the private sector that 
put over $1.6 trillion in capital at risk and built the next generation networks that are now the envy of the 
world.
Our reliance on the free market has many benefits for consumers.  We don’t impose utility-style 
regulations on the Internet, which sacrifice competition for government control.  We don’t impose 
mandatory unbundling obligations, which skew investment decisions and deter network deployment.  
And we certainly don’t have a nationalized communications network.  
But unleashing the private sector to build and operate networks means that private companies are 
also charged with defending critical infrastructure.  And the private sector is deploying substantial 
resources to secure their networks from attack—whether those attacks stem from an individual effort, a 
company, or a state actor.  I visited Cable Labs outside Boulder, Colorado, two months ago and saw some 
of the good work industry is doing to help secure our communications infrastructure.
The federal government also has a role to play.  Indeed, the federal government has been engaged 
in a decades-long effort to enhance the security of communications networks and their supply chains.  In 
2013, for example, the White House directed federal agencies to work together to increase the security of 
communications infrastructure.  In 2017, Congress passed legislation prohibiting federal agencies from 
using any products provided by certain companies.  And just yesterday, the Commerce Department 
banned the export of components to a foreign manufacturer that was found to have repeatedly evaded 
sanctions aimed at strengthening our national security. 
Over the years, the FCC has taken targeted actions, as well.  We have prohibited companies that 
have been barred from bidding on federal contracts for national security reasons from participating in our 
spectrum auctions.  We consider national security and foreign policy concerns in evaluating a company’s 
application to operate communications infrastructure in the U.S.  And we have established CSRIC as an 
advisory council charged with providing recommendations to ensure the security of our communications 
networks, among other actions.
As threats continue to evolve, we must continue our work on this front—that means supporting 
the private sector’s efforts, coordinating with our fellow agencies, and exercising our own authority, 
however limited, to advance the security of communications networks.
We do that through this Notice by proposing to cut off Universal Service Fund subsidies for the 
purchase of equipment or services from companies that pose a national security threat to communications 
networks or their supply chains.  That’s a very reasonable proposal.  Americans should not be paying for 
equipment that undermines our national security.  
But I am also glad that my colleagues have agreed to broaden the scope of this proceeding in two 
important respects.
First, we now seek additional information that will allow us to more fully assess the scope and 
nature of any threats and thus the costs and benefits of our decisions.  
Second, the Notice now explores a broader set of options for remedying any threats that we 
identify.  For instance, we now ask about more than just USF-funded equipment.  And the Notice now 
tees up additional remedies from testing regimes (which have been employed by some of our closest 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 18-42
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allies) to actions related to the removal or prospective deployment of equipment.  I want to thank the 
Chairman and my colleagues for agreeing to put all of these options on the table.
Strengthening our national security will continue to be a top priority for the FCC.  Doing so 
requires timely, accurate information concerning the threats we face and a holistic discussion of potential 
responses.  I believe this Notice, as revised, will continue this important discussion, so I am glad to 
support it today.
Thank you to the staffs of the Wireline Competition Bureau and the Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau for their diligent work on this item.  It has my support.