*Pages 1--306 from Microsoft Word - 17734* Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 Before the Federal Communications Commission Washington, D. C. 20554 In the Matter of Joint Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., And BellSouth Long Distance, Inc for Provision of In- Region, InterLATA Services In Georgia and Louisiana ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CC Docket No. 02- 35 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Adopted: May 15, 2002 Released: May 15, 2002 By the Commission: Commissioner Copps issuing a statement. TABLE OF CONTENTS Paragraph I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 1 II. BACKGROUND................................................................................................................... 4 III. PRIMARY ISSUES IN DISPUTE................................................................................... 9 A. COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271( C)( 1)( A)........................................................................ 11 1. Georgia.......................................................................................................................... 12 2. Louisiana....................................................................................................................... 15 B. EVIDENTIARY CASE ........................................................................................................... 16 C. CHECKLIST ITEM 2 – UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS.................................................. 21 1. Pricing of Network Elements........................................................................................ 21 2. Access to Operations Support Systems ...................................................................... 101 3. UNE Combinations (UNE- P and EELs)..................................................................... 199 IV. OTHER CHECKLIST ITEMS ................................................................................... 201 A. CHECKLIST ITEM 1 – INTERCONNECTION ......................................................................... 201 1. Pricing of Interconnection .......................................................................................... 210 B. CHECKLIST ITEM 4 – UNBUNDLED LOCAL LOOPS............................................................ 218 C. CHECKLIST ITEM 5 – UNBUNDLED TRANSPORT ............................................................... 245 D. CHECKLIST ITEM 6 –UNBUNDLED LOCAL SWITCHING..................................................... 248 1 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 3 BellSouth. We grant BellSouth’s application in this Order based on our conclusion that BellSouth has taken the statutorily required steps to open its local exchange markets in Georgia and Louisiana to competition. 2. We wish to acknowledge the effort and dedication of the Georgia Public Service Commission (Georgia Commission) and the Louisiana Public Service Commission (Louisiana Commission), which have expended significant time and effort overseeing BellSouth’s implementation of the requirements of section 271. The Georgia and Louisiana Commissions conducted proceedings concerning BellSouth’s section 271 compliance with opportunities for participation by interested third parties. Both commissions adopted a broad range of performance measures and standards, as well as Performance Assurance Plans designed to create a financial incentive for post- entry compliance with section 271. In addition, the Georgia Commission provided for extensive third- party testing of BellSouth’s operations support systems (OSS) offerings. As the Commission has recognized, state proceedings demonstrating a commitment to advancing the pro- competitive purpose of the Act serve a vitally important role in the section 271 process. 3 We commend both states for their enormous time and effort in developing this application. 3. We also commend BellSouth for the significant progress it has made in opening its local exchange market to competition in Georgia and Louisiana since the Commission last reviewed its application. 4 BellSouth has implemented several improvements to its OSS which respond to previous Commission concerns identified on the record of BellSouth’s earlier application. Additionally, BellSouth states that competitive local exchange carriers (competitive LECs) provide local service to some 828,281 lines on a facilities basis in Georgia, and to some 155,179 lines on a facilities basis in Louisiana. BellSouth also states that over one- third of all competitive LEC- served lines in BellSouth’s Georgia service area and over 20 percent of competitive LEC- served lines in BellSouth’s Louisiana service area are provisioned using (Continued from previous page) Application); see Comments Requested on Application by BellSouth Corporation for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In- region, InterLATA Service in the States of Georgia and Louisiana (CC Docket No. 01- 277), Public Notice, DA No. 01- 2286 (rel. October 2, 2001). 3 See, e. g., Application of Verizon New York Inc., Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Verizon Global Networks Inc., and Verizon Select Services, Inc., for Authorization to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Connecticut, CC Docket No. 01- 100, FCC 01- 208, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 14147, 14149, para. 3 (2001) (Verizon Connecticut Order); Application of Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc. (d/ b/ a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance Company (d/ b/ a Verizon Enterprise Solutions) and Verizon Global Networks Inc. for Authorization to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Massachusetts, CC Docket No. 01- 9, FCC 01- 130, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 8988, 8990, para. 2 (2001) (Verizon Massachusetts Order). 4 See BellSouth GALA I Application; see also, Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In- Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599 (1998) (Second BellSouth Louisiana Order); Application by BellSouth Corporation, et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 6245 (1998) (BellSouth Louisiana Order). 3 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 4 unbundled local loops and unbundled network elements platform (UNE- P) provided by BellSouth. In addition, as of December 2001, competitors have acquired and placed into use more than 80,000 loops in Georgia and more than 19,000 loops in Louisiana. There is also an active resale market in Georgia and Louisiana. BellSouth states that it provides 84,450 resold local exchange lines, including 64,929 residential lines and 19,521 business lines in Georgia. In Louisiana, BellSouth provides 71,383 resold local exchange lines, including 58,423 residence lines and 12,960 business lines. These results, in addition to the significant progress BellSouth has made in improving its OSS, show that BellSouth has made extensive efforts to open its local exchange markets in compliance with the requirements of the Act. 5 II. BACKGROUND 4. In the 1996 amendments to the Communications Act, Congress required that the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) demonstrate compliance with certain market- opening requirements contained in section 271 of the Act before providing in- region, interLATA long distance service. Congress provided for Commission review of BOC applications to provide such service in consultation with the affected state and the Attorney General. 6 5. We rely heavily in our examination of this application on the work completed by the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions. On May 7, 2001, the Georgia Commission initiated a proceeding to review BellSouth’s satisfaction of the requirements necessary to provide in- region, interLATA service in Georgia. 7 After conducting this proceeding, which was open to participation by all interested parties, the Georgia Commission determined “that BellSouth had 5 Joint Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc. for Authorization Under Section 271 To Provide In- Region, InterLATA Service in the States of Georgia and Louisiana, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed February 14, 2002) (BellSouth GALA II Application) at Attach. A; BellSouth GALA II Supplemental App. A, Vol. 2A, Tab D, Supplemental Affidavit of Elizabeth Stockdale (BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff.) at 6, 9. 6 The Commission has summarized the relevant statutory framework in prior orders. See, e. g., Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc., d/ b/ a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of In- Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma, CC Docket No. 00- 217, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 6237, 6241- 42, paras. 7- 10 (2001) (SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order), aff’d in part, remanded in part sub nom. Sprint Communications Co. v. FCC, No. 01- 1076 (D. C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2001); Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc., d/ b/ a Southwestern Bell Long Distance pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Texas, CC Docket No. 00- 65, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18354, 18359- 61, paras. 8- 11 (2000) (SWBT Texas Order); Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, CC Docket No. 99- 295, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC 3953, 3961- 63, paras. 17- 20 (1999) (Bell Atlantic New York Order), aff’d, AT& T Corp v. FCC, 220 F. 3d 607 (D. C. Cir. 2000). 7 BellSouth GALA I Application at 17; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 1. 4 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 5 met the competitive checklist set forth in section 271 of the 1996 Federal Telecommunications Act.” 8 6. On April 20, 2001, BellSouth notified the Louisiana Commission of its intent to file an application to provide interLATA telecommunications services in Louisiana. 9 In response, the Louisiana Commission initiated a proceeding, which was open to participation by all interested parties, to examine BellSouth’s compliance with the requirements of section 271. 10 On September 19, 2001, the Louisiana Commission issued an order “endors[ ing] the application of BellSouth to the FCC . . . to provide interLATA service originating within the State of Louisiana,” and approving BellSouth’s SGAT. 11 7. BellSouth filed its initial application for section 271 authority for the states of Georgia and Louisiana (the BellSouth GALA I Application) on October 2, 2001 but later chose to withdraw it. 12 BellSouth filed another application for Georgia and Louisiana (BellSouth GALA II Application) on February 14, 2002. The BellSouth GALA II Application incorporates the material in the original application by reference to demonstrate compliance with the section 271 requirements. It also provides additional information concerning BellSouth’s provision of access to its OSS offerings. As in the prior application, the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions endorse BellSouth’s present application. 13 8. The Department of Justice filed its recommendation on March 21, 2002. 14 The Department of Justice recommends approval of BellSouth’s application for section 271 authority in Georgia and Louisiana, stating that: BellSouth’s Supplemental Application demonstrates that it has made substantial progress in addressing issues previously identified by the Department. The 8 Id. See also Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 9- 11 (describing the Georgia Commission’s approval of BellSouth’s Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT)). 9 BellSouth GALA I Application at 12; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 10- 11. 10 Id. 11 BellSouth GALA I Application at 13; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 12. 12 This is BellSouth’s fourth application to the Commission for authorization to provide in- region, interLATA services in Louisiana and its second for Georgia. BellSouth previously applied for section 271 approval for Louisiana in November 1997, July 1998 and jointly for Georgia and Louisiana in October 2001. The Commission denied the first two applications and, as noted previously, BellSouth withdrew the third. See BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 6245; BellSouth Second Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599; Letter from James G. Harralson, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, BellSouth, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277 (filed December 20, 2001) (withdrawing BellSouth’s GALA I Application) (BellSouth December 20 Ex Parte Letter). 13 Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 3, 32; Louisiana Commission GALA II Comments at 4. 14 Section 271 (d)( 2)( A) requires us to give “substantial weight” to the Department’s evaluation. 5 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 6 Department recognizes that additional improvements in BellSouth’s OSS have been identified and will be implemented under the direction of the Georgia and Louisiana PSCs, and that final completion of the metrics audit under the auspices of the Georgia PSC should further improve the accuracy and reliability of BellSouth’s performance reports. 15 While the Department of Justice supports approval of BellSouth’s application, based on the current record, it noted its conclusions were “subject to the Commission’s review of the concerns expressed in this Evaluation.” 16 III. PRIMARY ISSUES IN DISPUTE 9. As in recent section 271 orders, we will not repeat here the analytical framework and particular legal showing required to establish checklist compliance with every checklist item. Rather, we rely on the legal and analytical precedent established in prior 271 orders, and we attach comprehensive appendices containing performance data and the statutory framework for evaluating section 271 applications. 17 Our conclusions in this Order are based on performance data as reported in monthly performance reports reflecting service in the most recent months before filing (October 2001 through February 2002). 18 10. We focus in this Order on the issues in controversy in the record. Accordingly, we begin by addressing whether the application qualifies for consideration under section 271( c)( 1)( A) (Track A), the evidentiary case, and checklist item two (unbundled network 15 Department of Justice Evaluation at 21. 16 Id. at 3. In particular, the Department of Justice expressed concern regarding BellSouth’s consistency in adhering to change management principles, and its decision to make changes to the Service Order Accuracy metric without prior approval of the Georgia Commission or notice to competitive LECs. The Department of Justice also noted that the Commission should not rely solely on BellSouth’s performance reports in reviewing competitive LEC complaints, until the Georgia Commission has completed its review of BellSouth’s metrics, or until there is additional commercial experience with the reported metrics. Id. at 20. 17 Appendices B (Georgia Performance Data), C (Louisiana Performance Data), and D (Statutory Requirements). See Application by Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc. (d/ b/ a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance Company (d/ b/ a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), Verizon Global Networks Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc., for Authorization To Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Rhode Island, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17 FCC Rcd 3300, Apps. B, C, and D (2002) (Verizon Rhode Island Order); Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc., d/ b/ a Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Arkansas and Missouri, 16 FCC Rcd 20719, Apps. B, C, and D (SWBT Arkansas/ Missouri Order); Application of Verizon Pennsylvania Inc., Verizon Long Distance, Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Verizon Global Networks Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc. for Authorization to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Pennsylvania, 16 FCC Rcd 17419, 17508- 545, Apps. B and C (2001) (Verizon Pennsylvania Order). 18 We examine data through February 2002 because they describe performance that occurred before comments were due in this proceeding on March 4, 2002. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18372, para. 39. 6 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 7 elements, or UNEs). Next, we address the following checklist items: one (interconnection), four (unbundled local loops), five (transport), six (switching), seven (E911/ Operator Services/ Directory Assistance) (OS/ DA), eight (white pages), eleven (number portability), twelve (local dialing parity), thirteen (reciprocal compensation) and fourteen (resale). The remaining checklist items are discussed briefly. We find, based on our review of the evidence in the record, that BellSouth satisfies all the checklist requirements. A. Compliance with Section 271( c)( 1)( A) 11. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC’s application to provide in- region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271( c)( 1)( A) (Track A) or 271( c)( 1)( B) (Track B). 19 To qualify for Track A, a BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more competing providers of “telephone exchange service . . . to residential and business subscribers.” 20 The Act states that “such telephone service may be offered . . . either exclusively over [the competitor’s] own telephone exchange service facilities or predominantly over [the competitor’s] own telephone exchange facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications services of another carrier.” 21 The Commission has further held that a BOC must show that at least one “competing provider” constitutes “an actual commercial alternative to the BOC,” 22 which a BOC can do by demonstrating that the provider serves “more than a de minimis number” of subscribers. 23 1. Georgia 12. We conclude that BellSouth satisfies the requirements of Track A in Georgia. We base this decision on the interconnection agreements BellSouth has implemented with competing carriers in Georgia and the number of firms that provide local telephone exchange service, either exclusively or predominantly over their own facilities, to residential and business customers. 24 19 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( A). 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 Application by SBC Communications Inc., Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Oklahoma, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 8685, 8695, para. 14 (1997) (SWBT Oklahoma Order). 23 SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6257, para. 42; see also Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in Michigan, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20585, para. 78 (1997) (Ameritech Michigan Order). 24 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff., Exh. ES- 5 and ES- 6 (citing confidential information); Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 2. We note that a survey commissioned by the Georgia Commission found that 5 firms provide residential service over their own facilities and that 8 firms provide residential service by a combination of their own and leased BellSouth UNEs. This same survey found that 20 firms provide business services over their own facilities and 21 firms provide business services by a combination of their own and leased BellSouth UNEs. Georgia Commission GALA I Comments, Appendix A. 7 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 8 In support of its Track A showing, BellSouth relies on interconnection agreements with AT& T (MediaOne Telecom, Teleport), MCImetro, and Mpower. 25 We find that each of these carriers serves more than a de minimis number of residential and business customers predominantly over its own facilities and represents an “actual commercial alternative” to BellSouth in Georgia. 26 Specifically, the record demonstrates that AT& T provides residential and business service to its customers over its own facilities, UNE- Platform (UNE- P) and UNE Loops. 27 MCImetro provides service to residential and business customers over their own facilities and UNE- P. 28 Mpower provides service to residential and business customers over UNE- Loops. 29 13. Two commenters assert that BellSouth overestimates the number of lines provided by competitors in Georgia. 30 Specifically, Sprint asserts that BellSouth’s methodology is overinclusive in that it captures high- speed data lines and that the level of competition is de minimis. 31 In addition, AT& T argues that BellSouth’s market share estimates is inaccurate because it includes lines provided to Internet service providers. 32 In response to Sprint, we note that our analysis does not rely on the lines that BellSouth attributes to Sprint. 33 As stated above, the record demonstrates that, even excluding Sprint’s lines, there are numerous carriers that provide voice services to more than a de minimis number of residential customers and business customers over their own facilities, UNE- Loops, and UNE- P. Similarly, in response to AT& T we note that even assuming that AT& T’s estimated market share is correct, we still find that 25 BellSouth GALA I Application at 18- 19. 26 SWBT Oklahoma Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 8695, para. 14. 27 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff., Exh. ES- 5 and ES- 6 (citing confidential information). 28 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff., Exh. ES- 5 and ES- 6 (citing confidential information); Worldcom GALA I Comments at 14. 29 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff., Exh. ES- 5 and ES- 6 (citing confidential information). 30 Sprint GALA II Comments at 11- 13; US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 53- 54; AT& T GALA I Comments at 75; AT& T GALA I Comments App. Tab I, Declaration of Joseph Gillan (AT& T GALA I Gillan Decl.) at 17; El Paso et al GALA I Comments at 43. 31 Sprint GALA II Comments at 12. 32 AT& T estimates that facilities- based competitors have a 6. 3% market share in Georgia. AT& T also asserts that BellSouth does not provide entrants access to the local network on equal terms and that this is demonstrated by the declining number of lines resold. As noted by the Department of Justice, however, competing LECs may be converting their resale lines to UNE- P lines. We note that the number of UNE- P lines increased significantly as the number of resold lines declined between July 2001 and December 2001. BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff. Exh. ES- 5; BellSouth GALA I Application, App. A, Vol. 10, Tab V, Affidavit of Victor K. Wakeling (BellSouth GALA I Wakeling Aff.), Exh. VW- 6, VW12; Department of Justice Evaluation GALA I at 10; AT& T GALA I Comments at 77; AT& T GALA I Gillan Decl. at 5- 6, 12, 15. 33 BellSouth includes the number of interconnection trunks between itself and each individual competitive LEC (including Sprint) in its estimation of the competitive LECs’ presence in the market. Our assessment of the market, however, does not employ these estimates. 8 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 9 more than a de minimis number of customers are served over competitive LEC facilities. Therefore, even if BellSouth’s methodology inflates the total number of lines, as Sprint and AT& T suggest, we still find that there is an actual commercial alternative based on the sufficient number of voice customers served over competing LECs’ own facilities. 34 14. US LEC/ XO argue that there is a disparity between BellSouth’s estimate of the competitive LECs’ market share and the estimated competitive LECs’ market share reported in the Commission’s most recent Local Telephone Competition Report. 35 We note, however, that the market share reported in the Local Competition Report reflects market share for the entire state of Georgia rather than just BellSouth’s territory, and does not indicate whether any specific competitor serves more than a de minimis number of customers. 36 Accordingly, it does not undermine our confidence in the accuracy of BellSouth's estimates. Moreover, as the D. C. Circuit confirmed in Sprint v. FCC, Congress specifically declined to adopt a market share or other similar test for BOC entry into long distance. 37 Accordingly, the applicant is not required to show that competitors have captured any particular market share. US LEC/ XO argument, therefore, is irrelevant to our analysis under Track A. 2. Louisiana 15. We conclude that BellSouth demonstrates that it satisfies the requirements of Track A based on the interconnection agreements it has implemented with competing carriers in Louisiana and the numerous carriers providing facilities- based service to residential and business customers in this market. 38 In support of its Track A showing, BellSouth relies on interconnection agreements with AccessOne, Cox, and ITC^ DeltaCom. 39 The record demonstrates that each of these carriers serves more than a de minimis number of residential and business customers via UNE- P or full- facilities lines. 40 Thus, we find that there is an “actual 34 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff. Exhs. ES- 5 and ES- 6 (citing confidential information). 35 US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 53- 54. 36 BellSouth’s territory amounts to 83% of the Universal Service Funds lines in Georgia. Statistics of Communications Common Carriers, (released September 15, 2001), Table 5- 1, at 227. Additionally, carriers with fewer than 10,000 local telephone lines in service in a state are not required to report those lines for purposes of the FCC Report. Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2001, Common Carrier Bureau, Industry Analysis Division, February 2002, fn. 8 and Table 8. 37 Sprint v. FCC, 274 F. 3d at 553- 54 (stating that “the statute imposes no volume requirements for satisfaction of Track A.”); see also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77. 38 The Louisiana Commission asserts that while various parties questioned the level of competition during BellSouth's third application before the Louisiana Commission, no party challenged BellSouth's compliance with Track A in that proceeding. Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 13- 14. 39 BellSouth GALA I Application at 19- 20. 40 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff. Exh. ES- 6 and ES- 7 (citing confidential information). We note that the number of UNE- P lines has been increasing. BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff. Exh. ES- 6, ES- 7, BellSouth GALA I Wakeling Aff. Exh. VW- 7 and VW- 13. 9 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 10 commercial alternative” to BellSouth in Louisiana and that BellSouth satisfies the requirements of Track A in Louisiana. Some commenters challenge the accuracy of BellSouth’s estimate of the competitive LECs’ market share. 41 As stated above, however, the actual market share is irrelevant to our Track A analysis, 42 and these commenters have not otherwise countered BellSouth’s showing that it has interconnection agreements with competitors that serve more than a de minimis number of customers. B. Evidentiary Case 16. As a threshold matter, we address challenges to the validity of the data submitted by BellSouth. As BellSouth’s data is important to its showing of compliance with several different checklist items, it is appropriate for us to dispose of this issue as a threshold matter before addressing compliance with each checklist item. 43 BellSouth has submitted performance metric data with its application as evidence of meeting its nondiscriminatory requirements under the checklist. These performance metrics measuring BellSouth’s performance in Georgia and Louisiana were calculated according to the business rules (the BellSouth Service Quality Measurement Plan or “SQM”) approved by the Georgia Commission. 44 The SQM was developed in an open, collaborative proceeding conducted by the Georgia Commission. 45 The 41 Sprint GALA II Comments at 17, US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 11- 12. AT& T GALA I Comments at 75; Sprint GALA I Comments at 11. AT& T estimates that facilities- based competitors have a 2. 3% market share in Louisiana. AT& T GALA I Gillan Decl. at 15, para. 27. 42 See discussion above. 43 We note that the Commission discussed the importance of data validity issues in the New York, Texas and Massachusetts Section 271 Orders. See Verizon New York 271 Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3959, para. 11 (the monthly review by the New York Commission of Bell Atlantic’s raw data, the collaborative proceedings conducted by the New York Commission concerning the performance metrics, and the review by KPMG and the New York Commission of Bell Atlantic’s internal controls surrounding the data collection process, ensured that the performance data was accurate, consistent and meaningful); SWBT Texas 271 Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18377- 78, para. 57 (SWBT’s data had been subject to scrutiny and review by interested parties, to a large extent its accuracy had not been contested, and in those instances where it had been disputed, the Commission looked first to the results of data reconciliations between SWBT and competing carriers); Verizon Massachusetts 271 Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9058- 59, para. 129 (when performance metric data is challenged and has not been audited, competing carriers should be given access to their carrier- specific data, and to the underlying data used for any special studies of the BOC’s performance). 44 BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 9a, Affidavit of Alphonso J. Varner for Georgia (BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff.) at paras. 5- 7. BellSouth explains that it used the Georgia SQM for the Louisiana performance metric data, with the Louisiana Commission’s approval, because the Louisiana SQM that was in effect when BellSouth filed its application with the Louisiana Commission lacked sufficient disaggregation to report on performance that the Commission has traditionally examined. BellSouth reports data to the Louisiana Commission using the current Louisiana SQM, which was developed in an open proceeding conducted by the Louisiana Commission. BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 9a, Affidavit of Alphonso J. Varner for Louisiana (BellSouth GALA I Varner Louisiana Aff.) at paras. 5, 24- 33. 45 BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at paras. 8- 22. 10 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 11 Georgia performance metric data has been subject to three audits ordered by the Georgia Commission, of which the first two are almost complete 46 and the third is still in progress. 47 17. Several commenters challenge the validity of the data provided by BellSouth. Specifically they claim that: a number of metrics were not calculated properly; 48 the metric data is not an accurate representation of BellSouth’s performance; 49 BellSouth’s metric data is not provided in a manner that allows competing carriers to readily verify whether BellSouth’s performance is meeting state- established standards; 50 the pattern of restatements of the data by BellSouth and BellSouth’s acknowledgements of problems with certain metrics mean that the data is not stable enough to be relied upon; 51 BellSouth unilaterally changed the rules by which 46 Two exceptions remain open for the first two audits. BellSouth GALA II Reply App., Volume 3, Tab I, Supplemental Reply Affidavit of Alphonso J. Varner for Georgia and Louisiana (BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff.) at paras. 20- 21; BellSouth GALA II Application App. A, Tab E, Supplemental Affidavit of Alphonso J. Varner for Georgia and Louisiana (BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff.) at paras. 49- 51; BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at Ex. PM- 13 (KPMG Interim Status Report). An “exception” is a problem with BellSouth’s performance encountered by KPMG in the course of its audit and test, which KPMG was unable to resolve. BellSouth GALA I Application App. F, Volume 12a- c, Tab 76, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. OSS Evaluation - Georgia, Master Test Plan Final Report (MTP Final Report) and Supplemental Test Plan Final Report (STP Final Report) submitted by KPMG Consulting, March 20, 2001, at II- 6. 47 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 28- 62. Audit I, also known as Phase I, was ordered as part of the Master Test Plan in the May 20, 1999 order, and as part of the Supplemental Test Plan ordered in Jan. 2000. It reviewed the calculations of 42 metrics, which covered 256 submetrics. Audit II/ Phase II was ordered in the June 6, 2000 order, for 60 metrics, covering 1178 submetrics. Audit III/ Phase III was ordered in Jan. 16, 2001, auditing 75 metrics covering 2678 submetrics and BellSouth’s performance plan, called SEEMS. BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at paras. 38- 40; KPMG Interim Status Report. Each audit had 6 parts, covering for each audit: PMR 1, Data Collection and Storage; PMR 2, Standards and Definitions (metric conformity to the SQM); PMR 3, Change Management (how BellSouth managed changes to the metrics); PMR 4, Data Integrity (checking the integrity of the data as it moved from the Legacy/ source systems to its database containing its raw data called PMAP); PMR 5, Replication of SQM and 271 charts (replicating metric calculations based on PMAP data); PMR 6, Statistical Analysis (checking statistical tests used for SQM and SEEMS). Audit III also included PMR 7, Enforcement Review of SEEMS (checking the calculations of payments for the SEEMS plan). KPMG Interim Status Report. 48 AT& T GALA I Comments App. Tab E, Declaration of Cheryl Bursh and Sharon Norris at paras. 36- 113 (AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl.); AT& T GALA II Comments App. Tab E, Declaration of Cheryl Bursh and Sharon Norris at paras. 72- 94 (AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl.); Birch GALA II Comments at 6- 8; WorldCom GALA II Comments App. Tab A, Declaration of Sherry Lichtenberg at paras. 64- 66 (WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl.); Network Telephone Corp. GALA II Comments at 1- 3; Covad GALA I Comments at 35- 43. 49 AT& T GALA II Comments App. Tab A, Declaration of Robert M. Bell (AT& T GALA II Bell Decl.); AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 95- 102; Birch GALA II Comments at 9- 11; Birch GALA II Reply Comments at 4- 12. 50 Mpower GALA II Comments at 17- 18. 51 AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 5, 90- 93, 101- 102; AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 14- 23. 11 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 12 the metrics are calculated after the Georgia Commission had approved them; 52 and the lack of a completed audit, and the problems found by KPMG in its Georgia and Florida audits of BellSouth’s metric data, demonstrate that the data is unreliable. 53 In its evaluation, the Department of Justice expressed concern about the reliability and accuracy of BellSouth’s data in certain respects. 54 While the Department observed that the stability and accuracy of BellSouth’s performance data was improving, it cautioned the Commission that when faced with “credible complaints” regarding BellSouth checklist compliance, the Commission should not rely “solely” on BellSouth performance reports, until the audits are completed or there is additional commercial experience with the metrics. 55 18. BellSouth argues that its performance metrics were developed in extensive, open proceedings and that its internal and external controls and checks ensure that its data continue to be reliable. Specifically, BellSouth has adopted internal quality assurance controls, including automatic checks on the data integrity and calculations, as well as manual data validation processes to validate both the software code used and the application of the business rules, both of which serve to check that the results are reasonable. 56 BellSouth also points out the data has been and continues to be subject to independent third- party audits, and the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions will continue to oversee annual third- party audits of its performance metric reports for the next four years. 57 In addition, the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions are conducting regular reviews of the performance metrics, during which competing LECs may raise data reliability concerns. And, although the Georgia Commission has established a process for 52 AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 5, 41- 44, 50- 69; AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at para. 106; Birch GALA II Comments at 11- 13. 53 AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 24- 71. 54 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 18. The Department considers performance measures to be reliable if the measures are “meaningful, accurate and reproducible.” Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation at 31. In its previous comments, the Department noted a large number of software coding errors admitted to by BellSouth, and the failure of BellSouth to correct all of these errors, with some corrections introducing new coding errors into the software. The Department discussed problems with metrics concerning flow- through, trouble report rates for xDSL and line- sharing, FOC and Reject Response Completeness, Reject Interval, FOC Timeliness, LNP standalone, Completion Notice Interval, Pre- Ordering Average Response Time, and Acknowledgement Message Timeliness. Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation at 32- 33. The Department was also concerned about the validity of a number of the measures, which may not provide a meaningful depiction of BellSouth’s performance due to flaws in the definitions of some of the metrics. The Department cited the metrics concerning OSS availability, rejected orders, the flow- through rate, jeopardy notices, hot cut timeliness, hot cut outages rates, order completion interval and total service order cycle time, and trunk group performance. Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation at 35- 37. These specific comments were not mentioned in its evaluation of BellSouth’s instant application. 55 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 20. 56 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 8- 10. 57 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 11, 13; see also Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 8- 9; Georgia Commission GALA II Comment at 30- 31. 12 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 13 competitive LECs to bring concerns about data integrity to them, no competitive LEC has done so. 58 Moreover, BellSouth has provided competing carriers their carrier- specific data, and gives them access to most of the raw data it uses to calculate its metrics, in a data warehouse it calls the Performance Measurement Analysis Platform or PMAP, containing 2.5 Terabytes of data. 59 BellSouth also states it is ready to engage in data reconciliations with any requesting carrier. 60 BellSouth maintains that these extensive safeguards will ensure that BellSouth’s data will remain consistently meaningful and reliable. 61 BellSouth also points out that its data is now stable, with a low rate of repostings in recent months. 62 BellSouth has provided us with an interim status report from KPMG detailing the current status of all three of KPMG’s audits, what exceptions are outstanding on the audits, and the nature of the problems found. 63 BellSouth has also provided extensive evidence to demonstrate that the exceptions generated on its audits did not suggest a material difference on important metrics that the Commission traditionally examines. 64 58 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 14- 15; BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 46- 47; see also Georgia Commission GALA II Comment at 30- 31; Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 5. 59 BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at paras. 23- 29; BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 12. Some metrics are calculated using raw data stored in other systems. BellSouth also provides detailed information about the calculations it uses in its PMAP Raw Data Users Manual. BellSouth believes that no other ILEC provides such detailed instructions and easy access to the raw data. BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at para. 24. 60 Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President- Federal Regulatory, BellSouth Corporation, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed March 27, 2002) at 1- 2 (BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter). 61 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 17. 62 BellSouth reports that it reposted (revised published data) only 3.2% of its key measures for Georgia’s MSS reports, and only 0.43% for Louisiana’s MSS reports, for May through December. Of those revisions, only 0.53% for Georgia, and 0.05% for Louisiana, necessitated a change in the parity evaluation, using the SQM- established standard. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 18- 22. There were no repostings for the last four months of data submitted with the application, September through December. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 25. BellSouth claims this was because of greater stability of the data and the calculations. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 18- 27; BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 5- 19. Some commenters allege, however, that BellSouth has made corrections to the underlying data in PMAP but did not appropriately update its metric reports, and that some of the data in the reports is incorrect and should be restated. AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl at paras. 14- 23 and Attach. 1; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 2- 3, Exhs. 1, 2. The Department of Justice expressed concern about relying on BellSouth’s reduced number of repostings as proof that the data is reliable. Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 18- 19 and nn. 84- 85 (reduced number of restatements is encouraging, but in light of commenters allegations, the current upgrade of the PMAP, and BellSouth’s exercise of discretion in restating data, this is not proof that the problems have been resolved or that the data are accurate). Consistent with the Department of Justice’s finding, while we consider the lack of repostings encouraging, we do not rely on this evidence for our determination that BellSouth’s data is reliable and accurate, because we are unable to determine if this was due to greater stability of the data. 63 KPMG Interim Status Report. 64 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 28- 62 and Exhs. PM- 13, PM- 14, PM- 15, PM- 16, PM- 17, PM- 18, PM- 19; KPMG Interim Status Report; BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 20- 40 and Exhs. PM- 6, PM-7, PM- 8, PM- 9. 13 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 14 19. In view of the extensive third- party auditing, the internal and external data controls, the open and collaborative nature of metric workshops in Georgia and Louisiana, 65 the availability of the raw performance data, BellSouth’s readiness to engage in data reconciliations, and the oversight of the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, we are persuaded that, as a general matter, BellSouth’s performance metric data is accurate, reliable, and useful. We furthermore cannot find general allegations of problems with the reliability of BellSouth’s data provide sufficient reason to reject BellSouth’s application. BellSouth’s data has been subject to a series of audits overseen by the state commissions, and the previous audits have demonstrated that almost all of the data is reliable and accurate. 66 While the current audit has generated exceptions, the record demonstrates, through BellSouth’s analysis, the interim status report from KPMG, and the comments by the state commissions, that the problems identified have had, for the most part, only a small impact on the data presented to us. 67 We recognize that BellSouth’s data continues to be subjected to third- party audit, but we cannot as a general matter insist that all audits must be completed at the time a section 271 application is filed at the Commission. 68 Moreover, we note that the data has shown greater stability in recent months, with fewer metrics identified by BellSouth as having significant or fatal flaws. 69 BellSouth has also undertaken to settle disputes 65 Georgia Commission GALA II Comment at 30- 31; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 8- 9. We commend the extensive work undertaken by the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions for their work in developing a set of performance metrics, and for instituting and overseeing workshops and a set of audits of BellSouth’s data. We believe that the hard work of these state commissions in developing a more effective set of performance metrics, and ensuring its reliability and accuracy, will serve to establish and sustain the development of a more robustly competitive and dynamic local communications market in their states. 66 There were two exceptions remaining from audits I and II, which BellSouth demonstrated had only a minor impact on the metrics we are most concerned about. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 49- 51 and Exhs. PM-13, PM- 14, PM- 15, PM- 16, PM- 17, PM- 18, PM- 19; KPMG Interim Status Report; BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 20- 40 and Exhs. PM- 6, PM- 7, PM- 8, PM- 9. 67 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 49- 51 and Exhs. PM- 13, PM- 14, PM- 15, PM- 16, PM- 17, PM- 18, PM- 19; KPMG Interim Status Report; BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 20- 40 and Exhs. PM- 6, PM-7, PM- 8, PM- 9; Georgia Commission GALA II Comment at 28- 31; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 8- 9. 68 Doing so would impose a considerable burden on applicants, particularly where the applicants’ data is otherwise reliable. Indeed, the Commission has not required a completed audit of the data in past section 271 orders, but has said that it will give greater weight to evidence that has been audited, or has been made available to competing carriers, and for which a data reconciliation has been conducted when questions about the accuracy of the data have been raised. Texas 271 Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18377- 78, para. 57; Massachusetts 271 Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9058- 59, para. 129. The results of any completed audits will be very useful in our assessment of the reliability of the data. If an audit is underway, an interim status report from the third party conducting the audit that states how much of the audit is complete, what problems or exceptions have been found, and the nature and size of those problems, also weigh heavily in our analysis. We note that the existence of exceptions does not necessarily mean the performance data in general should be considered unreliable, if the magnitude of the discrepancies are small, or the metrics affected are not critical to our analysis. 69 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 18- 27, 63- 82; see note 62 supra. BellSouth says it has fixed problems identified in its GALA I application with the metrics FOC and Reject Completeness, Flow Through, Customer Trouble Report Rate for xDSL and line sharing, % Provisioning Troubles Within 30 Days, and FOC Timeliness and Reject Interval Timeliness. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 71. 14 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 15 concerning its reported performance metric data with competing carriers through data reconciliations, and provide carrier- specific reports to competing carriers. 70 In addition, BellSouth has made available to competing carriers and regulators most of the raw data it uses for its calculations in its data warehouse called PMAP. 71 20. For all these reasons, we find that BellSouth’s data is sufficiently reliable for purposes of conducting our section 271 analysis. 72 Consistent with the recommendation of the Department of Justice, however, where specific credible challenges have been made to the BellSouth data, particularly with respect to checklist items 1, 2 and 4, we will exercise our discretion to give that data lesser weight, and discussed more fully below, look to other evidence to conclude that BellSouth has met its obligations under section 271. 73 We note that access to complete and accurate data will be important to the Commission’s assessment of BellSouth’s future performance. As discussed below, BellSouth is required to report to the Commission all Georgia and Louisiana carrier- to- carrier performance metrics results and Performance Assurance Plan monthly reports. Failure to provide complete and accurate data to the Commission could result in enforcement action. C. Checklist Item 2 – Unbundled Network Elements 1. Pricing of Network Elements 21. Checklist item two of section 271 states that a BOC must provide “nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with sections 251( c)( 3) and 252( d)( 1)” of the Act. 74 Section 251( c)( 3) requires incumbent LECs to provide “nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 75 Section 252( d)( 1) requires that a state commission’s determination of the just and reasonable rates for network elements shall be based on the cost of providing the network elements, shall be 70 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 12; BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte at 1- 2. NewSouth says it has found BellSouth’s data to be consistent with its own data. NewSouth GALA II comments at 3- 4. 71 BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at paras. 23- 29. We note that no other BOC has made its raw data routinely available, and commend BellSouth for opening up its raw data to competing carriers and regulators. 72 We note that, our approval of this application is based upon the evidence before us, including the metric data submitted. If new evidence becomes available, such as exceptions found by KPMG as part of their audit, that demonstrate that there are significant problems with the metric data, this may have a significant impact on our evaluation of the metric evidence in future 271 applications. In addition, if such new evidence demonstrates that BellSouth is not meeting its section 271 obligations in Georgia or Louisiana, this may constitute grounds for an enforcement action under section 271( d)( 6). 73 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 20. 74 47 U. S. C. § 271( B)( ii). 75 Id. § 251( c)( 3). 15 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 16 nondiscriminatory, and may include a reasonable profit. 76 Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Commission has determined that prices for unbundled network elements (UNEs) must be based on the total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) of providing those elements. 77 22. Although the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the Commission’s pricing rules in 1996 and vacated them in 1997, 78 the U. S. Supreme Court restored the Commission’s pricing authority on January 25, 1999, and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of the merits of the challenged rules. 79 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that, while a forward- looking cost methodology is an acceptable method for determining costs, certain specific Commission pricing rules were contrary to Congressional intent. 80 The Eighth Circuit stayed the issuance of its mandate pending review by the Supreme Court. 81 The Supreme Court on May 13, 2002, upheld the Commission’s forward-looking pricing methodology in determining costs of UNEs and “reverse[ d] the Eighth Circuit’s judgment insofar as it invalidated TELRIC as a method for setting rates under the Act.” 82 Accordingly, the Commission’s rules remain in effect. 76 Id. § 252( d)( 1). 77 In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket 96- 98, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15844- 46, paras. 674- 79 (1996) (Local Competition Order) (subsequent history omitted); 47 C. F. R. §§ 51.501 et seq. See also Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98- 147, and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96- 98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912, 20974, para. 135 (1999) (Line Sharing Order), pets. for review pending sub nom. USTA, et al. v. FCC, D. C. Cir. No. 00- 1012 and consolidated cases (filed Jan. 18, 2000) (concluding that states should set the prices for line sharing as a new network element in the same manner as states set prices for other UNEs). 78 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F. 3d 753, 800, 804, 805- 06 (8th Cir. 1997). 79 AT& T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999). In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that section 201( b) “explicitly grants the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act applies.” Id. at 380. The Court determined that section 251( d) provides evidence of an express jurisdictional grant by requiring that “the Commission [shall] complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section.” Id. at 382. The pricing provisions implemented under the Commission’s rulemaking authority, according to the Court, do not inhibit the establishment of rates by the states. The Court concluded that the Commission has jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local competition under the 1996 Act, including pricing for interconnection and unbundled access, as “it is the States that will apply those standards and implement that methodology, determining the concrete result.” Id. 80 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F. 3d 744 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 531 U. S. 1124 (2001), argued October 10, 2001. 81 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96- 3321 (8th Cir. Sept. 25, 2000). 82 Verizon v. FCC, Nos. 00- 511, 00- 555, 00- 587, 00- 590, and 00- 602, 2002 WL 970643 at *22 (Sup. Ct. May 13, 2002). 16 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 17 23. This is BellSouth’s first approved 271 application, and commenters criticize many inputs of BellSouth’s various cost models for Georgia and Louisiana. Because we have not previously approved a section 271 application of BellSouth, we conduct a stand- alone analysis of BellSouth’s rates, in which we review the rates from the “bottom up” to ensure they comply with our TELRIC standards. The Commission has previously noted that different states may reach different results that are each within the range of what a reasonable application of TELRIC would produce. Accordingly, an input rejected elsewhere might be reasonable under the specific circumstances here. We will not conduct a de novo review of a state’s pricing determinations. 83 We will, however, reject an application if “basic TELRIC principles are violated or the state commission makes clear errors in factual findings on matters so substantial that the end result falls outside the range that the reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce.” 84 24. Because our review here is a stand- alone analysis, we review each issue on its own merits, rather than engaging in any benchmarking or other state comparisons. Although such benchmarking is advocated by some commenters, 85 our analysis is complete if it reveals that there are no basic TELRIC violations or clear errors on substantial factual matters, and we do not proceed further to determine TELRIC compliance on the basis of comparisons with other states, including those that have section 271 approval. To do otherwise would put the Commission in the position of establishing benchmark rates for the nation on the basis of the few states where the Commission, thus far, has found state commissions to apply TELRIC correctly. 86 We see no reason to do this as it undermines the importance of state- specific, independent analysis of rates for UNEs. The Act contemplates the states independently setting rates based on federally established guidelines. It is important to recognize both that costs may vary between states and that state commissions may reach different reasonable decisions on matters in dispute while correctly applying TELRIC principles. 25. As we have previously recognized, separate, reasonable applications of TELRIC principles can produce a range of rates. It would be inappropriate for us to reject an application that relied on rates that reflected a reasonable application of TELRIC principles merely because that application was filed after we had approved a separate application based on rates at a lower point in the TELRIC range. Thus, we use our benchmarking test based on the USF cost model only in the event we find that there may be clear error with a state’s application of TELRIC. Benchmarking is used for the limited purpose of providing confidence that a rate, despite its potential TELRIC errors, falls within the range that a reasonable application of TELRIC would 83 Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Record at 17453, para. 55 (citations omitted). See also Sprint v. FCC, 274 F. 3d at 556 (“ When the Commission adjudicates § 271 applications, it does not – and cannot – conduct de novo review of state rate- setting determinations. Instead, it makes a general assessment of compliance with TELRIC principles.”). 84 Id. 85 E. g., ASCENT GALA II Comments at 2- 5; CompTel GALA I Comments at 10- 17. 86 The Commission has found, for example, that the New York, Texas and Kansas Commissions have applied TELRIC correctly for recurring UNE charges. 17 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 18 produce. We do not, however, regard failure to meet a benchmark, by itself, as evidence that a state commission failed to reasonably apply TELRIC in setting UNE rates. 87 26. Commenters also attack various rates by comparing them to similar rates in other states. 88 We are not persuaded by the commenters’ comparative analyses. Commenters generally do not show why any particular alleged comparison is appropriate or relevant. Some commenters also compare dissimilar rate elements and do not explain their key economic assumptions. 89 Without a basis to weigh such comparisons to account for the differences between states and the fact that state commissions can reasonably reach different conclusions on disputed issues, such comparisons are not useful. Accordingly, we find the comparisons asserted by commenters in this proceeding do not establish that the relevant state commissions have committed clear error. 27. In this section, we first summarize the analyses and conclusions reached during the several different cost dockets of the Louisiana and Georgia commissions. We then turn to the commenters’ challenges to BellSouth’s pricing. In general, the commenters criticize BellSouth’s loop rates, cost model inputs, switching rates, and Daily Usage File (DUF) rates. 90 With regard to loop rates, commenters argue that the rates would be lower if BellSouth used 100 percent Integrated Digital Loop Carrier technology and did not base its loop model or loading factors on an embedded network. 91 With regard to cost model inputs, commenters argue that BellSouth’s fill factors and productivity rates are too low, cost of capital is too high, drop lengths are too long, and inflation is double- counted. 92 With regard to switching rates, commenters claim that BellSouth should not have used a meld of new and growth switch discounts in its cost model and that its switching rates are not TELRIC because new, lower rates have been proposed in Georgia. 93 Finally, commenters attack BellSouth's DUF rates in Georgia based on the inputs used in the cost study and assert that section 271 approval in Georgia should be conditioned on adopting, on an interim basis subject to true- up, the lower DUF and non- loop rates now proposed in the ongoing state proceeding. 94 87 We note, however, that both Georgia’s and Louisiana’s loop and non- loop rates compare favorably with current New York rates when benchmarked using our universal service cost model that takes into account cost differences between states. 88 E. g., ASCENT GALA II Comments at 2- 5; CompTel GALA I Comments at 10- 17. 89 E. g., AT& T GALA II Comments at 45. 90 E. g., AT& T GALA I Reply at 32- 43; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 54- 60. 91 Id. 92 E. g., ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6; AT& T GALA I Comments at 48- 62; AT& T GALA I Comments, Ex. A, Declaration of Michael Baranowski at para. 9 (AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl.). 93 AT& T GALA I Comments at 48- 53. 94 AT& T GALA II Reply 43- 45. 18 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 19 28. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that BellSouth UNE rates in Georgia and Louisiana are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, and are based on cost plus a reasonable profit as required by section 252( d)( 1). 95 Thus, BellSouth UNE rates in Georgia and Louisiana satisfy checklist item two. a. Background (i) Pricing Proceedings before the Georgia Commission 29. The Georgia Commission set UNE rates over the course of three proceedings. Following a hearing process that lasted about one year, the Georgia Commission on December 16, 1997, established rates for individual network elements and interconnection services. 96 The Georgia Commission had previously approved a presumption that prices should be based upon TELRIC as a forward- looking methodology. 97 It adopted BellSouth’s cost model after ordering a modification to prevent unbundled loop and port rates from reflecting “historical, embedded- cost prices” and making other adjustments to assumptions that BellSouth used to promote forward-looking pricing and competition. 98 In rejecting the Hatfield cost model sponsored by AT& T and MCI, the Georgia Commission noted “that the choice of inputs has more impact on the results than the choice of model,” and concluded “that the end result of cost- based rates is ultimately more important than strict adherence to a particular methodology.” 99 95 See infra Appendix D, section IV. B. 3. 96 BellSouth GALA I Application App. G, Vol. 7, Tab 20, Docket No. 7061- U (Georgia Commission’s Review of Cost Studies, Methodologies, and Cost- Based Rates for Interconnection and Unbundling of BellSouth Telecommunications Services (Dec. 16, 1997) (Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order); see also Georgia Commission Comments at 11 (stating the Georgia Commission initiated this case in 1997, and it included several pre- hearing conferences and informal workshops to review various cost models presented by the parties numerous data requests, and fifteen intervenors participated in the five- day hearing. “The setting of these rates concludes a substantial leg of the journey toward full competition in the telecommunications marketplace in Georgia.”) (citing Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 3)). 97 See Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 20 (citing orders in Dockets No. 6415- U/ 6537- U on September 18, 1996 and in Docket No. 7061- U on December 6, 1996). 98 Id. at 5, 11, 20 (stating that the Georgia Commission disallowed BellSouth’s proposed Residual Recovery Requirement (RRR) because it “would run counter to the goal of moving Georgia’s telecommunications market toward competition, and would contravene the directive of the 1996 Act. . . . BellSouth’s proposed RRR would fluctuate in amount, depending upon the forward- looking TELRIC calculation, and simply adds to the TELRIC costs the amount that would result in full recovery of historical, embedded costs.”). The Georgia Commission also modified cost of capital, depreciation, fill factors, and shared costs for labor rates. Id. at 26, 29, 33, 53. 99 Id. at 17. 19 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 20 30. On February 1, 2000, the Georgia Commission established rates for the combinations of UNEs, including those commonly used in the UNE- platform. 100 As part of its analysis in adopting a cost methodology, the Georgia Commission found the Hatfield model sponsored by AT& T and MCI was not reliable for computing cost- based rates, and “that the costs generated by the BellSouth models, with the proper modifications and inputs, best reflect the forward- looking costs of UNE Combinations.” 101 The state commission noted, as it had in the UNE Rate Order, that after it reviewed the costs produced by the various models using different sets of inputs, it believed “the decisions most affecting the costs generated are the inputs and adjustments used, rather than the choice of the basic model itself.” 102 The Georgia Commission stated that regardless of which model it selected, it “would need to adjust the model and modify the inputs.” 103 Many of the model inputs that the Commission ordered in the previous UNE rate proceeding were incorporated into BellSouth’s new model and cost studies. 104 In addition, the Georgia Commission made other adjustments, which included changes related to Digital Loop Carrier and related technology. 105 31. On June 11, 2001, the Georgia Commission decided issues that included rates for xDSL facilities, after, as in past hearings, conducting workshops which included competitive LECs and requiring comprehensive work papers and documents that explained the basis for BellSouth’s study assumptions, inputs and underlying analysis. 106 The state commission approved a settlement agreement on some issues. It also evaluated disputes regarding BellSouth’s cost studies, reducing some rates and also setting interim rates that it will revisit in a 100 See BellSouth GALA I Application App. I, Vol. 6a, Tab 7, Docket No. 10692- U (Georgia Commission’s Generic Proceeding to Establish Long- Term Pricing Policies for Unbundled Network Elements (Feb. 1, 2000)) (Georgia Commission UNE- platform Order). 101 Id. at 15- 16. 102 Id. at 16. 103 Id. (“ The [Georgia] Commission has selected to use the BellSouth model and has made adjustments which reduce the costs generated by that model. However, even if the [Georgia] Commission were to choose the HAI model, it could not do so without modifications. It appears that after all the necessary adjustments were made, the costs ultimately produced by either model would be very similar.”) 104 Id. at 18. 105 Id. at 19. The Georgia Commission adjusted the model so that 98 percent of digital loop carrier (DLC) loops were served by integrated DLC, as opposed to the 49 percent proposed by BellSouth, which would result in a $ .71 decrease to the 2- wire loop/ port UNE combination price. 106 See BellSouth GALA I Application App. K, Vol. 5, Tab 11, Docket No. 11900- U (Georgia Commission’s Investigation of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ’s Provision of Unbundled Network Elements for the xDSL Service Providers (June 11, 2001)) at 2 (Georgia Commission UNE xDSL Order). 20 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 21 generic pricing docket now pending. 107 Hearings in this proceeding are scheduled to set new cost- based rates for UNEs, UNE combinations and interconnection. (ii) Pricing Proceedings before the Louisiana Commission 32. The Louisiana Commission set rates for interconnection and UNEs in two cost dockets. 108 In its 1997 costing order in Docket U- 22022/ 22093- A, the Louisiana Commission adopted nine specific TELRIC costing principles. 109 In the 2001 order presently before us in Docket U- 24714- A, the Louisiana Commission applied the same TELRIC costing principles. 110 33. On April 23- 27, 2001, the Louisiana Commission held hearings on the merits of BellSouth’s proposed new UNE rates. 111 BellSouth conducted new cost studies in support of the proposed new UNE rates and UNE combinations. 112 The testimony and cross examination of 21 witnesses were received into evidence. 113 BellSouth, the parties, and the staff of the Louisiana Commission filed post- hearing briefs on June 25, 2001. 114 The Louisiana Commission itself presented the expert testimony and economic analysis of its consultant Kimberly Dismukes. 115 Ms. Dismukes affirmed that, in evaluating the reasonableness of BellSouth’s BSTLM 116 cost model, she relied on the same nine TELRIC costing principles that the Louisiana Commission 107 Id.; see also Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 19 (citing Georgia Commission’s Generic Proceeding to Review Cost Studies, Methodologies, Pricing Policies and Cost Based Rates for Interconnection and Unbundling of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ’s Network). The Georgia Commission established a Procedural and Scheduling Order on August 21, 2001, which included a technical workshop. 108 BellSouth GALA I Application App. F- Louisiana, Vol. 9 Tab 40, Docket No. U- 24714- A at 3- 5 (In Re: Final Deaveraging of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., UNE Rates pursuant to FCC CC 96- 45 9th Report and Order on 18 th Order on Reconsideration released 11/ 2/ 99 to be established and submitted for the December Louisiana Public Service Commission Business and Executive Session. August 4, 2000 republished to include: consideration of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ’s new cost studies to establish rates for unbundled network elements and network element combinations . . . as well as geographically deaveraged rates for certain unbundled network elements and combinations, Order Number U- 24714 (Subdocket A), (September 21, 2001) (Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order). 109 Id. at 4. 110 Id. at 3- 5. 111 Id. at 2. 112 Id. at 1- 2. 113 Id. at 2. 114 Id. at 2- 3. 115 BellSouth GALA I Application App. F- Louisiana, Vol. 9 Tab 38, Docket No. U- 24714- A, at 2 (Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief). 116 “BSTLM” stands for “BellSouth Telecommunications Loop Model.” Id. at n. 2; Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 5. 21 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 22 had adopted in Docket U- 22022/ 22093- A. 117 In several instances, Ms. Dismukes recommended (and the Louisiana Commission ultimately adopted) loop assumptions, rates, and charges that were lower (or more favorable to the competitive LECs) than those BellSouth proposed. 118 34. The final recommendation of the Louisiana Commission staff was filed on August 31, 2001. 119 After reviewing all of the post- hearing briefs, an administrative law judge filed a proposed order on September 10, 2001 that was considered and adopted, as amended, by the Louisiana Commission at its September 19, 2001 meeting. 120 On September 21, 2001, the Louisiana Commission issued an order in Docket U- 24714- A that set new TELRIC rates for UNEs and UNE combinations and also established final deaveraged rates. 121 In its September 21, 2001 order, the Louisiana Commission noted that only BellSouth developed cost models to establish rates for UNEs and UNE combinations. 122 Although parties raised concerns about BellSouth’s cost models, they did not object to the proper use of BellSouth’s cost models to set rates in Louisiana. 123 b. Loop Rate Issues 35. Commenters criticize BellSouth’s UNE loop rates as being inflated due to numerous purported TELRIC violations related to the use of loop sampling methodology, loop modeling, Universal Digital Loop Carrier and Integrated Digital Loop Carrier, loading factors, fill factors, and other loop rate inputs. 124 We address each of these issues below. (i) Loop Sampling 36. Georgia Loop Sampling. Commenters argue that Georgia’s loop rates are not consistent with TELRIC because BellSouth’s cost models relied on loop sampling methodology 117 Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 2. 118 Id. at 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 16. 119 BellSouth GALA I Application App. C- Louisiana, Vol. 6 Tab 22, Docket No. U- 22252- E, at 116 (In re: Consideration and Review of Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. ’s Preapplication Compliance With Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Provide a Recommendation to the Federal Communications Commission Regarding Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc. ’s Application to Provide InterLATA Services Originating In- Region) (Louisiana Commission Staff Final Recommendation). 120 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 7. 121 Id. at 1. 122 Id. at 4. 123 Id. 124 Commenters also contend that loop rates cannot be justified in comparison with other states. As discussed above, comparative analysis, without more, is not evidence that a rate is not TELRIC compliant. See supra Section III. C. 1. 22 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 23 that was based on a reproduction of BellSouth’s existing network. 125 We disagree. The Georgia Commission was not hesitant to apply adjustments to BellSouth’s cost model to ensure cost-based rates consistent with TELRIC and a forward- looking approach. 126 The evidence shows that the Georgia Commission deliberated over the loop sample methodology and corrected the omission of shorter multi- line business loops. 127 The state commission, however, did not accept AT& T’s criticism that BellSouth’s loop sample “improperly adjusted the loop characteristics to be forward- looking.” 128 While BellSouth’s loop model was based on a sample of existing loops, the record demonstrates that loops were redesigned to reflect forward- looking criteria rather than reproducing the existing network. 129 Also, the sample assumed cable routes would follow existing rights- of- way and roads that BellSouth would use today if it were to place that cable. 130 In addition, the sample size was statistically valid. 131 37. Furthermore, there is evidence that even if the cost model advocated by AT& T and WorldCom were used, and it included modifications to reflect inputs consistent with those adopted by the Georgia Commission, the loop costs and rates would have been higher than those resulting from BellSouth’s sample- based loop model. 132 The Georgia Commission, which reviewed costs generated by various models, found that decisions about inputs and adjustments used in the model have the most impact on costs, compared to the choice of the model itself. 133 TELRIC does not require the use of any specific model, as long as the model complies with TELRIC principles. The Georgia Commission rejected the Hatfield models because “there were serious problems with each version that precluded its use in establishing forward- looking costs. . . .” 134 Here, we believe that the adjustments made were reasonable, and that the Georgia 125 See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Comments at 53, 55- 59 (BellSouth utilized an “impermissible reproduction approach to compute loop costs.”); ASCENT GALA II Comments at 5 (BellSouth “employed a statistical sample of its historical network design.”) 126 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 5, 15, 17, 26, 31; see also supra Section III. C. 1. a.( i). 127 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 37. 128 Id. at 35. 129 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at 4- 6 (stating loops were redesigned to reflect placement of digital loop carrier systems and fiber feeder, bridge tap length reduction and cable gauge changes). 130 Id. at 5. 131 BellSouth Caldwell GALA I Reply Aff. at 5. Expert testimony by a statistician, Ellis Smith, supported the 400 loop sample in Docket 7061- U (“[ A] point is reached with sample sizes where increasing the sample size simply does not add significantly to the accuracy of the answer in a manner that is cost and time efficient.”) 132 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at 6; see also BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Aff. at 25; BellSouth Jamshed K. Madan and Michael D. Dirmeier, Georgetown Consulting Group, Aff. at 1- 17; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 63. 133 See supra Section III. C. 1. a.( i). 134 Georgia Commission Reply at 29 (citing problems with versions of the model used in Docket 7061- U and Docket 10692); see also Georgia Commission UNE- platform Order at 15- 16 (stating “while some of the principles (continued….) 23 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 24 Commission reasonably considered and rejected the model proposed by AT& T and WorldCom. For the foregoing reasons, AT& T and WorldCom have failed to persuade us that either of these decisions constitutes clear error or otherwise show that the Georgia Commission’s analysis was not forward looking. (ii) Loop Modeling 38. Louisiana Loop Modeling. The way BellSouth prices its UNEs is different from methods used by other BOCs that we have evaluated in previous section 271 proceedings. It separately determines prices for loops and ports on a stand- alone basis and loops and ports in combination. Because more efficient technology can be employed for the loop- port combination, this results in a higher price for a stand- alone loop and port, and a lower- priced UNE loop- port combination (UNE- platform). We have no objections to this pricing methodology even though other states may use different approaches in which they derive an average price for both. Different pricing methodologies may be used in light of the different technologies that may be employed for a stand- alone loop and port or UNE loop- port-combination. 39. In Louisiana Docket U- 24714- A, BellSouth developed a new cost model for loop investment, called the BellSouth Telecommunications Loop Model, that replaced the loop sample approach. 135 The Louisiana Commission approved BellSouth’s proposal to use five different network scenarios for costing UNEs and UNE combinations. 136 As a result of this costing methodology, BellSouth uses UDLC for stand- alone loops, and thus the price of a loop and port, when purchased as individual elements, is more than a UNE loop/ port combination, which uses IDLC. 137 40. The Southeastern Competitive Carriers Association (SECCA) unsuccessfully argued that only the “Combo Scenario” should be used in developing all UNE loop and combination costs. 138 The Louisiana Commission investigated this issue extensively and found that modeling the cost under only the “Combo Scenario” understated BellSouth’s cost of provisioning stand- alone loops and ports, and that the use of multiple scenarios is reasonable and (Continued from previous page) used in constructing the Hatfield model are useful to consider in evaluating and in making adjustments to BellSouth’s model, the Hatfield model itself has not been demonstrated to be a reliable method for computing the cost- based rates”). 135 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Aff. at para. 61 136 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 8. 137 See infra Section III. C. 1. b.( iii). There is evidence in the record that UDLC is generally less efficient than IDLC, but there are additional costs that make IDLC an inefficient technology for unbundled loops. Id.; see also Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 4. 138 Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 4. 24 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 25 consistent with TELRIC. 139 Based on the record, we believe the Louisiana Commission’s findings here are supported by the evidence. 140 41. The evidence before the Louisiana Commission indicated that using only one scenario would lead to under- recovery of BellSouth’s costs. For instance, the conclusion of the Louisiana Commission staff, reflected in the Louisiana Commission’s decision, was that if BellSouth relied only on the “Combo Scenario,” it would not recover costs unique to providing stand- alone UNE loops or the cost of copper loops greater than 12,000 feet. 141 In addition, we reject commenters’ criticism that the multiple scenario approach means that BellSouth’s cost model does not capture economies of scope inherent in the network. 142 We agree with BellSouth that because it considers the entire quantity of lines in each scenario, its methodology reflects economy of scope. 143 42. In accepting the staff’s conclusion, the Louisiana Commission found that BellSouth’s methodology “is the most reasonable and accurate approach put forth in this proceeding for costing the UNEs and UNE combinations sought by competitive LECs in Louisiana.” 144 We believe the Louisiana Commission’s findings here are reasonable. We find that commenters have not presented evidence sufficient to show that the Louisiana Commission erred in its decision or to overcome the current evidence BellSouth has presented as to why the 139 Id. at 2- 4. 140 We also reject commenters’ assertions here that Louisiana loop rates are not consistent with TELRIC because BellSouth’s proposal improperly used multiple scenarios to model loop costs for different kinds of loops. WorldCom GALA I Frentrup Decl. at para. 3; ASCENT GALA II Comments at 5. 141 Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 4. “[ T] he Combo scenario assumes that all loops will be provided on fiber- based DLC systems directly integrated into BellSouth’s switch at the central office. However, voice grade unbundled loops, by definition, must terminate on the Main Distribution Frame. The costs for this conversion and the MDF termination are not included in the Combo run. Consequently, the cost under the Combo only scenario understates the true cost of provisioning these UNEs. In addition, the Combo scenario assumes that all loops greater than 12,000 feet from the wire center are served on fiber- fed DLC systems, which means that the Combo scenario only develops costs for copper loops less than 12,000 feet.” Id. 142 E. g., WorldCom GALA II Reply at 41. The ALJ did not accept arguments by intervenors, including SECCA, WorldCom and Covad, against the use of different network scenarios in loop modeling, including the contention that different scenarios preclude capturing economies of scale, similar to the assertion WorldCom makes here. The ALJ concluded that the use of five scenarios “is the most reasonable and accurate approach” that was proposed. In Re: Final Deaveraging of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., UNE Rates pursuant to FCC CC 96- 45 9th Report and Order on 18 th Order on Reconsideration released 11/ 2/ 99 to be established and submitted for the December Louisiana Public Service Commission Business and Executive Session. August 4, 2000 republished to include: consideration of BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. ’s new cost studies to establish rates for unbundled network elements and network element combinations . . . as well as geographically deaveraged rates for certain unbundled network elements and combinations, Recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge, Docket Number U- 24714 (Subdocket A) at 16- 18 (September 21, 2001) (Louisiana Commission ALJ Recommendation). 143 BellSouth GALA II Reply at 54. 144 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 8. 25 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 26 use of multiple scenarios is appropriate. Moreover, we have never held that an appropriate application of TELRIC precludes such an approach. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the Louisiana Commission committed any clear error in adopting it. (iii) Use of Universal Digital Loop Carrier and Integrated Digital Loop Carrier Technologies 43. Background. Loop cable can be either copper or fiber. Digital loop carrier (DLC) uses fiber cable to digitally encode and multiplex (combine) subscriber loop channels into DS1 or higher signals for more efficient transmission or extended range than copper cable. 145 With DLC, analog signals, carried from the customer’s premises to a remote terminal, are converted to digital signals, multiplexed with other signals, and transported to the LEC central office. 146 The two traditional DLC systems are Universal Digital Loop Carrier (UDLC) and Integrated Digital Loop Carrier (IDLC). 147 UDLC, the older version of DLC technology, is not directly integrated into the switch. 148 Digital signals must be routed through a central office terminal and converted back to analog signals before reaching the central office switch. 149 UDLC technology is therefore capable of interfacing with any analog or digital central office switch. 150 IDLC, on the other hand, eliminates the need for this digital- to- analog signal conversion and the demultiplexing (separating) of loop circuits before the signal reaches the switch. 151 This is because IDLC technology establishes a direct, digital interface to a digital central office switch. 152 IDLC therefore allows a carrier to multiplex and demultiplex traffic at a remote concentration point, or remote terminal, and to deliver the combined traffic directly into the switch, without first separating the traffic from the individual lines. 153 As a result, IDLC technology can only operate with a digital switch. 154 145 In the Matter of Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98- 147, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 24011, 24110, para. 212 (1998) (Advanced Services Order). 146 Id. 147 Id. 148 Id. 149 Id. 150 Id. 151 Id. 152 Id. 153 In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96- 98, Third Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3696, 3793, para. 217 (1999) (UNE Remand Order). 154 Wireline Services Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 24110, para. 212. 26 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 27 44. The Georgia and Louisiana Commissions reviewed and adopted a BellSouth cost model that used UDLC as the input for pricing stand- alone loops and a mix of IDLC and UDLC as pricing inputs for UNE combination loops. The state commissions accepted BellSouth’s assumption that it deployed IDLC for the loop- port combinations, which is how BellSouth expects to serve its existing customer base. 155 The state commissions also accepted BellSouth’s assumption that it did not use IDLC in pricing any stand- alone loops that a competitive LEC might purchase. 156 45. Specifically, in Georgia Docket 10692- U, the proceeding setting loop rates for the UNE- platform combination, the Georgia Commission ordered that BellSouth’s cost studies “reflect 98 percent IDLC [for DLC systems].” 157 The Georgia Commission rejected AT& T’s and WorldCom’s argument that 100 percent of DLC loops should be IDLC. 158 In Georgia’s 1997 cost docket (Docket 7061- U), the issue of BellSouth’s use of UDLC in setting the rates for stand- alone loops did not arise. 46. The Louisiana Commission, in Docket U- 24714- A, only indirectly considered the IDLC/ UDLC issue as part of a commenter’s general challenge to BellSouth’s use of different scenarios in its BSTLM cost model. 159 The commenter argued that BellSouth should be required to use only the so- called “Combination Scenario” to calculate all two- wire analog voice grade UNE stand alone loop and combination loop costs. 160 The Combination Scenario is used to develop material investment costs for loops offered in combination with other unbundled network elements, 161 and it assumes 100 percent IDLC for switched services. 162 BellSouth stated that using only the Combination Scenario in the BSTLM would understate costs associated with unbundled loops or copper- only loops. 163 As reflected in the September 21, 2001 order, the 155 BellSouth GALA I Application Reply Appendix, Vol. 1, Tab C, Reply Affidavit of D. Daonne Caldwell at para. 55 (BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff.). 156 See AT& T GALA I Comments at 54. 157 Georgia Commission UNE- platform Order at 19. 158 Id. 159 Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 3- 5. 160 Id. at 4; BellSouth GALA I Application, Appendix A, Vol. 2, Tab D, Affidavit of D. Daonne Caldwell at paras. 73,75 (BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Aff.). 161 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Aff. at para. 66. 162 Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 3. 163 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Aff. at para. 73. BellSouth states that the Combination Scenario does not include the costs of converting an unbundled loop from IDLC to UDLC. Id. IDLC systems are integrated directly with a digital switch; they do not terminate on the main distribution frame. Under these circumstances, when a competitive LEC purchases a stand- alone unbundled loop, without unbundled switching, the loop must be removed from the carrier system, converted to voice grade and terminated on the main distribution frame. 27 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 28 Louisiana Commission accepted BellSouth’s arguments concerning the Combination Scenario and thus the deployment of UDLC and IDLC for unbundled loops. 164 47. Because, as commenters argue, UDLC is generally less efficient than IDLC and because BellSouth uses UDLC for stand- alone loops, 165 BellSouth’s price for a stand- alone loop is higher than that for a UNE combination loop. In Georgia, for example, the price of a loop and port, when purchased as individual elements, averages $18.36. 166 By contrast, BellSouth’s UNE loop/ port combination in Georgia costs $14.34. In Louisiana, the price of a loop and a port, when purchased as individual elements, is $18.82, 167 and a UNE loop/ port combination is $17.63. 48. Discussion. AT& T and WorldCom challenge both state commissions’ acceptance of BellSouth’s assumption of 100 percent UDLC in setting the prices for stand- alone loops. 168 The commenters claim that UDLC is not forward- looking and therefore does not comply with TELRIC. 169 The commenters generally argue that the prices for stand- alone loops and ports would decrease if BellSouth used only IDLC to price these elements. 170 49. We note at the outset that no commenter challenged BellSouth’s use of UDLC in setting rates for stand- alone loops in Georgia Docket 7061- U and that, in Louisiana Docket U-24714- A, the issue was raised only through a challenge to the BellSouth cost model. Previously we have explained that our role in considering a section 271 application is to review the record in the state UNE rate proceeding to determine whether the state commission correctly applied TELRIC principles in adopting UNE rates and made no clear error which causes the rates to fall outside a reasonable TELRIC range. 171 As we have previously stated, we cannot conduct a de novo rate proceeding in a section 271 review. 172 While we are not requiring parties to raise all pricing issues at the state level before raising them in a section 271 proceeding, we note that it is 164 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 8, 10. 165 Id. 166 The individual prices for the sub- elements are as follows: loop -- $16.51 (statewide average based on BellSouth’s Sept. 24, 2001 SGAT); port -- $1.85. 167 The individual prices for the subelements are as follows: loop $17.30 (statewide weighted average rate); port -- $1.52. 168 AT& T GALA I Comments at 54- 55; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 55- 56. 169 AT& T GALA I Comments at 53- 54; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 55- 56. 170 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 40- 42. 171 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244, aff’d, AT& T v. FCC, 220 F. 3d at 615- 16. SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6266, para. 59, aff’d, Sprint v. FCC, 274 F. 3d at 556; Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17453, para. 55. 172 Id. 28 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 29 both impracticable and inappropriate for us to make many of the fact- specific findings the parties request concerning IDLC and UDLC. 173 In any event, commenters have failed to demonstrate that either state commission committed clear error regarding this issue. 174 50. Specifically, no commenter provides any cost analysis to show that IDLC is less expensive than UDLC for stand- alone loops and ports, and we are not persuaded, based on the record before us, that a correct application of TELRIC would require 100 percent use of such technology for that purpose. 175 Commenters did not present persuasive evidence that the use of IDLC would be cheaper for pricing stand- alone loops and ports. Indeed, there is some evidence that technical limitations associated with unbundling a stand- alone loop from an IDLC system may make IDLC more expensive than UDLC in some circumstances. In the UNE Remand Order, for example, the Commission specifically discussed this difficulty of using IDLC in conjunction with stand- alone loops and ports. 176 Several technical alternatives for using IDLC were reviewed in that context, including “side door grooming” (i. e., “hairpinning”), multiple switch hosting, integrated network architecture, and digital cross connect grooming. 177 The Commission stated that some of these options are “very expensive.” 178 The Commission also concluded that each option has limitations and that “such methods have not proven practicable.” 179 Thus, not only have commenters failed to offer persuasive evidence, but prior Commission orders have recognized that at least certain IDLC alternatives would likely be more expensive. Therefore, we find no error, on the present record, in either state commission’s approval of BellSouth’s employment of UDLC for stand- alone loops. 180 173 See SWBT Missouri/ Arkansas Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 20754- 55, para. 73. 174 Of course, if we note a patent TELRIC error in the course of a section 271 review, we will not ignore it simply because it was not raised before the state commission. 175 The Georgia and Louisiana Commissions made decisions to price stand- alone and UNE- platform loops separately using the lowest cost technology for each. Other states have not distinguished between stand- alone and UNE- platform loops, and we do not require it; see also infra n. 163 176 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3793- 94, para. 217 nn. 417- 18. 177 Each of these options is described in further detail in the UNE Remand Order. Id. at para. 217 n. 417. 178 Id. 179 Id. at para. 217 n. 418. 180 Commenters' related argument is that BellSouth's prices for stand- alone loops would decrease if BellSouth were required to use 100 percent GR- 303 technology. See AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at paras. 21- 22; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 40- 42. This contention merely re- casts the UDLC/ IDLC argument in different technical terms. GR- 303 technology is not compatible with UDLC. Because we conclude that BellSouth may use UDLC to set prices for stand- alone loops, we also dismiss commenters' argument that BellSouth must use 100 percent GR- 303 technology in pricing stand- alone loops. 29 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 30 (iv) Loading Factors 51. Georgia Loading Factors. Commenters assert that BellSouth’s UNE loop and switch rates are inflated because its cost model did not apply loading factors correctly. 181 In-plant loading factors generally are percentages of total costs for items like labor and additional materials that are added to the price of the equipment, such as the switch and copper or fiber cable, 182 allowing engineering, furnishing and installation (EF& I) costs to be taken into account. The loading factor converts material costs to installed investment costs and thus provides for recovery of EF& I costs. ASCENT and AT& T argue that BellSouth bases its loading factors on an embedded rather than forward- looking network, and double counts certain items, including drop wires and network interface devices, that are recovered through loading factors. 183 WorldCom contends that the manner in which these factors were developed is not described in BellSouth’s documentation of its cost models, and that the use of a single loading factor, or percentage, to determine costs, such as those for installation and switching, results in overstating UNE costs. 184 52. Based on the record, we conclude that the Georgia Commission made a reasonable determination of BellSouth’s loading factors that is in accordance with TELRIC principles. The Commission has held that, “while TELRIC consists of ‘methodological principles’ for setting prices, states retain flexibility to consider ‘local technological, environmental, regulatory, and economic conditions. ’ ” 185 In arriving at cost- based rates, the Georgia Commission established loading factors based on intensely factual and detailed information which may vary by cost model and by state. 186 The record indicates that the Georgia Commission accepted BellSouth’s application of forward- looking principles rather than an 181 AT& T GALA I Comments at 48; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 56. 182 Only the equipment price, itself, is used as the input to the cost model. 183 ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6; AT& T GALA I Comments at 61; AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at 5, 8 (stating that drop and NID costs are counted “[ o] nce as part of the cable material load factor and again as part of a specific cost model input to the cost study.”) “A drop is a length of cable, typically two to five pair cable, that connects the outside plant distribution facility to the customer location. The NID, or network interface device, is a small box, typically hung on the outside of the customer premises, that represents the demarcation between the telephone outside plant and the customer owned facilities.” AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at 8. 184 WorldCom GALA I Comments at 57. 185 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244 (citing Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15558- 59 para. 114). 186 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at 38- 39 (“ Each state negotiates vendor contracts independently, work content differs, and state taxes are unique. Thus, the in- plant factors may differ by state.”). WorldCom generally asserts that BellSouth loading factors vary from state to state more than could be explained by labor or other cost differences but offers insufficient support for its contention; thus, we reject this assertion. WorldCom GALA II Comments at 36. 30 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 31 embedded network approach in developing loading factors against forward- looking investment. 187 53. More recently, after reviewing commenters’ criticism in this regard, the Georgia Commission noted that in the UNE rate proceeding, “BellSouth produced evidence establishing the reasonableness of the use of these loading factors, and BellSouth’s cost studies explained in detail how these factors were developed.” 188 The state commission also considered the testimony of AT& T, but found that AT& T “did not offer any reasonable alternative to the use of BellSouth’s loading factors or propose any specific adjustments to BellSouth’s cost studies to address this issue, other than to advocate use of assumptions from the Hatfield model, which the Commission had rejected.” 189 The state commission noted that neither AT& T nor WorldCom raised any objections to BellSouth’s loading factors in the UNE- platform proceeding. 190 As we observed above, the Georgia Commission recognized the importance of making modifications to BellSouth’s cost model to ensure that the rates it established were forward looking, and in fact did so in several other instances. 191 We may reasonably assume that the Georgia Commission would have also done so for loading factors if it believed they were not forward looking. However, it did not do so. We see nothing raised by commenters here that would give us reason to challenge the Georgia Commission’s exercise of its expertise and reasoned judgment in this matter and its choice of loading factors. 54. AT& T contends that “it appears that both drop and NID costs are double- counted within BellSouth’s loop costs” – “[ o] nce as part of the cable material load factor and again as part of a specific cost model input to the cost study.” 192 BellSouth shows that certain accounts track labor- related costs of placing drop wires and the associated NIDs. 193 It also explains that the material costs associated with drop wires and NIDs are distributed among the various asset accounts. 194 In addition, it shows that the development of in- plant factors does not include 187 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at paras. 71- 72. “The in- plant factor development is based on the latest year- end data available at the time the studies are conducted. This relationship of capitalized labor, exempt material costs, and sales tax to material prices, however, is anticipated to continue in the future. Since the relationship (i. e. the in- plant factor applied against forward- looking material price) is one based upon an efficiently deployed network, the result by definition is forward- looking. Other loading factors reflect projected investments – pole, conduit, land, and building loading factors – based on anticipated additions. . . . Thus, when these [loading] factors are applied against forward- looking investments, the result projects a forward- looking investment.” Id. 188 Georgia Commission GALA I Reply at 31 (citing Docket 7061- U). 189 Id. (citing testimony of AT& T witness James Wells). 190 Id. 191 See supra Section III. C. 1. a.( i). 192 AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at para. 9. 193 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at para. 37 (additionally stating this issue was never raised in the Georgia Commission UNE proceedings). 194 Id. 31 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 32 anything already assigned to the drop and NID accounts. 195 BellSouth asserts that this demonstrates the costs of placing service drops and NIDs are not reflected in the in- plant factors. 196 We find that this response to AT& T’s assertion is reasonable and convincing, and also note that AT& T has never contested it. Accordingly, AT& T’s claim here does not support a finding of clear error by the Georgia Commission. 55. We also are not persuaded by WorldCom’s contention that BellSouth did not describe and document how it developed these factors. 197 Most currently, BellSouth in an ex parte filing either identified where the relevant description and documentation could be found in the record or provided it directly to WorldCom. 198 The evidence also shows that BellSouth documented in publicly available information how it developed loading factors, 199 and the Georgia Commission confirmed that “BellSouth’s cost studies explained in detail how these factors were developed.” 200 56. WorldCom also contends that applying the same loading factors to all sizes of equipment would have a significant impact on costs. 201 BellSouth presents evidence that switch-related in- plant factors have a small impact on total switching costs. 202 Regarding the loop, BellSouth asserts that use of the same in- plant factors may overstate or understate costs to a degree, but its factors “accurately reflect the average costs associated with installing a cable.” 203 BellSouth further argues that since loop costs are de- averaged, lower costs associated with larger 195 Id. 196 Id. 197 WorldCom GALA I Frentrup Decl. at para. 4. 198 Letters from Sean A. Lev, Counsel to BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 02- 35 (March 1, 2002 and March 14, 2002). We note that there was a problem with incomplete filed information, but BellSouth took steps to correct it. 199 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Aff. at para. 69. BellSouth provided the Georgia Commission with a detailed description of the methodology, data sources and assumptions that were used in the development of its factors in the filed cost studies. Additionally, it provided the commission with an electronic copy of the files used to develop the factors to enable users to adjust the input. 200 Georgia Commission GALA I Reply at 31. 201 WorldCom GALA II Frentrup Decl. at para. 16; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 57. “[ B] ecause BellSouth applies the same loading factors to all sizes of equipment, these factors add a great deal more total cost to areas that are served by large switches or cable sizes, i. e., primarily the more densely populated areas of the state. This difference occurs despite the fact that the cost for laying a cable or placing a switch does not vary linearly with size, e. g., it does not require twice as much expense to lay a 2400 pair cable as it does to lay a 1200 pair cable.” Id. 202 Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, BellSouth Vice President- Federal Regulatory, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission at 1- 5, CC Docket No. 02- 32 (March 26, 2002) (BellSouth March 26 ex parte letter). 203 Id. 32 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 33 cable sizes in denser areas are reflected in lower rates. 204 Moreover, WorldCom fails to establish how much of an impact its criticism would have on costs. On the basis of the record, we find BellSouth’s argument more persuasive. In any event, WorldCom does not provide sufficient evidence to support its claim, and we cannot find that the Georgia Commission committed clear error with respect to BellSouth’s use of loading factors here. 57. For similar reasons, we reject WorldCom’s claim that BellSouth’s loading factors were excessive because they cause the cost of an unbundled loop in Georgia to more than double and that a factor “over 100 percent cannot be reasonable.” 205 First, WorldCom’s general allegations do not address any violations with the kind of specificity that is required to provide sufficient evidence to support its claim. It appears to ignore that various factors in a range may be applied to different kinds of equipment regarding the loop. Second, to support its contention, WorldCom compares the loop related loading factors here to switch related loading factors we evaluated in a separate proceeding. We find this comparison is inappropriate. For example, BellSouth contends that it may be reasonable for in- plant loading for unbundled loops to exceed 100 percent since the items captured by the in- plant factors – engineering labor costs, placing and splicing costs, exempt material and sales tax -- may exceed the cost of material. 206 On the other hand, BellSouth asserts that its switching in- plant loading factor in Georgia is less than 8 percent (and in Louisiana, about 14 percent). There may be several reasons for this difference, including the labor- intensive nature of construction of outside plant facilities, the type of installation involved and the environment in which it is conducted. 207 As a result, we find WorldCom’s contention unpersuasive. 58. In sum, commenters have not presented evidence that is sufficient to show that the Georgia Commission erred in its decision or that is sufficient to support contentions they raise here with respect to loading factors. Accordingly, we conclude that BellSouth’s loading factors do not reflect clear errors in factual findings so substantial that the end result falls outside the range that a reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce. 59. Louisiana Loading Factors. Commenters assert that BellSouth’s UNE loop and switch rates are inflated in Louisiana because its cost model did not calculate loading factors correctly, based on basically the same arguments made in Georgia. 208 ASCENT and AT& T add here that BellSouth double counts inflation. 209 204 Id. 205 WorldCom GALA II Frentrup Decl at para. 15. 206 BellSouth March 26 ex parte letter at 4- 5. 207 Id. at 5. 208 AT& T GALA I Comments at 48, 60; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 56. See supra para. 51. 209 ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6; AT& T GALA I Comments at 61; AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at 5- 8 (stating that inflation is counted in the material price through loading factors and again in calculating return on investment). 33 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 34 60. Based on the record, we conclude that the Louisiana Commission made a reasonable determination of BellSouth’s loading factors that are in accordance with TELRIC principles. In the course of its proceedings, the Louisiana Commission rigorously examined BellSouth’s cost studies. The Louisiana Commission considered fact- intensive, specific information and detailed issues that may vary by cost model and state, 210 such as how loading factors were developed, as part of the process of setting rates based on TELRIC methodology. 211 Based on the ALJ’s recommendation in the Louisiana proceeding to establish rates for UNEs, the Louisiana Commission adopted “BellSouth’s ‘in- plant factor’ approach to the development of structure costs.” 212 61. AT& T and ASCENT assert that BellSouth’s loading factors reflect the cost of an embedded, rather than forward- looking, network. 213 The Louisiana Commission asserts that it already addressed these concerns. “[ I] n Docket U- 24714- A, the [Louisiana Commission] did not adopt the factors that BellSouth proposed.” 214 The state commission staff “found that BellSouth’s proposed expenses did not adequately recognize forward- looking technology and efficiencies because BellSouth relied on 1998 relationships between investment and expense.” 215 As a result, “the Staff proposed a reduction by 10% as a reasonable means of achieving the development of forward- looking, rather than historical, costs. 216 The ALJ agreed with the staff’s position which was adopted by the Louisiana Commission. 217 In addition, BellSouth contends that “since the relationship (i. e. the in- plant factor applied against forward- looking material price) is one based upon an efficiently deployed network, the result by definition is forward- 210 BellSouth March 26 ex parte letter. In- plant factors differ by state “because each state negotiates vendor replacement contracts independently, has different work content, and imposes unique state taxes.” 211 Louisiana Commission Staff Post- Hearing Brief at 10. “In- Plant Factors are account specific and are developed based on BellSouth- specific information for Louisiana. There are four types of In- Plant factors: (1) Material Loading, (2) Telco Loading, (3) Plug- in Loading, and (4) Hardwire Loading. The Material Loading is applied to a material price, the TELCO Loading to the vendor- installed investment, the Plug- in Loading to the deferrable plug- in and common plug- in material prices, and the Hardware Loading to the hardwire portion of an equipment material price.” 212 Louisiana ALJ Recommendation at 27. “BellSouth utilizes in- plant loading factors to add engineering and installation labor costs and miscellaneous equipment costs to the material price and/ or vendor installed price. The factor represents a mathematical relationship between the material prices and the additional expense; when applied, the factor converts the material price to an installed investment cost.” Id.; see also Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 9. 213 ASCENT GALA II at 6; AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at para. 6. 214 Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 11. 215 Id. 216 Id. at 12. 217 Id. (citing Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 11). 34 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 35 looking.” 218 We find the evidence is sufficient to support the Louisiana Commission’s expertise and reasoned judgment in this matter and its choice of loading factors. 62. As in Georgia, BellSouth demonstrates here that it has documented in publicly available information how it developed loading factors, 219 and that service drop and NID costs were not double- counted. 220 The Louisiana Commission considered and rejected AT& T’s contention that inflation was double- counted by finding “[ t] here are two distinct types of inflation which impact BellSouth’s costs: an inflation amount which compensates investors for the use of their funds and an inflation amount associated with the increased price of the plant item over the year.” 221 63. The Louisiana Commission specifically considered contentions similar to WorldCom’s assertion here that applying the same loading factors to all sizes of equipment would significantly impact total cost but approved BellSouth’s approach. 222 As an initial matter, we note that, like in Georgia, it is not clear from the record what the impact on costs would be as a result of WorldCom’s assertion. Like in Georgia, BellSouth asserts that its factors reflect the average costs associated with installing a cable and that switch related in- plant factors have a small impact on total switching costs. 223 The Louisiana Commission declared it was “committed to achieving accurate, forward- looking costs for each UNE” but was “not convinced, from the record in this proceeding, that an approach other than BellSouth’s ‘in- plant factor’ approach would better accomplish that goal.” 224 The Louisiana Commission notes that “[ u] nlike 218 BellSouth Caldwell GALA I Reply Aff. at paras. 71- 72. See supra n. 187. 219 Id. at 36- 37 BellSouth provided the Louisiana Commission a detailed description of the methodology, data sources and assumptions that were used in the development of its factors in the filed cost studies. Additionally, it provided the commission an electronic copy of the files used to develop the factors to enable users to adjust the input. BellSouth points out that the Louisiana Commission consultant, Kimberly Dismukes, used this information and made modifications to these factors. The Louisiana Commission also explained this information was available to parties, including WorldCom, in Docket No. U- 24714. Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 11- 12. Most currently, BellSouth filed related information in our section 271 proceeding and pointed out the location of loading factor development in the record in an ex parte filing. See Letters from Sean A. Lev, Counsel to BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 02- 35 (March 1, 2002 and March 14, 2002). 220 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at 20- 21 (explaining why there is no double- counting and additionally stating that this issue was not raised in the Louisiana UNE proceeding). 221 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 10. 222 BellSouth GALA I Application App. F- Louisiana Vol. 2 Tab 10, SECCA Wood/ Wilsky Testimony at 46- 49; 52 (stating that BellSouth’s “in- plant” factor approach distorts costs); but see Louisiana Commission ALJ Recommendation at 29 (summarizing BellSouth’s argument that “there may be some cost distortion with regard to large size cable as well as with regard to small size cable, but overall distortion is minimal.”) (concluding “[ a] t this time, we choose to adopt BellSouth’s ‘in- plant factor’ approach . . . .”); see also Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 10 and BellSouth March 26 ex parte letter. 223 BellSouth March 26 ex parte letter at 3- 5. 224 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 9. 35 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 36 WorldCom’s unsupported allegations,” BellSouth presented evidence in Docket No. U- 24714 that “the use of in- plant factors tends to understate the total cost of the installed copper under the model used to calculate UNE prices.” 225 64. For the foregoing reasons, our finding here is similar to that in Georgia. We conclude that commenters have not presented evidence that is sufficient to demonstrate that the Louisiana Commission made clear errors in these factual findings. (v) Other Inputs to Loop Rates 65. ASCENT, WorldCom, and AT& T contend that BellSouth uses non- TELRIC fill factors and other loop rate inputs in calculating its UNE loop rates in Georgia and Louisiana. 226 As a result, the commenters claim, BellSouth’s resulting loop rates violate basic TELRIC principles. We separately discuss each of the allegedly non- TELRIC inputs and conclude that, with regard to inputs, the loop models adopted in each state do not violate basic TELRIC principles. 227 66. Fill Factors. We first note that both the Louisiana and Georgia commissions considered substantial evidence concerning fill factors. 228 In general, when used as an input to the loop model, a higher fill factor results in lower rates. In Georgia Docket 7061- U, the Georgia Commission adjusted BellSouth’s loop utilization for the copper segments upward by 5 percent for a distribution fill factor of 48 percent and a copper feeder fill of 69.5 percent. 229 Fiber feeder fill was set at 74 percent. 230 225 Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 12. 226 ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 57- 59; AT& T GALA I Comments at 59- 60. 227 ASCENT also alleges that “loop installation charges in Georgia and Louisiana also exceeded comparable charges in New York, Massachusetts, Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas by upwards to more than 180 percent.” ASCENT GALA II Comments at 3. We reject this contention. ASCENT provides no support whatsoever for this allegation and does not explain how it arrived at this conclusion. Nor could we independently duplicate or verify ASCENT's figures. Moreover, as we previously stated, we cannot rely on a mere comparison of rates in other states as evidence that the rates in question are not TELRIC compliant. See supra Section III. C. 1. 228 A fill factor is the estimate of the proportion of a facility that will be used. The per unit cost associated with a particular element should take into account the total cost associated with the element divided by a reasonable projection of the actual usage. If a fill factor is set too low, the network could have considerable excess capacity, which results in increases to the per- unit cost higher than an efficient firm’s cost. If it is set too high, the network could have insufficient capacity to accommodate anticipated increases in demand. Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17454- 55, para. 58 n. 230. 229 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 33. 230 Id. 36 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 37 67. In the most recent Louisiana cost docket (U- 24714- A), the BellSouth model as approved by the Louisiana Commission contained fill rates of 41 percent for copper distribution and 74 percent for copper feeder. 231 These results, however, were generated as an output of the BSTLM cost model, itself, and consequently, are not an input to the cost model. 232 This distinction, as we discuss below, is important. 68. ASCENT alleges that BellSouth’s 48 percent and 41 percent loop fill factors for copper distribution in Georgia and Louisiana, respectively, compared with other section 271- approved states are too low, in effect, driving up rates. 233 The commenters also compare these percentages to the Synthesis Model, 234 which uses fill factors of 50- 75 percent, depending on density. 235 The commenters also claim that BellSouth’s fill factors for copper feeder and fiber feeder in Georgia (69.5 percent and 74 percent, respectively) are too low. 236 By contrast, the commenters assert, 237 the Synthesis Model uses a copper feeder fill factor of 80 percent 238 and a fiber fill factor of 100 percent. 239 69. With regard to Louisiana, no commenter challenges the actual inputs used to generate the fill factors that are a product of the BSTLM cost model. The Louisiana fill factors, as we have already noted, 240 are an output of the cost model based on BellSouth’s existing network and adjusted upward for reasonable growth. Accordingly, the fill factors are not inputs 231 Id. at para. 23. 232 The BSTLM cost model generates fill factors as a product of, not an input to, the running of the model. The inputs for the fill factors are the actual physical locations of every BellSouth line, which is termed “geocoding,” and an assumption of two lines for each residential location. See BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at para. 24. No commenter challenges any of the inputs that produced the fill factors, despite having challenged the BSTLM inputs in Louisiana Docket U- 24714- A. Id. at para. 25. 233 ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6; AT& T GALA I Comments at 59 (challenging only the Louisiana distribution fill factor). 234 E. g., WorldCom GALA I Comments at 58. 235 Federal- State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket 96- 45, Tenth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20156, 20369, App. A (1999) (Universal Service Tenth Report and Order). 236 E. g., WorldCom GALA I Comments at 58. 237 Id. 238 In fact, the Synthesis Model uses feeder fill factors ranging from 70. 0% to 82. 5%. Universal Service Tenth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20369, App. A. 239 Id. at 20247, para. 208. 240 See supra para. 67. 37 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 38 that affect the rates generated by the loop model. 241 Because no commenter argues that the inputs that generate the fill factors are flawed, we find no error with regard to Louisiana fill factors. 70. With regard to Georgia, the comparative analysis advocated by the commenters does not establish that the Georgia Commission committed clear error. The Commission has never determined that a mere comparison of fill factors between states provides persuasive evidence that the lower fill factor is incorrect. Further, as we have previously stated, inputs in the Synthesis Model are not binding on states in setting rates for UNEs. 242 We also note that the Georgia fill factors are not far off from fill factors we have approved in previous section 271 applications. 243 In this case, the Georgia Commission extensively considered state specific evidence regarding loop utilization factors before adjusting and/ or approving utilization rates. The Georgia Commission made an upward adjustment because “BellSouth’s [proposed] fill factors would result in charging the competitive LECs too much for the unused capacity in the feeder and distribution cable, which represents inappropriate cost causation and also would have an inhibiting effect on competition.” 244 Despite the fact- specific nature of these determinations, commenters fail to convince us that any errors remain with the inputs chosen by the state to establish the fill factors at issue. 71. Cost of Capital. ASCENT claims that the cost of capital (10.09 percent) approved in Louisiana is over two points higher than what BellSouth needs for equity and debt financing. 245 After considering competing evidence submitted by BellSouth and the competitive LECs, the Louisiana Commission rejected BellSouth’s proposed cost of capital of 11.25 percent and adopted a 10.09 percent cost of capital, which reflects a debt/ equity ratio of 40/ 60. 246 Louisiana determined that these ratios are appropriate because they approximate BellSouth’s actual capital structure in Louisiana. 247 ASCENT provides no evidence on what should be the optimal mix of debt and equity capital when calculating the UNE cost of capital. Moreover, a change to a company's capital structure generally would change the risk of investing in the company and therefore the company's cost of debt and equity. Thus, if the estimate of a company's capital structure is changed, then the estimates of the company's cost of debt and equity may also require changes. ASCENT did not provide any evidence on the UNE cost of 241 In the cost models we have evaluated in the past, the fill factor is an input that affects loop rates. E. g., Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9007, para. 39; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 6275- 76, para. 80. 242 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 245. 243 See generally Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3953; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd 6237; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18354. 244 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 33. 245 ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6. 246 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 8- 9. 247 Id. 38 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 39 debt and equity, given an optimal UNE capital structure. We, therefore, decline to find that ASCENT has shown that the Louisiana Commission committed clear error. 248 72. Drop Lengths. AT& T and WorldCom contend that BellSouth improperly used aerial drop lengths of 200- 250 feet and buried drop lengths of 300 feet in its cost model based on BellSouth’s embedded plant. 249 The commenters claim that the national average drop length is 73 feet and that therefore the drop length approved by the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions must be too high. 250 WorldCom adds that BellSouth’s drop lengths in Georgia implies that customers are located on two- to- three acre lots which is “patently unreasonable,” 251 and that “drop lengths used to set UNE loop rates should vary by line density” instead of being a single average length. 252 Additionally, WorldCom asserts that Georgia’s drop lengths used in setting UNE rates are longer than what the Commission found reasonable for purposes of modeling universal service costs. 253 Based on the record, we believe that the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions’ findings here are reasonable. 73. As an initial matter, the use of a national average drop length or the national defaults of the Commission’s federal universal service cost model are not dispositive in considering a section 271 application for a specific state. The Commission generally adopted nationwide, rather than company- specific, input values in the federal model. 254 For purposes of determining federal universal support amounts, the Commission found nationwide averages to be appropriate. 255 The Commission did not consider what type of input values would be appropriate 248 ASCENT also contends in a single sentence that BellSouth’s productivity factors in Georgia and Louisiana are insufficient because they “are a mere fraction of the 6.5 percent productivity factor recognized by the Commission as appropriate in the access charge context.” ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6. We reject this argument as insufficiently supported. First, the 6.5 percent reduction factor cited by ASCENT is not a productivity factor; it is a transitional mechanism. Access Charge Reform Price Cap Performance Review for Local Exchange Carriers, CC Docket Nos. 96- 262 and 94- 1, Sixth Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 12962, 13028, para. 160 (2000) (Access Charge Reform Order). We note further that the 6.5 percent figure was remanded to the Commission. See Texas Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F. 3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001). Additionally, the appropriate level of productivity reduction is a complicated, fact- specific analysis, and ASCENT has made no allegations of specific errors that were made by the Georgia or Louisiana Commissions in determining the productivity factors at issue. 249 AT& T GALA I Comments at 60; AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at para 33; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 58- 59. 250 E. g., WorldCom GALA I Comments at 58. 251 Id. at 59; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 39. 252 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 39. 253 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 39. 254 Universal Service Tenth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20172, para. 31- 32. 255 Id. at para. 32. 39 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 40 for any other purpose and has cautioned against relying on this model for other purposes, such as determining prices for unbundled network elements. 256 74. In addition, the various regions of the United States contain divergent topographical features and population densities; therefore, national data do not necessarily reflect drop lengths in Georgia or Louisiana. We note that both the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions considered this very issue in Dockets 7061- U and U- 24714- A, respectively, and that they adopted BellSouth’s proposed drop lengths. 257 Furthermore, the evidence shows that BellSouth’s drop length data came from subject matter experts and reflect drop lengths anticipated for future BellSouth provisioning. 258 This is consistent with forward- looking methodology as opposed to using average national figures that reflect embedded data. 75. BellSouth provides evidence that even though its cost model began with an average drop length to calculate statewide average loop costs in Georgia, ratios were used to de-average those costs and “caused the final de- averaged rates to reflect ‘density- specific’ drop lengths.” 259 We believe this addresses WorldCom’s concern about the need of drop lengths to vary by line density. Commenters have also attempted to quantify by how much loop rates are supposedly inflated, but provide no work papers or other supporting documentation that would enable us to understand their proposed analyses or conclusions. 260 Accordingly, we find that commenters have not presented evidence in this matter sufficient to show that the state commissions erred in their decisions. 76. Inflation. AT& T alleges that BellSouth’s Louisiana cost model may double count inflation – once in the material price through loading factors and again in the calculation of the return on investment. 261 As we have already discussed, it is not double counting for a commission to account for inflationary pressures on both the price of material goods and on the price of money itself. 262 256 Id.; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084- 85, para. 245. 257 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 37; Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 10. 258 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at para. 30 (citing BellSouth witness Gray testimony in Georgia Docket No. 7061- U). 259 Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President- Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (March 26, 2002) (“ In Georgia… zone-specific ratios from the Benchmark Cost Proxy Model (BCPM) were… applied to the statewide average loop cost in order to create de- averaged zone rates. The BCPM used internal algorithms to determine drop lengths that differ by density zone.”) In Louisiana, the BellSouth Telecommunications Loop Model produced loop costs that reflect specific drop lengths for actual customer locations for wire centers in each density zone. 260 AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at para. 34; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 39. 261 AT& T GALA I Comments at 61- 62. 262 See supra Section III. C. 1. b.( iv) (discussing inflation). 40 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 41 77. Conclusion. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions have complied with basic TELRIC principles in their orders concerning BellSouth’s fill factors and other UNE loop rate inputs. c. Switching Rate Issues 78. Georgia Switch Rates. Commenters contend that BellSouth inappropriately applied switch discounts in its model. 263 We conclude that BellSouth provides sufficient evidence to demonstrate that its switch costs are consistent with a reasonable application of TELRIC. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that commenters have not established basic TELRIC violations or clear error on substantial factual matters. We believe that the Georgia Commission exercised reasonable judgment on fact- intensive issues which may vary by state in deciding that a meld of new and growth discounts could be used as an input to the switch model. 79. As a preliminary matter, the record shows that the Georgia Commission appropriately exercised its discretion to take account of conditions in Georgia in the course of deciding switch discounts and rate design. 264 As noted previously, the Georgia Commission reviewed extensive factual records, including detailed cost studies and state specific information. 265 It also had the opportunity to hear witnesses who could be cross- examined regarding the forward- looking nature of BellSouth’s proposed cost models and rates. 266 80. We reject AT& T’s contention that BellSouth’s switch rates are inflated because BellSouth applied switch discounts to its cost model that were not forward- looking. 267 In its UNE Rate Order, the Georgia Commission noted its consideration of forward- looking pricing 263 AT& T GALA I Comments at 52. Commenters make several other allegations related to the switching rates that are addressed elsewhere. First, commenters assert that a benchmark or direct comparison with other states is appropriate here. See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Comments at 49- 50; CompTel GALA I Comments at 10- 17. Because we evaluate BellSouth’s rates on a stand- alone basis, we reject allegations that a failure to meet a benchmark or other comparison is evidence that the rates in question are not TELRIC compliant. See supra Section III. C. 1. Second, commenters contend that BellSouth has conceded that its current applicable rates are not TELRIC compliant because it has proposed lower rates in its ongoing state proceeding. See infra Section III. C. 1. d.( ii). Finally, we address other minor challenges by commenters, such as loading factors. See supra Section III. C. 1. b.( iv). We also address DUF charges separately. See infra Section III. C. 1. d.( i). 264 BellSouth GALA I Application Caldwell Aff., App. A Tab D at 36 (“ BellSouth entered detailed and specific data [in the switching cost model] for digital switches in Georgia []. Inputs included such items as: number of lines per office, number of trunks per office, CCS (hundred call seconds) per line, CCS per trunk, and vendor discount rates.”) 265 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 10; see also Georgia Commission UNE- platform Order at 4. 266 Id. 267 AT& T GALA I Comments at 52. 41 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 42 principles in adopting cost- based UNE rates. 268 AT& T presented testimony concerning how BellSouth applied discounts in its switch modeling, including information on the average price for RBOC digital switches per line. 269 BellSouth responded that AT& T’s testimony regarding such average price reflected only new switch discounts, and that growth discounts should also be taken into consideration when setting forward- looking costs. 270 The Georgia Commission adopted BellSouth’s proposed switch pricing that reflected a meld of new and growth discounts. 81. Generally, certain vendors have provided a greater discount for new switches and smaller discounts for growth or expansion of existing switches, and such discounts were only valid when an overall purchase of both new and growth equipment was made. 271 The Georgia Commission found that BellSouth’s cost model could, in a forward- looking manner, take into account specific new and growth discounts it received in contracts with vendors. 272 In reaching this conclusion, the Georgia Commission considered fact- intensive and complex information, including complicated vendor contracts. 273 82. AT& T does not present sufficient evidence here that persuades us that “any volume discounts for equipment, like switches, must be based on th[ e] assumption” that they are all “newly purchased.” 274 We have previously rejected AT& T’s argument that our Universal 268 Georgia Commission UNE Rate Order at 11. “The Commission noted in its initial Procedural and Scheduling Order that it would presume that the cost study methodology should be forward- looking, consistent with the Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (“ TELRIC”) approach previously approved by the Commission. . . .” Id. 269 AT& T Catherine E. Petzinger Rebuttal Testimony in Docket No. 7061- U at 4- 5, 13- 14. 270 BellSouth Surrebuttal Testimony of Zarakas and Caldwell in Docket No. 7061- U at 45 (stating that the cost of digital switches by AT& T’s witness “fails to state [] that this is for replacement (new) investment only. . . .nowhere does the TELRIC methodology preclude the recognition of how switch expenditures have actually been made and will continue to be made in the future. Melding of growth and replacement (new) discounts is more indicative of the cost of doing business to BellSouth. . . . Forward- looking costs cannot exclude consideration for growth expenditures which will continue in the future.”). 271 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Exhibit DDC- 2 at 1. 272 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply at 25 (stating AT& T in Georgia did not dispute “that switches are purchased with the number of lines needed to serve two or three years’ worth of demand. The switch is then grown as necessary, at regular intervals, to accommodate expected increases in demand. The growth equipment is purchased at a lower discount rate than the initial switch purchase, and considering both the higher initial discount coupled with a lower replacement discount is economically sound.”). 273 AT& T Catherine E. Petzinger Rebuttal Testimony in Docket No. 7061- U at 18 (“ Switch vendor contracts often are expressed in terms of price per line, rather than a discount off the list price. This is true for the BellSouth/ Lucent contract and means that the telephone company must interpret these complicated contracts and develop equations to compute what the SCIS/ MO discount input should be.”). SCIS/ MO refers to a program BellSouth used in its cost model known as Switching Costs Information System. 274 AT& T GALA I Reply at 52 (stating that the “correct level of switch discounts” should be based on all newly purchased switches rather than a mix of new and growth switch purchases which “understates the switch discounts that should be reflected in a forward- looking cost model.”). 42 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 43 Service Tenth Report and Order makes “recovery of the cost of ‘augmented switches, ’ which are existing switches with capacity upgrades,” a TELRIC violation. 275 We have also specifically cautioned parties from making any claims in other proceedings based on the input values adopted in the Universal Service Tenth Report and Order. 276 Furthermore, in prior section 271 applications, the Commission has taken notice that other states have concluded that costs should be recovered based on carrier vendor contracts that applied a larger discount for new switches and smaller discounts for growth. 277 Rates that are generated based on a forward- looking network should reflect the cost of purchasing a new network at a specific point in time. The state commission may reasonably take into account that there will be growth in that network in the future, and that it may not be cost- effective to acquire all of the projected need at the outset. Accordingly, the Georgia Commission adopted a meld of new and growth discounts available to BellSouth. 278 It made a state- specific, factual determination of what discounts would be available if a carrier purchased a new network at a certain point in time, with anticipated future growth. AT& T does not argue here that the specific discounts that were applied were inappropriate. Therefore, we find that AT& T is incorrect in asserting that the use of a mix of new and growth switch purchases in the cost model may never be used to determine forward- looking costs. 279 83. We also dismiss AT& T’s contention that BellSouth “has not provided any details relating either to new or growth switch equipment discounts for which it is eligible.” 280 Most recently, BellSouth in an ex parte filing identified for WorldCom where this information was located. 281 The record also shows that AT& T previously was provided with BellSouth’s switch 275 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, paras. 243- 245. 276 Universal Service Tenth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20172, para. 32; see also id. 277 Verizon Rhode Island Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 3318, para. 34; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6274, para. 77; Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9004, para. 33. 278 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Exhibit DDC- 2 at 2 (stating that to reflect the Lucent negotiated contracts, the cost model used two discounts – “one for new jobs and one that reflected a meld of new and growth jobs. The new discount was applied to equipment that would only be purchased in conjunction with a ‘new’ switch. This equipment is referred to as ‘getting started’ investments and is comprised predominately of the switch processor. All other equipment was set at the melded discount.”). 279 AT& T also argues that BellSouth states that the BellSouth model assumes the mix of new and growth discount reflects that the majority of switch related purchases are to support growth in existing switches. The BellSouth testimony quoted by AT& T addresses BellSouth’s actual purchasing practices that underlie the negotiation of its vendor contracts, not the ratio of new and growth discounts used in the model. See AT& T GALA I Comments at 52; GALA II Comments at 46 n. 39. AT& T also mistakenly relies on the Verizon Rhode Island Order for the proposition that overstating growth additions may not comply with TELRIC principles. See AT& T GALA II Comments at 46 n. 39. In the Verizon Rhode Island Order, we found that switch prices based on an assumption of 100% growth additions did not comply with TELRIC, not that switch prices must be based on an assumption of 100% new switches. Verizon Rhode Island Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 3318, para. 34. 280 AT& T GALA I Baranowski Decl. at para. 15. 281 Letter from Sean A. Lev, Counsel to BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (March 1, 2002). 43 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 44 vendor contracts, under protective restrictions, that contained those details. This information was utilized by AT& T witness Catherine E. Petzinger in developing her testimony in the state proceeding which criticized BellSouth’s switch discounts and prices. 282 Furthermore, AT& T had the opportunity to obtain information it required through data requests and discovery before the Georgia Commission. BellSouth also filed Caldwell Reply Exhibit DDC- 2 (proprietary) in its section 271 application that details BellSouth’s switch modeling and discount rates used in Georgia. 84. Louisiana Switch Rates. WorldCom contends that Louisiana’s switch usage costs are overstated and in violation of TELRIC principles because the Louisiana Commission allowed BellSouth to add costs of providing features to usage costs, even though the usage costs already included sufficient hardware and software cost to provide features. 283 On this issue, the state commission disagreed with the ALJ’s recommendation and concluded “that the features cost recognized by Staff should be incorporated into the per minute of use switching rate, thus zeroing out any stand alone features charge and increasing the switching per minute of use rate to $0.0018679.” 284 WorldCom ignores that the Louisiana Commission carefully considered this issue in the course of its decision. First, the costs added to the switch charge were those recommended by the Commission’s staff, which was about 13 percent less than the amount requested by BellSouth. 285 Second, there was considerable discussion of this issue at the Louisiana Commission’s September 19, 2001 session when the methodology of including feature costs in the minutes of use switching charges was adopted. 286 In addition, the record contained evidence that there are costs associated with features that are not recovered in the separately calculated usage rates. 287 On that basis, the Louisiana Commission found the average cost of the total switching element, including the feature element, to be just and reasonable. 288 The state commission made a fact- sensitive and state- specific determination that “[ c] ontrary to the allegations of WorldCom, there was substantial evidence in the record to support a cost 282 AT& T Petzinger Rebuttal Testimony in Docket 7061- U. 283 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 37- 38. Commenters also assert that a benchmark or direct comparison with other states is appropriate here. See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Comments at 53. Because we evaluate BellSouth’s rates on a stand- alone basis, we reject allegations that a failure to meet a benchmark or other comparison is evidence that the rates in questions are not TELRIC compliant. See supra Section III. C. 1. 284 Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 10. 285 Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 13. 286 Id. 287 Id. at 13- 14 (citing rebuttal testimony in Docket No. U- 24714 from BellSouth witness Daonne Caldwell, e. g., hardware equipment that is required to make some features function). 288 Id. 44 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 45 associated with features.” 289 We thus cannot find that the Louisiana Commission committed clear error. d. Other Pricing Issues (i) Daily Usage Files 85. Background. Consistent with prior section 271 orders, a BOC must demonstrate that it provides competing carriers with complete, accurate, and timely reports on the service usage of their customers in substantially the same time and manner that a BOC provides such information to itself. 290 This is both an OSS and a pricing issue. We will discuss the former below. 291 As a pricing matter, several commenters challenge the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions’ conclusions that BellSouth’s Daily Usage File (DUF) rates 292 comply with basic TELRIC principles. 293 They also allege that BellSouth’s DUF rates fail any analysis that compares them to other section 271- approved states. 294 86. As an initial matter, the commenters include DUF rates as part of the switching price. 295 Although carriers only purchase DUF when they purchase unbundled switching, DUF charges are separated from switching charges, and we have not included them in our earlier 289 Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 14. 290 See, e. g., SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6316- 17, para. 163; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18461, para. 210; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4075, para. 226; Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17426, para. 14 & n. 38. 291 See infra Section III. C. 2. 292 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at para 78- 81. BellSouth offers three types of DUFs in Georgia and Louisiana: the Access Daily Usage File (ADUF); the Optional Daily Usage File (ODUF); and the Enhanced Optional Daily Usage File (EODUF). ADUF provides the competitive LEC with records for billing interstate and intrastate access charges, whether the call was handled by BellSouth or an IXC. ADUF also provides records for billing reciprocal compensation charges to other local exchange carriers and IXCs for calls originating from and terminating to unbundled switch ports. 292 ADUF includes records for both originating and terminating traffic. ODUF contains information on billable transactions for resold lines, interim number portability accounts, and unbundled switch ports. For end users who are served by resold lines, interim number portability, or unbundled switch ports (including the UNE- platform), a competitive LEC can use ODUF to bill for usage events associated with calls placed by those end users (e. g., *69, operator assistance). EODUF is an enhancement to ODUF and includes usage records for local calls originating from a reseller’s flat- rated lines (BellSouth’s retail flat- rated local service offering purchased for resale). EODUF would only be necessary for a reseller that needs usage data for calls that are placed on flat- rated lines. Thus, a UNE- platform provider would typically not need to purchase EODUF and could obtain the requisite billing information from ADUF and ODUF. 293 AT& T GALA I Comments at 51; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 59- 60. 294 E. g., AT& T GALA I Comments at 51. 295 E. g., AT& T GALA I Comments, Ex. G, Declaration of Michael Lieberman at Ex. 2 (showing that Georgia switching cost of $10.89 includes DUF charge of $2.96)( AT& T GALA I Lieberman Decl.). 45 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 46 benchmark comparisons of non- loop rates among states. 296 Nor is the cost for DUF service provided by an incumbent LEC to a competitive LEC reflected in the Synthesis Model that we use to compare relative local exchange network costs. 297 We conclude that any analysis of DUF charges should be done independently. 298 87. Louisiana Proceedings. The Louisiana Commission considered DUF rates as part of the UNE cost proceeding in Docket U- 24714- A. That commission reviewed proposed recurring and non- recurring charges for each of several UNE elements. DUF charges were among these elements. Louisiana used demand estimates for DUF rates that were calculated for the 2000- 2002 time period based on information available in 2000 and submitted on March 26, 2001, before the record closed in the UNE docket. 299 In this proceeding’s final order on September 21, 2001, the Louisiana Commission adopted BellSouth DUF rates, but subsequently learned that more current demand data were available. As a result, on November 27, 2001 the state commission directed BellSouth to file an amended Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT) by December 7, 2001, proposing updated DUF rates that reflect new demand data. 300 The Louisiana Commission stated that “[ s] taff is concerned that the DUF pricing recently established by this Commission does not take into account the latest demand data for these specific UNEs (i. e., DUF rates) and that, therefore, the pricing of these UNEs may be 296 E. g., Verizon Massachusetts Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 9000- 02, paras. 23- 28; Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17456- 59, paras. 62- 67. 297 See Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17458, para. 65 n. 249 (listing costs derived from the Synthesis Model). 298 Application by Verizon New England, Inc., Bell Atlantic Communications, Inc. (d/ b/ a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance Company (d/ b/ a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), Verizon Global Networks, Inc., and Verizon Select Services, Inc., for Authorization to Provide In- Region, Inter- LATA Services in Vermont, CC Docket No. 02- 7, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 02- 118, 67 Fed. Reg. 20771, (rel. April 17, 2002) (Verizon Vermont Order). 299 Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, BellSouth Vice President- Federal Regulatory, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission at 1, CC Docket No. 01- 277 (Nov. 13, 2001) (BellSouth Nov. 13 ex parte); see also BellSouth GALA I Application App. F- Louisiana, Vol. 3 Tab 14, Docket. No. U- 24714- A, BellSouth Caldwell Rebuttal Test. at 52- 54 (Caldwell Rebuttal Test. in Docket No. U- 24714- A). BellSouth uses region- wide demand estimates in its DUF rate model. The Louisiana DUF rates reflect demand figures that were updated over the course of the Louisiana cost proceeding. BellSouth explains that, after the Louisiana docket had opened but before the hearing, it filed revised demand numbers that resulted in lower DUF rates. BellSouth states that the cost study that produced the original DUF rates was based on projected demand that reflected “rather stagnant” record numbers. Id. at 53. The actual number of records, BellSouth discovered, was higher, and BellSouth therefore filed updated demand inputs for the study period 2000- 2002. The revised demand figures resulted in lower DUF rates. It was these lower rates, which were based on BellSouth’s higher record numbers, that the Louisiana Commission adopted on September 21, 2001; see also Louisiana Commission UNE/ Deaveraged Rates Order at 1. 300 Letter from Lawrence C. St. Blanc, Secretary, Louisiana Commission, to William A. Oliver, President, BellSouth- Louisiana (Nov. 27, 2001). 46 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 47 higher than they otherwise should be.” 301 BellSouth responded by filing updated DUF rates on December 6, 2001, which are generally lower. 88. Georgia Proceedings. In Docket 10692- U, the Georgia Commission established DUF rates on February 1, 2000. BellSouth revised its SGAT on August 27, 2001, to reflect lower ADUF and ODUF rates that are presently in effect on an interim basis subject to true- up based on a final order in the new state UNE proceeding. 302 The same demand estimate for the 2000- 2002 time period submitted by BellSouth in Louisiana on March 26, 2001, was also used to update these Georgia DUF rates. 303 BellSouth’s filing on October 1, 2001, in the current UNE proceeding (Docket No. 14361- U) includes updated cost studies for all UNEs in Georgia 304 and uses a demand estimate for the 2002- 2004 time period that was calculated in September, 2001. 305 BellSouth’s proposed DUF rates in the pending proceeding are generally lower than the present interim rates in the Georgia SGAT. 306 89. Challenges to the DUF Rates. As a preliminary matter, we dismiss commenters attack on DUF rates in Louisiana because the only challenge was based on rates that existed before the most current rates were filed. The old rates are no longer relevant to our analysis, and there is no direct and independent attack on current Louisiana DUF rates. As discussed further below, we conclude that there is insufficient evidence that either the Georgia or Louisiana Commission’s approvals of BellSouth’s DUF rates violate basic TELRIC principles. 307 90. AT& T attacks the Georgia DUF cost study underlying the current DUF rates as not being TELRIC- compliant. 308 Under the circumstances presented here, we find this dispute is 301 Id. 302 BellSouth GALA I Application Reply Appendix, Vol. 2, Tab L, Joint Reply Affidavit of John A. Ruscilli and Cynthia K. Cox at paras. 24- 25 (BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff.). The SGAT rate was established by running the currently approved model with the new demand estimate. DUF rates were revised in the course of the Georgia Commission’s review of Docket 6863- U concerning BellSouth’s application to provide interLATA service in Georgia. The competitive LECs challenged the previously approved DUF rates as non- cost- based. 303 BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 24- 25 (“ These [present interim] rates were the result of increased demand that reduced certain rates.”). 304 BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 24. 305 BellSouth Nov. 13 ex parte. 306 BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 24 (explaining this is a result of updated demand volumes). 307 Some commenters rely on a mere comparison of Georgia DUF rates with those in other states. See, e. g., CompTel GALA I Comments at 15- 17. As we have noted, we cannot rely on such comparisons to accurately assess whether DUF rates fall outside a range of reasonableness. See supra Section III. C. 1. AT& T also contends that BellSouth has effectively conceded that its DUF rates in Georgia are too high and not TELRIC simply by filing new proposed DUF rates in Docket 14361- U. AT& T GALA I Comments at 51; AT& T GALA II Comments at 45. As discussed infra Section III. C. 1. d.( ii), the filing of new lower proposed rates is not evidence that currently effective rates are not TELRIC compliant. 308 AT& T GALA II Reply at 43- 45. 47 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 48 best handled by the Georgia Commission. First, AT& T’s challenges to the reasonableness of the DUF cost study were not made in the original cost proceeding. Second, as noted above, the rates in effect are interim subject to true- up with the rates that will be adopted in the ongoing cost proceeding. Third, the Georgia Commission has demonstrated a continuing commitment to implementing TELRIC principles. Accordingly, we conclude that it is appropriate under these circumstances to defer to the state commission to address AT& T’s concerns in the first instance. 91. We also reject AT& T’s assertion that BellSouth’s 271 application should be conditioned on its immediate adoption of the lower DUF rates proposed in the pending Georgia UNE docket. 309 BellSouth’s filing of interim DUF rates represents an effort to update rates with the latest information available at the time. We are satisfied that the filing of interim rates in this case meets our requirements by eliminating uncertainty. The fact that the rates are subject to a downward true- up with the state commission’s final determination gives us further confidence that competitive LECs will be compensated for any overcharges in a timely manner. 310 92. As a separate argument, CompTel argues that BellSouth’s DUF rates are not TELRIC compliant because BellSouth provides some DUF information free of charge to some independent LECs, 311 an assertion that BellSouth does not dispute. 312 BellSouth explains, however, that it exchanges usage information with both independent and competitive LECs at no charge, where the independent or competitive LEC has its own switch. Accordingly, both BellSouth and the LEC receive data from one another. By contrast, competitive LECs that use BellSouth’s local switching UNE do not generate their own usage information. Rather, they must receive their usage information from BellSouth and are thus charged for the usage information service. 313 It appears that BellSouth makes a reasonable distinction in this respect. Thus, we are not persuaded that the provision of DUF rate information as part of an exchange 309 AT& T GALA II Comments at 46. Georgia DUF rates are “[ i] nterim and subject to true- up based upon final Order in Docket No. 14361- U.” See Georgia SGAT Attach. A. 310 The Commission previously has approved a section 271 application based on interim rates. Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4090- 91, paras. 258- 60. As the Commission noted in approving Bell Atlantic’s 271 application in New York, “Uncertainty will be minimized if the interim rates are for a few isolated ancillary items, permanent rates that have been established are in compliance with our rules, and the state has made reasonable efforts to set interim rates in accordance with the Act and the Commission’s rules.” Id. at para. 258. Here, BellSouth has sought to provide assurance that “to the extent that the GPSC [Georgia Public Service Commission] orders lower rates in the current proceeding, AT& T, as well as all other CLECs, will receive the benefit of these rates retroactively.” BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Reply at 8- 9. Thus, it appears that BellSouth has minimized uncertainty by proposing lower rates and committing to refund any DUF overcharges. This consists of the difference between the interim rates and new permanent rates to be established by the Georgia Commission, and is retroactive to August 27, 2001. 311 Z- Tel GALA I Ford Aff. at para. 32. 312 BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 27. 313 Id. 48 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 49 with some LECs that have their own switches necessarily suggests that charging LECs that purchase BellSouth’s switching UNE for DUFs violates TELRIC. 93. WorldCom also argues that BellSouth should eliminate DUF charges altogether in both Louisiana and Georgia since BellSouth already recovers DUF rates in the shared and common costs that BellSouth adds to the direct costs of its other UNEs. 314 BellSouth provides evidence that the company identified and removed costs that are directly assigned in the cost studies from the development of the shared and common factors in both Georgia and Louisiana. 315 We find that this evidence addresses WorldCom’s concerns about any double-counting of DUFs. 94. Conclusion. Based on the foregoing, we therefore find that rates that BellSouth charges to provide DUFs to competitive LECs are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in compliance with checklist item 2. (ii) Effect of BellSouth’s Proposed UNE Rates on Our Analysis of BellSouth’s Existing Rates 95. BellSouth has proposed new UNE rates in Georgia in connection with a new cost docket that was initiated on October 1, 2001. Commenters contend that the new rates proposed by BellSouth represent an admission that the 1997 rates on which BellSouth bases its 271 Georgia application are outdated, not in compliance with TELRIC or checklist item 2 and should be rejected. 316 We disagree. 96. In this case, we do not believe that the existence of a new Georgia cost docket, without more, should affect our review of the currently effective rates submitted with BellSouth’s section 271 application. States review their rates periodically to reflect changes in 314 WorldCom GALA I Comments at 60. 315 BellSouth GALA I Caldwell Reply Aff. at para. 38. WorldCom apparently alleges that BellSouth is double-counting because the same expense accounts appear in both the DUF studies and in the shared and common cost factors. WorldCom GALA I Frentrup Decl. at para. 25. BellSouth, however, identified and removed costs that are directly assigned in the cost studies form the development of the shared and common factors. Caldwell GALA I Reply Aff. at 38. Specifically, file EXPPROJ00. xls, contained in the cost study filed in Louisiana, outlines the adjustments BellSouth made to remove the directly assigned costs. Id. Although the doubling- counting of DUF rates was not raised in Georgia, BellSouth made the same adjustments to its shared and common factors there as it made in Louisiana. Id. 316 E. g., ASCENT GALA II Comments at 6; AT& T GALA I Reply Comments at 33 (“ In a separate Georgia UNE pricing proceeding commenced just prior to submission of this Application, BellSouth submitted new switching rates that are 35 percent lower than those upon which it now relies. Because the rates in BellSouth’s Georgia Section 271 Application do not reflect these reduced costs, its Application fails to satisfy Checklist Item 2.”); Id. at 34 (stating that Georgia’s 271 application includes a DUF rate that when applied to AT& T would be $2.96 per line per month as opposed to the $1.40 per line per month proposed in its pending state UNE proceeding); Allegiance Telecom GALA II Comments at 1- 4 (stating because BellSouth is seeking new Georgia rates, including proposed increases, the Commission should not rely on them in its section 271 evaluation); Covad GALA II Comments at 15- 16. 49 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 50 costs and technology. 317 As a legal matter, we see nothing in the Act that requires us to consider only section 271 applications containing rates approved within a specific period of time before the filing of the application itself. Such a requirement would likely limit the ability of incumbent LECs to file their section 271 applications to specific windows of opportunity immediately after state commissions have approved new rates to ensure approval before the costs of inputs have changed. We doubt that Congress, which directed us to complete our section 271 review process within 90 days, intended to burden the incumbent LECs, the states, or the Commission with the additional delays and uncertainties that would result from such a requirement. That a cost factor has changed does not always invalidate rates that were originally set according to a TELRIC process. As the D. C. Circuit stated, “[ i] f new [cost] information automatically required rejection of section 271 applications, we cannot imagine how such applications could ever be approved in this context of rapid regulatory and technological change.” 318 97. AT& T also asserts that BellSouth’s 271 application should be conditioned on its immediate adoption of the lower non- loop rates and DUF rates that have been proposed in the pending Georgia UNE docket because they represent an improvement or may affect future benchmarking. 319 As discussed above, we find no need to condition 271 approval on different rates because the Commission has repeatedly held that the existence of a new cost proceeding is insufficient reason to find that a state’s existing rates do not satisfy TELRIC principles. 320 We decide the merits of BellSouth’s 271 application based on its present rates, and it would be arbitrary and inappropriate for the Commission to consider other rates here that have been proposed in another proceeding, especially just because rates are lower. Some of these proposed rates are lower, like the non- loop and DUF, and others are higher, like the loop, but they are all appropriately before the Georgia Commission to decide whether they constitute an improvement or require additional adjustments based on the updated cost models, data and other evidence before it. 98. Allegiance, Cbeyond and Covad also contend that BellSouth’s proposed increases for some rates affecting loops and transport in the ongoing Georgia UNE rate proceeding are unreasonably high and anti- competitive, and that therefore, BellSouth’s 271 application here should be denied. 321 While competitive LECs are concerned about the proposed increases in some of the UNE rates, 322 these proposed rates have not yet been put to the test in evidentiary 317 We note that Georgia is, in fact, revisiting BellSouth’s rates in a timely manner as contemplated by the Act. See Georgia Commission Proceedings to Open the Local Market at 133. 318 AT& T v. FCC, 220 F. 3d at 617. 319 AT& T GALA II Comments at 46- 50. 320 Verizon Rhode Island Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 3317, para. 31 (citing Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085- 86, para. 247, aff’d, AT& T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F. 3d at 617). 321 Allegiance GALA II Comments at 1- 4; Cbeyond GALA I Comments at 26; Covad GALA II Comments at 15- 16. 322 E. g., Letter from Florence M. Grasso, Covad, to William F. Caton, Jr., Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Docket No. 02- 35 (filed March 29, 2002). 50 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 51 hearings where they will face challenge by competitive LECs and the scrutiny of the Georgia Commission. The commission has been working diligently since 1995 to establish the conditions necessary to support local market entry, including its commitment to TELRIC- based pricing of UNEs. It also recognizes its “work is not done.” 323 The Georgia Commission is actively involved in overseeing BellSouth’s obligations and establishing ongoing state policies to ensure that local competition thrives in the future. 324 This provides us with added assurance that the Georgia Commission will examine BellSouth’s proposal appropriately and weigh concerns about anti- competitive conduct in continuing to set cost- based rates for UNEs in the future. Furthermore, the Commission decides the merits of a section 271 application based on its present rates. As we have previously noted, it would be inappropriate here for us to preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier disputes by state commissions which follow our rules in their disposition of those disputes. 325 Moreover, as we have pointed out in past section 271 proceedings, if “prices are not set in accordance with our rules and the Act, we retain the ability going forward to take appropriate enforcement action, including action pursuant to section 271( d)( 6).” 326 Thus, we do not consider commenters’ criticism of some proposed BellSouth UNE rates in Georgia’s pending proceeding to be relevant or ripe for our consideration here. 99. We also believe that AT& T’s concern at this point -- that future benchmarking problems may result in evaluating BellSouth’s Georgia 271 application on its present rates even though newer rates are pending in another proceeding -- is premature, speculative and misplaced. 327 It does not address whether or not the Georgia Commission followed basic TELRIC principles or whether it made errors of fact so substantial that the end result falls outside the range that a reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce. 323 Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 5 (stating it was reviewing BellSouth’s performance measures and enforcement plan and the entire Change Management process, as well as overseeing completion of the audit for BellSouth’s performance data and reexamining BellSouth prices for UNEs and interconnection services). 324 Id. 325 See, e. g., Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9102, para. 203. 326 Id. at para. 30; see 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 6). 327 AT& T also speculates that a situation like Massachusetts could repeat itself in the BellSouth region. AT& T GALA II Comments at 48- 50. In Massachusetts, Verizon’s rates were equivalent to those in New York, and Verizon in Massachusetts obtained section 271 approval based on a comparison of its Massachusetts and New York rates, even though the New York Commission was in the process of setting new rates in a state proceeding. New York recently adopted new rates, including lower switching rates, but AT& T asserts “Verizon has done nothing to correct its Massachusetts rates.” Id. at 49. As the Commission noted, New York’s action to modify its rates may undermine Verizon’s compliance with the requirements of section 271 in Massachusetts, and the Commission retains the ability to take appropriate enforcement action pursuant to section 271( d)( 6). Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9002- 03, para. 30. The Commission is currently investigating a complaint filed by WorldCom pursuant to section 271( d)( 6) about Verizon’s rates in Massachusetts. WorldCom v. Verizon New England, File No. EB- 02- MD- 017 (filed April 24, 2002). 51 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 52 100. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that BellSouth has demonstrated that its Georgia and Louisiana UNE rates satisfy the requirements of checklist item two. 328 2. Access to Operations Support Systems 101. We find, consistent with the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth provides competitive LECs nondiscriminatory access to its OSS and, thus, satisfies the requirements of checklist item 2. 329 In reaching this conclusion, we note that since its October 2001 section 271 filing, BellSouth has made a number of improvements to its systems in response to concerns raised by the Department of Justice and the Commission. a. Background 102. The Commission has defined OSS as the various systems, databases, and personnel used by incumbent LECs to provide service to their customers, 330 and consistently has found that nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of meaningful local competition. 331 Because the Commission has described its two- step analysis of OSS in previous orders, we do not repeat that analysis here. 332 We focus our discussion of BellSouth’s OSS on the major areas of contention. Specifically, we analyze BellSouth’s performance in providing access to pre- ordering, ordering, provisioning, and maintenance and repair as well as BellSouth’s change control process. Our assessment of these issues form the basis of our conclusion that BellSouth provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. Also, because BellSouth contends that its OSS systems are the same in Georgia and Louisiana, we describe the analytical roadmap we use in reviewing the regionality of BellSouth’s OSS. b. Third- Party Testing and OSS “Sameness” Audit 103. KPMG’s Independent Third- Party Testing. The Georgia Commission ordered BellSouth to conduct an independent, third- party test of the readiness of specific aspects of BellSouth’s OSS, and related interfaces, documentation, and processes supporting local market 328 AT& T also argues that BellSouth’s UNE rates in Louisiana create a price squeeze which makes them discriminatory in violation of checklist item two. AT& T GALA II Comments at 50- 60. We discuss this claim infra Section VI. A. 329 Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 3- 5; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 54; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 84. 330 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3989- 90, para. 83; Application by BellSouth Corporation, et al., Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Service in South Carolina, CC Docket No. 97- 208, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 539, 585, para. 82 (BellSouth South Carolina Order); SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18396- 97, para. 92. 331 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3900, para. 83; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653- 57, paras. 83- 90; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 547- 49, 585, paras. 14- 18, 82. 332 See, e. g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3991- 92, paras. 85- 86; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6284- 85, paras. 104- 05. 52 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 53 entry by competitive LECs. 333 Though the test was conducted in Georgia, BellSouth relies on the test to support its Louisiana application on the basis of the PricewaterhouseCoopers region- wide OSS audit discussed below. 334 Under the direction of the Georgia Commission, KPMG conducted a Master Test Plan (MTP) which focused on UNE loops, UNE switch ports, UNE- P, and combinations. The Master Test reviewed the five OSS functions, as well as normal and peak volume testing of the OSS interfaces supporting pre- ordering, ordering, and maintenance and repair functions for both resale and UNE services. 335 On January 12, 2000, the Georgia Commission ordered BellSouth to develop a Supplemental Test Plan (STP) to describe additional third- party testing of aspects of BellSouth’s OSS. The STP evaluated the Electronic Interface Change Control Process, pre- ordering, ordering and provisioning of xDSL- capable loops, pre- ordering, ordering and provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing of resale services, as well as the processes and procedures supporting collection and calculation of performance data. 336 In addition, both the application- to- application electronic data interchange (EDI) and Telecommunications Access Gateway (TAG), BellSouth’s machine- to- machine interface for pre- ordering and ordering were tested. 337 KPMG performed pre- order, order and repair transactions using BellSouth’s interfaces to evaluate functional capabilities and determine whether competing carriers receive a level of service comparable to BellSouth retail service. 338 Each test was divided into five domains, including each critical OSS function as well as Change Management. Within each domain, specific methods and procedures were applied to evaluate BellSouth’s performance vis- à- vis specific target tests. 339 To perform these transaction- driven tests, KPMG combined efforts with Hewlett Packard. 340 KPMG monitored BellSouth’s performance while creating and tracking orders, entering trouble tickets and evaluating carrier-to- carrier bills. 341 KPMG also evaluated BellSouth’s day- to- day operations and operational management practices, including change management. 342 333 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 113; BellSouth GALA I Application at 59. 334 BellSouth GALA I Application at 59. 335 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 3. 336 KPMG STP Final Report at II- 3. 337 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 5. 338 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 5. 339 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 4; KPMG STP Final Report at II- 4. 340 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 5. 341 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 5. Hewlett Packard’s role was that of Information Technology group, translating back and forth between business and electronic interface rule formats, and resolving problems with missing orders and responses. 342 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 6. 53 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 54 104. In performing these tests, KPMG adopted a military- style test standard. 343 Thus, when situations arose where testing revealed that a BellSouth process, document, or system did not meet expectation, BellSouth would formally respond by providing clarification or describing its intended fix for the problem, and KPMG would retest the process, document, or system as required. 344 Furthermore, KPMG instituted procedures to help ensure that testing mirrored the experience of a competitive LEC to the greatest extent possible. 345 105. The persuasiveness of a third- party review depends upon the conditions and scope of the review. 346 To the extent a test is limited in scope and depth, we rely on other evidence, such as actual commercial usage, to assess whether the BOC provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. Several commenters challenge the scope, objectivity and completeness of the third-party test in Georgia, and argue that the test data is of little probative value. 347 We note, however, that the Georgia Commission states that while it originally structured the third- party test as a supervised audit, the test was later expanded in response to competitive LEC concerns. 348 The Georgia Commission notes that KPMG’s functions were substantially similar to the functions performed in both New York and Massachusetts. 349 The Georgia Commission also actively directed and supervised the test, 350 and took efforts to ensure that KPMG orders did not receive preferential treatment. 351 106. Separately, we note that several commenters also oppose this application based on exceptions and observations issued by KPMG in connection with its third- party test of 343 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 6. 344 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 6. 345 KPMG MTP Final Report at II- 7. While KPMG notes that it was virtually impossible to have a truly blind test since each competitive LEC has its own unique set of identifiers, KPMG offset this lack of blindness by setting procedures so that it would not receive treatment from BellSouth that was different from that received by a real competitive LEC. 346 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659, para. 216. 347 See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Comments App. Tab K, Declaration of Sharon E. Norris at paras. 55- 79 (AT& T GALA I Norris Decl.) (arguing that BellSouth influenced the design and reported results of the test, that several key interfaces, systems and performance issues were not evaluated, and that the metrics evaluation portion of the test is not complete); Covad GALA I Comments at 5, 8 (asserting that the details of the testing were not directed by the Georgia Commission but left to KPMG and BellSouth, and citing several xDSL OSS items that were not tested); CTAG GALA I Comments at 2- 4 (stating that KPMG found OSS deficiencies in BellSouth’s systems that could have a material adverse impact on a competitive LEC’s ability to compete effectively, and noting that KPMG relied on its own expertise rather than seeking input from competitive LECs). 348 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 116. 349 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 116. 350 Georgia Commission GALA I Reply Comments at 15- 16. 351 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 124- 126. 54 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 55 BellSouth’s OSS in Florida. 352 For purposes of the instant analysis, we focus our analysis on the OSS as it functions in Georgia and Louisiana. We recognize that should the Florida test reveal a systemic problem with BellSouth’s OSS in Florida, this may inform analysis of the systems in Georgia and Louisiana. However, commenters have not provided sufficient evidence demonstrating a systemic problem with BellSouth’s OSS or why the exceptions and observations from the Florida test require us to deny BellSouth’s section 271 application. 353 In addition to failing to demonstrate the competitive significance of the issues, in several instances, commenters cite exceptions that have since been closed by the Florida Commission or amended with responses by BellSouth. 354 107. We note that we must grant the Georgia Commission wide latitude to design an appropriate OSS test since, without such latitude, preliminary objections raised in other states based on different testing methodologies could prevent BOCs from ever obtaining section 271 approval, particularly in light of the sequential nature of state testing. 355 Indeed, as the Georgia Commission points out, the third- party tests in Georgia and Florida were designed differently and may vary in certain respects. 356 If, however, the observations and exceptions opened as a result of the Florida OSS test ultimately indicate systemic OSS failures or barriers to competition, we are confident that the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions will take appropriate and immediate remedial action and we are prepared to take appropriate enforcement action under section 271( d)( 6). 108. Based on our review of the evidence in the record describing the test process, and on the assurances provided by the Georgia Commission, we find that the results of KPMG’s test in Georgia provide meaningful evidence that is relevant to our analysis of BellSouth’s OSS. We also note that BellSouth does not rely on the results of the KPMG test alone, but also relies on evidence of significant commercial usage in Georgia. 357 109. PricewaterhouseCoopers Third- Party OSS “Sameness” Audit. BellSouth engaged PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to review BellSouth’s assertions on the sameness of its OSS systems. PwC conducted an “attestation examination” of BellSouth’s assertion that: (1) the same pre- ordering and ordering OSS, processes and procedures are used to support competing 352 See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Norris Decl. at 55- 78; Covad GALA I Comments at 21. 353 See, e. g., Covad GALA II Comments at 13- 15; Covad GALA I Comments at 21, 45- 53; AT& T GALA I Norris Decl. at para. 63 & Ex. 8. 354 See BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App. A, Vol. 3, Tab O, Reply Affidavit of William N. Stacy (BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff.) at paras. 370- 74. 355 See AT& T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F. 3d 607, 617 (D. C. Cir. 2000) (AT& T v. FCC) (noting that it would be hard to imagine how section 271 applications would ever be approved if new information required the automatic rejection of such applications, particularly “in [the] context of rapid regulatory and technological change.”) 356 See Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 12. 357 See Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 12 & n. 6. 55 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 56 LEC activity across BellSouth’s nine- state region, and that (2) there are no material differences in the functionality or performance of BellSouth’s two order entry systems: Direct Order Entry (DOE) and Service Order Negotiation System (SONGS). 358 PwC concluded that, in its opinion, BellSouth’s assertions were “fairly stated, in all material respects.” 359 BellSouth notes, in particular, that PwC’s “attestation examination” found that BellSouth’s order entry systems have no material differences for service order entry by BellSouth’s Local Carrier Service Center (LCSC). 360 DOE and SONGS are two of the order entry systems used within the BellSouth LCSC to create service orders or various types of customer requests. 361 BellSouth explains that DOE is a system database used by BellSouth’s LCSC to input manual orders for orders in Georgia, while SONGS is used by the LCSC to input manual orders for orders in Louisiana. 362 PwC examined both the functionality and performance of DOE and SONGS and found no material differences between the two systems. 363 110. We conclude that BellSouth, through the PwC review and other aspects of its application, provides sufficient evidence that its electronic processes are the same in Georgia and Louisiana. 364 In conducting its review, PwC examined the consistency of applications and technical configurations used to process pre- ordering and ordering transactions region- wide, and reviewed the consistency of documentation of systems and processes in BellSouth’s local carrier service center. 365 PwC observed transactions, reviewed user guides, performed change control review, and interviewed relevant BellSouth service representatives in making its determination that BellSouth’s OSS systems for pre- ordering and ordering are identical. PwC also reviewed the consistency of Local Service Requests (LSRs) for order entry, LSR screening and validating 358 BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 8a, Tab T, Affidavit of William N. Stacy (BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff.) at Ex. OSS- 86. 359 Id. 360 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 676, 679 & Ex. OSS- 86. 361 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at Ex. OSS- 86. BellSouth provides that these systems use screens, menus and on- line access to back- end legacy systems as well as on- line editing to automatically generate common order data entries. DOE is used in the “old Southern Bell States” (GA, FL, NC, & SC) while SONGS is used in the “old South Central States” (LA, MS, TN, AL, & KY). Id. 362 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at Ex. OSS- 83. 363 BellSouth GALA I Application at 56 n. 52, 59; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at Ex. OSS- 86. 364 We note that although the Commission stated four years ago that “BellSouth’s operations support systems are essentially the same throughout the region,” we do not find this statement to be dispositive of our analysis here. See Application by BellSouth et al. Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to Provide InterLATA Services in South Carolina, CC Docket No. 97- 208, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 539 at 594, para. 90 (BellSouth South Carolina Order). Instead, we base our current findings on the more recent PwC attestation that BellSouth submits in the application before us, and our “sameness” analysis as stated in the SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order. See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6253- 55, paras. 34- 35. 365 BellSouth GALA I Application at 58. 56 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 57 procedures, and various servicing processes to conclude that there is “no material difference in functionality or performance” between DOE and SONGS. 366 In addition to PwC’s review, the record indicates that the BellSouth OSS for pre- ordering and ordering functions does not distinguish between Georgia and Louisiana. 367 111. We reject competitive LEC claims that BellSouth’s OSS are not the same in Georgia and Louisiana. 368 The record indicates that the PwC examination closely modeled the successful “Five State Regional OSS Attestation Examination” performed in the context of SWBT’s Kansas/ Oklahoma Section 271 application and BellSouth has provided detailed information regarding the “sameness” of BellSouth’s systems in Georgia and Louisiana, including their manual systems and the way in which BellSouth personnel do their jobs. 369 Accordingly, we find that BellSouth, through the PwC audit and its attestation examination, provides evidence that its OSS in Georgia are substantially the same as the OSS in Louisiana. We shall consider BellSouth’s commercial OSS performance in Georgia and the Georgia third-party test to support the Louisiana application and rely on Louisiana performance to support the Georgia application. In addition, because the OSS are the same in both states, where low volumes in one state yield inconclusive or inconsistent information concerning BellSouth’s compliance with the competitive checklist, we can examine data reflecting BellSouth’s performance in the other state. The Commission may, however, evaluate the performance in Georgia and Louisiana separately for enforcement purposes pursuant to section 271( d)( 6). c. Pre- Ordering (i) Access to Loop Qualification Information 112. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 370 that BellSouth provides competitive LECs with access to loop qualification information in a manner consistent with the requirements of the UNE Remand Order. 371 366 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at 679. 367 BellSouth GALA I Application at 54. 368 WorldCom claims, for example, that it has “suspicions that there are important back- end different system differences across BellSouth’s region” due, in part, to BellSouth’s plans to implement a single order process in only select states. WorldCom GALA I Comments at 52- 53; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 34. WorldCom also notes that orders formatted in a certain way (without an asterix as part of an address) flow through in Georgia but not Louisiana. WorldCom GALA II Comments at 34; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 88- 89. Aside from noting that BellSouth grew out of a merger of Southern Bell and South Central Bell, and concluding that BellSouth’s implementation plan is “extremely odd,” WorldCom does not offer any specific support for its suspicions. See id. 369 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 675- 89 & Ex. OSS- 86. 370 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 91- 92; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 36- 38. 371 The Commission’s rules require BellSouth to provide competitors all available information in its databases or internal records, in the same time intervals that it is available to any BellSouth personnel, regardless of whether BellSouth has access to such information. See UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885- 86, paras. 427- 31. 57 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 58 Specifically, we find that BellSouth provides competitors with access to all of the same detailed information about the loop that is available to itself and in the same time frame as any of its personnel could obtain it. 372 113. Covad claims that when BellSouth deploys fiber, it removes the copper loops from the Loop Facility Assignment Control System (LFACS) Database. 373 Covad states that BellSouth’s practice of removing copper loops from LFACS drastically limits the customers it can serve. 374 According to BellSouth, however, it does not automatically remove copper facilities from LFACS whenever a retail customer’s service is changed from copper to digital loop carrier equipment or other fiber- based technologies in violation of the UNE Remand Order. 375 Rather, BellSouth states that it removes loop make- up information from its LFACS database only when it replaces existing copper with fiber- based technologies. 376 BellSouth claims that when copper facilities are replaced with fiber optic facilities, the copper facilities are no longer in the LFACS database because the facilities cannot be used to provide service by either BellSouth or a competitive carrier without additional engineering or construction work. 377 114. The UNE Remand Order makes clear that, to the extent the incumbent LEC has compiled information for itself, it is obligated to provide requesting competitors with nondiscriminatory access to loop information within the same time frame whether it is accessed manually or electronically. 378 The Commission did not address a BOCs ability to remove loop make- up information from LFACS in the UNE Remand Order or in subsequent rulings. Because BellSouth’s policies in this respect do not expressly violate the Commission’s UNE Remand rules, we decline to find that these allegations warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. As we have stated in other section 271 orders, new interpretative disputes concerning the precise content of an incumbent LEC’s obligations to its competitors, disputes that our rules have not yet addressed and that do not involve per se violations of the Act or our rules, are not appropriately dealt with in the context of a section 271 proceeding. 379 372 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 9016- 17, para. 54. 373 See Covad GALA II Comments at 20. 374 See Letter from Florence A. Grasso, Covad, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed Apr. 12, 2002). 375 BellSouth GALA II Reply at 13. 376 BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 25. 377 Id. 378 See UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3886, para. 429. Indeed, BellSouth asserts that it allows competitive LECs to request that its outside plant engineers perform a manual look- up in BellSouth’s Corporate Facilities Database should LFACS lack the desired loop makeup information, such as whether a copper loop exists alongside the fiber facilities. See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 231- 32; BellSouth GALA I Application at 107. 379 See Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17470, para. 92. 58 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 59 115. Covad also discusses recent KPMG exceptions in Florida concerning BellSouth’s manual loop qualification process. 380 We do not believe that these exceptions cited by Covad are germane to our analysis of whether BellSouth’s loop makeup information process operates in a nondiscriminatory fashion in Georgia and Louisiana. In addition to failing to demonstrate the competitive significance of these exceptions, Covad cites exceptions that have been closed by the Florida Commission or amended with responses by BellSouth. 381 Moreover, BellSouth’s performance data concerning loop makeup information in Georgia and Louisiana reflect that it provides responses to competing carrier requests for loop information in substantially the same time and manner as for itself. 382 Accordingly, we find that the record in this proceeding contains no evidence to suggest that BellSouth’s current manual process for access to loop qualification information warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. 116. Sprint claims that it has been unable to obtain timely, electronic access to BellSouth’s facility reservation number information because all BellSouth facility locations are not loaded into BellSouth’s LFACS database. 383 Instead, Sprint asserts that it is required to submit loop make- up information manually. 384 BellSouth currently provides competitive LECs with access to competitive carrier specific assignments on an Internet site that is updated daily. 385 At the present time, we conclude that this solution affords competitive carriers an adequate opportunity to verify connecting facility assignments, and do not find any evidence in the record to suggest that this process is discriminatory. 386 Accordingly, we do not find any evidence in the record that Sprint’s claim warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. Moreover, we are encouraged that BellSouth has agreed to provide competitive carriers access to LFACs to verify connecting facilities assignments in a future update to its system. 387 380 See Covad GALA I Comments at 34- 35 (discussing Florida exceptions 112, 117, and 134). 381 For example, exception 134 was closed by the Florida Commission on April 10, 2002, and Florida exceptions 112 and 134 have been amended with responses by BellSouth. See KPMG BellSouth Florida OSS Test Exceptions, available at . 382 See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 2.1 (Loop Makeup Inquiry (Manual), Loops); Georgia/ Louisiana F. 2.2 (Loop Makeup Inquiry (Electronic), Loops). 383 Sprint GALA I Comments at 18. 384 Sprint GALA I Comments at 18. 385 See BellSouth Milner GALA I Reply Aff. at para. 38. 386 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9021, para. 61 (concluding that Verizon’s interim offering for access to loop make- up information is in compliance with the checklist requirements). 387 See BellSouth Milner GALA I Reply Aff. at para. 38. 59 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 60 (ii) Pre- ordering Functionality 117. We find that BellSouth provides carriers in Georgia and Louisiana nondiscriminatory access to all pre- ordering functions. 388 Competing carriers have access to the same pre- ordering OSS used by BellSouth’s retail operations using either the TAG or LENS interfaces. 389 BellSouth offers carriers access to an application- to- application interface, TAG, as well as the graphical user interface (GUI), LENS, for pre- ordering functions. 390 Competitive LECs may use this interface to submit orders for end users region- wide. BellSouth states that TAG is a standard Application Programming Interface (API) to BellSouth’s pre- ordering OSS. 391 Using these interfaces, BellSouth provides competing carriers with pre- ordering information including: street address validation, telephone number selection; service and feature availability; due date information; customer service record information; and loop make- up information. 392 Furthermore, performance data show that BellSouth typically meets or exceeds every benchmark or retail analog, confirming that competitors have equivalent access to BellSouth’s pre- order databases. 393 388 See App. D. paras. 33- 34. 389 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 193- 94. LENS uses the TAG architecture and gateway and provides identical service, with a few minor exceptions. Id. at para. 194 & n. 39. 390 BellSouth GALA I Application at 64- 65; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 44, 194. In previous applications, BellSouth offered access to pre- ordering functions through its CGI- LENS, EC- Lite and LENS interfaces. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20660- 61, para. 95. 391 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 33. BellSouth also states that some competitive LECs use RoboTAG-- a standardized, web- browser- based interface to the TAG gateway that rests on the competing carrier’s Local Area Network (LAN) server and integrates pre- ordering and ordering with upfront editing. Id. at paras. 40- 42. 392 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 190. We note that KPMG tested BellSouth’s pre- ordering functionality. KPMG MTP Final Report at IV- A- 9 through IV- A- 21; KPMG STP Final Report at IV- B- 8 through IV- B- 12. Although CompTel argues that BellSouth does not provide equivalent access to information on pending service orders (PSOs) on a customer’s service record, BellSouth does provide a PSO flag in the LENS interface to alert carriers that a service order is pending. BellSouth explains that PSO information is proprietary customer information, but that competitive LECs have the ability to track the details of pending service orders for their own customers using the [Competitive] LEC Service Order Tracking System (CSOTS). BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 144- 46; CompTel GALA II Comments at 3- 5; CompTel GALA II Comments App., Tab A, Affidavit of Mary Conquest, ITC^ Deltacom at para. 2 (CompTel GALA II Conquest Aff.); CompTel GALA I Comments at 4- 5; Letter from Maureen Flood, Director, Regulatory and State Affairs, CompTel, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 1- 2 (filed Apr. 24, 2002) (CompTel April 24 Ex Parte Letter); see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4015- 16, 4051, 4055, para. 132 & nn. 586, 611. 393 Georgia/ Louisiana D. 1.1 – D. 1.2 (% Interface Availability including EDI, TAG, and LENS). BellSouth has consistently met the 95% benchmark for each sub- metric from September through February including 100% availability for the EDI interface between October and February. This metric records all system outages regardless of duration and is similar to metrics used by other BOCs. BellSouth GALA II Application App. A, Vol. 1a, Tab C, Affidavit of William Stacy, Alphonso Varner, and Ken Ainsworth (BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff). at para. 197 & n. 22. See also Georgia/ Louisiana D. 1.3 – D. 1.4 (Pre- ordering Average Response Interval). (continued….) 60 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 61 118. We reject Birch’s assertion that it experiences a number of slowdowns in its TAG interface. 394 BellSouth discovered that the use of an old version of TAG by another competitive LEC was causing Birch’s problem. BellSouth provided assistance to the carrier in order to allow it to upgrade its TAG interface, which resolved the problem. 395 We also find unpersuasive comments by AT& T and US LEC/ XO claiming that LENS, TAG, and EDI outages interfere with their ability to provide service. 396 While we share the Department of Justice’s concern that severe interface outages can impact a competing carrier’s ability to successfully compete, commenters do not demonstrate that the few outages they mention have caused competitive harm sufficient to warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. 397 Moreover, BellSouth’s performance data indicate that these situations are not significant. 398 Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate, we are prepared to pursue appropriate enforcement action. (iii) Pre- ordering and Ordering Integration (a) Background 119. The Commission has previously stated that the inability to integrate may place competitors at a disadvantage and significantly impact a carrier’s ability to serve its customers in a timely and efficient manner. 399 In order to demonstrate compliance with checklist item two, the BOC must enable competing carriers to transfer pre- ordering information (such as customer’s billing address or existing features) electronically into the carrier’s own back office systems and back into the BOC’s ordering interface. We do not simply inquire whether it is possible to transfer information from pre- ordering to ordering interfaces. Rather, we assess whether the BOC enables successful integration by determining if competing carriers may, or (Continued from previous page) We note only one isolated incident in the month of November when access to one pre- ordering function was slightly out of parity for the month of November, but is back in parity. D. 1.3.6.1 and D. 1.3.6.2 (access to the central office facilities database (COFFI)). We note that KPMG continues to review an open exception for replicating the data for pre- ordering response interval for the HALCRIS sub- metric that BellSouth describes as “exceedingly minor – between 0.0001 seconds and 0.01062 seconds.” BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para 51 & Ex. PM- 13 at 2 (KPMG Interim Status Report describing exception 89.3). 394 Birch GALA II Comments at 20- 21. 395 BellSouth GALA II Application Reply App., Vol 2, Tab G, Reply Affidavit of William N. Stacy (BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff.) at para. 224. See Birch GALA II Comments at 21 n. 27 (noting that BellSouth was about to fix this problem). 396 AT& T GALA II Seigler Decl. at para. 17; US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 33. 397 Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation at 13. 398 For a discussion of BellSouth’s performance data, see supra note 393. 399 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18428- 29, para. 152. 61 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 62 have been able to, automatically populate information supplied by the BOC’s pre- ordering systems onto an order form (the LSR) that will not be rejected by the BOC’s OSS systems. 400 120. The Commission has held that successful parsing is “a necessary component of successful integration.” 401 Our prior orders dictate that a BOC can demonstrate the ability of competitive LECs to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functions if the BOC parses the customer record information into identifiable fields for the competing carriers. 402 Also, if the BOC does not provide parsed pre- order information, the BOC can demonstrate that competing carriers can or have been able to successfully integrate. 403 (b) Discussion 121. We conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth now provides competitive LECs with the information necessary to integrate its pre- ordering and ordering interfaces using the TAG interface. 404 We believe that BellSouth has adequately addressed the issues raised by commenting parties. Accordingly, we conclude that BellSouth’s TAG pre- ordering interface can be successfully integrated with BellSouth’s EDI ordering or 400 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18428, para. 152. 401 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18429, para. 153. “Parsed” pre- ordering information is electronic data that are divided into fields that can be electronically transferred into other fields used in the pre- ordering and ordering process. In the BellSouth South Carolina Order, the Commission concluded that BellSouth “impeded competing carriers’ efforts to connect LENS electronically to their operations support systems and to the EDI ordering interface by not providing competing carriers with the necessary technical specifications and by modifying the types of data provided through the LENS interface.” BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 623, para. 155; see First BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 6277- 79, paras. 52- 55; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661, para. 96. Unlike the integrated pre- ordering and ordering interface used by BellSouth for its own retail business, the Commission found that competing carriers had to copy information from the LENS screen and reenter it manually into their own operations support systems and into the EDI ordering interface. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission rejected BellSouth’s assertion that it had addressed these issues. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20663, para. 98. 402 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4019, para. 137. 403 To satisfy the “successful integration” standard, a BOC that does not provide parsed pre- order information must demonstrate that competing carriers “may, or have been able to, automatically populate information supplied by the BOC’s pre- ordering systems onto an order form … that will not be rejected by the BOC’s OSS systems.” SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18428- 29, para. 152. 404 BellSouth GALA II Application at 8- 23; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 8- 107; Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 11- 16; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 32- 34. See also BellSouth GALA I Application at 67- 68; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at 220- 224; BellSouth Stacy GALA I Reply Aff. at 145; KPMG MTP Final Report at V- A- 28 through V- A- 31; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 38 & Ex. SVA- 13 (Feb. 2, 2002 letter from KPMG stating, “BellSouth’s documentation is sufficient to allow a [competitive LEC] to develop the parsers and filters required to accomplish electronic bonding with BellSouth”). 62 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 63 TAG ordering functions in compliance with the standards previously established by the Commission in the SWBT Texas Order and, additionally, now offers a parsed CSR . 405 122. Specifically, we find that competing carriers are able to query the unparsed or parsed pre- order information and integrate that information into ordering functions using available BellSouth documentation. As in previous section 271 proceedings, we rely primarily on evidence of actual commercial usage, submitted by competing LECs active in BellSouth’s territory and by BellSouth, that carriers have been able to successfully integrate certain pre-ordering and ordering functions. 406 Specifically, we rely on: statements from four competing carriers indicating that they have been able to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functions; 407 the results of two third- party tests, one by KPMG and a second by Telcordia; 408 the fact that BellSouth now provides telephone number (TN) migration to enable competing carriers to order migrations to UNE- P using only the telephone number (and house number for verification) in order to substantially reduce rejected orders; 409 and as further proof of the ability of competitive LECs to integrate, we note that BellSouth now parses the Customer Service Record (CSR) for competitive LECs; 410 and BellSouth’s retention of Accenture and Science Application 405 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18428- 34, paras. 152- 61 (concluding, based on the totality of evidence in the record, that SWBT’s interfaces could be successfully integrated). 406 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18430- 31, paras. 154- 55. 407 Letter from Bob D. Crenshaw, Jr., President, Exceleron Software and GoComm, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277, filed Nov. 28, 2001 (GoComm Nov. 28 Ex Parte Letter); Letter from Alan Creighton, President and CEO, Momentum Business Solutions, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277, filed Dec. 4, 2001 (Momentum Dec. 4 Ex Parte Letter); Letter from J. Rodney Page, Vice President, Access Integrated Networks, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277, filed Dec. 6, 2001 (Access Integrated Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter); Letter from Jonathan D. Lee, Vice President, CompTel, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277, filed Dec. 6, 2001 (CompTel Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter) (describing the capabilities of member company ITC^ Deltacom). 408 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff., Ex. OSS- 77 (KPMG Master Test Plan (MTP) Final Report) at V- A- 28 through V- A- 31, Ex. OSS- 78 (KPMG Supplemental Test Plan (STP) Final Report) at V- A- 28 through V- A- 30, V- B- 27 through V- B- 29; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff., Ex. SVA- 13 (KPMG Feb. 2 Integration Letter); Letter from Sean A. Lev, Counsel to BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35, filed Feb. 28, 2002 (Telcordia Unparsed CSR test). See also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18430,18432- 33, paras. 154, 158- 59. 409 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 39- 58. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18433, para. 160. 410 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 59. Until January 5, 2002, BellSouth offered only an unparsed CSR. BellSouth recently began offering parsed pre- order information and it now argues that it satisfies either Commission standard for successful integration. BellSouth GALA II Application at 8. Competing carriers are still able to retrieve pre- ordering information in an unparsed format. Id 63 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 64 International Corporation to provide technical assistance, free of charge, to competing carriers attempting to integrate their pre- ordering and ordering systems. 411 123. Evidence of Integration Using BellSouth’s Unparsed CSR. With respect to the letters from competing carriers, three of these competing carriers, Exceleron/ GoComm, Momentum, and Access Integrated, state that they are able to obtain pre- ordering information, parse the CSR, populate back office systems, and then electronically populate a Local Service Request (LSR). 412 The fourth competing carrier, ITC^ Deltacom, states that it is able to parse pre-order information and generate certain orders. 413 Furthermore, BellSouth demonstrates that because Sprint uses the integrated clearinghouse service Exchange Link, it too uses an integrated pre- ordering and ordering interface. 414 Moreover, BellSouth demonstrates that the competing carriers that use integrated pre- order and order interfaces show low reject rates in actual commercial performance. 415 These carriers order a variety of products using these interfaces including resale, UNE- P, directory listings, and loops and show reject rates that are low, or explained by factors other than integration. 416 124. In addition to this commercial usage, we also rely on the third- party tests performed by KPMG and Telcordia. First, KPMG, in its role as a pseudo- competitive LEC, integrated its pre- ordering and ordering functionality in order to submit order requests during the functional part of its testing. 417 KPMG formally reviewed and reported on the documentation for TAG pre- ordering, TAG ordering, and EDI ordering and reviewed fields and the field formats in the CSR finding only a few minor discrepancies. 418 KPMG states that, based on their commercial knowledge and on BellSouth documentation, they were able to parse the BellSouth 411 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 22- 23. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18434, para. 161. 412 GoComm Nov. 28 Ex Parte Letter at 1; Momentum Dec. 4 Ex Parte Letter at 1; Access Integrated Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 413 CompTel Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter at 1. Of these four carriers, three state that they have integrated their TAG pre- ordering interface with their TAG ordering interface while Momentum states that it has integrated its TAG pre-ordering interface with its EDI interface. Id.; GoComm Nov. 28 Ex Parte Letter at 1; Momentum Dec. 4 Ex Parte Letter at 1; Access Integrated Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 414 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 29. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18430- 31, para. 155 (noting that AT& T had also developed a program to parse address information). 415 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 30- 34. 416 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 30- 32. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18430- 31, paras. 155- 56 & n. 421. 417 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 35- 38. 418 KPMG MTP Final Report at V- A- 28 through V- A- 31; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 38 & Ex. SVA- 13 (Feb. 2, 2002 letter from KPMG describing the extent to which it formally and informally tested the ability of a competing carrier to integrate). 64 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 65 CSR, populate necessary information into order requests, and populate their back office databases. 419 Second, Telcordia, using only BellSouth documentation and access to unparsed CSRs, was able to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functions. 420 We conclude that KPMG’s third party review in Georgia, supplemented by the February letter from KPMG clarifying the extent to which they functionally were able to parse BellSouth’s pre- order information and integrate that data into their orders and databases, as well as the Telcordia Report, provide us with additional evidence that competitive LECs are able to write a parsing program that enables integration efficiencies. 421 125. We also rely on BellSouth’s implementation of TN migration, which enables competing carriers to migrate a customer (from resale or BellSouth retail) to UNE- P using only the telephone number and house number. 422 This has reduced the percentage of rejected orders, especially address related errors. 423 We also note that BellSouth has eliminated a mismatch problem that was causing a small number of rejects for TN migration orders when the address on the CSR did not match the Regional Street Address Guide (RSAG) database. 424 Finally, we recognize that BellSouth has engaged two companies, Accenture for the EDI interface and SAIC for the TAG interface, to provide technical assistance related to integration, free of charge, to competing carriers seeking to integrate their electronic pre- ordering and ordering functions. 425 419 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 38 & Ex. SVA- 13 (finding that “in general, it is possible for [competitive LECs] to: [e] lectronically retrieve Pre- Order queries” ; “[ e] lectronically parse most of the desired information from the query response”; “[ e] lectronically store the retrieve data into [competitive LEC] databases of a proprietary design”; and “[ e] lectronically populate fields in a Order using data previously stored in the [competitive LECs’] proprietary databases”). 420 BellSouth Feb. 28 Ex Parte Letter (with Telcordia Report attached stating, “Telcordia was able [ ] to query and store pre- order unparsed Customer Service Record information from BellSouth, and then use pre- order information in the BellSouth order process.”) 421 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18432, para. 158. 422 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 39- 58. 423 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 56- 57 (address errors on all UNE- P migrations, as a percentage of all errors, dropped from 4.4% in October to 1.7% in January while total rejects and auto clarifications on UNE- P migrations dropped from 15.81% in October to 10.14% in January). See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18433, para. 160. Despite claims that the initial implementation of TN migration was faulty, WorldCom acknowledges that “BellSouth’s migrate by TN release is working relatively effectively” and notes, “MCI’s immediate need for parsed CSR has been reduced somewhat.” WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 9. Finally, we find, as did the Department of Justice, that “[ t] he introduction of TN migration represents an important step in upgrading BellSouth’s OSS.” Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 8. 424 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 48. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18433, para. 160 (noting the virtual elimination of address- related errors). 425 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 22- 23. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18434, para. 161. 65 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 66 126. Further Evidence of Integration Using BellSouth’s Parsed CSR. On January 5, 2002, BellSouth began making available a parsed CSR to competing carriers. 426 As such, BellSouth maintains that it provides competitive LECs with the tools necessary to satisfy the standard for integration that the Commission established for BOCs that provide a parsed CSR. 427 Although we are not aware that any competing carriers have yet begun to commercially use the parsed CSR on interfaces they modified themselves, two software vendors have successfully tested the parsed CSR functionality and report that it works as designed. 428 Specifically, using only publicly- available information, Telcordia conducted a third- party test in which it created a pseudo- competitive LEC to test the retrieval of parsed CSRs and the ability to populate that information into the proper fields on an order. 429 Telcordia successfully tested the ability to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functionality for the ordering of resale, UNE- P, and UNE loops. 430 In addition, Exceleron conducted its own test of the parsed CSR functionality and further verified the findings of Telcordia. 431 We also note that Birch has started preliminary testing of the parsed CSR in the CAVE test environment which, to date, has proved successful. 432 127. We disagree with AT& T’s argument that the documentation BellSouth provides to competing carriers is inadequate to allow competitive LECs to adequately integrate their interfaces in a commercial setting. 433 We reject this assertion because, as described above, the successful commercial experience of other competing carriers, as well as third- party testing, indicates that integration is possible using BellSouth documentation. 434 AT& T also critiques the letters sent by the competing carriers that claim to use integrated pre- ordering and ordering functions arguing that the integration claimed in the letters is minimal and does not support a finding that competing carriers can commercially integrate their interfaces. 435 We reject this argument because, as an initial matter, the commercial experience of four competing carriers 426 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 59. 427 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 59; see Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4019- 20, paras. 137- 38. 428 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 60. We note that competitive LECs, including Sprint, commercially use the integrated interfaces provided by these vendors. Id. at para. 29. 429 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 61- 63 & Ex. SVA- 19. 430 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 61- 63 & Ex. SVA- 19. BellSouth asserts that this selection of order types accounts for 79% of all order activity in a typical month and accounts for 99% of UNE- P migrate- as- specified orders. Id. at para. 62. 431 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 64 & Ex. SVA- 20, SVA- 21. 432 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 66 & Ex. SVA- 23. 433 AT& T GALA II Bradbury Decl. at paras. 45- 48. 434 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18431- 32, para. 157. 435 AT& T GALA II Bradbury Decl. at paras. 49- 53. 66 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 67 indicates that successful integration is possible to the extent required by the Commission’s prior orders. 436 There is also evidence that address- related rejects are relatively low for these carriers. 437 This suggests, contrary to AT& T’s assertions, that integration has been successful. 128. AT& T also asserts that the KPMG test did not truly replicate the experience that a competing carrier would encounter in attempting to integrate and thus argues that the KPMG testing done in this regard is of limited value. 438 While KPMG’s official mandate for its third party testing did not specifically include building an electronic parser to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functionality, KPMG tested the fields and formats of the BellSouth data against the documentation to establish that it was possible. 439 And, although not formally part of the third-party test, KPMG functionally built its own parser to separate BellSouth’s pre- order data into usable fields – fields KPMG needed to place several different types of orders. 440 KPMG concluded that “BellSouth’s documentation is sufficient to allow a [competitive LEC] to develop the parsers and filters required to accomplish electronic bonding with BellSouth. 441 Therefore, we disagree with AT& T that KPMG’s testing is not probative in our analysis of the ability of a competing carrier to parse CSRs and integrate their pre- ordering and ordering functions. 129. AT& T also claims that BellSouth’s parsed CSR functionality is “defective” because BellSouth reported a number of software defects after implementation. 442 Like the Georgia Commission, we reject AT& T’s argument. 443 While BellSouth notified competing carriers of a number of defects with the parsed CSR functionality, BellSouth demonstrates that these defects do not prohibit the use of the parsed CSR for a majority of orders, nor do the defects require that all information be input manually into orders. 444 Moreover, BellSouth already has corrected all of the defects associated with the parsed CSR functionality. 445 436 GoComm Nov. 28 Ex Parte Letter; Momentum Dec. 4 Ex Parte Letter; Access Integrated Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter; CompTel Dec. 6 Ex Parte Letter. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18430- 31, paras. 155- 56. 437 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 30- 34. 438 AT& T GALA II Bradbury Decl. at paras. 55- 60. AT& T also criticizes the third- party testing as unreliable. AT& T GALA II Comments at 10 (stating that Telcordia is not an impartial tester). Like the Georgia Commission, we find this argument without merit based on successful commercial integration and the corroborative results of other third- party testing. Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 7. 439 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 38 & Ex. SVA- 13 at 1- 4. 440 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 38 & Ex. SVA- 13 at 5- 7. 441 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff., Ex. SVA- 13. 442 AT& T GALA II Bradbury Decl. at para. 21. 443 Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 14; Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 6- 7. 444 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 67- 72; Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 14 (describing AT& T’s claim that the minor defects associated with parsed CSR have prevented the testing or use (continued….) 67 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 68 130. AT& T further argues that BellSouth has not parsed several fields on the CSR that are commercially important to its business. 446 As an initial matter, AT& T has not addressed how the unparsed fields other than hunting are competitively significant. We are thus not convinced that all the fields that AT& T mentions are necessary for successful integration. 447 Moreover, we find that BellSouth sufficiently explains that the remaining unparsed fields are either not maintained in a format that can be parsed simply, or are not even retained at all. 448 Further, although not decisional to our analysis, we note that parsed hunting information, claimed by AT& T to be valuable in competing for business customers, was implemented on March 23. 449 Accordingly, we find BellSouth provides competing carriers with the tools necessary to integrate their ordering and pre- ordering functions, both with and without a parsed CSR. 450 (iv) Lack of Equivalent Access to Due Dates 131. We find that BellSouth offers nondiscriminatory access to due dates. In its review of BellSouth’s previous Louisiana section 271 application, the Commission found that new entrants “cannot be confident that the due dates actually provided after the order is processed will be the same date that the new entrants promised their customers at the pre-ordering stage.” 451 The Commission also noted that it would closely review BellSouth’s automatic due date capability in future applications. 452 (Continued from previous page) of parsed CSR as “unpersuasive” and stating “there is simply no evidence to support this claim.”). Birch makes a similar claim. Birch GALA II Comments at 26. 445 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 67; Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 7 & n. 2. To the extent carriers wish to test the parsed CSR functionality, BellSouth has made its CAVE testing environment freely available for this purpose. 446 AT& T GALA II Bradbury Decl. at paras. 28- 31. 447 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18430, para. 154. We agree with the Georgia Commission’s determination that “there has been no showing that the parsing of these fields is critical to ensuring that ‘a broad range of residential customers are to have a competitive choice for local service. ’” Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 15 (quoting the Department of Justice standard for nondiscriminatory access to a BOC’s OSS. Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation at 10). See BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 77- 91. 448 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 77- 86. 449 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 132. 450 The Department of Justice states that BellSouth’s provision of a parsed CSR “may facilitate competitive entry by lowering the operating costs of the new entrant. It should also reduce the costs associated with mistakes that are made when [competitive LEC] service representatives are required to retype pre- order information on orders to be sent to BellSouth.” Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 9- 10. 451 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20699, para. 105 & n. 339. (citations omitted). 452 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20670, para. 106. 68 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 69 132. BellSouth has implemented an electronic due date calculator in LENS that allows competitive LECs to view an installation calendar and obtain automatically calculated estimated due dates. 453 BellSouth also notes that due date calculation functionality was added to TAG pre-ordering and ordering. 454 Moreover, BellSouth states that it has fixed the systemic problem that commenters raised during the GALA I proceeding. 455 BellSouth now demonstrates that the error in the due date functionality impacted only a small number of orders. 456 Moreover, the problem became less severe over the last few months until it was fixed, prior to the filing of the instant application, on February 9. 457 Therefore, we find that BellSouth provides reliable due dates to competitors, and in a manner equivalent to what BellSouth provides its retail services. 458 133. We reject AT& T’s assertion that BellSouth does not provide equivalent access to due dates. 459 Although AT& T complains about the previous state of this functionality, AT& T appears to recognize that BellSouth has implemented software change to fix the problem. 460 Because no other competing carrier raises a new complaint about this same problem, and one of the objectors from the previous application, Birch, affirmatively now states that the due date calculator problem it experienced is no longer a problem, we are assured that the due date functionality problem has been resolved and that competing carriers have equivalent access to due dates. 461 134. We also reject WorldCom’s contention that when it submits a supplemental order to change a due date, BellSouth’s OSS improperly sends them a second Firm Order 453 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 48; BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App. A, Vol. 3, Tab O, Reply Affidavit of William Stacy (BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff.) at para. 131. BellSouth’s pre- ordering due date calculator estimates due dates based upon BellSouth’s business rules which establish standard intervals for different types of services. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 207- 08. Just as is true for BellSouth’s retail services, due dates are not guaranteed until the ordering stage. Id. at paras. 209- 10. 454 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 211; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 34; 455 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 145- 51. Specifically, Mpower, Birch and AT& T complained that BellSouth’s due date calculator provided due dates that differed from the due dates in BellSouth’s system and provided multiple order confirmations for single orders. Mpower GALA I Comments at 11- 14; Birch GALA I Comments at 11- 12 & Declaration of Tad Jerret Sauder at para. 19 (Birch GALA I Sauder Decl.); AT& T GALA I Bradbury Reply Decl. at para. 21. 456 BellSouth demonstrates that by January, this problem affected only 2- 3% of all orders. BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 149- 50. 457 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 149. 458 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 209. 459 AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras. 77- 92. 460 AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at para. 92. 461 Birch GALA II Comments at 24. 69 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 70 Confirmation (FOC) that does not indicate the new requested due date. 462 Instead, WorldCom contends that the new date actually has been accepted by BellSouth’s OSS, despite the date provided on the second FOC, and service is performed on the newly requested date. 463 WorldCom contends that this confusion impairs WorldCom’s ability to inform its customers about when service will occur. 464 Moreover, WorldCom states that it is unlikely that this problem is caused by manual handling, as BellSouth contends, because 100 percent of WorldCom’s due date supplements have been affected, and BellSouth’s downstream systems report and act on the supplement correctly. 465 However, BellSouth claims that only 17 of 249 due date supplements submitted by WorldCom in February received an incorrect due date, far from 100 percent. 466 Additionally, BellSouth demonstrates that all of the due date supplements that were handled electronically returned a correct due date. 467 We also reject AT& T’s argument that a number of its orders do not flow through because of an error stating that the “due date could not be calculated.” 468 BellSouth demonstrates that this error message affects only a small percentage electronic orders when the information provided by the competitive LECs is insufficient to allow the due date calculator to work properly. For example, this error message is returned when the competitive LEC order includes an invalid address, when the competitive LEC requests a due date in excess of one year from the date of submission, or prior to the date of submission, as well as planned fallout to a service representative for such things as orders requesting more than 15 lines. 469 Therefore, we find that AT& T has not demonstrated that a systemic problem exists with BellSouth’s due date calculator that warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate or become a systemic problem, we are prepared to pursue appropriate enforcement action. d. Ordering 462 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 11. 463 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 11. 464 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 12. WorldCom asserts that it now supplements the due date for a large proportion of its orders, but does not provide additional details. Id. at para. 11. 465 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 173 (finding that a service representative error caused the due date to be incorrect on the orders identified by WorldCom and that testing indicated that no electronic system problem exists); WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 35. 466 Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 02- 35 (filed Apr. 12, 2002) at 4 (BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter). 467 BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter at 4. 468 AT& T GALA II Reply at 8; Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Vice President, Federal Government Affairs, AT& T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 4- 5 (filed May 10, 2002) (AT& T May 10 Ex Parte Letter). 469 BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter at 3- 4. BellSouth has investigated and found no problems with its software. Id. at 4. For a discussion of electronic order flow- through, see our discussion infra at section III. C. 2. d. iii. 70 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 71 135. In this section, we address BellSouth’s ability to provide competing carriers with access to the OSS functions necessary for placing wholesale and resale orders. We find that BellSouth demonstrates, based on the evidence in the record, that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its ordering systems. In the following discussion, we address the OSS issues primarily in dispute in this application: order confirmation notices; rejection notices; flow- through; completion notices; and jeopardy information. (i) Order Confirmation Notices 136. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 470 that BellSouth is providing timely order confirmation notices to competitive LECs in Georgia and Louisiana. 471 BellSouth demonstrates that it met the relevant benchmark for each service type in the months most relevant for the instant application. 472 Between October and February, BellSouth, on average, met or exceeded the 95 percent within three hours standard for electronically submitted UNE- P orders in both Georgia and Louisiana. 473 Similarly, between October and February, BellSouth, on average, met or exceeded the 85 percent within 10 hours standard for partially mechanized orders and the 85 percent within 36 hours standard for non-mechanized orders all product types. 474 For resale orders, BellSouth met or exceeded all benchmarks for each relevant month. 475 137. We decline to find that BellSouth’s order confirmation notice process is noncompliant with the checklist. Several competitive LECs assert that they receive insufficient, inaccurate and invalid order confirmation notices from BellSouth. For example, KMC contends that BellSouth fails to provide complete FOCs including circuit identification numbers for local number portability (LNP) orders. 476 We note, however, that BellSouth implemented a fix to resolve such instances on February 2, 2002. 477 BellSouth states that it tested the implementation 470 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 92- 96; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 40- 42. 471 BellSouth submits performance data showing FOC Timeliness disaggregated by: (1) fully mechanized orders (i. e., orders that flow through); (2) partially mechanized orders that are submitted electronically but require some manual processing; and (3) manually submitted and processed orders. See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 120- 23. 472 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.9 (FOC Timeliness – Mechanized); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.12 (FOC Timeliness – Partially Mechanized); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.13 (FOC Timeliness – Non- Mechanized). 473 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.9.3 (FOC Timeliness- Mechanized). 474 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.12 (FOC Timelines- Partially Mechanized – 10 hours); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 13 (FOC Timelines- Non- Mechanized). 475 See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 1.9 (FOC Timeliness- Mechanized, Resale); A. 1. 12 (FOC Timelines- Partially Mechanized – 10 hours, Resale); A. 1.13 (FOC Timelines- Non- Mechanized, Resale). 476 KMC GALA II Comments at 3- 4. 477 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 177; BellSouth April 16 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 71 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 72 to confirm that the fix is working and that it has received no complaints from competitive LECs regarding the implementation. 478 Similarly, we reject general complaints that BellSouth returns FOCs in a discriminatory manner based on a lack of specific evidence in the record supporting that proposition and findings of the Georgia Commission to the contrary. 479 138. Additionally, Birch argues that the FOC Timeliness standard for returning partially mechanized FOCs is less stringent than in past applications and is discriminatory in light of BellSouth’s alleged excessive manual handling. 480 First, we disagree that this standard is less stringent than the FOC Timeliness intervals in other states where BOCs have received section 271 approval. 481 Further, we find that these standards, developed in a collaborative process with the input of competitive carriers and adopted by the Georgia Commission, 482 are acceptable measures of whether BellSouth processes orders in a manner that provides an efficient competing carrier with a meaningful opportunity to compete. 483 We also reject AT& T’s general allegations that BellSouth improperly calculates the FOC Timelines measure 484 based on the evidence to the contrary. 485 Specifically, KPMG’s evaluation of BellSouth’s calculation and 478 See BellSouth April 16 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 479 See, e. g., AT& T GALA II Bradbury Decl. at paras. 136- 39; KMC GALA II Comments Affidavit of John D. McLaughlin, Jr. at paras. 17- 18 (KMC GALA II McLaughlin Aff.); Mpower GALA II Comments at 9- 10; WorldCom Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 83; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 6. Commenters also point to a KPMG exception, which determined that BellSouth misplaced 14% of EDI and 16% of TAG orders as evidence of BellSouth’s inability to properly provision FOCs. US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 36- 37. We note, however, that the KPMG exception cited by competitive LEC’s has been closed. See id. See also BellSouth GALA I Varner Reply Aff. at para. 160; BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 176- 80 (explaining that BellSouth returns accurate FOCs in a timely manner); Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 30. 480 See Birch GALA I Comments at 23- 25 (noting that the benchmark used in SWBT’s Texas application and the Kansas/ Oklahoma application was “85% within 5 hours” versus the “85% within 10 hours benchmark here). Birch makes this same claim with regard to BellSouth’s Reject Interval standard and asserts that BellSouth’s handling of LSRs is more similar to the process utilized by SWBT than Verizon. See id. at 24. BellSouth explains that when orders that are submitted mechanically fall out for manual processing, BellSouth still returns rejects and FOC notices mechanically to the competitive LEC, thereby minimizing the impact of fallout. See BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 98. 481 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4032- 33, para. 160 (stating that the relevant standard for manually processed order confirmations in New York was 95% within 24 hours of submission). 482 See BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff., Exh. at 2- 27; BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at para. 108. 483 We note that since the benchmark was altered for partially mechanized orders in August from eighteen hours to ten business hours, BellSouth is meeting this benchmark with few inconsistencies. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.12 (FOC Timeliness – Partially Mechanized – 10 hours) (exceeding this benchmark for UNE- P orders, for example, in both states). See also Georgia B. 1.13 (FOC Timeliness – Non- Mechanized) (benchmark of 85% returned within 36 hours). 484 See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 91- 94 (contending that BellSouth improperly calculates FOC Timelines based on incorrect data). 485 See BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at para. 86 (stating that the sample LSR AT& T bases its claims on were properly handled); BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 57- 60. 72 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 73 performance for FOC Timelines determined that “BellSouth provides clear, accurate and complete FOCs.” 486 Thus, we find, as did the Georgia Commission, that BellSouth’s results for the FOC Timeliness metric are reliable. 487 139. Finally, we reject competitive LECs’ contention that BellSouth’s databases and records are too inaccurate to provide timely and useful information for the provision of service. 488 Specifically, competitive LECs allege that BellSouth sends “blind FOCs” where the competing carrier receives an order confirmation but is later notified that facilities are not available. 489 BellSouth explains that it does not generally check availability of facilities before committing to a due date of service to BellSouth’s retail customers. 490 Thus, the current process that BellSouth utilizes to provide the order confirmation to a competitive LEC is the same as BellSouth uses with its own end users when establishing due dates. 491 Therefore, we decline to find that these assertions warrant a finding of noncompliance. (ii) Order Reject Notices and Order Rejections 140. We conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 492 that BellSouth provides competing carriers with order reject notices in a timely and nondiscriminatory manner. 493 First, we find that BellSouth has demonstrated that it provides mechanically processed 486 See generally KPMG Final Report at V- A- 1, V- 8- 1. We note that KPMG issued exceptions for the raw data reported for FOC Timeliness. See KPMG Interim Status Report, KPMG Exceptions 136/ 137. However, we find, as did the Georgia Commission, that BellSouth’s data is sufficiently reliable to determine its checklist compliance. See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 221. 487 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 128. 488 See, e. g., KMC GALA II Comments at 3- 4; Mpower GALA II Comments at 8- 9; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 7. 489 See, e. g., KMC GALA II Comments at 3- 4; Mpower GALA II Comments at 8- 9; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 7. 490 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 177. 491 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 177. 492 See Georgia Commission GALA I Reply at 96- 99; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 41- 42. 493 BellSouth explains that it provides rejects for orders that are either (1) processed electronically (2) submitted electronically but require manual handling by a service representative or (3) submitted on a non- mechanized basis. See BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at paras. 113, 117- 18. We note that BellSouth’s performance for the FOC & Reject Response metric satisfies the 95% benchmark for most submetrics except for Loop + Port Combinations where BellSouth missed the benchmark by less than 5%. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.14 (FOC & Reject Response Completeness - Mechanized); B. 1.15 (FOC & Reject Response Completeness - Partially Mechanized); B. 1.16 (FOC & Reject Response Completeness - Non- Mechanized). BellSouth requests that the Commission not rely on the FOC & Reject Response Completeness (Multiple Responses) metric because BellSouth contends that it does not provide valuable information as to whether a particular reject or response was appropriate or necessary. See BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter Attach. 12 at 2. We also note that the Commission has never relied on, nor do the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions require, this metric. Further, we believe that the Reject Interval metric (continued….) 73 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 74 reject notices in a timely manner. Although BellSouth has fallen short of satisfying the applicable standard in Georgia and Louisiana for a few sub- metrics the past few months, we find that BellSouth’s overall performance is nondiscriminatory. 494 BellSouth explains that a change was implemented in Georgia and Louisiana in the February 2002 data for EDI submitted orders to address a problem with BellSouth’s timestamp and instances where some of BellSouth’s systems are on Eastern Time, and some are on Central Time. 495 BellSouth is working on similar fix for TAG. 496 BellSouth asserts that after fixing the problem BellSouth’s Reject Interval performance should improve by one to three percent. 497 We note this effort with approval and conclude that BellSouth’s current overall performance for mechanically processed orders is nondiscriminatory. 141. BellSouth also demonstrates that it provides reject notices in a nondiscriminatory manner for those orders that require manual processing. Specifically, BellSouth met the benchmark of 85 percent within ten hours for partially mechanized orders with only minor (Continued from previous page) provides a more probative evaluation of BellSouth’s performance. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.4 - B. 1.8 (Reject Interval). 494 Although, in Georgia, BellSouth failed to meet the 97% within 1- hour benchmark for UNE- P orders, its performance has been steadily improving during the 5- month period reaching 91.14% February. Given the steady improvement in this submetric, we do not find this performance warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. See Georgia B. 1.4.3 (Reject Interval- Mechanized). In Louisiana, BellSouth missed the benchmark for UNE- P orders, on average, by only approximately 3% over the five- month period. See Louisiana B. 1.4.3 (Reject Interval-Mechanized). Further, BellSouth states that it returned mechanically generated UNE- P rejects in an average of 1.85 to 4.36 hours from October to January in Georgia. See BellSouth March 22 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. A. We note that BellSouth also missed the benchmark for Other Non- Design in Georgia (53.57% to 76.06%) and Louisiana (66.67% to 91.67%). See Georgia B. 1.4.15 (Reject Interval- Mechanized). BellSouth explains that the data improperly indicates poor performance for Other Non- Design because of instances where clarifications are counted as rejects instead of jeopardies. BellSouth states that this problem was corrected in April in the LCSC and has no impact on the normal flow of order processing for the competitive LEC. See BellSouth April 23 Ex Parte Letter at 1- 2 (stating that the data in the SQM Report for this metric was harmonized with the MSS Reports in December). BellSouth also missed the relevant benchmark with respect to the Other Design metric. We note, however, that order volumes were low for several months and that BellSouth’s performance improved as order volumes increased for the month of January. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.4.14 (Reject Interval- Mechanized). As the Commission previously determined, low competitor order volumes can cause seemingly large variations in the monthly performance data. Thus, the Commission, in prior section 271 orders, has declined to make a determination that a BOC fails to satisfy its section 271 obligations based on low volume performance measurements. See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9040, para. 94 n. 299. With regard to its resale performance, BellSouth met or exceeded the relevant benchmarks with few exceptions. See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 1.4.1, A. 1.4.2 (Reject Interval - Mechanized, Resale); A. 1.7.1, A. 1.7.2 (Reject Interval - Partially Mechanized- 10 hours); A. 1.8.1, A. 1.8.2 (Reject Interval – Non- Mechanized, Resale). 495 BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 79. 496 Id. 497 Id. 74 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 75 exceptions. 498 BellSouth has also complied with the Georgia and Louisiana standards for processing non- mechanized rejects in a timely manner, returning manually processed rejects, on average, in 24 hours after submission of an order. 499 Accordingly, we find that BellSouth’s manual reject process can provide competing carriers prompt notice that an order has encountered a problem, and the opportunity to resolve it before considerable delay. 500 142. While we note the assertions of some competitive LECs that BellSouth fails to provide reject notices in a timely or effective manner, 501 based on the relevant performance data and other evidence in the record demonstrating that BellSouth provides reject notices in a nondiscriminatory manner, we are unpersuaded. 502 Competitive LECs also complain that BellSouth returns invalid clarifications or multiple clarifications for the same order instead of highlighting all necessary corrections at once. 503 However, BellSouth has explained that it extensively trains its employees to provide proper rejections and instructs employees to make all appropriate corrections to competitive LEC orders at one time. 504 We note that the Louisiana Commission has encouraged BellSouth and competitive LECs alike to provide their staff with additional training and was not persuaded that claims of high reject rates were entirely attributable to BellSouth. 505 Based on a lack of supporting evidence in BellSouth’s performance data indicating a systemic problem in the manner that BellSouth provides clarifications, we 498 In Georgia and Louisiana, BellSouth satisfied the relevant benchmark from October to February. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.7 (Reject Interval - Partially Mechanized – 10 hours). 499 For the months of October through February, BellSouth returned timely reject notices on manually processed orders within the relevant benchmark in Georgia and Louisiana with one minor exception in Louisiana. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 1.8.3 (Reject Interval – Non- Mechanized). In Louisiana, BellSouth missed the relevant benchmark for UNE- P orders in November by approximately 11%. See Louisiana B. 1.8.3 (Reject Interval – Non-Mechanized). However, BellSouth satisfied the benchmark in December through February, indicating that this appears to be an isolated miss and not indicative of a systemic problem with BellSouth’s ordering systems. Id. 500 See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 79. 501 See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at para. 30 (citing problems found with data completeness in KPMG Exceptions 136/ 137); US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 36. See also WorldCom GALA I Comments App., Tab A, Declaration of Sherry Lichtenberg, Rene Desrosiers, Karen Kinard & Richard Cabe. at para. 24 n. 3 (WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg/ Desrosiers/ Kinard/ Cabe Decl.); WorldCom GALA II Reply at 13- 14. 502 See discussion of BellSouth’s reject performance supra. We note that BellSouth explains that its performance for the relevant metrics is good, and that no SEEMs penalties for either XO or US LEC were generated for 2001. See BellSouth GALA II Reply Stacy Aff. at para. 179; see also BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 102- 07, 120- 24 (stating that BellSouth’s reject rates are calculated in a similar fashion as other BOCs and that its reject rates are comparable to or lower than those of SWBT and Verizon in other applications). See also Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 128 (stating that BellSouth’s results for the Reject Interval metric are reliable). 503 See Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 5; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 6. 504 See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 110. 505 See Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 50. 75 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 76 conclude that these complaints do not warrant a finding of checklist item noncompliance. Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate, we may pursue appropriate enforcement action. (iii) Order Flow- Through Rate 143. We conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 506 that BellSouth’s OSS are capable of flowing through UNE orders in a manner that affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. 507 We also conclude that BellSouth is capable of flowing through resale orders in substantially the same time and manner as it does for its own retail customer orders. 508 We note at the outset that the Commission has used order flow- through as a potential indicator of a wide range of problems that underlie a determination of whether a BOC provided nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. 509 The Commission has not considered flow-through rates as the sole indicator of nondiscrimination, however, and thus has not limited its analysis of a BOC’s ordering process to a review of its flow- through performance data. Instead, the Commission has held that factors such as a BOC’s overall ability to accurately process manually handled orders, scale its systems, and return timely order confirmation and reject notices are relevant and probative for analyzing a BOC’s ability to provide access to its ordering functions in a nondiscriminatory manner. 510 Accordingly, where, as in the instant application, other evidence demonstrates that such problems do not exist, it is unnecessary to center our analysis on flow- through rates. 511 In particular, as discussed supra, BellSouth demonstrates that 506 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 99 (stating that KPMG’s evaluation of BellSouth’s flow-through and overall functionality and scalability of BellSouth’s ordering interfaces determined that BellSouth satisfied all of the applicable test criteria); Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 44 (stating that current BellSouth flow- through performance is satisfactory). 507 BellSouth’s commercial data show, on the average, modest achieved flow- through levels in Georgia and Louisiana for UNEs (69.77%). See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 1.2 (Flow Through Service Requests- Achieved). BellSouth’s performance data for the % flow through service requests metric demonstrated 82.24% flow- through for UNEs in Georgia and Louisiana. See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 1.1.5 (% Flow Through Service Requests). We note that “achieved” flow- through includes competitive LEC error, where as the % flow through service requests metric does not. See BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at Tab 26. 508 See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 1.1.3 – 1.1.4 (% Flow Through Service Requests). See also BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 94 (demonstrating that BellSouth flows through 74% to 81% of resale orders). 509 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035, para. 162 (stating that “[ f] low through rates . . . are not so much an end in themselves, but rather are a tool used to indicate a wide range of possible differences in a BOC’s OSS that may deny an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.”) 510 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034- 35, paras. 161- 63; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18443- 44, para. 179. 511 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034, para. 162. 76 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 77 it provides timely order confirmation and reject notices. In addition, the evidence in the record demonstrates that BellSouth accurately processes both manual and mechanized orders. 512 144. Moreover, as discussed more fully below, we find that BellSouth scales its system as volumes increase, and demonstrates its ability to continue to do so at reasonably foreseeable volumes. As a result, in this application, flow- through has significantly less value as an indication of deficiencies of BellSouth’s OSS. 513 145. We also note that BellSouth’s ability to flow- through orders at high rates is dependent, in part, on the ability of competing carriers. 514 We find it particularly informative that several competing carriers are achieving much higher flow- through rates than other carriers. Specifically, data regarding UNE orders shows that individual competitive LEC flow- through rates range from 20 percent to 97.92 percent. 515 Thus, BellSouth demonstrates that its OSS provides certain competitive LECs with high levels of flow- through. In fact, BellSouth states that there are over 20 individual competitive LECs with flow- through rates in excess of 90 percent. 516 Because the record demonstrates that a number of competitive LECs experience high flow- through rates, we conclude that it is inappropriate to attribute the wide range of flow through results entirely to BellSouth. As the Commission previously stated, a BOC is not accountable for orders that fail to flow through due to competing carrier- caused errors. 517 Our conclusion that BellSouth’s OSS is capable of achieving high flow- through levels is further bolstered by KPMG’s testing. KPMG’s flow- through evaluation report indicates that BellSouth is capable of flowing through a high percentage of orders. 518 512 See discussion of BellSouth’s performance in other subsections herein. 513 We also note that the instant application is unlike BellSouth’s previous section 271 applications, where the Commission had independent evidence in the record indicating deficiencies in BellSouth’s application, including (1) the failure to provision orders in a timely manner, (2) the failure to provide competing carriers with complete, up- to-date business rules and ordering codes; (3) the lack of integration between pre- ordering and ordering functions; and (4) the failure to provide order status notices electronically. See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034- 35, para. 162; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20671, para. 108; First BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 6259- 70, 77, paras. 24- 40; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 597- 611, paras. 104- 31. 514 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4038- 39, para. 166. 515 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para 99. 516 Id. We note that BTI, a competitive LEC, contends that its orders to BellSouth flow through with a minimal fall out. BTI GALA II Comments at 2. 517 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9030- 31, para. 78; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4039- 40, 4049, paras. 167, 181; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20674, para. 111. 518 See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. Ex. OSS- 79 at n. 7 (stating that KPMG found BellSouth flow- through rates of 92. 56% in October and 93. 11% in November for competitive LEC error rate excluded figures). The KPMG test evaluated the calculation of the flow- through percentages produced by BellSouth for competitive LEC activities for the months of September, October, and November 1999, and for the transactions of the test competitive LEC (continued….) 77 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 78 146. We also note that the Georgia Commission established the Flow Through Task Force (FTTF) to further improve BellSouth’s performance. 519 Subsequently, BellSouth has enumerated eighteen flow- through improvement features, eight of which were implemented in February and March 2002, with ten more improvements to BellSouth’s OSS that are targeted for implementation in May. 520 While we find that BellSouth’s OSS currently provides competing carriers with a meaningful opportunity to compete, we expect that BellSouth will continue to improve its flow- through performance, work with competitive LECs in workshops, and make requested improvements through the change management process. 521 We note that we will monitor BellSouth’s compliance with its commitment to improve its flow- through performance. Deterioration in BellSouth’s performance could result in enforcement action. 147. Commenters express four concerns regarding the manual nature of BellSouth’s OSS. 522 First, competitive LECs contend that a high proportion of orders submitted electronically are falling out to manual handling primarily due to BellSouth error. 523 Second, commenters argue that BellSouth continues to erroneously calculate flow- through rates. 524 Third, commenters (Continued from previous page) established by KPMG. The test utilized raw data to calculate flow- through and fallout statistics and compared the data used in those calculations to the data collected by KPMG. See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Aff. OSS Ex. 79 at 13. 519 The Flow- Through Task Force (FTTF) was established at the direction of the Georgia Commission in February 2001. The FTTF has identified twenty- one flow- through improvement items. See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 321- 322; see also Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 17; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 22. 520 See BellSouth April 18 Ex Parte Letter at 3. BellSouth April 18 Ex Parte Letter at 3 (stating that six of the eighteen improvements were from the Flow Through Task Force list). 521 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 195. We note, for example, that BellSouth has identified specific errors relating to the flow through rates of Birch and Network Telephone and has scheduled a change to rectify these problems for May 18, 2002. 522 See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Reply at 7; AT& T GALA II Comments at 17- 19; AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. paras. 8, 102; Birch GALA I Comments at 15- 19; Birch GALA II Comments at 15- 19; AT& T GALA II Comments at 17- 18; Covad GALA I Comments at 11- 17; Mpower GALA I Comments at 8- 10; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 4- 5; US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 34- 36; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 15; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 30- 32. 523 See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Comments at 23; AT& T GALA II Comments Aff. para. 111; AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras. 8, 102- 03; Birch GALA II Comments at 14- 18; Network Telephone GALA II at 4- 5; WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg, Desrosiers, Kinard & Cabe Decl. at paras. 54- 55. See also AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras. 98- 99, 105- 07 (arguing that BellSouth’s performance did not improve in 2001). Several commenters in this proceeding claim that BellSouth’s high level of manual handling is causing the inaccurate provisioning of orders, delays in provisioning, and increased costs to competitive carriers). See also Birch GALA I Comments at 15- 19 (arguing that BellSouth’s excessive manual handing of orders causes service order inaccuracies and forces Birch to request extended due dates to monitor BellSouth’s processing); Covad GALA I Comments at 11- 17 (noting that BellSouth’s manual loop ordering process is time consuming, error prone and costly); WorldCom GALA I Comments at 15 (asserting that BellSouth’s manual processing of orders results in delays and errors). 524 See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 75- 77, 119 (stating that BellSouth bases its calculations on inaccurate data and citing Varner Aff. Ex. PM- 3 (F. 1.22; F. 1.2.5)); Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 5; (continued….) 78 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 79 contend that BellSouth improperly designs its systems so that orders fall out by design or cannot be ordered electronically. 525 Finally, competitive LECs assert that BellSouth’s OSS are not sufficiently scalable. 526 148. We are not persuaded by these arguments. For the reasons explained above, we believe that commenter concerns regarding BellSouth’s level of manual handling are addressed by the record evidence demonstrating that BellSouth is capable of flowing through competitive LEC orders, is accurately processing service orders, and is providing timely order confirmation and reject notices. We also reject AT& T’s claim that BellSouth erroneously calculates flow- through since, as noted earlier, KPMG evaluated the calculations of the flow- through percentages produced by BellSouth, utilized raw data to calculate flow- through and fall out statistics, and compared the data used in those calculations to the data collected by KPMG. 527 149. Further, we reject arguments that too many orders fall out by design or cannot be ordered electronically. Rather, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth properly designs its systems so that a minimal number of orders cannot be ordered electronically. 528 According to BellSouth, the majority of its “products” may be ordered electronically and completed electronically. 529 Furthermore, BellSouth claims that 75 percent of the xDSL- capable loops that were ordered in Georgia could have been ordered electronically, and 83 percent of the xDSL- capable loops could have been ordered electronically region- wide. 530 BellSouth also states that electronic ordering via all interfaces for Unbundled Digital Channels/ ISDN Digital Subscriber Line (UDC/ IDSL) loops was implemented on February 2, 2002, and, in May 2002, a second process will be developed to provide electronic ordering and full flow- through. 531 BellSouth acknowledges that it does not currently offer electronic ordering of a Unbundled Copper Loop- Non Design (UCL- ND) and ADSL- compatible loop or line sharing with conditioning, but has investigated the system changes that would be required to (Continued from previous page) Sprint GALA II Comments at 13; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 30- 31; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 59- 70. 525 See e. g. Covad GALA I Comments at 10- 11; Covad GALA II Comments at 1- 3. 526 See AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras. 104- 05. 527 See notes and discussion supra. See also Varner GALA I Reply Aff. at paras. 31- 52; Varner GALA II Reply Aff. at paras. 8- 16 (stating that BellSouth properly calculates flow through); BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply at paras. 50- 52; BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply at paras. 202- 03. We also note that the Georgia Commission rejected AT& T’s claims regarding BellSouth’s flow through data and found that it was reliable. Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 129- 30. 528 Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 5 (stating that BellSouth provides credible evidence that it is providing electronic ordering for competitive LECs at parity with the electronic ordering it provides itself). 529 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 18- 20; see also BellSouth Stacy GALA II Reply Aff. at para. 152 (describing the unbundled loop products BellSouth has created). 530 See BellSouth Stacy GALA II Aff. at para. 159. 531 See BellSouth Stacy GALA II Aff. at para. 159. 79 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 80 implement electronic ordering. 532 BellSouth further notes that, as of February 2002, there were a total of 295 UCL- ND loops in service region- wide, with 10 in Georgia and 12 in Louisiana. 533 With respect to the ADSL- compatible loops and line sharing with conditioning, BellSouth states that it has completed 20 xDSL orders requiring conditioning for the period July 2001 through January 2002 in Georgia and Louisiana. 534 150. Given the fact that the volume of orders for these products are low, BellSouth’s demonstrated willingness to automate the ordering for these orders despite their low volumes, and the very high percentage of loops that can be ordered electronically, we cannot agree with commenters, like Covad, that BellSouth’s ordering systems deny competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. 535 Although it may be true that some specific products that Covad ordered during this time are predominately manual, BellSouth’s analysis shows that several loops can and are ordered via electronic interfaces. 151. Other competitive LECs note that a significant portion of orders that fall out to manual handling are simple orders, or orders with basic features such as voice mail or call forwarding and must therefore be designed to fall out. 536 However, BellSouth explains that it manually handles conversion orders with such features as Memory Call and call forwarding as part of a workaround process designed in response to competitive LEC complaints that customers were losing these features after conversion. 537 We find, based on BellSouth’s data that less than one percent of UNE- P orders were affected by this workaround, that this issue is not competitively significant and does not indicate a systemic flow- through problem. We note that on March 23, 2002, BellSouth implemented a system change to ensure that its OSS are designed to flow through orders with such features and stated that this implementation will be completed with an additional release on May 18, 2002. 538 While we do not rely on this information, we find 532 Indeed, BellSouth states that electronic ordering with flow through for the UCL- ND product is targeted for July 2002. See BellSouth Stacy GALA II Reply Aff. at para. 159. BellSouth explains that a change control request was not submitted until November 5, 2002. Id. at para. 162. 533 See BellSouth Stacy GALA II Reply Aff. at paras. 63- 64. 534 See BellSouth Stacy GALA II Reply Aff. at paras. 162- 64. 535 We also note Network Telephone’s claim that competitive LECs can no longer electronically submit some types of T- 1 orders. See Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 9. BellSouth has explained, however, that this is not a change, but rather a clarification that in the small number of instances where inside- wiring orders are included with orders for T- 1 circuits, those orders must be ordered manually. BellSouth GALA II Application Reply App., Vol 1, Tab A, Reply Affidavit of Ken L. Ainsworth (BellSouth GALA II Ainsworth Reply Aff.) at para. 51. 536 See AT& T GALA II Reply at 11- 12; Birch GALA II Comments at 15- 16; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 32, WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg, Desrosiers, Kinard & Cabe Decl. at para. 55; WorldCom GALA II Reply at 32. 537 See BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 4. 538 See BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 4; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply at paras. 197- 98. 80 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 81 that it provides further assurance that this loss of features issue will be completely resolved in the near future. 152. Finally, we reject arguments by some commenters that BellSouth’s alleged mishandling of manually processed orders indicates that its OSS are not sufficiently scalable to handle larger volumes of competitive LEC orders. 539 As discussed above, we find that BellSouth handles manually processed orders in a nondiscriminatory manner. Thus, we find, furthermore, that concerns regarding the scalability of BellSouth’s OSS are addressed by evidence in the record demonstrating that BellSouth has been able to maintain or improve upon its performance while order volumes have generally increased. 540 Because BellSouth demonstrates the ability to handle competitive LEC orders in a nondiscriminatory manner, even as order volumes increase, we are persuaded that BellSouth’s OSS is sufficiently scalable to process increases in competitive LEC order volumes in the foreseeable future. Our conclusion is supported by the findings of the Georgia Commission that BellSouth’s OSS are sufficiently scalable to handle reasonably foreseeable commercial volumes of orders in a nondiscriminatory manner. 541 (iv) Order Completion Notices 153. We conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth generally provides completion notices to competitive LECs in a nondiscriminatory manner. 542 Based on the level of BellSouth’s performance in the most recent months’ performance data, we conclude that BellSouth provisions completion notices in a manner that provides competitive LECs a meaningful opportunity to compete. 543 539 See, e. g., AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Aff. at paras. 104- 05; AT& T GALA II Reply at 12- 14 (claiming that deficiencies in BellSouth’s flow through performance and with BellSouth’s LCSCs, which are responsible for manually processing orders, will preclude BellSouth from handling increased order volumes in a nondiscriminatory manner). Several competitive LECs criticize the third- party test in Georgia for volume testing. See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Norris Decl. at paras. 15- 28; Covad GALA I Comments at 8- 9; 20. 540 BellSouth GALA I Application at 77. 541 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 90, 118- 20 (stating that KPMG’s volume test was conducted in an appropriate manner). See also BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 183- 87, 235- 36. 542 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 90; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 41. 543 BellSouth met or exceeded parity with the relevant retail analogue with only minor disparities of less than 0.3 hours. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.21.3.1.4 (Average Completion Notice Interval- Mechanized). We note that BellSouth implemented a fix for February 2002 data to address AT& T’s concern that LSRs classified as “projects” were not reported in the Average Completion Notice Interval. BellSouth states that it also made an interim fix in February to the retail analogue to properly report auto- restorals of service that were previously distorting the results of approximately 1% of the retail orders. BellSouth states that neither of these changes should have a material impact on the results for this measure. See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 53; BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at paras. 72- 73. 81 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 82 154. AT& T claims that BellSouth’s fails to properly provide completion notices. 544 In doing so, AT& T points to two exceptions opened by KPMG on the basis of BellSouth’s failure to satisfy the applicable criteria for accurate and timely completion notices. 545 We do not agree with AT& T that the discrepancies related to BellSouth’s performance for this metric are competitively significant. First, KPMG’s test concluded that BellSouth provides “clear, accurate, and complete” order completion notices. 546 Further, we note that the exceptions cited by AT& T are closed. 547 Additionally, as we note above, we rely on the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions determination that BellSouth’s performance is acceptable. 548 Therefore, based on the evidence in the record and BellSouth’s performance for the applicable metric, we conclude that BellSouth provides completion notices in a nondiscriminatory manner. (v) Jeopardy Notices 155. Based upon the evidence in the record before us, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 549 that BellSouth provides jeopardy notices in a manner that affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. In making this determination, we rely on BellSouth’s performance data, which indicate that BellSouth is providing competing carriers access to jeopardy notices on orders for UNE- P on a nondiscriminatory basis. 550 The data for the 544 See AT& T GALA I Comments Ex. D, Declaration of Jay M. Bradbury at paras. 16, 144- 48 (AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl.); AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 80- 88; 130 (asserting that BellSouth improperly excludes notices and LSRs from its Average Completion Notice Interval metric); Letter from Joan Marsh, Director, Federal Government Affairs, AT& T to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at n. 17 (filed April 19, 2002) (AT& T April 19 Ex Parte Letter) (stating that BellSouth improperly excludes orders that complete in one month but have a completion notice issued in the next month). First, BellSouth states that such instances occurs no more than 0.30% of the time. See BellSouth May 3 Ex Parte Letter at 3. Further, BellSouth explains that the purpose of this practice was to provide a snapshot of the data for the purposes of processing the data and producing performance reports. See id. Based on the minimal number of orders impacted by AT& T’s allegations, we are not inclined to find that BellSouth’s data is unreliable. Finally, we note, but find it unnecessary to rely on, BellSouth’s statement that in response to AT& T’s complaint, BellSouth has agreed to include these orders in future months possessing. See id. 545 See AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 146- 47; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply at paras. 356- 57. 546 See KPMG MTP Final Report at III- B- 1. See also Georgia B. 2.21 (Average Completion Notice Interval- Mechanized); Louisiana B. 2.21.3 (Average Completion Notice Interval- Mechanized). 547 See AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 146- 47 (stating the exceptions cited were closed). 548 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 90, 130- 31; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 41. 549 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 102- 103; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 40, 47; see also BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at para. 135. 550 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.8 (Average Jeopardy Notice Interval- Mechanized), Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.9 (Average Jeopardy Notice Interval (Non- Mechanized). See also BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 76. We note that BellSouth explains that the Average Jeopardy Notice Interval was not providing a “meaningful measure” until January, because BellSouth improperly measured the interval from the due date to the date/ time of order completion rather than to the date/ time of the originally scheduled due date. See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 76 (stating that the metric is valid for January data); BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at para. 44 (explaining (continued….) 82 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 83 months most relevant to this application also indicate that BellSouth is not placing a greater percentage of competitive carriers’ orders in jeopardy than it places its own, with a few scattered exceptions. 551 156. We note that several competitive LECs allege problems with receiving adequate and timely jeopardy notices. 552 Commenters also argue that the Commission should not rely on the Missed Installation Appointments metric measurement for determining BellSouth’s ability to return jeopardy notices for those months for which the Average Jeopardy Notice Interval was not providing “meaningful measure.” 553 We reject these arguments. First, the record does not support carriers’ claims that BellSouth is not providing adequate or timely jeopardy notices. 554 Specifically, BellSouth has submitted data demonstrating that, in general, it provides jeopardy notices to competing LECs and to its own retail operations in the same time and manner. 555 Further, as held in previous section 271 orders, we note that BellSouth is held accountable by the Missed Installation Appointments metric for instances where BellSouth- caused jeopardies result (Continued from previous page) problem with the metric for data prior to January). See also AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at para 143, AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at para. 131 (stating that in light of the lack of reliability of BellSouth’s data, BellSouth cannot be said to be providing jeopardy notices on a timely and nondiscriminatory basis). BellSouth states for the months where this metric is not reliable, the Commission should instead rely on BellSouth’s performance for the Missed Installation appointments metric. See BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at para. 44. Furthermore, BellSouth’s performance data for January and February reflect compliance with the retail analogue. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.8 (Average Jeopardy Notice Interval- Mechanized); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.9 (Average Jeopardy Notice Interval (Non- Mechanized). 551 See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 135; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 103. For every month between October to February, BellSouth’s wholesale performance is better than the retail analogue for UNE-P. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.5.3 (% Jeopardies- Mechanized). Although BellSouth missed parity in Georgia for one product from December through February, the data are based on low competitor volumes (77 competitive LEC orders over a five- month period). See Georgia B. 2.5.4 (% Jeopardies- Mechanized). As the Commission previously determined, low competitor order volumes can cause seemingly large variations in the monthly performance data. Thus, the Commission, in prior section 271 orders, has declined to make a determination that a BOC fails to satisfy its section 271 obligations based on low volume performance measurements. See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9040, para. 94 n. 299. 552 See, e. g., AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 142- 43; US LEC/ XO Comments GALA II at 36; see also Birch GALA II Comments at 22 (alleging that an analysis of data underlying BellSouth’s Average Completion Interval revealed that BellSouth had not provided jeopardy notices for forty- two Birch orders region- wide where BellSouth reported missed installation dates). 553 See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 45, 90- 98 (citing Exception 142 and difficulty KMPG experienced in replicating BellSouth’s reported results for the Jeopardy Interval and % Jeopardy Non- Mechanized measures). As discussed below, BellSouth implemented a coding change to resolve problems associated with this measure. 554 BellSouth contends that it provides proper status information for orders submitted both manually and electronically. See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply at para. 210. 555 See discussion para. 155. 83 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 84 in missed due dates. 556 In addition, BellSouth explains that it implemented a coding change beginning with January data for the Average Jeopardy Notice Interval metric. 557 As we note above, BellSouth’s performance data indicates that it met or exceeded parity with the retail analogue since this implementation. With regard to Birch’s claims regarding the lack of jeopardy notices, BellSouth states that the orders cited by Birch were handled properly and should not in fact have received jeopardy notices. 558 We also rely on the results of KPMG’s testing, which found that BellSouth satisfied the test criteria for EDI, TAG and CSOTS as it related to jeopardy notifications. 559 Accordingly, we are unable to conclude that the problems raised by competitive LECs are nothing other than a limited failure, rather than a systemic problem with BellSouth’s processes for issuing jeopardy notices. To the extent, however, that we are provided evidence of systemic problems, or BellSouth’s performance deteriorates, we may consider appropriate enforcement action. (vi) Other Ordering Issues 157. DSL USOC. BellSouth states that its policy “not to offer its wholesale DSL service to an ISP or other network services provider [ ] on a line that is provided by a competitor via the UNE- P” is not discriminatory nor contrary to the Commission’s rules. 560 Commenters allege that BellSouth will not offer its DSL service over a competitive LEC’s UNE- P voice service on that same line. 561 We reject these claims because, under our rules, the incumbent LEC 556 See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 76. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18 (% Missed Installation Appointments). In Georgia, BellSouth met or exceeded parity with the retail analogue, on average, from October through February, with only minor exceptions of less than 0.01%. See Georgia B. 2.18 (% Missed Installation Appointments). In Louisiana, on average, BellSouth met or exceeded parity with the retail analogue from October through February. See Louisiana B. 2.18 (% Missed Installation Appointments). See also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18447- 48, para. 185 (stating that the missed installation appointments measure holds SWBT accountable for SWBT- caused jeopardy situations resulting in missed due dates). 557 See BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 76. 558 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 204- 11. 559 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 204- 11. 560 Letter from Sean A. Lev, Counsel to BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 2 (filed Mar. 19, 2002) (BellSouth March 19 DSL Ex Parte Letter). See BellSouth GALA II Application Reply App. , Vol 1., Tab C, Reply Affidavit of Eric Fogle (BellSouth GALA II Fogle Reply Aff.) at para. 3; BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol 1, Tab D, Reply Affidavit of Eric Fogle (BellSouth GALA I Fogle Reply Aff.) at para. 5. 561 See Birch GALA II Comments at 32; AT& T GALA II Comments at 42- 44; KMC GALA II Comments at 12- 14; CompTel GALA II Comments at 7; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 10; Letter from Tricia Breckenridge, KMC Telecom, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 2 (filed May 2, 2002) (KMC May 2 Ex Parte Letter). In addition, commenters claim that in order to prevent a customer from losing its billing telephone number (BTN) or change its established hunting sequence, the customer may be required to change the DSL service from the existing line to a “stand alone” line. See Birch GALA II Comments at 30- 32; AT& T GALA II Comments at 5, 42- 44; AT& T GALA II Reply at v, 38- 41; Mpower GALA II Reply at 7; KMC GALA II Comments 12- 15; CompTel GALA II Comments at 7- 8; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 10- 11; KMC May 2 Ex Parte Letter. 84 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 85 has no obligation to provide DSL service over the competitive LEC’s leased facilities. 562 Furthermore, a UNE- P carrier has the right to engage in line splitting on its loop. 563 As a result, a UNE- P carrier can compete with BellSouth’s combined voice and data offering on the same loop by providing the customer with line splitting voice and data service over the UNE- P loop in the same manner. 564 Accordingly, we cannot agree with commenters that BellSouth’s policy is discriminatory. Further, we note that BellSouth is taking adequate steps to remedy any confusion that may arise when customers order DSL. 565 158. We reject commenters’ claims that BellSouth has created a significant impediment to ordering UNE- P by placing erroneous DSL codes on the customer service record (CSR) in an effort to delay competitors’ orders. 566 Specifically, commenters maintain that before converting customers from BellSouth to their service, the universal service order code (USOC) for DSL service must be removed from the end user’s retail account which can significantly delay their order. 567 In many cases, commenters claim the end user did not even subscribe to DSL service and were not being billed for it, despite the presence of a DSL USOC on their line. 568 We disagree that these claims warrant a finding of noncompliance. This problem affects a very small number of orders and commenters have not otherwise provided any evidence of a systemic problem warranting a finding of noncompliance. BellSouth demonstrates that less than 1.58 percent of UNE- P conversions were affected by having a DSL USOC on the line and only 0.37 percent were affected by the alleged “phantom USOC.” 569 Furthermore, we note that some 562 In the Line Sharing Order, the Commission required unbundling of the high frequency portion of the loop when the incumbent LEC provides voice service, but did not require unbundling of the low frequency portion of the loop and did not obligate incumbent LECs to provide DSL service under the circumstances the commenters describe here. Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Third Report and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 96- 98, Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 98- 147, Sixth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96- 98, 16 FCC Rcd 2101, 2109- 14, paras. 14- 26 (Line Sharing Reconsideration Order); see also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18517- 18, para. 330. 563 Line Sharing Reconsideration Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 2109- 14, paras. 14- 26; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18515, para. 324. 564 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18517- 18, para. 330. 565 In particular, BellSouth demonstrates that it places its DSL service on a particular line as requested by the customer. Furthermore, sales agents are trained to ask the customer which phone number they would like to use for this service. BellSouth has stated that it is also sending a notice to its agents reminding them of this policy. See BellSouth March 19 DSL Ex Parte Letter at 3- 4; BellSouth GALA II Fogle Reply Aff. at para. 15. 566 See Birch GALA II Comments at 30- 31; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 7- 8; Xspedius GALA II Reply at 3; Mpower GALA II Reply at 7; AT& T GALA II Comments at 42; AT& T GALA II Reply at 38, 41; Allegiance GALA II Comments at 5; KMC GALA II Comments at 15; KMC May 2 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 567 Id. 568 Some commenters refer to this situation as a “phantom USOC.” Id. 569 During January, only 1,069 UNE- P orders were affected by DSL service on the end- user’s line. BellSouth GALA II Fogle Reply Aff. at para. 12; BellSouth March 19 DSL Ex Parte Letter at 3- 4. Of these 1,069 orders, only (continued….) 85 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 86 DSL USOC problems may be the result of delays in canceling old DSL accounts or installing new DSL accounts. 570 Finally, we note that BellSouth has recognized the DSL USOC problem and has implemented an interim process to quickly handle orders affected by this problem. 571 We will monitor BellSouth’s compliance with its commitment to provide an interim solution. If BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorates or if we are provided with evidence in the future that the DSL USOC issues increase in magnitude, we may pursue appropriate enforcement action. 159. Service Order Accuracy. We find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth accurately processes manual and electronic orders. 572 BellSouth states that, since its October 2001 application, it has improved the processes it uses to ensure the accuracy of competitive LEC orders and that these processes have positively impacted their performance data. 573 BellSouth changed the manner in which it calculates this metric beginning in November, but the relevant period of review for this application includes September data. 574 (Continued from previous page) 251, or 0.37 percent of all UNE- P conversions, involved instances where the end- user was actively adding or disconnecting DSL service, or did not have working DSL. See BellSouth March 19 DSL Ex Parte Letter at 3- 4. In February, only 832 orders were affected by DSL service on the end- user’s line. Of these 832 orders, only 203, or 0.38 percent of all UNE- P conversions, involved instances where the end- user was actively adding or disconnecting DSL service, or did not have working DSL. See BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 570 BellSouth March 19 DSL Ex Parte Letter at 3; BellSouth GALA II Application Reply at 43. 571 After conducting a trial with Birch, BellSouth made available to all competitive LECs, on April 1, 2002, a new expedited process by which a competitive LEC, after receiving notice of the USOC, has the option to call a dedicated group at BellSouth’s Local Carrier Service Center (LCSC) to remove the DSL USOC if that the end user is not receiving DSL. BellSouth GALA II Fogle Reply Aff. at para. 14, Ex. 1 (detailing the process); BellSouth March 19 DSL Ex Parte Letter at 3; BellSouth GALA II Reply at 43- 44. This process updates the CSR to remove the DSL USOC in the same manner other CSR updates are performed. Most orders handled through this new process are completed in less than 24 hours. Generally, an error- free service order received by 5: 00 p. m. should be updated by the morning of the next business day. Orders that are received during the monthly bill processing period for that account, however, may take the full three day period, in order to allow for the proper operation of the billing system. This affects only a small percentage of orders. From April 1 – April 8, 2002, there were 32 errors handles in the process: 27 were posted within one day, three were posted within two days, and two were cancelled. See BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter at 2- 3. 572 Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 18- 19; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 5- 7. 573 BellSouth states that it has focused efforts in its LCSC by resolving common errors, adding additional oversight to order processing, conducting quality audits of its representatives, and receiving input from BellSouth’s provisioning centers regarding errors. BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 151- 57. BellSouth also points to an improving trend in performance including the fact that 22 of 28 submetrics met or exceeded the 95 percent benchmark from October through December. Id. at 158- 60. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.34 (UNE Service Order Accuracy – Regional); Georgia/ Louisiana A. 2.25 (Resale Service Order Accuracy – Regional). See also Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 18- 19. 574 BellSouth states that the measure was updated to improve statistical sampling including sampling of all product categories, such as UNE- P, that were not offered when the metric was first developed, as well as improved sample sizes for all product categories to yield statistically valid results for all product disaggregations. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 64; BellSouth March 15 Service Order Accuracy Ex Parte Letter at 2- 6. Additionally, the measure now reports data for the entire region instead of reporting state- specific data for some states (including (continued….) 86 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 87 The Department of Justice notes that, because BellSouth changed the way in which it calculates this metric, it is difficult to track the benefits of these process improvements. 575 Nevertheless we conclude, as did the Georgia Commission, that the changes made by BellSouth to the manner in which it calculates the service order accuracy metric are consistent with the SQM. 576 Although BellSouth has changed several aspects of this measure, we are able to evaluate BellSouth’s performance because BellSouth has restated its data back to September under a consistent methodology, and shows that its performance is substantially in compliance with appropriate standards. 577 BellSouth’s service order accuracy performance is further reinforced based on sample order reviews performed by competitive LECs. 578 (Continued from previous page) Georgia) and reporting multi- state data for other states (including Louisiana). Id. at 1, 3. The third, and arguably the most significant change, was a shift from an LSR based methodology (reviewing the accuracy of all service orders associated with an LSR) to a service order based methodology. Id. at 1- 4; AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 105, 111- 12. We note that the Georgia Commission has found that these changes are appropriate in that they bring the measurement into closer conformity with the metric definition. Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 19 n. 17; Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 9- 11. 575 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 13- 14 (stating, “[ t] he significance of the improvements in BellSouth’s service order accuracy is unfortunately obscured [by the changes in the calculation of the metric]” without notice to competitive LECs). We note that a number of commenters have expressed concern about how BellSouth changed its metric. See, e. g., Birch GALA II Comments at 11- 13. We support the recommendations by both the Georgia and Louisiana Commission staffs that would require BellSouth to provide prior notice of any proposed changes to the calculation of performance measures prior to implementation and may penalize BellSouth for its late announcement of changes to its service order accuracy metric. Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 8- 9; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 7. 576 Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 9- 11; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 6- 7 (noting that the Department of Justice did not question the validity of the new measurement and the Georgia Commission’s conclusion that the changes are consistent with the metric definition). We note that the Louisiana Commission did not originally order BellSouth to report this measure, but BellSouth included this measure in support of its application to this Commission for section 271 approval in Louisiana using the format mandated by the Georgia Commission. Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 5- 6 n. 4. 577 BellSouth March 15 Service Order Accuracy Ex Parte Letter at 8- 10. For UNEs, performance is very good showing that for October through February, BellSouth exceeded the 95 percent benchmark for 32 of the 35 reporting submetrics and exceeded the benchmark in all submetrics from December through February. Id.; Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.34 (UNE Service Order Accuracy – Regional). For those UNEs with the highest volumes, BellSouth met or exceeded its 95 percent benchmark 13 out of 15 times from October through February and, in all but one instance (reporting 89.6 percent), performance was above 90 percent. Id. Performance for resale orders, especially those with the highest volumes, shows 12 out of 15 of these submetrics reporting performance above the 95 percent benchmark and all reporting performance above 90 percent. Georgia/ Louisiana A. 2.25 (Resale Service Order Accuracy – Regional); BellSouth March 15 Service Order Accuracy Ex Parte Letter at 7- 9. See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4044, para. 174 n. 87 (citing recalculated service order accuracy performance of 87 percent service order accuracy). 578 Birch notes that service order accuracy has improved citing several order reconciliations which show an improvement in service order error rate for its orders from approximately 30 percent during the fall, 12- 16 percent in December, 2 percent in early February, 8 percent in late February, and an average of 10.56 percent over several days throughout March. Birch GALA II Comments at 7- 8 & Attachs. 5- 8 (also stating that Birch will continue to perform monthly reconciliations); Birch GALA II Reply at 11 & Ex. 2. WorldCom also has performed a sample (continued….) 87 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 88 160. We reject Birch’s concern that the improved performance has resulted from the implementation of additional manual processes that are not guaranteed to last. 579 We find no reason to believe this claim, especially with the inclusion of a service order accuracy measure in the SEEMs plan. 580 Specifically, if Birch is correct that BellSouth’s improved performance is temporary, BellSouth will face penalties in both Georgia and Louisiana for its failure to meet specified performance benchmarks and could also face enforcement action here under section 271( d)( 6). 581 We also reject Birch’s claim that the inclusion of mechanized orders in the metric skews the results in favor of BellSouth. 582 BellSouth has provided performance results showing that even when fully mechanized orders are separately measured from manually- handled orders, the performance for manually handled orders remains very high. 583 Further, like the Georgia Commission, we find this argument unpersuasive because, under the metric definition, BellSouth is required to include fully mechanized orders. 584 161. AT& T raises several claims regarding the new sampling methodology BellSouth employs for its service order accuracy metric. First, we reject AT& T’s claim that the current service order accuracy metric does not utilize a proper sampling technique. 585 AT& T does not show that BellSouth incorrectly sampled orders. Rather, AT& T merely argues that BellSouth fails to explain fully how it samples orders and that performance in some product categories could be marginally overstated. BellSouth demonstrates that, under the new sampling methodology, sampling is more accurate including samples from all 24 sub- metric categories and all product offerings, as well as addressing concerns about over- and under- sampling certain (Continued from previous page) audit of its early February orders to check for service order errors finding a 2.3 percent error rate. WorldCom GALA II Comments at 25. 579 Birch GALA II Comments at 7- 8. 580 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 161. 581 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 161. 582 Birch GALA II Comments at 10- 11. 583 For example, service order accuracy for manually handled UNE orders with the highest volumes was greater than 95 percent for 22 out of 24 of the submetrics for September through February, 23 of which were above 90 percent. BellSouth March 15 Service Order Accuracy Ex Parte Letter at 9; Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz , Vice-President, BellSouth, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed Apr. 19, 2002) (BellSouth April 19 Ex Parte Letter) . This includes five month averages of 98.86 percent accuracy for UNE Designed <10 circuits – dispatched, 97.73 percent accuracy for UNE Non- Designed <10 circuits – non- dispatched, and 96.37 percent accuracy for UNE Non- Designed <10 circuits – dispatched. 584 BellSouth GALA I Varner, Ex. 1 at 3- 34 (Georgia SQM definition for the Service Order Accuracy measure P-11); Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 9. 585 AT& T GALA II Comments at 20; AT& T GALA II Bell Decl. at paras. 3- 8; AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 105- 118; AT& T GALA II Reply at 29- 31; AT& T GALA II Reply App., Tab A, Reply Declaration of Robert M. Bell at paras. 9- 12 (AT& T GALA II Bell Reply Decl.); AT& T GALA II Reply App., Tab C, Reply Declaration of Cheryl Bursh and Sharon E. Norris at paras. 13- 20 (AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Reply Decl.). 88 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 89 order types. 586 We note that the Georgia Commission found BellSouth’s explanation of their sampling methodology to be adequate and that KPMG plans to conduct a review of the new service order accuracy measurement including how sampling is performed. 587 Accordingly, we find no evidence to suggest that BellSouth’s sampling is incorrect. 588 Second, we reject AT& T’s allegation that, because BellSouth adjusted its sample size when the error rate rose in order to maintain precision, BellSouth’s sampling methodology produced biased results in favor of BellSouth. 589 We note that BellSouth has amended its policy to avoid the potential for bias and, while we recognize that the methodology had the potential to produce a bias, we believe that any bias would be small and insignificant to our analysis. 590 Third, we reject AT& T’s claim that shifting the scope of the metric to a regional measure masks BellSouth’s performance in each state. 591 We find nothing inherently wrong with region- wide sampling for metrics that rely on the operation of a uniform regional system, nor does AT& T argue why or how a state- by- state showing would necessarily result in a more accurate representation of BellSouth’s performance. 592 Notably, AT& T does not explain why we should accept its argument in light of our precedent which has accepted region- wide data 593 and data from anchor states. 594 We thus find that concerns regarding BellSouth’s sampling methodology are more appropriately addressed by the state commissions, as they are in a better position to make the initial assessment 586 BellSouth GALA II Johnson Reply Aff. at paras. 3- 5; BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 66. 587 Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 19 n. 17. The Georgia Commission also concluded that service order accuracy performance improved for reasons other than the change in how the metric is calculated. Georgia Commission GALA II Reply at 10. BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 68 (explaining KPMG’s intent to review the new metric). 588 See BellSouth GALA II Johnson Reply Aff. at paras. 3- 9 (describing the sampling methodology and addressing AT& T’s concern about sample sizes). 589 Letter from Joan Marsh, Director, Federal Government Affairs, AT& T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed Apr. 19, 2002) (AT& T April 19 Ex Parte Letter) at 9- 12 & Attach. 3 (Second Reply Declaration of Robert M. Bell). 590 AT& T’s comments in this regard echo the concerns described in an Observation by KPMG in its third- party test of BellSouth’s OSS in Florida. AT& T April 19 Ex Parte Letter at 10- 11. This Observation has since been closed because BellSouth has changed its re- sampling policy, as described above. See Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed May 6, 2002) (BellSouth May 6 Ex Parte Letter) at 1. 591 AT& T GALA II Bell Reply Decl. at paras. 5- 6. 592 BellSouth GALA II Johnson Reply Aff. at paras. 10- 14 (describing how this improves the statistical sampling of the regional ordering process). See discussion of BellSouth’s regional OSS at section III. C. 2. b., supra.; BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 67. 593 See, e. g., BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 595- 96, para. 101. See also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20670 n. 615 (noting the importance of clearly articulating whether data, offered as evidence in support of an application, is calculated on a state- specific or regional basis). 594 See Appendix D, para. 14 (describing how the Commission may rely on performance data from an anchor state). 89 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 90 as to whether state- by- state variation is significant enough to call into question a region- wide showing of compliance. 162. Line Loss Notification Reports. WorldCom reports that it has discovered instances where BellSouth fails to provide timely Network Data Mover (NDM) line loss reports that signal to competing carriers that a customer has migrated to another LEC. 595 Without the reports, WorldCom explains, a competitive LEC will continue to bill an end user even after the customer discontinues service, which results in double billing. 596 WorldCom asserts that this problem has affected thousands of customers, and contends that although BellSouth attempted to fix the problem in February and March, 597 as of March, BellSouth still failed to transmit line loss information for 2.3 percent of all customers that change carriers. 598 163. More recently, in an ex parte letter filed in March, WorldCom states that discrepancies in the line loss reports continued to exist. Specifically, it performed an audit of the line losses posted on BellSouth’s Web GUI and those sent to WorldCom via its NDM feed. 599 WorldCom asserts that the audit covered line loss reports posted from March 25, 2002 through April 15, 2002 and found that approximately 4,300 ANIs appeared on the Web GUI line loss file that were not sent to WorldCom via NDM. 600 However, BellSouth explains that the disparity between the NDM reports and the Web GUI arose from a complication resulting from BellSouth’s OSS software upgrade to single “C” ordering, as is always possible in a major OSS software change of this nature and magnitude. As a consequence of this complication, new migrations were temporarily being incorrectly reported as line losses on the Web GUI. 601 BellSouth states, however, that as soon as it became aware of the problem, it informed affected carriers and fixed the problem within 3 weeks. 602 According to BellSouth, the fix it made on 595 See WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Decl at para. 3. WorldCom also contends that it receives bills for traffic for customers who remain assigned to WorldCom at the switch for days or even weeks after WorldCom had received the line loss reports. Id. 596 See id. 597 BellSouth states that in February, it implemented a change so as to include all disconnect reasons in the line loss reports. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 216- 20. BellSouth also states that it made additional change to its retail systems to require the use of specific disconnect codes on orders where an end user was returning to BellSouth from a competitive LEC. See BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 598 See WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Decl at para. 3; Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel Federal Advocacy, WorldCom to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 02- 35 at 5- 7 (filed May 10, 2002). We note that BellSouth states that it sends line loss reports to only four competitive LECs in addition to the Web GUI database. Thus a limited number of competitive LECs were impacted by this problem. See BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 599 WorldCom April 29 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 600 Id. 601 BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 602 See BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 90 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 91 April 15 to solve this problem caused an additional problem affecting line loss reports between April 15 and May 6, 2002. 603 BellSouth fixed this problem on May 6, 2002, and now states that both the NDM and web reports are providing accurate records to competitive carriers. 604 We conclude that the discrepancy in BellSouth’s line loss reports does not appear to be indicative of a systemic problem with BellSouth’s OSS and thus, does not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. In reaching this conclusion, we find that the discrepancies appear to be relatively limited in duration and scope and, based on this record, do not appear to be competitively significant. Moreover, we recognize that BellSouth has made repeated attempts to resolve these discrepancies and that WorldCom is the only carrier on the record that has raised this issue. Nevertheless, we expect that BellSouth will work closely with WorldCom, and any other affected carriers, to resolve any outstanding line loss discrepancies. To the extent that we are provided with evidence suggesting that these line loss discrepancies are systemic or that they are of greater scope and duration than is indicated in this record, we may take appropriate enforcement action pursuant to section 271( d)( 6). 164. We also reject Mpower’s claim that BellSouth continues to bill Mpower for disconnected lines. 605 In particular, BellSouth has explained that the service order process for both competitive LECs and BellSouth retail orders, stops billing for a particular line based on the completion date of the order requesting disconnection. 606 BellSouth also asserts that the proper billing transactions took place in a timely manner in all of the instances of improper billing alleged by Mpower. 607 Therefore, based on the record before us in this proceeding, we find that any problems experienced by Mpower are merely isolated incidents that are not systemic deficiencies in BellSouth’s billing systems. 165. Partial Migrations. Mpower maintains that BellSouth improperly discriminates against competitive LECs by requiring them to use multiple LSRs and CSRs for orders and accounts with multiple lines that BellSouth’s retail division has on a single account or one bill. 608 603 Also BellSouth explains that an error occurred with both reports from April 15 to May 6 as a result of a failure to transmit line loss notifications for certain disconnect activity. BellSouth discovered this problem on May 3 and implemented a fix on May 6, 2002. See BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 604 BellSouth has indicated that it placed a notice on the web report explaining how competitive LECs may obtain any missing records and informing them of this issue. See BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 605 Mpower GALA I Comments at 19; Mpower GALA II Comments at 13. 606 BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 60. This stop in billing occurs even if errors exist in the order that delay posting the order to the account. Id. 607 BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 15. 608 See Mpower GALA II Comments at 10- 11. We note that Mpower also claims BellSouth’s process for competitive LEC to competitive LEC conversions increase costs and cause a loss of facilities. Mpower GALA I Comments at 14- 15. However, Mpower fails to provide specific evidence to substantiate its claim and BellSouth states that it is not aware of competitive LECs actually experiencing any problems with competitive LEC to competitive LEC conversions. See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 237. 91 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 92 We are not persuaded, however, that BellSouth’s processes for ordering violate its section 271 obligations. BellSouth explains that Mpower’s claim relates to partial migrations, situations “where one or more telephone lines migrate to a competitive LEC, with at a minimum, at least one line remaining with the LEC,” that are complex and require more than one order. 609 Based on our findings that BellSouth’s performance data demonstrates that BellSouth handles competitive LEC orders in a nondiscriminatory manner, and a lack of evidence in the record to warrant a finding that BellSouth’s ordering process for such special circumstances impedes a competitive LEC’s ability to compete in a meaningful manner, we cannot conclude that this processes constitutes systematic discriminatory treatment of competitive LEC orders. e. Provisioning 166. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 610 that BellSouth provisions competitive LEC customers’ orders for UNE- P services in a nondiscriminatory manner. 611 We recognize that BellSouth’s performance in Georgia with respect to the Order Completion Interval performance metric, which measures the time it takes BellSouth to complete competitive LEC orders for a particular product type, appears to be substantially out of parity for several recent months. 612 We find, however, that 609 See BellSouth GALA I Reply Stacy Aff. at paras. 177- 84 (describing a variety of scenarios under which multiple orders are necessary to ensure proper customer conversion and stating, to its knowledge, that requiring multiple LSRs for partial migrations is common industry practice). 610 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 103, Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 40- 45. 611 BellSouth met or exceeded parity with the retail analogue for UNE- P orders in Louisiana for the five- month period and, in Georgia, exceeded parity for February and only missed parity for the five- month period, on average, by less than 0.5 day. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.1.3.1.1 (Order Completion Interval- Loop + Port Combo/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). 612 See Georgia B. 2.1.4.1.1 (Order Completion Interval- Combo Other). We note that BellSouth missed the same metric in Louisiana. Competitive LEC volumes, forty orders over a five month period, were not substantial enough, however, to warrant a finding of checklist item noncompliance in light of BellSouth’s overall performance. See Louisiana B. 2.1.4.1.1 (Order Completion Interval- Combo Other). We recognize the concerns of commenters that the Order Completion Interval measure fails to properly capture the provisioning interval from the time when a CELC sends its order to BellSouth to when an order is provisioned. See, e. g., Birch GALA I Comments at 26. We note that AT& T and Network Telephone also argue that the data BellSouth bases its calculation on is inaccurate. See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 80- 84, 126- 130; see generally Network Telephone March 26 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. (stating that some purchase order numbers were not found in BellSouth’s raw data). However, we find, based on the evidence in the record, that the current measure is useful in evaluating BellSouth’s performance for provisioning competitive LEC orders. See BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol. 4, Tab S, Reply Affidavit of Alphonso J. Varner (BellSouth GALA I Varner Reply Aff.) at para. 129 (explaining that the Order Completion Interval metric is a valuable indicator of BellSouth’s ability to provision orders, because the FOC timeliness measure already accounts for the period from which a competitive LEC submits an order and receives a FOC); BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at paras. 55- 56 (stating that alleged data problems raised by AT& T affect a small number of orders); BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff. at para. 113; BellSouth April 17 Ex Parte Letter at 4) (stating that less than 0. 5% of competitive LEC orders and less than 1. 0% of BellSouth retail orders are affected by the problems Network Telephone raises). See also Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 103- 04. We also reject claims regarding BellSouth’s performance for the Total Service Order Cycle Time (TSOCT) metric because we find that the FOC Timeliness and Order Completion Interval metrics are more probative as they actually (continued….) 92 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 93 BellSouth’s performance with regard to this metric does not warrant a finding of noncompliance. First, we find that the “missed appointments” metric that the Commission typically analyzes demonstrates parity performance for the relevant months. 613 Second, BellSouth has explained that the disparity in the order completion interval metric is attributable to the product mix of the retail analogue versus the wholesale measure. In particular, BellSouth notes that the retail analog consists of a large number of non- designed products with shorter intervals while the wholesale product mix consists primarily of extended enhanced loops (EELs) that, by design, require a longer interval. 614 Accordingly, this metric could suggest unequal treatment simply because a competitive LEC orders a disproportionate share of products with a longer provisioning interval. 615 Significantly, as held in prior orders, the Commission has discounted the relevance of this metric in prior section 271 orders where there is evidence of this “order mix” problem. 616 BellSouth states that it has reached an agreement with competitive LECs to create a separate disaggregation for EELs that has been proposed to the Georgia and Commission in Georgia to address this problem. 617 Once this metric is established for EELs, we expect that BellSouth’s performance should improve. 618 Based on the evidence in the record demonstrating that BellSouth generally provisions competitive LEC orders in a nondiscriminatory manner, we conclude that BellSouth is in compliance with this checklist item. Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate, we may pursue appropriate enforcement action. (Continued from previous page) compare BellSouth’s performance to either a benchmark or the retail analogue, whereas TSOCT is merely a diagnostic test. See generally Network Telephone March 26 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 613 See Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.5 (Missed Installation Appointments). We note that AT& T asserts that BellSouth improperly calculates the missed installation appointment metric. See AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 91- 93. BellSouth states that AT& T submitted a proposal to include second appointments for the metric but it was not included in an industry- consensus working document. See BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply at para. 57. Thus, we find, based on a lack of evidence in the record to the contrary, that this metric is reliable. See BellSouth GALA I Varner Reply Aff. at para. 154 (stating that the Missed Appointments measure is properly calculated). 614 See BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 6. 615 See id. See also Verizon Rhode Island Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 3334, para. 70. Although BellSouth agreed to this change in competitive LEC workshops, Cbeyond and AT& T criticize BellSouth’s performance for this metric, and Cbeyond specifically contends that BellSouth provides EELs to itself in 5 to 8 days compared to 10 days for competitors. See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 118, 126- 27; Cbeyond March 26 Ex Parte Letter at 2. However, BellSouth states that the Order Interval Guide for EELs lists intervals from 5 to 27 days depending on the type of EELs. See BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter at Attach. 6. As we explain above, we find that BellSouth generally provisions competitive LEC orders in a nondiscriminatory manner and that there is a lack of specific evidence in the record to the contrary. We defer to the Georgia Commission’s open deliberative processes to determine an appropriate benchmark for EELs. 616 See, e. g., Verizon Rhode Island Order, 17 FCC Rcd at 3334, para. 70 n. 190. 617 See BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter at 3. We note BellSouth’s statement that it will propose that the same disaggregation for EELs be included in the Louisiana SQM during the Louisiana Commission’s six- month review. See BellSouth April 16 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 618 See BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter Attach. 6 at 1- 2. 93 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 94 167. Quality service problems. We recognize that several competitive LECs complain of problems resulting from mishandled or delayed UNE- P conversions. In particular, competitive LECs argue that UNE- P customers experience a loss of dial tone because of problems associated with BellSouth’s two- order system for UNE- P conversions. 619 While we are concerned by complaints of instances where customers lose dial tone, we are not persuaded that BellSouth fails to provision competitive LEC orders in a nondiscriminatory manner. We are persuaded by the Georgia Commission’s analysis that the reports of loss of dial tone are exaggerated. 620 Specifically, the Georgia Commission states that only 0.18 percent of UNE- P requests from June through December had a possible conversion- related problem resulting in a loss of dial tone. 621 Because commenter’s claims affect a relatively small percentage of orders and BellSouth has reviewed its conversion performance and implemented the requisite steps to ensure that its OSS provides nondiscriminatory access to its provisioning systems and processes. 622 While we need not rely on enhancements to BellSouth’s provisioning systems and processes, we note that under the direction of the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, BellSouth implemented single “C” ordering in March to replace the two- order process. 623 Although competing competitive LECs complain that there is not enough time to properly evaluate BellSouth’s implementation of single “C” ordering, 624 BellSouth has also agreed, in the interim, to implement a performance measure to report the percentage of premature disconnection of UNE- P conversions associated with the two- order conversion process that will include a benchmark of 1 percent. 625 Similarly, we expect BellSouth to take the necessary steps 619 Commenters complain that customers experience a loss of dial tone when BellSouth improperly executes a disconnect (D) order before provisioning a new service (N) order. See e. g. AT& T GALA II Comments at 39- 40; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 5- 6; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 26; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 36- 37; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 5- 6. See also Xspedius GALA II Goodly Aff. at paras. 3- 8 (stating that loss of dial tone occurs where BellSouth disconnect customer despite being notified of a change in due date). 620 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 135- 36. 621 See Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 21 (citing data provided by BellSouth). BellSouth states that the percentage of UNE- P requests resulting in a loss of dial tone was 0.26% for January and 0.17% in February. See BellSouth April 16 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 622 See BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol 1A, Tab A, Affidavit of K. L. Ainsworth (BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff.). at para. 61 (stating that prior to single “C” ordering BellSouth reviewed its performance and taken the necessary steps to ensure that its OSS properly provisions conversions); see also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18456- 57, paras. 199- 200 (finding that SWBT’s three- order process, with alleged outage rates of 2.8% to 5.6%, did not warrant a finding of discriminatory access to SWBT’s provisioning systems and processes). 623 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 149 (stating that BellSouth implemented single “C” ordering in Release 10.4 on March 23, 2002). 624 See WorldCom March 26 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (stating that BellSouth is experiencing problems with the implementation for this release). BellSouth notes that testing had already begun as of Friday, March 24, 2002. See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Aff. at paras. 149- 50. 625 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at 182. 94 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 95 to cure any problems associated the implementation of single “C” ordering. We, therefore, are confident that this issue is resolved. We note, in accordance with section 271( d)( 6), that if BellSouth’s performance in this area regresses, we may pursue appropriate enforcement action. 168. To the extent that competitive LECs argue that BellSouth fails to provision UNE-P conversions and other services in a nondiscriminatory manner due to BellSouth’s own error or poor database records, 626 we conclude that these arguments are vague and lack supporting evidence in the record. 627 Thus, based on BellSouth’s performance data, its continued efforts to improve its provisioning of competitive LECs’ orders, and the support of the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, we conclude that BellSouth provisions competitive LECs’ orders in a nondiscriminatory manner. 628 f. Maintenance and Repair 169. We conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth provides nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair OSS functions. We find that BellSouth has “deployed the necessary interfaces, systems, and personnel to enable requesting carriers to access the same maintenance and repair functions” that BellSouth provides itself. 629 Moreover, competing carriers have access to these functions “in substantially the same time and manner” as BellSouth’s retail operations, and with an equivalent level of quality. 630 (i) Functionality 170. BellSouth offers competing carriers access to the same system and functionality that BellSouth uses for its retail operations. Most competing carriers use the Trouble Analysis Facilitation Interface (TAFI), the same interface BellSouth retail operations use, to handle any basic exchange service trouble reports (i. e. telephone number- based or non- designed services). 631 626 See, e. g., AT& T GALA II Comments at 20- 21; AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras 132- 36; AT& T GALA II Bursh Norris Decl. at paras. 126- 130; AT& T GALA II Seigler Decl. at paras. 2- 16; Mpower GALA II Comments at 8- 9; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 10- 11; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 4- 7. 627 See, e. g., BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 165 (stating that BellSouth provides competitive LECs with access to provisioning information in substantially the same time and manner as itself); see generally KPMG Final Report at III- B. 1 (O& P- 1); III- B. 3 (Test O& P- 2) (finding that BellSouth provides timely, clear, accurate and complete notifiers). 628 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 103, Louisiana Commission GALA I at 40- 45. 629 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4067, para. 211; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 108, 110; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 48- 49. See also BellSouth GALA I Application at 82. We also note that BTI asserts that BellSouth’s “repair services allow BTI to compete for local service in Georgia.” BTI GALA II Comments at 3. 630 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4067, para. 211. 631 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 49- 50, 393- 409. TAFI can be used to process trouble reports for port and loop combinations and high speed data connections (line sharing). Id. at para. 408. 95 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 96 Competing carriers also have access to the Electronic Communications Trouble Administration (ECTA) Gateway to achieve machine- to- machine access to maintenance and repair functions for resale and UNEs. 632 Commercial usage 633 and extensive testing by KPMG 634 demonstrate that BellSouth’s systems are functional and provide service to competitive LECs in a nondiscriminatory manner. 171. We reject AT& T’s assertion that TAFI does not provide parity with the functionality enjoyed by BellSouth retail because it cannot be integrated and because it cannot be used for all types of services. 635 Contrary to the Commission’s previous findings, BellSouth demonstrates that TAFI is not integrated with other BellSouth systems and that competitive LECs have equivalent access to the same functionality and information as BellSouth retail representatives. 636 We also reject AT& T’s argument that because ECTA is inferior to TAFI, users of ECTA do not have equivalent access to maintenance and repair functions. 637 We reject this argument on the same basis as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, finding BellSouth’s offer to include the functionality of TAFI into ECTA if AT& T pays for the development costs reasonable and nondiscriminatory because, as described above, competitive 632 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 51, 411- 17. ECTA is designed to meet the industry standard specifications for trouble administration and permits competitive LECs to open, modify, check the status of, and close trouble reports. Id. at para. 412. BellSouth notes that only three competing carriers have established an ECTA interface, and only one actively uses that interface. Id. at 51. 633 Performance data for providing access to the maintenance and repair databases show that BellSouth provides performance to competing carriers that is, in most cases, better than or equal to parity (or the benchmark level of performance). Georgia/ Louisiana D. 1.1 through D. 1.2 (% Interface Availability); Georgia/ Louisiana D. 1.3 through D. 1.4 (Average Response Interval at 4 seconds, 10 seconds, and greater than 10 seconds). While we note several instances where performance for competitive LECs is slightly below parity or benchmark performance, the difference is de minimis, not systemic, and not competitively significant. The Georgia Commission agrees that this disparity is “slight.” Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 109. 634 BellSouth satisfied all of KPMG’s criteria for both interfaces. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 392 (describing KPMG’s review of the TAFI interface), 411 (describing KPMG’s review of the ECTA interface). 635 AT& T GALA I Comments at 24; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. para. 159. 636 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 397. See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20694- 96, paras. 149- 52. Although the Commission raised some concerns in the BellSouth Second Louisiana Order about the importance of integrating maintenance and repair databases, more recently the Commission has found that “a BOC is not required, for the purpose of satisfying checklist item 2, to implement an application- to- application interface for maintenance and repair functions – provided it demonstrates that it provides equivalent access to its maintenance and repair functions in another manner.” Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4068, para. 215; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18458 n. 565. 637 AT& T GALA I Comments at 24- 25. 96 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 97 LECs have the same access to maintenance and repair functionality as BellSouth’s retail operations. 638 (ii) Time to Restore and Quality of Work Performed 172. We conclude that BellSouth “repairs trouble complaints for competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner that it repairs complaints from its own customers.” 639 We base our conclusion on the fact that, for the months October through February, BellSouth performed work faster for competing carriers than it did for its own customers. 640 We also find that BellSouth demonstrates that it “performs maintenance and repair work for customers of competing carriers at the same level of quality that it performs repair work for its retail customers.” 641 First, customers of competitive LECs were out of service for less time than BellSouth customers. 642 Second, the performance data indicate that BellSouth provides better than parity service in meeting repair appointments. 643 Third, we find that, generally, competing carriers and BellSouth report the same number of troubles and, therefore, BellSouth is “not discriminating against competing carriers in routine network maintenance and repair.” 644 Finally, 638 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at 147; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 48- 49; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 110; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 52. See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4069- 70, para. 215. 639 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4072, para. 220. 640 BellSouth reports perfect performance in Georgia against its retail analog for the “Maintenance Average Duration” metric and only one sub- metric out of parity for the month of January which we do not find problematic because volume for that sub- metric was one. Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3. 641 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4073, para. 222. 642 BellSouth nearly universally provided competing carriers better than parity performance in the “Out of Service after more than 24 hours” metric. Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.5. While Xspedius complains that its customers occasionally go without service, we note that the performance metrics do not show that BellSouth is acting in a discriminatory manner. Xspedius GALA II Comments at 12- 13. 643 BellSouth provides better than parity performance across all product categories, with a few de minimis exceptions. Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.1 (% Missed Repair Appointments). 644 Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.2.3.1 through B. 3.2.11 (Customer Trouble Report Rate). In particular, we note slightly higher trouble report rates in the “Combo Other” and “Other Non- design” product categories. Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.2.4 and B. 3.2.11 (showing an average disparity over 5 months in Georgia of less than 3% for “Combo Other - dispatch” metric and less than 6% for the “Other Non- design - dispatch” metric). See also AT& T GALA II Bush/ Norris Decl. at paras. 131- 35. BellSouth explains that the metric reports a substantial number of trouble tickets that, when checked by BellSouth technicians, are found to be functional. Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 2 (filed Mar. 22, 2002) (BellSouth March 22 Ex Parte Letter). However, AT& T, Mpower, and Xspedius note that BellSouth technicians occasionally do not identify problems that do exist and therefore incorrectly report the trouble ticket as not having a problem. AT& T GALA II Seigler Decl. at para. 12; Mpower GALA II Comments at 17; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 12- 13. While this anecdotal evidence questions the quality of repair investigations, our review of the record does not indicate a systemic or discriminatory problem. See BellSouth GALA II Ainsworth Reply Aff. at para. 59. 97 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 98 competing carriers generally report fewer repeat troubles than BellSouth customers indicating that BellSouth provides quality maintenance and repair services and is not closing out trouble tickets in a discriminatory manner. 645 g. Billing 173. Consistent with the determination of the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, we find that BellSouth provides nondiscriminatory access to its billing functions. 646 BellSouth must provide competing carriers with complete and accurate reports on the service usage of competing carriers’ customers in substantially the same time and manner that BellSouth provides such information to itself, and wholesale bills in a manner that gives competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. 647 BellSouth offers competing carriers access to a set of billing systems that are the same systems BellSouth uses for its own retail operations. 648 In combination, these billing systems provide competing carriers with all the information necessary to compete. 649 645 Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.1 through B. 3.4.11 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 days). See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4074- 75, para. 224. We note that a historic pattern of a high percentage of repeat troubles in the “Combo Other” category is improving as the average disparity between BellSouth and competitive LEC performance dropped to less than 6.5% in January and 7.4% in February after showing an average disparity of nearly 21% over the previous three months. Georgia B. 3.4.4.1 (Combo Other – Dispatch)( Commercial volumes for this product category in Louisiana are low thus making them less reliable). BellSouth explains that this improvement is the result of “an aggressive program to refer all chronic trouble circuits to a ‘chronics group’ for remediation” in the CWINS Center. BellSouth March 22 Ex Parte Letter at 2. BellSouth also demonstrates that by removing the 5 repeat troubles closed as “test okay / found okay,” the January results for Georgia would be 20.51% (compared with 18.34% for the BellSouth retail analog – a disparity of only 2.17%). Id. Finally, we note NewSouth’s recognition of BellSouth’s “improved responsiveness” to “chronic trouble customers.” NewSouth GALA II Comments at 4- 5. 646 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 111; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 49. 647 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9043- 44, para. 97; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4075, para. 226. 648 BellSouth provides bills to competing carriers and its own retail customers using two main systems. First, the Customer Records Information System (CRIS) is used to accumulate, rate, and format billing transactions for all toll calls, local calls, per- use vertical services, and service requests for unbundled switch ports and unbundled loops. BellSouth GALA I Application at 87; BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 7, Tab S, Affidavit of David Scollard (BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff.) at para. 10. The only difference for competing carriers is a sub- system of CRIS (BellSouth Industrial Billing System) which provides competing carriers information on switch port usage. Second, the Carrier Access Billing System (CABS) is used to bill all other UNE and interconnection services. BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 11. BellSouth also provides to competing carriers a set of Daily Usage Files (DUFs) which record usage data for all call events. BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 32. 649 In response to concerns raised by the Commission in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, BellSouth added two types of billing functionality to its existing usage reporting systems. First, BellSouth added the Enhanced Optional Daily Usage File (EODUF) to report on usage originating from competitive LEC flat- rated resold lines. BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 33; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20698, paras. 159- 60. Second, BellSouth added the Access Daily Usage File (ADUF) to provide competing LECs and interexchange carriers with records for billing interstate and intrastate access charges and reciprocal compensation charges for (continued….) 98 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 99 174. BellSouth’s performance data demonstrate its ability to provide competing carriers with billing usage information in substantially the same time and manner that BellSouth provides such information to itself, and carrier bills in a manner that gives competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. BellSouth consistently has met, with minor exceptions, the Georgia and Louisiana benchmarks for timeliness, accuracy, and completeness in sending out billing usage information 650 and for carrier bills. 651 Moreover, in finding that competing carriers have a meaningful opportunity to compete, we rely on third- party testing in Georgia which found BellSouth’s billing system to be accurate and reliable. 652 175. While several commenters describe problems with BellSouth’s billing systems, the record does not indicate that BellSouth fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to its billing functions. First, we reject WorldCom’s claim that, after the provisioning of an order is completed, delays in adding the new information to BellSouth’s billing system cause significant competitive harm that could be solved if BellSouth provided billing completion notifiers. 653 While it recognizes the benefits of billing completion notifiers, the Commission has previously approved section 271 applications where the BOC does not provide such a notifier. 654 BellSouth (Continued from previous page) calls originating from and terminating to unbundled switch ports. See BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 33; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20733- 37, paras. 230- 34. 650 BellSouth provides timely, accurate, and complete usage data. Georgia/ Louisiana F. 9.2 (DUF Delivery Timeliness); Georgia/ Louisiana F. 9.1 (DUF Delivery Accuracy); Georgia/ Louisiana F. 9.3 (DUF Delivery Completeness); F. 9.4 (Mean Time to Deliver Usage – Regional). 651 BellSouth provides timely, accurate, and complete carrier bills. See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 4.1 (Invoice Accuracy – Resale); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 4.1 (Invoice Accuracy – UNE); Georgia/ Louisiana A. 4.2 (Mean Time to Deliver Resale Invoices – CRIS); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 4.2 (Mean Time to Deliver UNE Invoices – CRIS). Performance data show that BellSouth has not consistently met parity or benchmark performance for charge completeness, particularly for non- recurring charges for interconnection. See AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at paras. 136- 37. While performance declined in January for UNEs and Resale, February performance regained its former levels of performance indicating that this was an isolated incident. See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 9.6. BellSouth explains that the drop in performance for this metric in January, for UNEs, resale and interconnection, resulted from the manual back billing BellSouth undertook to recover OSS charges for cancelled orders. BellSouth Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 18; BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 3- 4. BellSouth asserts, and we agree, that this one-time back- billing for cancelled order charges does not affect a competitive LEC’s ability to bill its customers for services provided because customers are likely only to be billed for the non- cancelled orders and, furthermore, carriers were given prior notice of this billing effort. Id. See also BellSouth GALA II Varner Aff., Ex. PM- 26 at 23 (describing the variety and complexity of correcting errors in non- recurring interconnection bills and new training for personnel). Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate, we may pursue appropriate enforcement action. 652 See KPMG MTP Final Report at III- C- 1 through III- C- 12 (Summary of Tests BLG1 through BLG5) and at VI-A through VI- F (Billing Results and Analysis). 653 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 25- 26; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 27- 34; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Aff. at paras. 21- 23. 654 The Commission has cited the billing completion notifier provided by Verizon as being beneficial to competitive LECs. Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4053- 54, para. 188; Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17446- 47, paras. 43- 44. In the SWBT Texas Order, the Commission “recognized that [a billing (continued….) 99 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 100 acknowledges that, when including orders into its billing system, a small percentage of orders include errors that require updating and are placed into a “hold file.” 655 BellSouth demonstrates that this same process is used for orders for BellSouth retail customers and there is no evidence of a systemic problem. 656 176. We reject commenters’ assertions that BellSouth improperly threatens to discontinue service for failure to pay disputed bills. 657 There is no evidence that demonstrates that BellSouth acts in a discriminatory manner or denies competitors a reasonable opportunity to compete. 658 To the extent that billing disputes arise, carriers are able to address their disputes through BellSouth’s billing dispute resolution process. 177. We also reject Covad’s claim that BellSouth’s provision of online account services to its retail customers, which are not available to its wholesale customers, means that BellSouth’s billing systems are discriminatory. 659 The Commission’s rules do not require a BOC to provide access to billing information in substantially the same manner that the BOC provides such information to its end- user customers. Rather, the Commission has held that nondiscriminatory access to billing OSS means that the BOC must provide reports on service usage to competing carriers “in substantially the same time and manner that [the BOC] provides (Continued from previous page) completion] notice can play a crucial role of informing the carrier that it can begin billing the customer for service and addressing any maintenance problems,” but relied on an provisioning completion notice, similar to the type of notice BellSouth provides, and the billing completeness metric that demonstrated that 98% of orders post to its billing system by the next billing cycle. SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18448- 49, 18451, paras, 187, 191. 655 BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 9 (stating that the “hold file” into which certain orders fall for corrections before the CSR can be updated accounts for only 0.6% of all orders in Georgia, 0.5% in Louisiana, and 0.7% for BellSouth retail); BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (same). BellSouth also demonstrates that 80% of all orders are posted in 1 day, 93% posted in three days, and 98% posted in five days. AT& T GALA II Reply Attach. 4 (BellSouth Post Workshop Comments) at 7. BellSouth also shows that the problem is minimal for WorldCom. BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 10; BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at paras. 54- 58. BellSouth also demonstrates that this “hold file” will not increase in light of the relaxed database validation for TN migration orders because its billing system does not validate the service address field against the CSR and, therefore, variations in the service address field between the RSAG database and the CSR will not affect CSR posting to billing. BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply at para. 3; BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 656 BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 9. 657 Covad GALA I Comments at 44; Mpower et al. GALA I Comments at 17- 18; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 45. 658 BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 17. But see Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17436- 37, para. 29 (The Commission was given further assurance that the extraordinary billing disputes described in that order would not adversely impact competing carriers because Verizon did not require immediate payment of bills in dispute). 659 See Covad GALA I Comments at 44. 100 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 101 such information to itself.” 660 We thus decline to expand our definition of nondiscriminatory access to billing information in this proceeding, but note that BellSouth must provide information to competitive LECs in a manner that allows them to construct their own online billing information systems as BellSouth retail operations do. Commenters also claim that the way BellSouth uses Billing Account Numbers (BANs) is confusing. 661 We do not believe that this is competitively significant because BellSouth has documentation explaining its wholesale bills and has demonstrated that legitimate auditing reasons exist for multiple BANs. 662 178. Commenters also raise some miscellaneous assertions regarding BellSouth’s billing system. For example, Network Telephone asserts that it was billed excessively for a one time retrieval of historical ADUF records. 663 BellSouth explains that significant work by an outside programmer was required to produce these records because they pre- dated Network Telephone’s request to receive DUF bills, and also that an estimated upfront payment is required for all requests of this type with any excess payment returned upon completion. 664 Moreover, Network Telephone’s contention stems from contractual terms between Network Telephone and Accenture that we are not willing to resolve in the context of a section 271 application. WorldCom also claims that BellSouth’s billing dispute resolution process is inadequate for disputes that pertain to a group of records with similar issues. 665 We reject these assertions because we find that BellSouth demonstrates sufficient processes to resolve billing disputes in a nondiscriminatory manner. 666 We also note BellSouth’s efforts to resolve billing issues with Mpower. 667 We find that these are isolated disputes and do not rise to the level of checklist noncompliance. 660 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4075, para. 226 (emphasis added). See BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol. 2, Tab N, Reply Affidavit of David Scollard (BellSouth GALA I Scollard Reply) at para. 16. 661 See Covad GALA I Comments at 44; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 45. 662 BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 5; BellSouth GALA I Scollard Reply at paras. 8, 16. 663 Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 8. 664 BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 2. 665 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 82- 84. 666 BellSouth GALA II Scollard Reply Aff. at para. 14 (describing Mpower’s claim by stating that the disputes Mpower claims BellSouth cannot track are the result of those disputes being clarified back to the competitive LEC due to insufficient information); Id. at para. 7 (describing that problems with multiple records can be submitted using the current reporting form and that electronic submission of records is redundant because BellSouth already has access to the records). See also BellSouth GALA I Scollard Reply at para. 22; BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 1a, Tab A, Affidavit of Ken Ainsworth (BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff.) at paras. 196- 202 (describing BellSouth’s billing dispute resolution processes). 667 BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter at 4- 5; Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35, Apr. 5, 2002 (BellSouth April 5 Ex Parte Letter). See Mpower GALA II Reply at 10. 101 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 102 h. Change Management and Technical Assistance (i) Change Management Process 179. In its prior orders, the Commission has explained that it must review the BOC’s change management procedures to determine whether these procedures afford an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete by providing sufficient access to the BOC’s OSS. 668 In evaluating whether a BOC’s change management plan affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, we first assess whether the plan is adequate by determining whether the evidence demonstrates: (1) that information relating to the change management process is clearly organized and readily accessible to competing carriers; (2) that competing carriers had substantial input in the design and continued operation of the change management process; (3) that the change management plan defines a procedure for the timely resolution of change management disputes; (4) the availability of a stable testing environment that mirrors production; and (5) the efficacy of the documentation the BOC makes available for the purpose of building an electronic gateway. 669 After determining whether the BOC’s change management plan is adequate, we evaluate whether the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this plan. 670 (a) Adequacy of the Change Management Plan 180. Change Management Plan Organization. We find that BellSouth’s Change Control Process became effective in August 2000 as a result of a collaborative effort between BellSouth and competing carriers. 671 BellSouth’s Change Control Process is memorialized in a single document entitled, “Change Control Process.” 672 This document sets forth the process and 668 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999- 4000, paras. 102- 103; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18403- 04, paras. 106- 08. 669 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18404, para. 108. We have noted previously that we are open to consideration of change management plans that differ from those already found to be compliant with the requirements of section 271. Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4004, para. 111; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC at 18404, para. 109. 670 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999, para. 101, 4004- 05, para. 112. 671 Beginning in October 1997, BellSouth began discussions with competing carriers about the creation of a region- wide change control process and in May 1998, BellSouth’s Electronic Interface Change Control Process (EICCP) became effective. Then, in January 2000, BellSouth initiated discussions on improving certain deficiencies in the EICCP. Eventually, the scope of the process was expanded to include defect changes, all documentation, software, and BellSouth- initiated changes that are competing carrier affecting, ordering and pre-ordering manual processes, and a formalized escalation process. After a period of interim use, the current Change Control Process was approved by participating competing carriers. See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 97- 105. 672 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff., App. A, Vol. 1c, Tab C, Ex. SVA- 38, Change Control Process, Version 2.7 (Dec. 7, 2001) (“ Change Control Process”). The Change Control Process document and other related forms are available on BellSouth’s website and is updated to reflect changes. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 112, 120. 102 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 103 procedures that govern the communication and management of changes to electronic interfaces and related manual processes that affect external users of BellSouth’s Electronic Interface Applications. 673 181. The Commission looks for “mechanisms to ensure the timely and effective transition from one [interface] release to another,” thus showing that competitors have a meaningful opportunity to compete. 674 We find that BellSouth’s versioning process, which allows competing carriers to continue to use an old version of the interface after a new one is released, provides a mechanism sufficient to protect competing carriers from premature cut-overs and disruptive changes to their interfaces to BellSouth’s OSS. 675 In addition, competing carriers are able to provide input at release package meetings before a release. 676 Therefore, we reject the assertion that the lack of a process whereby competing carriers can decide whether or not to implement a new release (i. e., “go/ no go” vote) deprives competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete, despite BellSouth’s versioning process. 677 We encourage BellSouth to continue to accept and consider any input from competitive LECs regarding software problems they discover during testing before BellSouth decides to implement a new software release. 673 See Change Control Process at 12- 13. The Change Control Process is designed to accommodate six different categories of changes: Type 1 requests are for system outages; Type 2 requests are for changes mandated by regulatory authorities; Type 3 changes are for updating interfaces to an industry standard; Type 4 requests are BellSouth initiated changes; Type 5 requests are competitive LEC initiated changes; and, Type 6 requests are to correct system defects. Change Control Process, Part 3 at 15- 16; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 123. The process for each type is well defined, including timeliness intervals, and an expedited procedure is also available for all Types 2 through 5 change requests. Change Control Process, Parts 4- 5 at 18- 53. We also note that the scope of the Change Control Process recently has been expanded allowing the group to discuss an even broader array of interface issues. BellSouth April 9 Ex Parte Letter, attach. A at 3- 4. We also note that our prior orders recognize that changes that do not impact OSS interfaces are not necessarily required to be a part of a change management process. Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17451, para. 51 (accepting Verizon’s argument that “the changes to the BOS BDT billing systems are ‘back- office’ OSS changes that do not impact OSS interfaces”). 674 SWBT Texas Order 15 FCC Rcd at 18408- 09, para. 115. 675 BellSouth continuously supports two industry standard versions of the TAG and EDI interfaces keeping the “old” version unchanged so that competing carriers are not forced suddenly to switch to a new interface. BellSouth does not provide versioning for LENS because LENS does not require competing carriers to reprogram interfaces. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 148- 51. In the SWBT Texas Order, the Commission noted favorably that SWBT employed a go/ no go vote, but also noted that SWBT had not yet implemented a versioning process by which competing carriers can continue to use an older version of the OSS interfaces for a period after a new version has been released. See id. at 18406- 07, para. 112. 676 Change Control Process at 32 (step 8 of the process flow for request types 2- 5). 677 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 17; AT& T GALA I Comments at 27. While it is crucial that a change management process include assurances that changes to existing OSS interfaces will not disrupt competing carriers’ use of the BOC’s OSS, the Commission has never held that any particular safeguard is required. See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4004- 05, para. 110; SWBT Texas Order 15 FCC Rcd at 18406, para. 112. See also Common Carrier Bureau, Strickling Letter to US West (Sept. 27, 1999) at 3. 103 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 104 182. Competing Carrier Input. We find that BellSouth’s Change Control Process was created with, and provides for substantial input from, competing carriers. 678 First, the document provides for regularly scheduled change control meetings between BellSouth and competing carriers. 679 Additionally, the Change Control Process provides for feedback from competing carriers through a process in which competing carriers rank all “[ competitive] LEC affecting” change requests. 680 Furthermore, the Change Control Process is not a static process, but rather allows participants to amend the process. 681 As noted in previous section 271 applications, “a key component of an effective change management process is the existence of a forum in which both competing carriers and the BOC can work collaboratively to improve the method by which changes to the BOCs OSS are implemented.” 682 To this end, the Change Control Process allows BellSouth and competitive LECs to continue to discuss and implement improvements to the process. 683 183. Competing carriers that wish to introduce a change to BellSouth’s OSS may submit a change request to the Change Control Process. 684 The BellSouth change control manager validates the change unless the change goes beyond BellSouth’s obligations under Commission orders, is not technically feasible, or requires BellSouth to make a substantial investment for a limited competing carrier benefit. 685 After the initiator of the change presents its proposal to the members of the Change Control Process at the next monthly meeting, competitive LECs jointly prioritize change requests using information BellSouth provides about 678 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 97- 105; BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 28- 34 (describing how competing carriers helped design the change control process). Our analysis of competing carriers on- going influence in the process is consistent with the third party review by KPMG which found that BellSouth’s “change management process includes procedures for allowing input from all interested parties.” KPMG Final Report, Test CM- 1- 1- 4, at VIII- A- 20. 679 Meetings to prioritize competitive LEC- affecting change requests are held quarterly. The process also dictates monthly meetings to discuss the status of change requests and of the process itself. Change Control Process at 54. 680 See Change Control Process at 55- 56. 681 See Change Control Process at 65- 66. 682 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18410, para. 117. 683 Among the recent improvements are improvements to the information competitive LECs have about the status of change requests and software releases (including a quarterly tracking report and documentation reflecting how the business and programming rules are affected by each release) and improved access to BellSouth technology experts. BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 109- 114. See also KPMG MTP Final Report, Test CM- 1- 1- 4, at VIII- A- 20. 684 See supra note 673. 685 See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 49- 50; Change Control Process at 28 (describing the acceptance process for request types 2- 5). We note that two new performance metrics will measure whether BellSouth performs this step within the 10 day interval (CM- 7) and will measure how many requests are denied by BellSouth for any of the reasons stated above (CM- 8). BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 119- 22; BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 54. 104 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 105 the approximate size of each change request feature and estimates of available capacity in future releases. 686 BellSouth then internally reviews the prioritization and sequences change requests beginning with the top priority request 687 and, although we do not rely on this, BellSouth has agreed to implement change requests within 60 weeks after prioritization, subject to capacity restraints. 688 We find that BellSouth demonstrates that the Change Control Process allows for substantial input from competing carriers because it allows competing carriers to prioritize change requests and that input, along with that of other stakeholders, is directly used to develop an overall release package. 689 184. We reject commenters’ allegations that BellSouth utilizes a “veto power” to deny change requests from acceptance into the Change Control Process. 690 While BellSouth retains some discretion about whether requests are accepted into the process, BellSouth must justify its 686 In preparation for the monthly meeting presentation, BellSouth has 5- 7 business days to prepare a preliminary assessment of the size and scope of the proposed change. Change Control Process at 29- 31 (steps 4 and 5 of the process flow for request types 2- 5), Section 6 at 54- 57 (detailing the prioritization process). Although we do not rely on this for purposes of checklist compliance, we note that BellSouth recently has provided competitive LECs with available capacity and a release schedule for each release planned for 2003 which will provide competitive LECs an additional tool to more efficiently prioritize change requests. Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 02- 35 at 5 (filed May 9, 2002) (BellSouth May 9 Ex Parte Letter); Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed May 14, 2002) (BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter) (describing release capacity estimates for BellSouth releases for the next 18 months). 687 Change Control Process at 31 (step 7 of the process flow for request types 2- 5), 57. BellSouth adequately explains its internal processes to competing carriers through documentation and discussions at Change Control Process meetings. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 58 & Ex. OSS- 5, OSS- 6. Also, as noted above, competing carriers have an opportunity for input at release package meetings. Supra para. 181 & n. 676. 688 BellSouth Feb. 27 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 38 (BellSouth’s “greenline” version of the Change Control Process describing its willingness to adhere to a 60- week implementation timeframe for implementation of change requests subject to capacity restraints); BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 689 Change Control Process at 31- 32 (step 7 of the process flow for request types 2- 5 stating, “[ s] izing and sequencing of prioritized change requests will begin with the top priority items and continue down through the list until the capacity constraints have been reached for the next release”). See also BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 57- 58 (describing this effort as a “monumental balancing act”). We have previously held that “we would be concerned about the impact of a BOC disregarding input from competing carriers on change management issues.” Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4011- 12, para. 124. The record indicates that BellSouth works to include competing carrier input in the form of change requests and changes to the process itself. See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 152- 53; see generally BellSouth May 9 Ex Parte Letter (describing recent improvements to the Change Control Process developed collaboratively with competitive LECs). 690 See AT& T GALA II Comments at 22; AT& T GALA I Comments at 26- 27; Covad GALA I Comments at 31, 34; CompTel GALA I Comments at 6; Letter from Joan Marsh, Director, Federal Government Affairs, AT& T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 2- 3 (filed April 19, 2002) (AT& T April 19 Ex Parte Letter). Covad March 28 Ex Parte Letter at 2; Covad Nov. 19 Ex Parte Letter at 3; Letter from AT& T to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 4 (filed May 13, 2002) (AT& T May 13 Ex Parte Letter). 105 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 106 decisions within a 10 business- day interval based upon reasons specified by the Change Control Process and BellSouth’s decision is subject to appeal. 691 Just as the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions found, we find the Change Control Process is designed to allow substantial input by competing carriers and provides sufficient channels of appeal to address complaints about the process. 692 185. Competing carriers argue there is a lack of transparency and definition to the process that determines which change requests are ultimately packaged into new releases. 693 This, in turn, they claim, limits their ability to provide valuable input at this stage in the process. Initially, we note that the process requires BellSouth to adhere closely to the competitive LEC prioritization ranking. 694 Additionally, in an effort to address this alleged lack of transparency, BellSouth has explained to competitive LECs the criteria it uses to make decisions during the internal prioritization step of the Change Control Process. 695 We also note that BellSouth has improved the availability of its technical and subject matter experts at meetings to address competitive LEC questions and, although we do not rely on this, BellSouth has proposed several process changes designed to improve how it communicates the technical aspects of planned system changes with competitive LECs. 696 We encourage BellSouth to continue to collaborate with competitive LECs through this important process. 697 691 Change Control Process at 28 (step 3 of the process flow for types 2- 5), 60 (escalation process); See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 128 (finding that no veto power exists and that BellSouth provides a reason for its response when it rejects a change request by a competing carrier). We also note the development in Georgia of a new metric designed to measure how often BellSouth denies changes from entry into the Change Control Process and how quickly BellSouth performs this review. See supra note 685. 692 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 128; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments, Exhibit 1 at 67 (Staff’s Final Recommendation in Louisiana Commission Docket Number U- 22252- E). But see AT& T GALA I Reply at 21. 693 See AT& T GALA I Comments at 28; CompTel GALA I Comments at 6- 7; CompTel GALA I Conquest Decl. at 3; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 38. Indeed, after competing carriers vote to establish a prioritized list of competing carrier- affecting change requests, the Change Control Process sets forth an internal BellSouth prioritization process. See Change Control Process at 31- 32 (step 7 of the process flow for request types 2- 5), 57. See also BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 57- 58. During this process, a BellSouth Internal Release Prioritization Team reviews the input from competing carriers as well as other stakeholder groups (including regulatory requests, internal BellSouth requests) and prioritizes all requests into a master list. See Id.; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 139. Then, with the help of a BellSouth information technology (IT) Team, the Release Prioritization Team determines which change requests will be packaged into the next release. See Change Control Process at 31- 32 (step 7 of the process flow for change requests types 2- 5). Finally, the release package determined by the Internal Release Prioritization Team is presented to the Change Control Process participants at a Release Package Meeting. Change Control Process at 32- 33 (step 8 of the process flow for request types 2- 5). 694 See discussion of BellSouth’s internal review process at note 689 supra. 695 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 58 & Ex. OSS- 5, OSS- 6. 696 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 112; BellSouth April 9 Ex Parte Letter, attach. A at 3 (describing increased technical staff involvement early in the process, as well as forums between BellSouth and (continued….) 106 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 107 186. Dispute Resolution. Additionally, we find that the BellSouth Change Control Process “defines a procedure for the timely resolution of change management disputes.” 698 The Change Control Process provides definitive response intervals for three levels of escalation internally within BellSouth and permits disputes to be escalated to the state commission level. 699 We note that, despite the numerous complaints in this proceeding, competing carriers have escalated very few disputes in the Change Control Process and none of these disputes have been escalated through the process to a state commission. 700 187. Testing Environment. We find that both BellSouth’s [Competitive LEC] Application Verification Environment (CAVE) and “original” testing environments allow competing carriers the means to successfully adapt to changes in BellSouth’s OSS. 701 A stable (Continued from previous page) competitive LEC technical personnel including the sharing of how new features will be designed to flow through the systems). 697 We recognize that some discrete steps in a change management process may necessarily involve less collaboration than others. However, we note that effective change management processes require a good working relationship between BOCs and competing carriers and that efforts to develop more transparent processes enhance the usefulness of the process for both competing carriers as well as BOCs. In fact, through a collaborative effort in the Change Control Process actively monitored by the Georgia Commission, participants are negotiating improvements to the feature sizing and resource allocation elements of the Change Control Process as well as possibly adding intervals for implementing features that could improve the transparency of software release decisions. We encourage BellSouth to continue to accommodate competitive LEC requests to improve the transparency and effectiveness of its Change Control Process. 698 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18404, para. 108. Change Control Process, Section 8 at 59- 63. See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 35- 40; BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter, Ex. 10 (describing the Change Control Process escalation process); BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 134- 39. These procedures were developed jointly by BellSouth and competing carriers through the Change Control Process and they adequately protect competing carriers against competitively harmful decisions by the Change Control Process. 699 The process dictates a five day response interval for each level of escalation for most disputes and even shorter intervals for very urgent matters. Change Control Process, Section 8 at 60- 63 (describing the escalation process including intervals for escalation responses and lists of contacts), 64 (describing the availability of mediation by or direct complaint to a state commission); BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter at attach. 10. BellSouth explains that managers at the third level have broad decision- making authority and have internally escalated issues even higher in order to satisfactorily address issues. Id. BellSouth has also proposed adding to the Change Control Process a higher fourth level of escalation. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 40. 700 Georgia Commission GALA I Reply at 19; Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 2; BellSouth May 9 Ex Parte Letter at 10. See, e. g., Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation, at 29 (stating that complaints about the Change Control Process “abound”). 701 BellSouth provides two testing environments as a part of its change control process. First, its “original” testing environment is used to allow competing carriers to shift from a manual process to an electronic interface, or when upgrading to a new industry standard. See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 98; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 152. Second, BellSouth offers its more recently developed CAVE test environment to test the ordering and pre- ordering functions of upgrades to the EDI, TAG, and LENS interfaces. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 167- 68. See BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 144 (describing how CAVE is becoming available for testing the LENS interface). 107 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 108 testing environment that mirrors the production environment and is physically separate from it is a fundamental part of a change management process ensuring that competing carriers are capable of interacting smoothly and effectively with a BOC’s OSS, especially in adapting to interface upgrades. 702 Moreover, a testing environment that mirrors production avoids a “competing carrier’s transactions succeeding in the testing environment but failing in production.” 703 The record indicates that CAVE is physically separate through all of the order and pre- order functions, except for the shared use of the service order processor and some necessary use of back- end databases. 704 To ensure that test orders are completely segregated from production orders, CAVE employs several safeguards to prevent test orders from interfering with live orders. 705 Similarly, third- party testing in Georgia found the “original” testing environment to be sufficiently segregated from production through both logical and structural means. 706 Additionally, the record shows that carriers are able to test new releases without substantial difficulty. 707 Finally, we note that BellSouth’s versioning process provides additional assurance of smooth transitions between releases. 708 188. We reject commenters’ allegations that the CAVE testing environment is not physically separate from production. 709 In particular, WorldCom claims that certain test orders 702 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18419, para. 132. Without the ability to test new releases prior to sending “live” orders, competing carriers might be unable to process orders accurately and provision new customer services without delays.” Id. 703 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18419, para. 132. 704 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 102. This eliminates potential synchronization problems. BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 138. Although CAVE was not tested in Georgia by third party reviewers, the record shows that, “[ t] o date, multiple [competitive] LECs have submitted well over 100 test orders in CAVE with no conflicts between test and production data.” Id.; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 107. 705 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 138; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 104- 06 (describing the hard- coding of all test account orders which keeps test orders separate from production). 706 STP Final Report, Test CM- 2- 1- 7, at VII- A- 24 through VII- A- 25. 707 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 101, 169. SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18422, para. 139 (it is important that “the vast majority of carriers are able to achieve production status and test new releases without substantial difficulty”). We also note that BellSouth recently has relaxed the requirements for renewing testing agreements and for developing test sets. Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed Apr. 22, 2002) (April 22 Ex Parte Letter). 708 For additional discussion of mechanisms BellSouth provides to enable smooth transitions from one interface version to another, see our discussion of BellSouth’s versioning process at para. 181 supra. 709 WorldCom GALA II Comments at 19- 20; AT& T GALA I Comments at 29; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 41. 108 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 109 flowed to WorldCom’s production environment. 710 Like the Department of Justice, we find that because the only incident on which commenters rely is heavily disputed, and because no other incidents have been reported by any carrier, including WorldCom, the record persuades us that CAVE does not interfere with production orders and, thus, that it is a physically separate testing environment. 711 189. Based on the evidence in the record, we also reject several arguments that AT& T and WorldCom advance asserting that BellSouth’s test environments do not “mirror” the production environment. First, we reject the assertion that in order to be useful, CAVE must fully test orders end- to- end. 712 The Commission has approved test environments that do not fully test end- to- end, stating, “competing carriers are able to test adequately OSS changes prior to their implementation as long as the testing and production environments perform the same key functions.” 713 While CAVE tests the ability of orders to process through provisioning, we note that end- to- end testing is available for major releases in the original testing environment. 714 Second, we reject the allegation that test orders are improperly treated differently than production orders. 715 Commenters have provided this general assertion, but without evidence that the test environment fails to perform the same key functions as the production environment. 716 Finally, we reject AT& T’s allegation that the CAVE test scenarios do not 710 In its comments, WorldCom alleges a mix- up of over 1,500 live orders with test orders, inferring that a lack of separateness impacts live orders. WorldCom GALA I Comments at 42; see also Department of Justice GALA I Evaluation at 27. 711 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 15. BellSouth investigated and found no evidence that these orders were misdirected but rather found that the orders were reflowed properly to WorldCom. BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at 140; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 108. CAVE has been used by competitive LECs on many occasions since WorldCom’s complaint and no further claims have been made asserting misdirected orders. Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 15; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 141. 712 AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at para. 211. 713 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18422, para. 138. In the SWBT Texas Order, the Commission noted that the ability of a testing environment to test through the posting of an order to the billing system is an important tool in providing competing carriers the assurance that new release will function as intended. SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18422- 23, paras. 139- 40. 714 For industry- standard releases, carriers have the opportunity to test orders “end- to- end” through to the posting to billing systems in BellSouth’s original testing environment. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 159 (describing the “Production Verification Testing” phase of the original testing environment). See also KPMG STP Final Report, Test CM- 2- 1- 6, at VII- A- 22 through VII- A- 24. 715 WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 164. 716 BellSouth demonstrates that CAVE test sets are inherently treated differently only because the environment address is different and test monitors must track the test sets as they flow through the system, but that the test orders flow through the test systems just as they would in production. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 115- 16. See also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18421- 22, paras. 136, 138 (describing how manual monitoring of the test process does not affect the adequacy of the test environment because “the testing and productions (continued….) 109 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 110 completely mirror what individual carriers typically order in the production environment. 717 BellSouth demonstrates that carriers can acquire test orders different from those in the standard catalog to more closely match a competitive LEC’s production orders. 718 We also note that CAVE provides testing for a wide variety of competitive LEC order types. 719 190. In addition, we disagree with commenters’ assertions that CAVE is not sufficiently available. 720 We find BellSouth demonstrates that, in December 2001 and January 2002, it expanded the availability of CAVE by scheduling availability around releases for the remainder of the year. 721 The Commission has never previously required a full- time testing environment and we find the window of CAVE availability around releases is consistent with our precedent. 722 We also reject the assertion that CAVE has insufficient capacity as no competing carrier has alleged an inability to submit a test LSR due to limited capacity. 723 Finally, competitors claim that the exclusion of LENS and RoboTAG from the CAVE testing environment burdens the ability of competitors to switch to new interface releases. 724 We note (Continued from previous page) environments perform the same key functions” and the practice allows most carriers to adequately test new software). SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18421- 22, para. 138. 717 AT& T Bradbury GALA I Decl. at para. 215. 718 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 158, 173. 719 Only one competitive LEC argued that CAVE was inadequate because it was not equipped to handle a specific type of order. Covad GALA I Reply at 10- 11 (asserting that Covad could not test xDSL orders). BellSouth subsequently implemented xDSL ordering, as well as improved loop makeup systems and line- splitting for the LENS interface, into CAVE in December 2001. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply at paras. 122- 24. No other parties commented that CAVE lacked the ability to test certain types of orders. 720 AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl., Attach. 50; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 51; WorldCom GALA I Reply at 7; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 43. 721 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 143. The Department of Justice notes that “[ t] he scheduled availability of the CAVE system [ ] has been substantially improved for the balance of this year and that should facilitate its effective use by the CLECs.” Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 15. 722 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4010, para. 121. 723 AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at para. 216. BellSouth, demonstrates that it reasonably planned for adequate capacity and that the maximum simultaneous use of CAVE so far has been three users. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 110. We expect that if competitive LEC increase their demand for CAVE to the point that CAVE’s current capacity is insufficient, that BellSouth will increase the capacity of CAVE to provide competitive LECs a meaningful opportunity to test new releases. See id. (stating, if “demand increases, BellSouth will address any issues regarding the number of simultaneous users”). 724 Birch GALA I Comments at 30- 32; Birch GALA I Wagner Decl. at paras. 11- 18; AT& T GALA I Comments at 30; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 219- 21. 110 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 111 that competing carriers can now test LENS in the CAVE environment 725 and that the impact of not including RoboTAG in CAVE is minimal. 726 191. Documentation Adequacy. We find that BellSouth provides documentation sufficient to allow competing carriers to design their systems in a manner that will allow them to communicate with BellSouth’s relevant interfaces. 727 In particular, BellSouth demonstrates that it makes available sufficiently detailed interface design specifications to offer competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. 728 BellSouth demonstrates compliance with its documentation responsibilities by showing satisfaction of the Georgia third- party test efforts to build an interface as well as demonstrating that competing carriers have a meaningful opportunity to compete. 729 Numerous competitors are now using electronic interfaces for pre-ordering, ordering, and reporting troubles which is strong evidence that the documentation is adequate. 730 Accordingly, we dismiss the various complaints alleging that BellSouth fails to provide adequate documentation. 731 725 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 144; Birch GALA II Comments at 27. 726 RoboTAG does not require competing carriers to re- program their side of the interface as all of the programming is performed by BellSouth. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 120- 21; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 176- 77. Also, no carriers submitted a change request to include RoboTAG in the CAVE environment as was done for the LENS interface. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 47. Finally, we note that very few competing carriers use RoboTAG and that BellSouth may no longer offer RoboTAG as an interface for new users and it will assist remaining competitive LECs using RoboTAG in adapting to another interface. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 40. 727 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18411, para. 119. 728 See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 54- 76; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 17, 370. 729 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. paras. 54, 68; see also KPMG MTP Final Report at V- 13. 730 In BellSouth’s region, 19 competing carriers used EDI in July 2001 while 34 used TAG in the same month. See Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277 (filed Nov. 21, 2001) (BellSouth Nov. 21 Ex Parte Letter). See also BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 48 (stating that an average of 35 competing carriers use EDI each month while an average of 65 competing carriers use TAG each month which, combined, account for 89% of all orders submitted); BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 67. This data shows that multiple competing carriers are able to design electronic interfaces based on available documentation and belies comments by Network Telephone and Mpower that BellSouth does not provide sufficient information for a competitive LEC to implement TAG. Mpower GALA II Comments at 6- 7; Network Telephone GALA II Comments at 2, 4, 6- 9. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18411- 12, para. 120 (SWBT demonstrated that sixteen carriers were in production using the EDI interface). 731 AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras. 177- 78 (citing open exceptions in the Florida third party test); WorldCom GALA I Reply at 3- 4 (discussing the documentation provided for the 10.2 release including migration by telephone number states that BellSouth improperly provided “user requirements, not business rules” that “were not designed to enable [competitive] LECs to code to the rules” and were inaccurate). We note that BellSouth expeditiously updated their documentation which has allowed competitive LECs to effectively implement this functionality. Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 7. 111 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 112 (b) Adherence to the Change Management Process 192. Accepting Change Requests. BellSouth demonstrates that it validates change requests for acceptance into the process in a timely manner and in accordance with the 10- day interval specified by the Change Control Process. 732 During the fourth quarter of 2001, BellSouth met this interval for 18 out of 19 requests. 733 We reject AT& T’s claim that BellSouth failed to meet this 10- day interval for validating a specific set of change requests. 734 All of these change requests were submitted for validation before the 10- day interval was a part of the Change Control Process and, therefore, we do not find that BellSouth fails to adhere to its process. 735 193. Implementation of Prioritized Changes. We find that BellSouth adheres to the Change Control Process by demonstrating that it implements change requests prioritized by competing carriers through the Change Control Process. BellSouth explains that, especially over the past six months, it has implemented a large number of change requests. 736 BellSouth also has scheduled for implementation this year fifteen of the top ranked change requests still outstanding, many of which have now been implemented. 737 Moreover, BellSouth has demonstrated sufficient capacity in its future releases to be able to implement a significant number of change requests, including backlog items to the extent carriers choose to prioritize these. 738 While we find BellSouth’s performance to be adequate, we note that it is important that BellSouth continue to work collaboratively with competitive LECs through the Change Control Process on prioritization issues, provide competitive LECs with sufficient information to be able to make informed decisions regarding prioritization of proposed systems changes, and implement changes in a timely manner. Should any problems in this regard develop such that the requirements of section 271 are no longer met, we are prepared to take appropriate enforcement action. 194. We reject the assertion of several commenters that BellSouth delays implementation of even very highly prioritized change requests resulting in a large backlog of 732 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 52- 53. For a discussion describing the process for introducing new changes into the Change Control Process and BellSouth’s new metrics, see supra para. 183 & n. 685. 733 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 52. 734 AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at para. 145. 735 See BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 53. 736 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 61- 69. 737 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 118, 123- 25 & Ex. SVA- 35, SVA- 36. 738 As noted above, although we do not specifically rely on this, BellSouth has agreed to implement change requests within 60 weeks after prioritization, subject to capacity constraints. See para. 183 supra; BellSouth May 14 Ex Parte Letter at 1 (explaining that according to release capacity projections, it is possible to eliminate approximately 80% of the “backlog” change requests by next year). 112 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 113 unimplemented system feature requests. 739 We recognize that BellSouth has not always implemented the Change Control Process in the most efficient manner, but because of its overall record, the recent improvements it has made, including the implementation of several important competitive LEC- requested features, its commitment to continued improvement, and its collaborations with competitive LECs in this process, we do not find a record that warrants checklist noncompliance. 740 As the Commission has repeatedly stated, the checklist does not require perfection. 741 Accordingly, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, we find that BellSouth provides competing carriers “an effective systems change management process to which it has adhered over time.” 742 195. We reject commenters’ assertions that BellSouth fails to implement corrections to defects in a timely manner and that there are unnecessary defects because BellSouth’s software implementations are not sufficiently tested before release. 743 While we recognize the importance of reducing the number of coding defects that require competing carriers to modify their electronic ordering processes, we find that BellSouth demonstrates that most of these defects have a very small impact and have been corrected quickly and within the timeframes set by the Change Control Process. 744 Covad claims that there is a “backlog” of defects, specifically 739 See, e. g., Birch GALA II Comments at 28- 29 (Birch claims that it constantly is directed by BellSouth to use the Change Control Process to address mechanical and operational issues, but it is wary that its issues will not be addressed in a timely manner as indicated by the ever- increasing backlog of change requests caused by BellSouth’s failure to implement even highly ranked change requests). 740 BellSouth demonstrates that it has implemented a large proportion of all the change requests that competing carriers have asked BellSouth to provide with over 80% either implemented or scheduled for implementation this year. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 61- 63. We also note that many of the submitted changes await prioritization by competitive LECs. Finally, we note the variety and quantity of feature enhancements that BellSouth has implemented over the past few releases. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 66- 68. 741 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4045, para. 176. 742 Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 25- 28. See Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments, Ex. 1 at 64- 69 (Staff’s Final Recommendation in Louisiana Section 271 Proceeding). 743 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 7, 10; Covad GALA II Comments at 9- 10; AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at para. 147; WorldCom GALA II Comments at 18; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 140- 45. 744 The Change Control Process requires BellSouth to correct “High Impact” defects within 10 business days, “Medium Impact” defects within 90 business days, and “Low Impact” defects with “best effort,” although BellSouth has committed to a 120 day interval. Change Control Process, Section 5 at 42- 53; BellSouth May 9 Ex Parte Letter at 7. BellSouth explains that it met the timeframes for “High Impact” defects 5 out of 7 times, missing the timeframe for 2 defects by 2 days in order to implement the fix during a release. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 78. BellSouth also explains that for “Medium Impact” defects, all 16 have been implemented, or scheduled for implementation, within the 90 day period. Id. at para. 79. Finally, BellSouth demonstrates that “Low Impact” defects are implemented in a timely manner, generally within 3 months. Id. at para. 80 n. 16. BellSouth also explains that defects associated with the parsed CSR release in January were low impact and were corrected in a timely manner. BellSouth GALA II Application at 21- 22; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 67- 78. 113 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 114 mentioning 11 that impact its business. 745 BellSouth explains that of the 38 system defects outstanding on March 5, 31 have been scheduled or targeted for implementation this year. 746 Birch, WorldCom and AT& T allege that BellSouth implements software releases without sufficient testing which results in a large number of defects in production. 747 Based on the evidence before us, however, we find that BellSouth performs adequate internal testing before releasing software. 748 At the same time, we share the Department of Justice’s concern that software releases with numerous defects inhibit smooth transitions between releases and we plan to monitor BellSouth’s performance in this regard. 749 Although not a basis for our assessment of checklist compliance here, we are reassured, however, that new metrics being developed in Georgia will measure how well BellSouth fixes defects within the required timeframes. 750 Should BellSouth’s performance in this regard decline such that it substantially degrades OSS performance, we may take appropriate enforcement action. 196. Notification Adequacy and Timeliness. We find that BellSouth has established a pattern of compliance with the intervals established in the Change Control Process for notification of a variety of system changes. 751 The Georgia third- party test and commercial data reveal a pattern of BellSouth providing notice of system changes in a timely, complete, and accurate manner. 752 Additionally, we find that BellSouth generally adheres to its notification 745 Covad GALA II Comments at 9- 10. 746 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Aff., Ex. WNS- 12. Moreover, while Covad asserts in its Comments that eleven outstanding defects directly impact its business, BellSouth demonstrates that one defect was cancelled, six have been implemented, and the remaining four are scheduled for the May 18 release. Covad GALA II Comments at 10; BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 747 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 142; Birch GALA II Comments at 26; AT& T GALA II Reply at 21, 23. 748 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 82- 89. In particular, BellSouth adheres to industry standard guidelines for testing its software releases before release and completed virtually all of the scheduled pre- release testing for releases 10.2 and 10.3. Id. at paras. 83, 85- 87. Moreover, the defects associated with BellSouth releases are minimal. Id. at paras. 87- 89. 749 Department of Justice GALA II Evaluation at 10 (noting that the releases for TN migration and parsed CSR functionality were introduced with defects). 750 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 120 (describing metric CM- 6 which will measure, region- wide, the percent of software defects corrected within their appropriate interval); Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 26; BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 54. 751 The Commission’s prior section 271 orders recognize the importance of a BOC’s provision of timely, complete, and accurate notice of alterations to its systems and processes and, therefore, the Commission requires that a BOC have “established a pattern of compliance with the relevance notification and documentation intervals in its Change Agreement.” SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18415, para. 126. 752 BellSouth provides notice of software releases in a timely manner. See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 10.1 (% software release notices sent on time – Regional); Georgia/ Louisiana F. 10.2 (average software release notification delay days – Regional). Third- party testing also shows timely notice of software releases. KPMG MTP Final Report, Test CM- 1- 1- 5, at VIII- A- 20 (finding that the Change Control Process “has defined and reasonable intervals for (continued….) 114 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 115 schedule 753 and that the documentation for the most recent releases has been timely and complete. 754 Finally, we find that BellSouth consistently provides competing carriers notice and information about access to its electronic interfaces. 755 197. We reject claims that the Change Control Process does not provide reasonable intervals for notifying competing carriers of changes to its systems. 756 We find that the current timeliness intervals provide competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete. 757 We also reject claims that BellSouth has not generally adhered to its notification intervals over time. 758 (Continued from previous page) considering and notifying customers about proposed changes”). BellSouth also notifies competing carriers about system changes, including outages, in a timely manner. Although BellSouth has not consistently met its benchmark for sending system change documentation in a timely manner, we find that the volumes are particularly low and BellSouth is addressing this issue adequately. See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 10.3 (% change management documentation sent on time – Regional); Georgia/ Louisiana F. 10.5 (average documentation release delay days – Regional); BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at paras. 180, 182; BellSouth GALA I Varner Louisiana Aff. at paras. 194, 196. See KPMG MTP Final Report, Test CM- 1- 1- 6, at VIII- A- 21 (finding that “[ d] ocumentation regarding proposed changes is distributed on a timely basis”). 753 In the SWBT Texas Order, the Commission found SWBT’s provision of documentation to be sufficiently timely despite its failure to strictly meet specified deadlines. SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18416, paras. 128- 29 & nn. 340, 343. We are further assured that BellSouth’s release documentation will continue to provide competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete in light of the newly devised documentation subcommittee in the Change Control Process. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply at para. 60. However, we stress the importance that BellSouth continue to provide adequate documentation in a timely manner. 754 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 116; BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 55- 60; BellSouth May 9 Ex Parte Letter at 2- 3. We also note that the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions find that BellSouth has established a pattern of compliance in providing documentation to competitive LECs. Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 129; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments, Exhibit 1 at 68. 755 See Georgia/ Louisiana F. 10.6 (% interface outage notices sent within 15 minutes – Regional). Like the Louisiana Commission, we find that this metric was adequately developed at the state level and that the state provides sufficient channels through which competing carriers can address this issue. Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 8- 9. We also note that through the Georgia workshops, the metrics for recording and reporting interface outages will become more inclusive. BellSouth March 27 Ex Parte Letter at 5- 6 (providing examples of how the new metrics expand the coverage of the metrics). In addition, we note that diagnostic information about each interface outage and slowdown are reported on BellSouth’s Change Control Process website. 756 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 149; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 38. 757 The Change Control Process establishes timeliness intervals for three types of releases: industry; major; and minor. For industry releases, BellSouth must notify competing carriers 42 weeks prior to production, provide final user requirements 35 weeks prior to production, provide final EDI and TAG specifications 10 weeks prior to production, and provide business rules 10 weeks prior to production. Change Control Process at 34. The documentation requirements for even minor releases give competing carriers sufficient time to prepare for software changes because BellSouth is required to provide final user requirements 18 weeks prior to production, final EDI and TAG specifications 5 weeks in advance, and business rules 5 weeks in advance. Id. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18415- 16, para. 127 & n. 338. 758 AT& T GALA II Bradbury/ Norris Decl. at paras. 181- 85 (describing BellSouth’s failure to meet documentation timeliness intervals); WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 139 (describing BellSouth’s failure to meet (continued….) 115 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 116 For example, BellSouth demonstrates that for the January 10.3 release, despite being tardy by 18 days in providing business rules, it had already provided competing carriers with sufficient documentation to begin coding and testing the parsed CSR functionality. 759 BellSouth also explains how advance documentation time can be impacted by agreements in the Change Control Process to provide more explicit documentation. 760 Finally, we recognize that documentation timeliness intervals can be impacted by regulatory mandates. 761 (ii) Training, Technical Assistance, and Help Desk Support 198. We find that BellSouth adequately assists competing carriers to use available OSS functions. 762 BellSouth demonstrates that it teaches a wide variety of training courses for competing carriers to assist in programming as well as ordering, pre- ordering, provisioning, and maintenance and repair. 763 Also, BellSouth provides several help desks to assist competing carriers in using OSS. 764 BellSouth demonstrates that its services centers are adequately staffed and able to handle spikes in their work loads. 765 Moreover, we do not find that competing carrier’s comments warrant a conclusion that BellSouth fails to adequately assist competing (Continued from previous page) documentation timeliness intervals); AT& T GALA I Reply at 20; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Reply Decl. at paras. 6- 14; WorldCom GALA I Reply at 3; WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 5- 6. 759 Specifically, BellSouth provided user specifications, preliminary field specifications, the TAG API Guide, and the CSR Job Aid in sufficient time for competing carriers to develop their interfaces. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply at para. 57. BellSouth also states that “[ competitive] LECs and vendors were able to use these documents in coding and testing the parsed CSR functionality.” Id. 760 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 58 (describing how BellSouth failed to meet draft and final user requirements for the February release because competing carriers agreed in the Change Control Process to the late delivery in order for BellSouth to include greater detail). 761 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 59; BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at para. 41 (indicating that BellSouth had only 30 days to implement TN migration functionality from the date of the Georgia Commission order). 762 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4012, para. 126. 763 See BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 77- 92. 764 BellSouth provides Local Carrier Service Centers (LCSC) to assist with pre- ordering and ordering portions of resale, UNE, and complex services. Its Customer Wholesale Interconnection Service Center (CWINS) handles provisioning for designed or coordinated resale and UNE products as well as maintenance and repair for resale and UNE products. BellSouth also provides service centers designed to handle ordering, provisioning, and maintenance for wideband services as well as support for interconnection trunking, inquiry processing, Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN), and interface connectivity and outage issues. See BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Decl. at paras. 4- 33; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at para. 93. 765 BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol. 1, Tab A, Reply Affidavit of Ken Ainsworth (BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Reply Aff.) at paras. 4- 7. BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Decl. at para. 6. We note a substantial decrease in answer time over recent months and do not find evidence of a systemic problem. See BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Reply Aff. at para. 9. 116 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 117 carriers seeking to use its OSS. 766 We reject Covad’s argument that a lack of coordination between different BellSouth’s support centers denies Covad a meaningful opportunity to compete. 767 BellSouth explains that it has simplified the escalation process by designating a single manager to handle all escalations in the LCSC and BellSouth representatives meet monthly with Covad to discuss and take action on operational issues confronting Covad. 768 3. UNE Combinations (UNE- P and EELs) 199. In order to satisfy section 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii), a BOC must demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements and that the BOC does not separate already combined elements, except at the specific request of the competing carrier. 769 Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude, as did the Louisiana and Georgia Commissions, that BellSouth provides access to UNE combinations in compliance with Commission rules. 770 BellSouth demonstrates that competitive LECs can order UNE- P electronically with flow- through on all of its interfaces, including ordering migrations by telephone number, and that commercial experience proves this is done in a nondiscriminatory manner. 771 Moreover, BellSouth demonstrates that it allows competitive LECs to order new EELs just like any other designed service. 772 Finally, BellSouth asserts that competitive LECs can convert special access circuits to EELs “using an individual LSR or by using a spreadsheet to facilitate conversion of multiple circuits. 773 200. Allegiance and US LEC/ XO allege that the 2- step process for converting special access circuits to EELs is needless, costly and does not comply with the Commission’s rules. 774 766 See Mpower, et al. GALA I Comments at 14; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 238- 41. 767 Covad GALA II Comments at 10- 12. 768 BellSouth GALA II Stacy/ Varner/ Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 170- 79; BellSouth GALA II Ainsworth Reply Aff. at para. 57 (stating that meetings with Covad have been productive and that BellSouth has undertaken several service improvements as a result of the meetings). 769 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii); 47 C. F. R. § 51.313( b). 770 BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 127- 28. Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 134- 36; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 51- 54. 771 BellSouth GALA I Stacy Aff. at paras. 261- 66. 772 BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff. at para. 128. BellSouth explains that electronic ordering of EELs has been targeted through the Change Control Process for implementation in May. BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 181. 773 BellSouth GALA II Stacy Reply Aff. at para. 181; BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff. at para. 128. In order to do so, competitive LECs must renegotiate certain terms in their interconnection agreements. BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply at paras 264- 69. 774 Allegiance GALA II Comments at 8- 9; US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 5 (citing Local Competition Supplemental Order Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, 9603, para. 30). 117 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 118 We reject this claim because we have previously held that a multi- step conversion process is not prima facie prohibited by our rules. 775 Moreover, BellSouth describes how this relatively new process has become more streamlined. 776 Likewise, we reject comments by US LEC/ XO that the disallowance of co- mingled traffic, early termination penalties, and surcharges are obstacles to their ability to convert special access circuits to EELs. 777 It is not clear that the practices described by US LEC/ XO violate the Commission’s rules. 778 We decline to address Cbeyond’s claim that the metric measuring the provisioning interval for EELs is discriminatory because the Georgia Commission, in April 2001, made an interim decision in Cbeyond’s favor reducing the provisioning interval to 10 days and, although not a factor in our decision, we note that the Georgia Commission is in the process of reviewing this very issue in the metrics review. 779 Finally, we reject Mpower’s complaint that BellSouth has not fulfilled any of its responsibilities under an agreement to convert special access lines to EELs. 780 We note that BellSouth claims the problem has been resolved. 781 IV. OTHER CHECKLIST ITEMS A. Checklist Item 1 – Interconnection 201. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( i) requires the BOC to provide equal- in- quality interconnection on terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the requirements of sections 251 and 252. 782 Based on our review of the record, 775 In prior orders, the Commission has restated that conversions from special access to EELs should be “simple and accomplished without delay.” SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6323- 24, para. 175. The Commission found that SWBT’s 2- step provisioning process for converting special access lines to EELs did not violate our rules. Id. at 6323- 24, paras. 175- 76. 776 BellSouth GALA II Application Reply App., Vol. 1, Tab E, Reply Affidavit of John Ruscilli and Cynthia Cox (BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff.) at paras. 38- 39. 777 US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 3- 5. Specifically, US LEC/ XO also allege that “BellSouth’s intransigence in providing … transport to XO and US LEC, or in converting special access circuits to UNEs, violates checklist items 2, 4 and 5.” Id. at 3. 778 Local Competition Supplemental Order Clarification, 15 FCC Rcd at 9598- 9604, paras. 21- 32; See also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18468- 70, paras. 224- 28; Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17460- 61, paras. 73- 75. 779 Cbeyond March 26 Ex Parte Letter at 2; Cbeyond GALA I Comments at 13- 15 & n. 8 (describing the proceedings in Georgia Commission docket no 7892- U). 780 Mpower GALA II Comments at 14. 781 BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 40. We also note that section 271 proceedings are not well suited to fact- intensive interpretive disputes of this nature and decline to address such disputes in this application. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18448 n. 510. 782 Appendix D at paras. 1- 3. 118 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 119 we conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 783 that BellSouth is in compliance with the requirements of this checklist item. 784 In reaching this conclusion, we examine, as in prior section 271 orders, BellSouth’s performance with respect to interconnection trunks and collocation. We find that BellSouth’s has met or exceeded the vast majority of its benchmarks or retail comparison standards for this checklist item. 785 In addition, we find that BellSouth satisfies its statutory requirements for the provisioning of collocation and provides interconnection at all technically feasible points including a single point of interconnection in Georgia and Louisiana. 202. Interconnection Quality. We find, based on the record, that BellSouth’s performance for trunk blockage satisfies its statutory obligations. 786 In particular, BellSouth met or exceeded all of its benchmarks for trunk blockage in Georgia and Louisiana and for the relevant months. 787 Nonetheless, we note that some commenters still assert that BellSouth fails to provide trunks on a nondiscriminatory basis. 788 Specifically, AT& T and Sprint argue that BellSouth’s method of calculating trunk blockage, the Trunk Group Performance (TGP) report, 789 is flawed. 790 They contend that the TGP report dilutes the figures for competitive LEC 783 See Georgia Commission Comments at 45; Louisiana Commission Comments at 23. 784 BellSouth GALA I Application at 26- 36; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 93- 97. In doing so we reject US LEC’s claim that BellSouth fails to provide proper interconnection ordering system, based on a lack of supporting evidence in the record of systemic problems with BellSouth’s interconnection ordering system and BellSouth’s statement that from March to September 2001 BellSouth’s systems were available at a rate of over 99%. See US LEC GALA I Comments at 35; BellSouth GALA I Stacy Reply Aff. at paras. 270- 73. 785 For example, we note that BellSouth missed parity with its retail analog in Georgia from October through February for the Order Completion Interval metric for trunks. However, the volumes were competitively insignificant. See Georgia/ Louisiana C. 1.1 (% Rejected Service Requests); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 1.2 (Reject Interval); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 1.3 (FOC Timeliness); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 1.4 (FOC & Reject Response Completeness); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.1 (Order Completion Interval); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.3 (% Jeopardies); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.5 (% Missed Installation Appointments); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.7 (Average Completion Notice Interval); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.10.1 (% Completions w/ o Notice or < 24 hours); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.11.1.1- C. 2.11.2.2 (Service Order Accuracy), Georgia/ Louisiana C. 3.1.2- C. 3.2.2, C. 3.3.2, C. 3.4.2, C. 3.5.2 (Local Interconnection Trunks- Maintenance and Repair); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 3.4.1 (Invoice Accuracy); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 4.2 (Mean Time to Deliver Invoices); Georgia/ Louisiana C. 5.1 (Trunk Blocking- Trunk Group Performance- Aggregate); Georgia /Louisiana E. 1.1.1- E. 1.1.2 (Collocation- Average Response Time); Georgia/ Louisiana E. 1.2.1- E. 1.2.4 (Collocation- Average Arrangement Time); Georgia/ Louisiana E. 1.3.2 (Collocation-% Due Dates Missed). 786 See 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( i). 787 Georgia/ Louisiana C. 5.1 (Trunk Group Performance). 788 AT& T GALA I Comments at 46- 47; Sprint GALA I Comments at 18- 19; AT& T GALA I Reply Comments at 29; XO, et al. GALA I Reply at 2- 4. 789 BellSouth previously used the Trunk Group Service Report (TGSR) that calculated the number of instances for which trunk blockage exceeded 3%. BellSouth’s new Trunk Group Performance (TGP) report calculates the number of consecutive two- hour periods for which competitive LEC trunk blockage exceeds BellSouth trunk blockage by more than .5% on BellSouth administered trunks. BellSouth argues that SWBT used a similar measure (continued….) 119 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 120 blockage because it measures BellSouth traffic as traffic carried over trunks linking BellSouth end offices, while competitive LEC traffic is measured as traffic over several other categories of trunking, many of which predominately carry BellSouth traffic. 791 Therefore, they argue, that the Commission should reject the new TGP report and utilize data from BellSouth’s previous trunk blockage report, the Trunk Group Service Report (TGSR), instead. 792 203. We conclude that BellSouth’s TGP report effectively assesses BellSouth’s performance. 793 We are persuaded by BellSouth’s argument that competitive LEC blockage is not diluted in the TGP report because BellSouth separately tabulates blockage affecting competitive LEC customers for shared trunks and competitive LEC dedicated trunks and then adds the figures to determine the total blockage experienced by competitive LEC customers, rather than mixing the results for smaller, dedicated trunks with larger, shared trunk groups. 794 Moreover, the report appears to represent an improvement over its previous reporting methods for trunk blockage. 795 BellSouth explains the TGP report is more informative because it depicts the actual impact of end- to- end service on customers by incorporating more relevant trunks and factoring the amount of time that blocking occurs. 796 Thus, the TGP report seems to provide a (Continued from previous page) for its Texas and Oklahoma/ Kansas Section 271 Applications. BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol. 2, Tab J, Reply Affidavit of W. Keith Milner (BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff.) at paras. 12, 15- 23, Ex. WKM- 7. 790 AT& T GALA I Comments at 46- 47; AT& T GALA I Comments App. Tab H, Declaration of Beverly J. McConnell and Denise C. Berger at paras. 13- 18, Ex. H (AT& T McConnell/ Berger Decl.); AT& T Comments App. Tab I, Declaration of Cheryl Norris and Sharon Bursh at para. 73 (AT& T Norris/ Bursh Decl.); AT& T GALA II Bursh/ Norris Decl. at para. 101. Competitive LECs also criticize BellSouth’s usage of a 3% threshold for trunk blockage, however, BellSouth explains that its actual design block rate is lower and that the blocking threshold merely denotes service above which it is statistically probable that the design- blocking standard is not met. See generally id.; BellSouth Milner Reply Aff. at para. 24. 791 AT& T GALA I Comments at 46- 47; AT& T McConnell/ Berger Decl. at para. 17; AT& T GALA I Reply at 29. See also Department of Justice Evaluation at 37, n. 132 (expressing concern that not all- relevant trunk groups are included in BellSouth’s calculations). AT& T also argues that BellSouth’s TGP report masks regional problems by presenting data as a statewide average. AT& T GALA I Reply at 29. 792 AT& T GALA I Comments at 46- 47; AT& T GALA I Reply at 29. AT& T also argues that the Commission used reports similar to the TGSR in the past. See AT& T GALA I Reply at 30. See supra for a comparison of the TGP report and the TGSR. 793 See supra note 79 for an explanation of BellSouth’s TGP report. 794 See BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at paras. 15- 16 (explaining that the TGP report does not count BellSouth traffic against competitive LECs, instead it calculates competitive LEC blockage on shared trunk groups by estimating the competitive LEC portion of the trunk groups based on data from past trunk reports). In other terms, for the TGP metric, the blocking rates on competitive LEC trunks and shared trunks are added, not averaged together. Therefore, if the blocking rate was 1% on the competitive LEC dedicated trunk, and the estimated blocking rate of the competitive LEC calls due to blockage on the shared trunk was .5%, the total competitive LEC blocking rate for the TGP metric would be 1.5%. 795 BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at paras. 11- 14 . 796 BellSouth GALA I Varner Ga. Aff. at 45- 46; BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at paras. 19- 20. BellSouth explains that the TGSR did not include BellSouth- administered high- usage trunk groups to competitive LECs that (continued….) 120 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 121 more appropriate foundation for analyzing BellSouth’s performance by comparing the blocking rates experienced by competitive LEC and retail customers, while the TGSR only compares the number of blocked competitive LEC and retail trunks. 797 Furthermore, the old TGSR treated all trunks with equal weight, even though blockage on small trunk groups would have a “substantially different impact on customers than a similar percentage of blockages on a larger trunk group.” 798 Finally, we note that both the Georgia and the Louisiana Commissions approved the TGP report measure and that according to these Commissions, competitive LECs had a full opportunity to participate in the review of the TGP report. 799 204. Interconnection Timeliness. We also conclude that BellSouth’s performance data indicate that BellSouth is providing nondiscriminatory interconnection in a timely manner. In reaching this conclusion we review BellSouth’s performance for missed installation appointments and average installation intervals. Specifically, we find that in Georgia and Louisiana for the relevant months BellSouth met or exceeded parity with the retail analogue for the missed installation appointments measure without exception. 800 Further, BellSouth met or exceeded parity with the relevant retail analogue in Louisiana from October through February for the order completion interval measure without exception. 801 Although BellSouth missed the relevant retail analogue for the order completion interval metric on several occasions in Georgia during the relevant period, a close examination of BellSouth’s performance reveals that this is a volatile metric. 802 Indeed, although BellSouth missed parity for three out of the five months we review, we note that BellSouth provisioned competitive LEC trunks in a more timely fashion than it did for itself in November, and in the most recent month, February, BellSouth achieved parity of performance. 803 Given this, and the fact that BellSouth’s performance for missed (Continued from previous page) carry 77% of the total traffic load. BellSouth asserts that the trunks from BellSouth to competitive LEC trunk groups reported in the TGSR carry only 23% of total BellSouth to competitive LEC traffic. BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at para. 20, Ex. WKM- 3 797 Id. at para. 19. 798 BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 5, Tab O, Affidavit of W. Keith Milner (BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff.) at para. 12. 799 See Georgia GALA I Commission Comments at 39- 42; Georgia GALA I Commission Reply at 6- 7 (asserting that AT& T failed to take advantage of opportunities to question the adequacy of the Trunk Group Blockage Report before the Georgia Commission); Louisiana GALA I Commission Comments at 2- 6. 800 See Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.5 (Missed Installation Appointments- Interconnection). 801 See Louisiana C. 2.1 (Order Completion Interval - Interconnection). 802 See Georgia C. 2.1 (Order Completion Interval - Interconnection) (demonstrating that BellSouth missed parity with the retail analogue by 11.4 days in October, 10.72 days in December and 9.55 days in January). 803 See Georgia C. 2.1 (Order Completion Interval - Interconnection). In November, BellSouth provisioned competitive LEC trunks on an average of only 24.35 days, whereas it provisioned it own trunks in 27.43 days. In February, BellSouth provisioned competitive LEC trunks in 21.82 days and its own trunks in 19.91 days. Id. 121 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 122 installation appointments is acceptable, we find that BellSouth provisions competitive LEC trunks in a nondiscriminatory manner. 804 205. Collocation. We conclude that BellSouth provides legally binding terms and conditions for collocation in its interconnection agreements and SGATs. 805 In reaching this conclusion, we note that BellSouth states that it permits the collocation of equipment as required in the Collocation Remand Order. 806 Furthermore, we find that BellSouth has met all of the applicable performance metrics for collocation for the relevant months in both Georgia and Louisiana. 807 206. We are not persuaded by Mpower that BellSouth fails to demonstrate compliance with this checklist item because BellSouth should provide shorter intervals where collocation necessitates less than the full complement of activities necessary for BellSouth to provision a full collocation application. 808 BellSouth contends that the 90- day interval for augments only applies to caged arrangements in Georgia and that all other augment intervals in Georgia and Louisiana are shorter. 809 Moreover, our collocation rules at this time do not establish separate intervals for augments. Rather, our rules require a 90- day interval for physical collocation, including augments, unless the relevant state has set its own standard, or the parties have agreed to an alternative. 810 Because our rules do not mandate a shorter interval for augments, we reject Mpower’s claim. 207. Interconnection Terms. We reject Nextel and Triton’s assertion that BellSouth fails to satisfy its section 271 obligations under checklist items 1 and 9 because these parties 804 See Georgia/ Louisiana C. 2.5 (Missed Installation Appointments- Interconnection). 805 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 42- 44; Louisiana GALA I Commission Comments at 20- 22; BellSouth GALA I Ga. Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at 6- 7, Ex. 4- 10, 37- 38, Attach. I, K. 806 BellSouth GALA I Application at 33. 807 See Georgia/ Louisiana E. 1 (Collocation). 808 Mpower GALA I Comments at 31 (asserting that competitive LECs are “forced to purchase facilities that they do not need because of the 90 day interval for collocation augments regardless of the amount of facilities added."). Id. For example, Mpower also contends that it cannot order power for its collocation space in the 60- amp to 225- amp range and that BellSouth requires competitive LECs to purchase more power than they need for collocation space. See pricing discussion, section IV. A. 1, infra. 809 The maximum interval for augments for cageless collocation in Georgia as well as caged and cageless collocation in Louisiana is 60 days. BellSouth also points out that Mpower provides no evidence or support for its claim that 90 days is too long. BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol 1, Tab E, Affidavit of Wayne Gray (BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff.) at paras. 9- 10, 42- 43, 46; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 42- 43. 810 See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 98- 147, 96- 98, Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd. at 17820- 22, paras. 25- 27. 122 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 123 raise issues the Commission currently is considering in ongoing rulemaking proceedings. 811 Nextel and Triton assert that BellSouth announced a policy of refusing to activate NPA/ NXX codes in its switches if the rating point for the code is located outside of BellSouth’s service area. 812 Nextel and Triton assert that this policy violates their rights to interconnect “at any technically feasible point” within BellSouth’s network and deprives CMRS carriers of their right to choose a single point of interconnection in a LATA. 813 In addition, Nextel and Triton argue that our rules “provide that landline- CMRS traffic must be treated as local traffic - not access traffic – whenever it is contained within a single MTA.” 814 208. We reject Nextel’s and Triton’s complaint for several reasons. First, we note that BellSouth rescinded its policy that gave rise to these parties’ complaint. 815 Second, as the Commission stated in prior section 271 orders, 816 while the Commission will consider, in a section 271 proceeding, whether a BOC permits a requesting LEC to physically interconnect at a single point of interconnection (POI), it will not attempt to settle new and unresolved disputes about the precise content of an incumbent LEC’s obligations to its competitors – disputes that do not involve per se violations of self- executing requirements of the Act. 817 We find that Nextel and Triton largely raise unresolved intercarrier compensation issues. Indeed, the issues raised by Nextel and Triton in this application are open issues before Commission in the Intercarrier Compensation proceeding. 818 Based on the time constraints and specialized nature of the section 271 process, we believe that these issues would be more appropriately resolved in a different 811 See Nextel GALA II Reply Comments at 11- 13; Triton April 5 Ex Parte Letter at 1. 812 On March 20, 2002, BellSouth clarified its interconnection policy and indicated that it would continue to activate these codes, but that it will seek compensation in state proceedings for routing calls to a CMRS provider with an NPA/ NXX code if the rating point for the NPA/ NXX is located outside of BellSouth’s landline franchise area. See BellSouth March 20 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 813 See Nextel GALA II Reply Comments at 12; Triton April 5 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 814 See Nextel GALA II Reply Comments at 12; Triton April 5 Ex Parte Letter at 3 (citing 47 C. F. R. § 51.701( b)( 2)). 815 See BellSouth March 20 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 816 See Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17419, para. 100. 817 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6246- 47, para. 19. 818 See Developing A Unified Intercarrier Compensation Regime, CC Docket No. 01- 92, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 01- 132, (rel. April 27, 2001)( Intercarrier Compensation NPRM) at para. 112. We note that both Nextel and Triton filed comments in that proceeding. In addition, we recognize that Sprint recently notified the Commission that it intends to file a Petition for Declaratory Ruling relating to the issues raised by Nextel and Triton and requests that the Commission refrain from attempting to resolve their claims in this proceeding. See Luisa L. Lancetti, Vice President, PCS Regulatory Affairs, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 1- 2 (filed May 8, 2002). 123 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 124 proceeding. Accordingly, we do not find that BellSouth’s policies violate its interconnection obligations under checklist item 1. 819 209. Other issues. Commenters also raise some additional issues that are more appropriately addressed in other fora or proceedings. Specifically, CBeyond claims that BellSouth fails to comply with its interconnection agreement obligations 820 and XO maintains that BellSouth seeks to “unilaterally change terms or otherwise impose conditions on XO that are more restrictive than BellSouth will follow.” 821 As the Commission found in previous proceedings, given the time constraints, the section 271 process simply could not function if we were required to resolve every interpretive dispute between a BOC and each competitive LEC about the precise content of the BOC’s obligations to its competitors. 822 Rather than being indicative of BellSouth’s ability to provide interconnection, these claims are fact- specific disputes between independent competitive LECs and BellSouth regarding its statutory obligations. We find, therefore, that a rulemaking proceeding or complaint brought before the Commission pursuant to section 208 is the more appropriate place for such allegations to be examined. 1. Pricing of Interconnection 210. Checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide “interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections 251( c)( 2) and 252( d)( 1).” 823 Section 251( c)( 2) requires incumbent LECs to provide interconnection “at any technically feasible point within the carrier’s network . . . on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 824 Section 252( d)( 1) requires state determinations regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of interconnection to be based on cost and to be nondiscriminatory, and allows the rates to include a reasonable profit. 825 The Commission’s pricing rules require, among other things, that in order to comply with its collocation obligations, an incumbent LEC provide collocation at rates that are based on TELRIC. 826 819 We note that BellSouth must comply with any rule adopted in the Intercarrier Compensation proceeding in order to remain in compliance with section 271. 820 See Cbeyond GALA I Comments at 7- 11. 821 XO GALA I Reply Comments at 4. 822 Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17475, para. 101; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6355, para. 230; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18366- 67, paras. 22- 27. 823 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( i). 824 Id. § 251( c)( 2). 825 Id. § 252( d)( 1). 826 See 47 C. F. R. §§ 51.501- 07, 51.509( g); Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812- 16, 15844- 61, 15874- 76, 15912, paras. 618- 29, 674- 712, 743- 51, 826. 124 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 125 211. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that BellSouth offers interconnection in Georgia and Louisiana to other telecommunications carriers at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, in compliance with checklist item 1. Both the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions conclude that BellSouth currently provides collocation under approved interconnection agreements, SGATs and tariffs, consistent with Commission and their respective state commission orders. 827 212. Mpower is the principal commenter that criticizes collocation pricing. 828 It contends that BellSouth’s collocation power rates are unreasonable because competitive LECs desiring power in the 60 to 225 amp range must buy 225 amps of power, even if it is not needed. 829 BellSouth denies this contention and states competitive LECs have long been able to order power from BellSouth’s Battery Distribution Fuse Board (BDFB) in amounts based on industry standard fuse sizes ranging from 10 to 60 amps, or any combinations of them, up to a total of 225 amps. 830 Additionally, BellSouth worked over the course of the last six months with electrical vendors to implement new power options greater than 60 amps on single redundant power feeds at the BellSouth BDFB. 831 These options are now available to competitive LECs. BellSouth now offers fuses in 70, 80, 90 and 100 amp options by retrofitting its BDFB’s to 827 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 45; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 23. 828 AT& T contends "that BellSouth charges almost a 50 percent higher rate for the same type of collocation space in Georgia as compared to Louisiana." See AT& T GALA I Reply Comments at 42. AT& T, however, does not support its contention by challenging any specific collocation rates on any basis as being non- TELRIC. Without more, AT& T does not provide evidence here sufficient to establish a violation of TELRIC pricing or checklist item 1. Furthermore, it is difficult to discern if AT& T refers to the modified and restructured collocation rates in Georgia’s latest SGAT which reduced non- recurring rates. See GALA I Application Appendix C, Vol. 13, Tab 68, BST’s Revised Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions for Interconnection, Unbundling and Resale, Letter from Bennett L. Ross, General Counsel- Georgia, BellSouth, to Reece McAlister, Executive Secretary, Georgia Public Service Commission at 2 (filed Aug. 27, 2001). BellSouth asserts its "restructured collocation rates . . . are interim and subject to true- up based upon a final order in Docket No. 14361- U, [and] are supported by a TELRIC- compliant cost study. . . ." Id. To the extent AT& T still has any concerns, it will be able to address them in the pending state proceeding where the Georgia Commission is revisiting collocation charges. 829 Mpower GALA I Comments at 29. 830 BellSouth GALA I Application Reply Appendix, Vol. 1, Tab E, Reply Affidavit of A. Wayne Gray at para. 11 (BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff.)(“ The fuse sizes available to CLECs are the standard sizes manufactured by fuse vendors that are commonly available at electrical supply stores. . . . For example, if Mpower wants 100 amps of power delivered to its collocation space today, then it can run two (2) power cables to BellSouth’s BDFB and connect it with two industry standard fuse sizes that equal 100 amps (i. e., a 40- amp fuse and a 60- amp fuse.”). BellSouth also states that “[ i] t is extremely uncommon for a single piece of equipment ever to need more than 60 amps,” and BellSouth designed its collocation power offering for competitive LECs based on the same power architecture that it used for its own equipment as well as what was accepted as the industry standard. BellSouth GALA I Reply at 96 n. 79; BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at para. 12. 831 BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at para. 23. These changes were made in response to requests from competitive LECs in the BellSouth/ CLEC Collocation User Group forum and several state section 271 proceedings. Id. 125 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 126 support larger fuse sizes and still comply with National Electric Code (NEC) standards. 832 BellSouth states that fuses larger than 100 amps would violate NEC and could create safety and loss of service problems. 833 BellSouth further responds to Mpower that there are no additional costs for equipment, materials, and work that will be required to offer these new power options. 834 Mpower has not challenged BellSouth’s description of the new power options that are available or the technical requirements cited. 835 213. Mpower also contends that it is unreasonable for BellSouth to refuse to provide a single feed power demand of less than 225 amps directly from the main power distribution board. 836 In response, BellSouth contends that it does not provide this feed because doing so would cause safety and fire concerns, violate electrical code requirements and could result in customer service outages. 837 BellSouth uses an industry standard size current breaker protection device of 225 amps at the main power board. 838 This precludes a single power feed of less than 225 amps from this source (although smaller power feeds are available from the BDFB). BellSouth also presents evidence that the 225- amp circuit breaker standard was developed three years before the Act was even passed, based on a study after a devastating Chicago central office fire. 839 In addition, BellSouth asserts that anything less than 225 amp protection at the main power board would violate National Electric Code requirements designed to limit electrical system failures that, in this case, could result in customer service outages. 840 Accordingly, we 832 Id. 833 Id. at para. 24. 834 Id. at para. 40 (responding to Mpower GALA I Comments at 30) (“ CLECs will pay the same power rate for each amp of fused power, no matter whether the CLEC orders 10 amps or 100 amps. The calculation is the same. The number of load amps is multiplied by the multiplier of 1. 5 (to bring it up to fused amps) and then this result is multiplied by the per fused amp power rate (the same power rate is used for each increment).”). 835 Following BellSouth’s reply to Mpower’s contentions, the Commission held an ex parte meeting on Nov. 15, 2001, with Mpower to address OSS issues at which time we asked Mpower to also inform the Commission of any continuing collocation pricing concerns, but to date no further pricing matters were raised. See Letter from Patrick J. Donovan, Counsel to Mpower, to Magalie R. Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277 (Nov. 16, 2001). 836 Mpower GALA I Comments at 29; but see BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at para. 24. BellSouth states that it can offer competitive LECs “the ability to order DC power capacity up to 100 amps from a BellSouth BDFB using a single redundant power feed,” that competitive LECs “still have the option of ordering 225 amps of DC power directly from the main power board… or of combining the available increments (10, 15, 30, 45, 60, 70, 80, 90 and 100 amp fuses) to achieve the total amount of power they need. Therefore, BellSouth contends that it offers the competitive LECs sufficient power capabilities, under various scenarios, to effectively power their collocation space.” Id. 837 BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at paras. 21- 22. 838 Id at para. 21. 839 Id. 840 Id. at para. 22. 126 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 127 believe BellSouth presents reasonable evidence here, and we are not persuaded by Mpower’s contention otherwise. 214. Mpower contends further that BellSouth collocation power rates are unreasonable because BellSouth’s charge is based on fused amps, rather than load amps, and thus results in charging for power capacity that competitive LECs cannot use. 841 BellSouth responds that its rates for power include a two- thirds multiplier that takes into account the difference between fused amps for protection and load amps as requested by the competitive LEC. 842 It further asserts that the Georgia Commission has already considered this pricing issue and ruled in favor of BellSouth’s current method of power assessment. 843 215. We conclude that BellSouth has responded sufficiently in a detailed and reasonable manner to Mpower’s contentions, and that Mpower offered no additional evidence or arguments in response to BellSouth’s reply comments. 844 We note that in its arguments, Mpower relies on contentions made by NewSouth in an earlier North Carolina proceeding regarding competitive LECs having to purchase more power than they need. 845 We question the evidentiary value and relevance of this past NewSouth testimony, in particular because NewSouth now supports BellSouth’s 271 application and has not made the same allegations here. In its comments in this proceeding, NewSouth concludes that BellSouth’s performance, “including collocation, is sufficient to provide NewSouth a meaningful opportunity to compete in Georgia and Louisiana.” 846 216. Furthermore, the Georgia Commission is revisiting collocation fees and charges in its ongoing proceeding to update UNE rates. BellSouth filed revised interim collocation rates subject to true- up with its latest SGAT on August 27, 2001, and parties will be able to raise any collocation pricing issues, should they arise, in a timely manner. In September, 2001, the Louisiana Commission addressed collocation pricing concerns similar to those that Mpower 841 Mpower GALA I Comments at 29. 842 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 96- 97 (“ Thus, 60 fused amps times the power rate (which already includes the two-thirds multiplier) results in a charge for only 40 load amps – in effect, a per- load amp charge because the power load should generally be two- thirds the capacity of the fuse that protects the power feed.”). 843 BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at para. 19 (citing Georgia MCI Arbitration Order, Docket No. 11901- U (March 7, 2001). We note that Mpower raises further arguments based on changes Verizon made to its collocation power tariff in connection with the Massachusetts section 271 proceeding. Mpower GALA I Comments at 30; BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at para. 33. Mpower’s analysis fails to address the structural difference between Verizon’s rates and BellSouth’s rate and thus its argument is not an appropriate comparison to the issue before us. 844 See supra n. 835. 845 Based on NewSouth testimony, Mpower argues that BellSouth cannot support power requirements in the 60- 225 amp range, while SBC offers power in increments of 20, 30, 50, 100 and 200 amps, and that reconfiguration of competitive LEC power arrangements to achieve desired power options is cost prohibitive. 846 NewSouth GALA I Comments at 7. 127 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 128 raises here. 847 “After reviewing BellSouth’s justification for its requirements, the LPSC approved BellSouth’s power options[].” 848 In addition, however, it ordered that any competitive LEC currently purchasing 225 amps directly from BellSouth’s main power board could have the option of reconfiguring its power to purchase smaller increments from BellSouth’s BDFB or of purchasing power directly from an electric utility company. 849 Furthermore, the Louisiana Commission also ordered BellSouth to waive any application fees or charges to accomplish either of these alternatives. 850 BellSouth also notes that “it is reviewing the possibility of offering the competitive LECs a reduction or waiver of the nonrecurring charges associated with either of the power reconfigurations [] for all of BellSouth’s other states.” 851 217. For the reasons discussed above, nothing Mpower has shown us leads us to believe that any Commission action here is warranted at this time, or that BellSouth has failed to comply with this checklist item. B. Checklist Item 4 – Unbundled Local Loops 218. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( iv) of the Act requires that a BOC provide, “[ l] ocal loop transmission from the central office to the customer’s premises, unbundled from local switching or other services.” 852 Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 853 that BellSouth demonstrates that it provides unbundled local loops in accordance with the requirements of section 271 and our rules. Our conclusion is based on our 847 Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 22- 23 n. 10 (citing Docket No. U- 22252( E) at 3- 4). See also Louisiana Commission Staff Final Recommendation in Docket No. U- 22252( E) at 33 (“ Given that BellSouth allows CLECs to purchase power in increments of as little as 10 amps, Staff recommends that the Commission find BellSouth’s collocation power options to be appropriate. It is unclear why a CLEC would elect to obtain power directly from BellSouth’s main power board at a minimum of 225 amps, if the CLEC’s equipment will actually use substantially less power.”). 848 Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 22- 23 n. 10. (“ Several CLECs apparently have installed their own BDFB in their collocation space, and order power directly from BellSouth. These CLECs complained about the charges that result from BellSouth’s requirement in such an arrangement for a standard 225 amp power feed.”). See also Louisiana Commission Staff Final Recommendation in Docket No. U- 22252( E) at 33 (“ BellSouth claims, and Staff agrees, that the use of the standard 225 amp power feed is necessary to comply with specific National Electric Safety Code requirements. . . .”). 849 Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 3- 4. 850 Id.; see also Louisiana Commission Staff Final Recommendation at 33, 34. 851 BellSouth GALA I Gray Reply Aff. at para. 28. 852 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( iv). The Commission has defined the loop as a transmission facility between a distribution frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and the demarcation point at the customer premises. Dark fiber and loop conditioning equipment are among the features, functions, and capabilities of the loop. UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772- 73, paras. 166- 67 n. 301. For a discussion of the requirements of checklist item 4, see Appendix D at paras. 48- 52, infra. 853 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 166; Louisiana Commission GALA II Comments at 1- 2. 128 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 129 review of BellSouth’s performance for all loop types, which include, as in past section 271 orders, voice grade loops, hot cut provisioning, xDSL- capable loops, high capacity loops, and digital loops, and our review of BellSouth’s processes for line sharing and line splitting. As of October 2001, competitors have acquired and placed into use more than 80,000 loops in Georgia, and 19,000 loops in Louisiana. 854 219. Consistent with our prior section 271 orders, we do not address every aspect of BellSouth’s loop performance where our review of the record satisfies us that BellSouth’s performance is in compliance with the parity and benchmark measures established in Georgia and Louisiana. 855 Instead, we focus our discussion on those areas where the record indicates minor discrepancies in performance between BellSouth and its competitors in Georgia and Louisiana. As in past section 271 proceedings, in the course of our review, we look for patterns of systemic performance disparities that have resulted in competitive harm or that have otherwise denied new entrants a meaningful opportunity to compete. 856 Isolated cases of performance disparity, especially when the margin of disparity is small, generally will not result in a finding of checklist noncompliance. 857 220. Hot Cut Activity. Like the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 858 we find that BellSouth is providing voice grade loops through hot cuts in Georgia and Louisiana in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. BellSouth provides hot cuts in Georgia and Louisiana within a reasonable time interval, 859 at an acceptable level of quality, with minimal service disruption, and with a minimum number of troubles following installation. 860 854 BellSouth GALA II Stockdale Aff., Exh. ES- 5 and ES- 6 (citing confidential information). As of February 2002, BellSouth had provisioned over 70,000 stand- alone loops (including DSL loops), 8,934 digital loops, and 3,145 high capacity loops. See Milner GALA I Aff. at para. 115; Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President-Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene R. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed April 17, 2002) (BellSouth Apr. 17 Ex Parte Letter). In Louisiana, BellSouth had provisioned over 15,000 stand- alone loops (including DSL Loops), 3,500 digital loops, and 3,154 high capacity loops. Id. 855 See, e. g., Verizon Connecticut Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 14151- 52, para. 9. 856 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055- 56, para. 122. 857 See id. 858 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 161; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 57. 859 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.12.1 (Coordinated Customer Conversions, Loops with INP); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.12.2 (Coordinated Customers Conversions, Loops with LNP); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.14.1- B. 2.14.4 (Hot Cut Timeliness); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.15.1- B. 2.15.4 (% Hot Cuts> 15 Minutes Late); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.16.1- B. 2. 16. 2 (Average Recovery Time – CCC); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2. 13 (% Hot Cuts> 15 minutes early); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.15 (% Hot Cuts> 15 minutes late). But see Xspedius GALA I Comments at 5- 6 (asserting that BellSouth does not perform coordinate customer conversions as scheduled). 860 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.17.1.1- B. 2.17.2.2 (% Provisioning Troubles Within Seven Days – Hot Cuts). KMC claims that, when BellSouth completes the physical hot cut, BellSouth fails to perform timely switch translations (continued….) 129 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 130 221. We reject the argument made by AT& T that BellSouth fails to meet the “standards” the Commission developed in the Bell Atlantic New York Order. 861 AT& T claims that when using the loop cutover calculation measures analyzed by the Commission in the Bell Atlantic New York Order, BellSouth’s on- time performance for completing hot cuts is deficient. 862 In the Texas proceedings, AT& T similarly argued that SWBT could not establish checklist compliance because the Texas performance metrics differed from those employed in New York. 863 As the Commission noted in the SWBT Texas Order, “[ w] ith each application we are presented with a different set of circumstances: new and differently designed performance measurements, state proceedings with different histories, new processes by which BOCs perform necessary functions for competing carriers, and new competing carrier concerns.” 864 In fact, this Commission has recognized that “individual states and BOCs may define performance measures in different ways.” 865 As a result, although our hot cut inquiry examines the same criteria as our inquiry in prior section 271 applications, we necessarily base our conclusion on the evidence presented in this application. 866 In particular, as noted above, we evaluate BellSouth’s hot cut process, and the timeliness and quality of the hot cuts it provides to competing carriers, and find that BellSouth’s hot cut performance for the five- month period, October through February, met or exceeded the checklist requirements. 222. We also reject Mpower’s claim that BellSouth’s failure to provide an adequate automated frame due time (FDT) violates BellSouth’s obligation to provide reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to OSS and to unbundled loops. 867 Mpower asserts that BellSouth should be required to provide an adequate automated FDT process or, at least, not separately charge for coordination of hot cuts. 868 Competing carriers can now chose freely between the CHC and FDT hot cut processes in Georgia and Louisiana. In the SWBT Texas and (Continued from previous page) and loop cutovers in a manner that prevent end users from losing service. KMC Comments at 7. We address KMC’s claim in checklist item 11, below. 861 See AT& T GALA I Comments at 40- 41. 862 Id. 863 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18485, para. 257. 864 Id. 865 Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17462- 63, para. 79 n. 275. In many cases, such differences are the product of state proceedings where provisioning processes and performance measurements were developed and refined with input from both the BOC and competing carriers. 866 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18485, para. 257. 867 Mpower GALA I Comments at 6; Mpower GALA II Comments at 15. 868 Mpower GALA II Comments at 16. Mpower states that BellSouth’s automated FDT is very unsatisfactory and compares unfavorably with the process of the other BOCs because BellSouth will only specify a business day on which the automated transfer will occur, which could result in customers being without service for several hours or more if the transfer fails. Id. at 15. According to Mpower, SBC and Verizon make a commitment to perform a transfer of service within a time frame of 60 or 90 minutes. Id. 130 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 131 Kansas/ Oklahoma Orders, however, the Commission expressly chose not to rely upon SWBT’s FDT showing in demonstrating compliance with checklist item 4 and relied instead on SWBT’s coordinated method (for which there was no charge). 869 Absent further substantiation, we cannot find that BellSouth does not provide an adequate automated FDT process. The evidence in this record demonstrates that BellSouth provisions FDT hot cuts in a timely manner and with a minimum number of troubles following installation. Concerning BellSouth’s separate charge for coordinated hot cuts (CHCs), the Commission has never required BOCs to provide CHCs at no charge. 870 By contrast, the Commission has found that competitive carriers have a meaningful opportunity to compete if a BOC makes available a non- automated CHC process with a charge. 871 We therefore believe that Mpower’s challenge to the cost basis of these charges is in reality a challenge to the pricing determinations of the Georgia Commission and, to the extent that Mpower is requesting a hot cut process that BellSouth does not currently offer, we note that a section 271 application is not an appropriate forum for the resolution of such inter- carrier disputes. Given that BellSouth demonstrates that it provisions CHCs in a timely manner and at an acceptable level of quality, with a minimal service disruption and a minimum number of troubles following installation, we find that Mpower’s concerns do not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. Thus, we do not believe that we have a sufficient basis for finding that these claims warrant checklist noncompliance. 223. Voice Grade Loops. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 872 that BellSouth provisions voice grade loops to competitors in Georgia and Louisiana in a nondiscriminatory manner. In order to determine that BellSouth’s performance reflects parity, we review performance measures comparable to those we have relied upon in prior section 271 orders. 873 224. In both Georgia and Louisiana, BellSouth has generally met the benchmark and parity standards for installation timeliness, installation quality, and the quality of the maintenance and repair functions. 874 We recognize that BellSouth’s performance with respect to 869 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18487, paras. 260- 61; see also SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6337, para. 201. 870 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18494- 95, para. 276. 871 See id. at 18494- 95, paras. 275- 77. In the SWBT Texas Order, the Commission found that time and material charges imposed during the CHC process were valid because of the Texas Commission’s demonstrated commitment to the Commission’s pricing rules. Id. at paras. 276- 77. 872 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 154; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 57. 873 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9078- 79, para. 162. 874 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.19.8.1.1- B. 2.19.13.2.4 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, 2W Analog Loop); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18.8.1.1- B. 2.18.3.2.4 (% Missed Installation Appointments, 2W Analog Loop); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.2.8.1- B. 3.2.9.2 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, 2W Analog Loop); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3.8.1- B. 3.3.9.2 (Maintenance Average Duration, 2W Analog Loop); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.8.1- B. 3.4.9.2 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, 2W Analog Loop). 131 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 132 a provisioning timeliness metric – the order completion interval metric – appears to be slightly out of parity in Georgia and Louisiana for several recent months. 875 However, recognizing that BellSouth performed at parity with respect to the majority of the voice grade loop “order completion interval” metrics, we find that BellSouth’s performance does not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate, we may pursue appropriate enforcement action. In addition, we note that BellSouth’s performance under the missed installation appointment metric suggests that BellSouth has generally been timely in the provisioning of voice grade loops. 876 225. We also recognize that BellSouth does not achieve parity under the missed repair appointments metric for three months during the relevant October through February period in Georgia. 877 BellSouth explains that the primary reason for the disparity is the small volume of competitive LEC reports. 878 BellSouth’s performance data demonstrate that it did not miss any competitive LEC repair appointments in January and February. 879 Given this improving trend in January and February, and the fact that competitive LEC volumes are low compared to other relevant missed repair appointment metrics, we do not find that this disparity rises to the level of checklist noncompliance. 226. KMC provides its own data to demonstrate that BellSouth’s Georgia and Louisiana performance for missed installation appointments and provisioning troubles within 30 days for voice grade loops show discriminatory performance for competitive LECs. 880 Xspedius 875 See Louisiana B. 2.1.8.1.1 (Order Completion Interval, 2W Analog Loop- Design/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch); Louisiana B. 2.1.12.1.1 (Order Completion Interval, 2W Analog Loop with LNP- Design/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). For B. 2.1.8.1.1, BellSouth performed better for its own retail affiliate in November and December in Louisiana. For B. 2. 1. 12. 1. 1, the competitive LEC average measure was 5. 47 for October- February and 3. 47 for BellSouth retail in Louisiana. 876 See generally Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18.8.1.1- B. 2.18.13.2.4 (% Missed Installation Appointments, 2W Analog Loop); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3.8.1- B. 3.3.9.2 (Maintenance Average Duration, 2W Analog Loop). 877 For October- February, BellSouth missed an average of 6.66% of competitive LEC repair appointments, compared to an average of 1.52% for BellSouth retail in Georgia. See Georgia B. 3.1.9.2 (Missed Repair Appointments, 2W Analog Loop, Non- Design/ Non- Dispatch). 878 See Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President- Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed March 14, 2002) (BellSouth Mar. 14 Ex Parte Letter). For the months of October, November, and December 2001, the competitive LEC volumes for this measure were 21, 13, and 20, respectively, with only two appointments missed each month. Id. 879 Id. In January, the reported results show zero missed appointments for the 26 competitive LEC appointments scheduled in Georgia, exceeding the retail analogue with 0.00% for competitive LECs compared to 1.06% for the retail analogue. BellSouth’s data show zero missed appointments for the ten competitive LEC appointments scheduled in February. Id. 880 KMC GALA I Comments at 3- 4. In Georgia, KMC claims that BellSouth missed over 10% of the basic 2 Wire Analog Loop installs for KMC over an 8 month period ending January 2002; 26% of KMC’s analog loop orders with LNP in December 2001; and 13% of KMC’s analog installs failed within 30 days of installation. See KMC (continued….) 132 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 133 also claims that BellSouth’s missed installation appointment performance for voice grade loops with LNP for October through January does not achieve parity. 881 We do not find that KMC and Xspedius’s claims warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. In making this finding, we rely on aggregate competitive carrier performance data, which we have found above to be accurate and reliable, to show that BellSouth’s performance meets the requirements of checklist item four in this case. 882 According to the carrier- to- carrier reports for both Georgia and Louisiana, with the exception of November 2001 in Louisiana, 883 BellSouth’s performance data for the relevant four month period show that it is provisioning voice grade loops in a timely manner in Georgia and Louisiana. Moreover, despite relatively low competitive carrier volumes, BellSouth’s Georgia and Louisiana performance data for installation quality of voice grade loops show nondiscriminatory treatment. 884 Given this evidence, and recognizing that BellSouth is meeting the service installation dates for competitive LECs at higher rates than for its own retail customers, 885 and provisions voice grade loops of a quality sufficient to afford competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete, we do not find that KMC and Xspedius’s claims warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. Thus, although KMC and Xspedius claim that its data show discriminatory performance, anomalous results for a single carrier in this instance does not qualify as a pattern of systemic performance disparities that result in competitive harm. 886 227. We also reject Mpower’s claim that BellSouth will not provide access to SL1 voice grade loops for end users that BellSouth serves through remote terminals. 887 In particular, Mpower asserts that when a requested loop is served by a DLC system, BellSouth insists on providing a more expensive SL2 loop to the competitive carrier. 888 The record reflects, however, that BellSouth will fill an SL1 loop order whenever the facilities are available, and it imposes no requirement that competitive LECs order a more expensive loop simply because DLC equipment (Continued from previous page) GALA II Comments at 6. In Louisiana, KMC asserts that 16% of the analog loop installs failed within 30 days of being installed in December 2001. Id. 881 Xspedius GALA II Comments at 8- 9. 882 For a discussion of the evidentiary case, see section IIIB, supra. 883 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18.8.1.1- B. 2.18.3.2.4 (% Missed Installation Appointments, 2W Analog Loop). BellSouth missed 4.06% of its appointments for its own customers, and 20.00% of the five appointments of those for its competitors in November in Louisiana. See Louisiana B. 2.1810.1.1 (% Missed Installation Appointments, 2W Analog Loop with INP Design< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). 884 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.19.8.1.1- B. 2.19.13.2.4 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, 2W Analog Loop). 885 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18.8.1.1- B. 2.18.3.2.4 (% Missed Installation Appointments, 2W Analog Loop). 886 Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055- 56, para. 122. 887 Mpower GALA I Comments at 30- 31. 888 Id. at 32. 133 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 134 is present. 889 Because we are not persuaded by Mpowers’ contention that BellSouth will not provide access to SL1 voice grade loops for end users that BellSouth serves through remote terminals, we do not believe that we have a sufficient basis for finding that these concerns warrant a finding of noncompliance with checklist item 4. We also note that no other carrier raises similar claims in this proceeding. 228. xDSL- Capable Loops. Based upon the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 890 that BellSouth demonstrates that it provides xDSL-capable loops in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. 891 BellSouth makes available xDSL- capable loops in Georgia and Louisiana through interconnection agreements and pursuant to tariffs approved by the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions. 892 In analyzing BellSouth’s showing, we review performance measures comparable to those we have relied upon in prior section 271 orders: order processing timeliness, installation timeliness, missed installation appointments, installation quality, and the timeliness and quality of the maintenance and repair functions. 893 Based on our analysis of BellSouth’s performance under these measures, we conclude that BellSouth’s performance for competitive LECs has generally met the benchmark and parity standards established in Georgia and Louisiana. 229. While BellSouth’s performance with respect to a maintenance and repair measure – the customer trouble report rate – appears to be out of parity in October and December in Georgia, we find that these disparities are slight and thus not competitively significant. Indeed, in Georgia, BellSouth’s performance data show that BellSouth performed slightly better for its retail affiliate from October through February. 894 Moreover, no commenter has indicated that the maintenance and repair performance of xDSL loops is a problem in Georgia. We therefore find that these issues are not fatal to BellSouth’s showing, and do not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. Should BellSouth’s performance in this area deteriorate, we will pursue appropriate enforcement action. Moreover, contrary to DIRECTV Broadband’s assertion, 895 we 889 BellSouth GALA I Reply App., Tab H, Reply Affidavit of Wiley G. Latham, Jr. at para. 7 (BellSouth GALA I Latham Reply Aff.). 890 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 157; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 61- 62. 891 We note that competing carriers in Georgia and Louisiana rely principally on two types of unbundled xDSL-capable loops: the xDSL loop and the ISDN loop. The Georgia and Louisiana Commissions developed separate loop- type performance measurement categories for xDSL loops (including, but not limited to, loops provisioned for ADSL, HDSL, and UCL) and ISDN loops, which can be used by some competing carriers to provide IDSL services. 892 See BellSouth GALA I Latham Aff. at para. 3. 893 See Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17462- 63, para. 79; Verizon Connecticut Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 15153- 56, paras. 15- 20; Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9056, 9059, paras. 123, 130; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6326- 27, paras. 181- 82. 894 The October- February average for this measure is 0. 82% for competitive LECs and 0. 81% for BellSouth retail. See Georgia B. 3.2.5.1 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, xDSL (ADSL, HDSL, and UCL)/ Dispatch). 895 DIRECTV Broadband GALA I Comments at 5. 134 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 135 are not persuaded that BellSouth is making fundamental changes to its DSL architecture that would severely limit the existing capability of DSL circuits to support advanced services. 896 230. ISDN Loops. Based on the evidence in the record, we also find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commission, 897 that BellSouth provides ISDN loops to competitors in Georgia and Louisiana in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. Although BellSouth’s data reveal some performance issues with ISDN loops, we conclude that these issues are not fatal to BellSouth’s showing. 898 We find that the performance issues are relatively slight and do not appear to be competitively significant to competing LECs. Accordingly, in light of BellSouth’s competitive carrier xDSL- capable loop record overall, we do not find that BellSouth’s performance demonstrates that it fails to meet the requirements of checklist item 4. 231. Digital Loops. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 899 that BellSouth’s performance with respect to digital loops complies with checklist item 4. We recognize that BellSouth’s performance with respect to the order completion interval metric in Georgia has been out of parity for competitive LECs for almost all months reported. 900 We find, however, that this performance does not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. BellSouth’s parity performance for all relevant months under the missed appointment metric in Georgia and Louisiana indicates that BellSouth provisions digital loops in a timely manner. We also note that, for every month during the 896 See BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at para. 44 (explaining that BellSouth has not changed the way DSL is provisioned, nor does it have plans currently do so). 897 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 157; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 61- 62. 898 Specifically, in Louisiana, BellSouth’s customer trouble report rate (dispatch) was out of parity for all months reported. See Louisiana B. 3.2.6.1 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, UNE ISDN/ Dispatch). However, the customer trouble report rate has remained low in Louisiana, with competitive carriers experiencing an average of 1.40% dispatch trouble reports compared to an average of 0.58% for BellSouth retail operations from October through February. Id. In addition, the UNE ISDN customer trouble report rate (non- dispatch) was in parity for all months reported, with competitive LECs experiencing an average of 0.79% non- dispatch customer trouble reports compared to an average of 1.03% for BellSouth retail operations from October- February. See Louisiana B. 3.2.6.2 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, UNE ISDN/ Non- Dispatch). BellSouth has also generally met the benchmark for installation timeliness and missed installation appointments for each month from October- February in Georgia and Louisiana. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.1.6.3.1 (Order Completion Interval, UNE ISDN< 6 circuits/ Dispatch); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18.6.1.1 (% Missed Installation Appointments, UNE ISDN< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). BellSouth’s Georgia performance data show that it provides an installation quality sufficient to afford competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. See Georgia B. 2.19.6.1.1 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, UNE ISDN< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). Competitive LECs experience an average of 4.90% trouble reports within 30 days after installation of an ISDN loop, compared to an average of 5.70% for BellSouth retail operations from October-February in Georgia. See id. In addition, BellSouth’s maintenance and repair performance, which measure the timeliness and quality of the maintenance and repair functions, has shown parity or very low repeat trouble rates during the same period. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.1.6.1- B. 3.16.2 (Missed Repair Appointments, UNE ISDN); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.6.1- B. 3.4.6.2 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, UNE ISDN). 899 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 166; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 56. 900 See Georgia B. 2.1.18.1.1 (Order Competition Interval, Digital Loop< DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). 135 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 136 relevant period, BellSouth maintained parity under the installation quality measure in Georgia and Louisiana. 901 Disaggregated maintenance and repair performance is not available for digital loops. Rather, digital loop maintenance and repair performance is subsumed under a broader category (“ UNE Other Design”), which include unbundled port and transport data. BellSouth generally maintained parity during the relevant months for measures of repair and maintenance timeliness and quality. 902 Given this evidence, we do not find that BellSouth’s digital loop performance warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. 232. High Capacity Loops. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 903 that BellSouth’s performance with respect to high capacity loops complies with checklist item 4. We reach this conclusion despite the fact that BellSouth’s performance with respect to two specific performance metrics – the percentage of troubles found within 30 days following installation of a high capacity loop and the percentage of missed installation appointments – appear to be out of parity for several recent months. 904 As we discuss below, however, this performance does not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. As the Commission has stated in the past, isolated cases of performance disparity, especially when the margin of disparity is small, generally will not result in a finding of checklist noncompliance. 905 Moreover, given BellSouth’s generally acceptable performance for all other categories of loops, and recognizing that high capacity loops make up a small percentage of overall loop orders in Georgia and Louisiana, we find that BellSouth’s performance is in compliance with checklist item 4. 906 233. In Georgia and Louisiana, BellSouth’s performance for a high capacity loop installation quality measure, the percentage of troubles found within 30 days following installation, has been statistically out of parity for the five- month period. 907 According to 901 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.19.18.1.1 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, Digital Loop< DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). 902 Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.1.10.1- B. 3.1.10.2 (Missed Repair Appointments, Other Design); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.2.10.1- B. 3.1.10.2 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, Other Design); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3.10.1- B. 3.3.10.2 (Maintenance Average Duration, Other Design); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.10.1- B. 3.4.10.2 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, Other Design). 903 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 166; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 56. 904 See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.19.19.1.1 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, Digital Loop >= DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch); Louisiana B. 2.18.19.1.1 (% Missed Installation Appointments, Digital Loop>= DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). 905 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055- 56, para. 22. 906 Through February 2002, BellSouth had provisioned 3,145 and 3,154 high capacity loops in Georgia and Louisiana, respectively. See BellSouth Apr. 17 Ex Parte Letter. 907 Competing carriers experienced an average of 7.87% trouble reports within 30 days after installation of an high capacity digital loop, compared to an average of 1.76% for BellSouth retail operations from October through February in Georgia. See Georgia B. 2.19.19.1.1 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, Digital Loop>= DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). Louisiana performance data show that competitive carriers experienced an average of 6. 93% (continued….) 136 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 137 BellSouth, however, when its performance under this metric is recalculated to not reflect troubles “found O. K.,” “no trouble” found, and competitive LEC caused reports its performance improves. 908 In Georgia, BellSouth explains that the competitive LEC troubles are approximately half central office problems and half facility problems. 909 BellSouth states that its review of the competitive LEC trouble reports in Louisiana indicates the majority of the reports are attributable to facility issues. 910 More significant, BellSouth claims that competitive LECs received approximately 95 percent actual trouble free installations from December through February when troubles found O. K., no troubles found, and competitive LEC caused reports are removed from the calculations. In light of these facts, we give credence to statements made by BellSouth in this proceeding and are encouraged that BellSouth has instituted new procedures in Georgia and Louisiana to reduce the trouble reports for this metric. 911 Moreover, prior to the completion of any high capacity loop, BellSouth states that its technicians in the customer wholesale interconnection network service (CWINS) center, central office, and field will do a simultaneous test to make sure that the loop meets the appropriate specifications. 912 234. We also note that BellSouth’s performance with respect to a provisioning timeliness metric – the missed installation appointments metric for dispatch orders – has been out of parity for October through February in Louisiana. 913 However, BellSouth’s performance reflected by another provisioning timeliness metric – the order completion interval metric – satisfies the benchmark for most months. 914 In addition, BellSouth’s satisfies the benchmark for (Continued from previous page) trouble reports, compared to an average of 1.00% for BellSouth resale operations for the same period. See Louisiana B. 2.19.19.1.1 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, Digital Loop>= DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch. 908 See BellSouth Mar. 14 Ex Parte Letter at Att. 7; BellSouth Apr. 17 Ex Parte Letter. 909 See BellSouth Apr. 17 Ex Parte Letter. 910 Id. 911 BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at para. 236. BellSouth states that it has implemented specific action plans in Georgia to bring the high capacity loop measure into parity with their retail analogue. See BellSouth Apr. 17 Ex Parte Letter. First, BellSouth states that the Louisiana Service Advocacy Centers (SACs) have increased their readiness to resolve any and all service order jeopardies. See id. Second, BellSouth claims that it is providing a “maintenance spare” DS1 circuit (where possible) in service areas with known defective pairs. In Georgia, BellSouth states that it has instituted an action plan requiring the appropriate Network supervisor to review all provisioning trouble reports to determine the report’s cause and the necessary action to keep it from recurring. Id. But see Letter from Patrick J. Donovan, Counsel to Cbeyond, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed April 26, 2002) (Mar. 14 Ex Parte Letter); Letter from Tricia Brekenridge, Executive Vice President, Industry Affairs, KMC Telecom, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed May 2, 2002) ( Mar. 14 Ex Parte Letter). 912 Id. We note that we will monitor BellSouth’s compliance with its commitment to improve its high capacity loop performance. Deterioration of BellSouth’s performance could result in enforcement action. 913 See Louisiana B. 2.18.19.1.1 (% Missed Installation Appointments, Digital Loop>= DS1/< 10 circuits/ Dispatch). The October- February average for this measure is 7. 13% for competitive LECs and 2. 23% for BellSouth retail. 914 See generally Louisiana B. 2.1.18.1.1- B. 2.1.19.2.2 (Order Completion Interval, Digital Loop). 137 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 138 all relevant months with respect to the non- dispatch missed installation appointment metric. 915 We are encouraged that BellSouth has initiated specific action plans to address missed installations, and BellSouth states that, for December 2001, the majority of the missed installations were a result of facility issues. 916 Because we look to the totality of circumstances in evaluating BellSouth’s performance in providing loops in accordance with the checklist requirements, we do not find that lack of parity on these high capacity loop measurements warrant a finding that BellSouth fails to meet checklist item 4. 917 235. KMC provides its own data to demonstrate that BellSouth misses firm loop installation appointments for high capacity loops, and that a large percentage of its high capacity loop installs fail within 30 days of installation. 918 We find, however, that this KMC- specific data does not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance for checklist item 4. We discuss above BellSouth’s aggregate performance under the installation quality and missed installation appointment metrics, and do not find that lack of parity on these high capacity loop measurements warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. 236. We also note that KMC has expressed concern about BellSouth’s high capacity loop maintenance and repair performance for the percentage of repeat troubles within 30 days. 919 As discussed above, disaggregated maintenance and repair performance is not available for high capacity loops. Rather, high capacity loop maintenance and repair performance is subsumed under a broader category (“ UNE Other Design”), which include unbundled port and transport data. BellSouth has maintained parity performance with respect to the maintenance and repair timeliness under the mean time to repair measure. Moreover, BellSouth’s disaggregated maintenance and repair performance for high capacity loops shows repair timeliness under the mean time to repair measure. Georgia and Louisiana UNE Other Design maintenance and repair performance, which measure the timeliness and quality of the maintenance and repair functions, has shown parity or very low trouble rates in recent months. 920 Given this evidence, we do not 915 See Louisiana B. 2.18.18.1.1 (% Missed Installation Appointments, Digital Loop< DS1/< 10 circuits/ Non Dispatch). 916 BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at para. 97. 917 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6344, para. 213. 918 See generally KMC GALA I Comments at 8. 919 KMC GALA I Comments at 3; KMC GALA II Comments at 10. KMC claims that BellSouth’s own reported performance indicates that over one- third of KMC’s DS1 and higher loop troubles in both Georgia and Louisiana from August 2001 to March 2002 experienced a trouble report within 30 days of installation. See KMC GALA II Comments at 10. 920 Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.1.10.1- B. 3.1.10.2 (Missed Repair Appointments, Other Design); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.2.10.1- B. 3.1.10.2 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, Other Design); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3.10.1- B. 3.3.10.2 (Maintenance Average Duration, Other Design); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.10.1- B. 3.4.10.2 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, Other Design). 138 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 139 find that BellSouth’s maintenance and repair performance warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance. 237. We also reject Cbeyond’s allegations that BellSouth provides competitive carriers inferior quality DS1 loops and does not charge competitors correctly. 921 The record reflects that BellSouth delivers DS1 loops with a four- wire interface, regardless of the particular technology developed. 922 Significantly, the Georgia Commission has investigated and dismissed Cbeyond’s claim, finding no basis to conclude that BellSouth has violated its interconnection agreement with Cbeyond in this respect. 923 Given this, we do not find that we have a sufficient basis for finding that Cbeyond’s claims warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. 238. Line Sharing. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 924 that BellSouth demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to the high frequency portion of the loop. 925 BellSouth offers line sharing in Georgia and Louisiana under its interconnection agreements and the terms of its tariff, in accordance with the requirements of the Line Sharing Order and the Line Sharing Reconsideration Order. 926 239. BellSouth’s performance with regard to the customer trouble report rate is out of parity for several recent months in Louisiana. 927 According to BellSouth, however, several of the customer trouble reports in November and December 2001, and January 2002, were actually 921 Cbeyond GALA I Comments at 22- 26. Cbeyond claims that BellSouth is violating the parties’ interconnection agreement because BellSouth does not provide the four- wire DS1 loops ordered by Cbeyond; instead, BellSouth frequently provides inferior quality 2- wire DS1 loops, which result in service degradation and inferior quality. Id. at 25. Cbeyond further claims that it is unfairly compensating BellSouth for its inappropriate provisioning of 2- wire DS1 loops. Id. 922 See BellSouth Milner GALA I Reply Aff. at paras. 25, 27- 29. 923 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 107. 924 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 164; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 64. 925 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capabilities and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order, CC Docket No. 98- 147, Fourth Report and Order, CC Docket No. 96- 98, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (1999) (Line Sharing Order) (pet. for rehearing pending sub nom. USTA v. FCC, DC Cir. No. 00- 102 (filed Jan. 18, 2000)); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capabilities and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 98- 147, Fourth Report and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 96- 98, Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; CC Docket No. 98- 147, Sixth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; CC Docket No. 96- 98, 16 FCC Rcd 2101 (2001) (Line Sharing Reconsideration Order); see also SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6345- 46, para. 215. 926 See BellSouth GALA I App., Tab W, Affidavit of Thomas G. Williams at para. 17 (Williams GALA I Aff.). 927 In Louisiana, the October- February average for this measure is 5. 10% for competitive LECs and 1. 47% for BellSouth retail. See Louisiana B. 3.2.7.2 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, Line Sharing/ Non- Dispatch). 139 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 140 information reports from competitive LECs and were not an indication of actual trouble. 928 Moreover, BellSouth’s performance data show that customer trouble reports for competitive LECs decreased from 9.60 percent in January to 2.11 percent in February in Louisiana. We find that, given BellSouth’s generally acceptable performance for all other categories of line- shared loops, BellSouth’s performance is in compliance with checklist item 4. 929 As the Commission has stated in the past, isolated cases of performance disparity, especially when the margin of disparity is small, generally will not result in a finding of checklist noncompliance. 930 No commenter has raised concerns with BellSouth’s line sharing customer trouble report rate in Louisiana. 240. While not addressing specific instances of line- shared performance disparities, AT& T raises broader policy and legal issues regarding BellSouth’s line- sharing obligations. 931 AT& T contends that BellSouth does not permit competitive LECs to obtain access to the entire capabilities of the unbundled next generation digital loop carrier loop at the central office and at the remote terminal through the installation of integrated splitter/ DSLAM cards. 932 We reject AT& T’s allegation because although incumbent LECs are required to provide unbundled access to the entire loop, we have found that “the high frequency portion of the loop network element is limited by technology, i. e., is only available on a copper facility.” 933 Furthermore, competitive LECs may provide data services to BellSouth voice customers served by digital loop carriers by either collocation in the remote terminal or, in the event that the Commission's four- part test for packet switching is met, access to unbundled packet switching. In fact, BellSouth states that competitive LECs can choose whether to access the high frequency portion of the loop at a BellSouth central office or remote terminal, and competitive LECs can engage in line sharing or 928 See Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President- Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed April 9, 2002) (BellSouth Apr. 9 Ex Parte Letter). BellSouth explains that a breakdown of the trouble report rate show that, during November and December 2001, and January 2002, the number of reports for which there were “no trouble found” ranged from 50% in November 2001 to 72% in February 2002. See id. 929 Georgia and Louisiana performance for installation timeliness and installation quality show nondiscriminatory treatment between competitors and BellSouth retail customers for line- shared loops. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.18.7.1.1- B. 2.18.7.2.2 (% Missed Installation Appointments, Line Sharing); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 2.19.7.1.2- B. 2.19.7.2.1 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, Line Sharing). In addition, BellSouth’s performance demonstrates that competing carriers experience comparable repair times for line shared loops as BellSouth retail operations, and in both states, the percentage of competitive LEC missed repair appointments and repeat troubles were out of parity for only one of the five months reported. See Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.7.1 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, Line Sharing/ Dispatch); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.4.7.2 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, Line Sharing/ Non- Dispatch); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3.7.1 (Maintenance Average Duration, Line Sharing/ Dispatch); Georgia/ Louisiana B. 3.3.7.2 (Maintenance Average Duration, Line Sharing/ Non- Dispatch). 930 See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055- 56, para. 22. 931 AT& T GALA I Comments at 42- 45. 932 Id. 933 See Line Sharing Reconsideration Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 2107, para. 10. 140 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 141 line splitting whether the customer is served by an all- copper loop, or by a combination of copper and digital loop carrier equipment. 934 Therefore, we disagree with AT& T that BellSouth’s policies and practices concerning the provisioning of line sharing, as explained to us in the instant proceeding, violate the Commission’s unbundling rules. 935 Accordingly, we decline to find that these allegations warrant a finding of checklist non- compliance. 241. Line Splitting. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 936 that BellSouth complies with its line- splitting obligations and provides access to network elements necessary for competing carriers to provide line splitting. 937 242. We disagree with AT& T’s claim that BellSouth must provide splitters for “voice” competitive LECs that seek to engage in line splitting. 938 The Commission rejected this precise argument in the SWBT Texas Order, explaining that “[ t] he Commission has never exercised its legislative rulemaking authority under section 251( d)( 2) to require incumbent LECs to provide access to the splitter, and incumbent LECs, therefore have no current obligation to make the splitter available.” 939 BellSouth, however, explains that it will allow a competitive carrier to provide its own splitter, or lease a BellSouth owned splitter for both line sharing and line splitting for central office based deployments and for both existing and new customers. 940 Thus, we do not find that AT& T’s claims warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. 243. We also disagree with AT& T’s claim that BellSouth’s OSS does not comply with our Line Sharing Reconsideration Order. 941 Specifically, AT& T asserts that BellSouth does not 934 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 78. 935 As we have stated in other section 271 orders, new interpretative disputes concerning the precise content of an incumbent LEC’s obligations to its competitors, disputes that our rules have not yet addressed and that do not involve per se violations of the Act or our rules, are not appropriately dealt with in the context of a section 271 proceeding. See Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 8993, para. 10; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18366, para. 23. We note that many of these allegations with respect to competitive access to fiber- fed loops are being addressed in pending proceedings before the Commission. See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket Nos. 98- 147, 96- 98, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98- 147, and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96- 98, FCC 00- 297, 15 FCC Rcd 17806, 17856- 62, paras. 118- 33 (Aug. 10, 2000); Line Sharing Reconsideration Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 2127- 30, paras. 55- 64. 936 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 165; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 65. 937 See Line Sharing Reconsideration Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 2111, para. 20 n. 36. 938 AT& T GALA I Comments at 44. 939 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18516, para. 327. 940 BellSouth GALA I App., Tab T, Reply Affidavit of Thomas G. Williams at para. 8 (Williams GALA I Reply Aff.). 941 AT& T GALA I Comments at 45- 46; AT& T GALA I Turner Decl. at para. 24. 141 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 142 provide electronic OSS for ordering, provisioning and maintaining line splitting. 942 Pursuant to the Georgia Commission’s mandate to make such OSS available for line splitting, BellSouth implemented permanent OSS for line splitting on January 5, 2002, and competitive LECs have raised no complaints about this new process. We find, therefore, that given the record before us, BellSouth’s process for line splitting orders is in compliance with the requirements of the checklist at this time. 244. Other Issues. KMC contends that BellSouth takes weeks to accomplish the actual loop disconnect when requested by KMC. 943 KMC estimates that, in Georgia, between 20 percent and 30 percent of the facilities underlying loop disconnect orders remain unavailable 30 days after the loop disconnect, and in Louisiana, BellSouth’s failure to disconnect loops properly has led to customer outages and delay in the release of the facility for use by KMC and other competitive carriers. 944 We conclude, however, that there is no evidence that the difficulties KMC may have encountered with BellSouth’s loop disconnect processes reflect systemic defects with BellSouth’s provisioning of unbundled local loops, and thus cannot find checklist noncompliance. C. Checklist Item 5 – Unbundled Transport 245. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC to provide “[ l] ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other services.” 945 Based on our review of the record, we conclude, as did both the Georgia Commission and the Louisiana Commission, that BellSouth complies with the requirements of this checklist item. 946 246. In past orders, the Commission has relied on the missed appointment rate to determine whether a BOC is provisioning transport to its competitors in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 947 Despite the low transport order volume for competitive LECs, BellSouth’s performance for this metric in Georgia and Louisiana from October through January shows that, with the exception of one month of performance in Georgia, BellSouth missed fewer appointments provisioning transport to its competitors than for its own retail customers. 948 Based 942 AT& T GALA I Comments at 45; AT& T GALA I Turner Decl. at 24. 943 KMC GALA I Comments at 10. 944 Id. 945 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( v). 946 See BellSouth GALA I Application at 26, 114- 116; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at para. 159; Georgia Commmission GALA I Comments at 166- 68; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 69- 71; Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 1; Louisiana Commission GALA II Comments at 1. 947 See, e. g., Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9106- 07, para. 210. 948 See B. 2.18.2.1.1 (% missed installation appointments). During October, BellSouth missed the one and only competitive LEC appointment in the month of October. Thus, BellSouth’s missed appointment rate was 100% for (continued….) 142 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 143 on this data, we conclude that BellSouth provides unbundled transport to competitive LECs in a nondiscriminatory manner. 247. We note that US LEC/ XO alleges that “BellSouth’s intransigence in providing … transport to XO and US LEC, or in converting existing special access circuits to UNEs, violates checklist item [5 – access to unbundled transport].” 949 These claims are addressed in our discussion of checklist item 2 above. 950 We also note that DIRECTV requests that the Commission require BellSouth to commit to offering interLATA ATM transport services after grant of its application. 951 We address these arguments in our public interest discussion below. 952 D. Checklist Item 6 –Unbundled Local Switching 248. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vi) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC to provide “[ l] ocal switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services.” 953 To satisfy its obligations under this subsection, an applicant must demonstrate compliance with Commission rules relating to unbundled local switching. 954 249. Based on our review of the record, 955 we conclude that BellSouth complies with this checklist item. 956 Specifically, BellSouth demonstrates that it provides: (1) line- side and (Continued from previous page) that month. We note that competitive LEC volumes were in the single digits from October through January in Georgia. Due to the low volume of competitive LEC orders, a single or handful of missed install appointments can cause seemingly large variations in the monthly data. See, e. g., Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9040, para. 94 n. 299. Given the low volumes, however, we do not find these disparities warrant a finding of noncompliance. We note that, in Louisiana, during the only months with competitive LEC data reported (December and January), BellSouth achieved parity. 949 US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 3- 5. 950 See discussion of checklist item 2, supra. 951 DIRECTV Broadband GALA II Comments at 6. 952 See discussion of the public interest analysis, infra. 953 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( vi). 954 See 47 C. F. R. § 51.319( c)( 4); see also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18520- 22, paras. 336- 38. 955 BellSouth GALA I Application at 116- 21; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at paras. 169- 93; BellSouth GALA I Application at 116- 120; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at paras. 169- 93; BellSouth Application App. A, Vol. 6a, Tab Q, Joint Affidavit of John A. Ruscilli and Cynthia K. Cox (BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Aff.) at paras. 45- 62; BellSouth Application App. A, Vol. 7, Tab S, BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at paras. 8- 9, 35; BellSouth GALA I Varner Ga. Aff. at paras. 257- 59; BellSouth GALA I Varner La. Aff. at para. 265. 956 We note that commenting parties’ challenges to BellSouth’s compliance with this checklist item have been previously addressed in this application. In particular, we address AT& T’s concern that BellSouth does not provide nondiscriminatory access to customized routing for operator services and directory assistance in our discussion of checklist item 7, infra. See AT& T GALA II Comments at 4; AT& T GALA I Comments at 13- 14, 66- 69. (continued….) 143 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 144 trunk side facilities; 957 (2) basic switching functions; 958 (3) vertical features; 959 (4) customized routing; 960 (5) shared trunk ports; 961 (6) unbundled tandem switching; 962 (7) usage information for billing exchange access; 963 and (8) usage information for billing for reciprocal compensation. 964 (Continued from previous page) Additionally, WorldCom states that BellSouth transmitted usage information on intraLATA calls, implicating either a switching or a billing problem. WorldCom GALA I Reply at 14- 15; WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg/ Desrosiers/ Kinard/ Cabe Reply Decl. at paras. 63- 66. We address this concern in our discussion of checklist item 2, supra. 957 Line- side facilities include, but are not limited to, the connection between a loop termination at a main distribution frame, and a switch line card. Trunk- side facilities include, but are not limited to, the connection between trunk termination at a trunk- side cross- connect panel and a switch trunk card. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20724 nn. 679- 80. See also BellSouth GALA I Application at 117; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at para. 170. 958 The basic switching function includes, but is not limited to: connecting lines to lines; lines to trunks; trunks to lines; trunks to trunks; as well as the same basic capabilities that are available to the BOC’s customers, such as a telephone number, directory listing, dial tone, signaling, and access to 911, operator services, and directory assistance. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20726 n. 690. See also BellSouth GALA I Application at 117; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at para. 170; BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Joint Aff. at para. 45. 959 Vertical features provide end- users with various services such as custom calling, call waiting, call forwarding, caller ID and Centrex. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order at 13 FCC Rcd at 20726, para. 216; see also BellSouth GALA I Application at 118; BellSouth Milner Aff. at para. 172; BellSouth Ruscilli/ Cox Joint Aff. at paras. 45, 54. 960 Customized routing permits requesting carriers to designate the particular outgoing trunks associated with unbundled switching provided by the incumbent that will carry certain classes of traffic originating from requesting carriers’ customers. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20728- 29, para. 221; BellSouth GALA I Application at 118- 20; BellSouth Milner Aff. at paras. 180- 93. Customized routing is also referred to as selective routing. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20728 n. 704. 961 Implementation of the Local Competition Provision in the telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection between Local Exchange carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket Nos. 96- 98 and 95- 185, Third Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 12 FCC Rcd 12460, 12475- 80, paras. 25- 30 (1997) (Local Competition Third Reconsideration Order); Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20716- 17, paras. 327- 29; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20732, para. 228; BellSouth GALA I Application at 117; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at paras. 170- 71. 962 The requirement to provide unbundled tandem switching includes: (i) trunk- connect facilities, including but not limited to the connection between trunk termination at a cross- connect panel and a switch trunk card; (ii) the base switching function of connecting trunks to trunks; and (iii) the functions that are centralized in tandem switches (as distinguished from separate end- office switches), including, but not limited to, call recording, the routing of calls to operator services, and signaling conversion features. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20733 n. 732. See also BellSouth GALA I Application at 117; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at paras. 178- 79; BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Joint Aff. at para. 48. 963 See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20733- 35, paras. 230- 31; BellSouth Aff. at 120- 21; BellSouth Ruscilli/ Cox GALA I Joint Aff. at para. 51- 53; BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 8. 964 See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20735- 37, paras. 232- 34; BellSouth GALA I Application at 120- 21; BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Joint Aff. at paras. 51- 53; BellSouth GALA I Scollard Aff. at para. 9. 144 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 145 We also note that the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions concluded that BellSouth complies with this requirement. 965 E. Checklist Item 7 – 911/ E911 Access & Directory Assistance/ Operator Services 1. 911 and E911 Access 250. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii) of the Act requires a BOC to provide “[ n] on discriminatory access to […] 911 and E911 services.” 966 BellSouth must provide competitors with access to its 911 and E911 services in the same manner that it obtains such access for itself, i. e., at parity. 967 Specifically, the BOC “must maintain the 911 database entries for competing LECs with the same accuracy and reliability that it maintains the database entries for its own customers.” 968 We find, consistent with the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth provides nondiscriminatory access to 911 and E911 services. 969 251. Only one competitive LEC raises an issue with this requirement by asserting that the database includes inaccurate data making BellSouth’s provision of 911 services in Louisiana discriminatory. 970 We are not persuaded by this argument because we agree with the Louisiana Commission that this is an isolated incident and is not indicative of a systematic problem with BellSouth’s 911 and E911 services. 971 2. Directory Assistance / Operator Services 252. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II) and section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( III) require a BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to “directory assistance services to allow the other carrier’s customers to obtain telephone numbers” and “operator call completion services,” respectively. 972 965 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 168; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 82; Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 1. 966 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii). 967 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd 4130- 31, para. 349 (citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256). 968 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256. 969 See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 182; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 78. The Commission has twice before found that BellSouth satisfies the 911 and E911 components of checklist item 7. See BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 666- 67, para 230; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20737, para. 235. 970 KMC GALA I Comments at 13- 14; KMC GALA I Demint Aff. at para. 9. 971 Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 78 (stating that the single example raised by KMC does not indicate a systemic failure and explains that the fault may not even be BellSouth’s). 972 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II), (III). See also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4131, para. 351. 145 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 146 Additionally, section 251( b)( 3) of the 1996 Act imposes on each LEC “the duty to permit all [competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service] to have nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing with no unreasonable dialing delays.” 973 253. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that BellSouth offers nondiscriminatory access to its directory assistance database. 974 BellSouth also offers competing carriers several options for accessing its operator services (OS) and directory assistance (DA) services. 975 BellSouth’s services are designed in such a manner that calls from customers of competing carriers are processed in an identical manner to BellSouth retail customers resulting in identical performance. 976 Also, pursuant to the Commission’s rules, competing carriers that wish to resell BellSouth’s operator services and directory assistance have a choice of whether the services will be branded, unbranded, or custom branded with the competing carrier’s own brand. 977 254. Only one commenter contends that BellSouth’s provision of OS/ DA is discriminatory. Specifically, AT& T, the only competing carrier in either Georgia or Louisiana to use customized routing, raises two issues with respect to customized routing and an additional complaint regarding customized branding using Original Line Number Screening (OLNS). 978 973 47 U. S. C. § 251( b)( 3). We have previously held that a BOC must be in compliance with section 251( b)( 3) in order to satisfy sections 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II) and (III). See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20740, n. 763. See also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4132- 33, para 352. 974 BellSouth offers access to its directory assistance database information through two methods. First, BellSouth “provides direct on- line access to the BellSouth directory assistance database for individual inquiries” through its Direct Access Directory Assistance Service (DADAS). BellSouth GALA I Application at 124. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission found that the DADAS system alone satisfied the requirements for nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance. 13 FCC Rcd at 20744- 45, para. 248. Second, BellSouth offers Directory Assistance Database Service (DADS) which gives competitive carriers the ability “to incorporate the subscriber listing information contained in the BellSouth directory assistance database into their own databases.” BellSouth GALA I Application at 124. 975 Competing carriers may choose to resell the BOC’s OS/ DA services, provide their own services, or route calls to a third- party provider BellSouth. GALA I Application at 123. 976 BellSouth GALA I Application at 125. Therefore, it is unnecessary to disaggregate BellSouth’s retail OS/ DA performance from competitive carrier end- user customers as required by the Commission in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order. 13 FCC Rcd at 20742- 43, para. 245. Likewise, the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions found that BellSouth provides OS/ DA services at parity with its retail by design. See Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 184; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 81- 82. 977 BellSouth GALA I Application at 126- 27. BellSouth has the ability to provide the requested branding in two ways. First, competitive carriers may choose branding via customized routing offered using either Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) or line class codes. Id. at 118- 19. Second, BellSouth offers customized branding using the Original Line Number Screening system which does not require customized routing. Id. at 126- 27 978 AT& T GALA I Comments at 67- 68. See BellSouth GALA I Milner Decl. at paras. 185, 188; BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Decl. at para. 57. 146 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 147 First, AT& T argues that customized routing is not being offered in the manner required by the BellSouth Second Louisiana Order because single region- wide codes for AT& T’s multiple routing options are not yet available to any carriers in BellSouth’s territory. 979 Instead, AT& T argues that new line class codes are needed for each line for which AT& T wants customized routing. 980 We reject AT& T’s assertion because we find that competitive LECs may obtain multiple customized routing options through AIN without having to specify line class codes. 981 Additionally, BellSouth and AT& T now have a contract establishing region- wide and state- wide codes for customized routing options. 982 Finally, the Commission previously has noted that section 271 proceedings are not the ideal venue for deciding whether to include line class codes among the specific attributes of the switching element. 983 255. Second, AT& T asserts that customized routing options cannot be included in electronic orders. 984 We reject this claim because BellSouth provides adequate documentation explaining how competing carriers can submit electronic orders with requests for customized routing using line class codes, like AT& T, or using AIN. 985 Moreover, we note that BellSouth also provides documentation explaining how to electronically order customized OS/ DA branding using its OLNS. 986 256. Finally, we reject AT& T’s contention that BellSouth’s provision of OS/ DA is discriminatory because, when competing carriers use OLNS for custom branding of BellSouth’s OS/ DA services, the customers of the competing carriers are not given as many automatic menu 979 See AT& T GALA I Comments at 67- 68; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 278- 80. See also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20730- 31, para. 224. 980 Last fall, AT& T contended that BellSouth fails to provide a required OS/ DA service because this functionality has not yet been implemented. See AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at para. 283; AT& T GALA I Comments at 67- 68. 981 BellSouth GALA I Application at 120; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at para. 183; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 98. Moreover, the Commission recognized in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, that BellSouth’s AIN offering has the potential to meet the requirements of this checklist item, but had not been fully implemented at that time. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20729, para. 222. BellSouth’s AIN is now available BellSouth’s region. BellSouth GALA I Reply at 98. 982 This contract was executed in August 2001. BellSouth April 5 Ex Parte Letter; BellSouth April 9 Ex Parte Letter at attach. B. This demonstrates BellSouth’s ability and willingness to make region- wide and state- wide codes available for customized routing options. See BellSouth GALA I Milner Decl. at paras. 190, 193. 983 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18523- 24, para. 342. 984 AT& T GALA I Comments at 68. 985 BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Decl. at paras. 49- 50; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 277- 83. As further assurance, we note that KPMG recently closed a related exception in the Florida third party audit stating, “KPMG Consulting was [ ] able to successfully submit its OS/ DA service requests electronically and manually.” Exception 69, Disposition Report, Nov. 13, 2001. 986 BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Decl. at paras. 49- 50; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 277- 83. 147 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 148 choices to route the customers’ calls as BellSouth retail customers. 987 BellSouth explains that providing competitive LECs with the type of routing they request would be extremely costly because it requires customized routing from BellSouth’s OS/ DA platform to the competing carrier’s individual repair center. 988 Nonetheless, BellSouth is willing to provide special trunks in order to do so through the Bona Fide Request (BFR) process which requires the competing carrier to fund the additional routing necessary. 989 Specifically, AT& T’s claim that BellSouth provides discriminatory treatment to competing carriers with custom branded OS/ DA was dismissed by the Georgia Commission. 990 We note that there is no indication on the record that AT& T has submitted a Bona Fide Request to acquire this capability. Nor does AT& T dispute that competing carriers can connect with the operator by dialing “0” or “0” plus the desired number in parity with BellSouth retail customers. 991 F. Checklist Item 8 - White Pages 257. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( viii) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC to provide “[ w] hite page directory listings for customers of the other carrier’s telephone exchange service.” 992 Section 251( b)( 3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service to have nondiscriminatory access to directory listings. 993 BellSouth asserts that it provides directory listings to competitive LECs in Georgia and Louisiana under the same business rules, and without any material change, as the Commission found acceptable in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order. 994 Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, that BellSouth satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8. 995 987 AT& T GALA I Comments at 68- 69; AT& T GALA I Bradbury Decl. at paras. 286- 90. Specifically, customers of competing carriers do not have the option to have their calls automatically transferred to the competing carrier’s repair services. Id. at 287- 88. 988 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 100; BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Decl. at para. 56. 989 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 100; BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Decl. at para. 56. 990 The Georgia Commission found that the “automatic routing of calls to a service or repair center is not an OS/ DA function.” Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 185. 991 See 47 C. F. R. § 51.217( c)( 2); BellSouth GALA I Reply at 100- 01. 992 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( viii). 993 47 U. S. C. § 251( b)( 3). 994 BellSouth GALA I Application at 127; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20747- 50, paras. 252- 59. 995 BellSouth provides competitive LECs with white page directory listings under interconnection agreements and tariffs. BellSouth GALA I Application at 26, 127- 29; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 102; BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Vol. 4, Tab J, Affidavit of Terrie Hudson (BellSouth GALA I Hudson Aff.) at paras. 5- 32; BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at para. 230, BellSouth Milner GALA I Reply Aff. at para. 59. 148 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 149 258. We disagree with KMC that BellSouth provides directory listing information in a discriminatory manner. Specifically, KMC contends that BellSouth made numerous errors processing its customer directory information. 996 KMC alleges that BellSouth lost all of KMC’s directory listing information submitted by KMC’s Augusta, Georgia office for the month of April 2001, and that the problem did not become apparent until two weeks prior to the directory closing. 997 BellSouth, however, states that it never lost any of KMC’s listings in Augusta. Rather, BellSouth contends that it was responding to a late request from KMC to make certain changes in listing for some KMC customers and, despite the short time- frame, those changes were implemented successfully. 998 In addition, KMC alleges that in October 2000, BellSouth did not give KMC adequate notice of a change in procedures for the submission of directory listings. 999 BellSouth, however, contends that the revised process for submitting directory listings was available as early as January 2000. 1000 We find that KMC’s allegations, even if true, describe merely isolated incidents and not systemic problems. Thus, we decline to find noncompliance for checklist item 8. Although not a basis for our decision here, the record demonstrates that BellSouth is attempting to implement procedures to minimize the potential errors in the listings provisioned for competitive LECs. 1001 G. Checklist Item 11 – Number Portability 259. Section 271( c)( 2)( B) of the Act requires a BOC to comply with the number portability regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant to section 251. 1002 Section 251( b)( 2) requires all LECs “to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission.” 1003 Based on the evidence in the 996 KMC GALA II Comments at 3; KMC GALA I Comments at 11- 13. 997 KMC GALA I Comments at 11. 998 See BellSouth GALA I Reply at 102; BellSouth GALA I Application Reply App., Vol 1, Tab G, Reply Affidavit of Terrie Hudson (BellSouth GALA I Hudson Reply Aff.) at paras. 4- 9; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 187- 89. 999 KMC GALA I Comments at 12. KMC also describes two incidents where it alleges that BellSouth printed incorrect numbers for KMC customers in the directory listings. BellSouth attributes one incorrect listing to human error and states that is has since been fixed. In the other case, BellSouth believes that KMC incorrectly asserted that BellSouth published an error in a listing in Savannah, Georgia. BellSouth GALA I Application Reply at 103. KMC alleges that in Louisiana, BellSouth twice incorrectly listed a large block of numbers for a medical center in the Shreveport directory. KMC GALA I Comments at 12. See also Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 187- 89. 1000 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 102. 1001 BellSouth GALA I Application at 127- 29, BellSouth GALA I Reply at 102- 03. 1002 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xi). 1003 Id. at § 251( b)( 2). 149 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 150 record, we conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 1004 that BellSouth complies with the requirements of checklist item 11. 1005 260. Several commenters raise issues concerning BellSouth’s compliance with its number portability obligation, none of which demonstrate that BellSouth presently fails to comply with the requirements of checklist item 11. For example, AT& T explains that, in a number of instances, after BellSouth has ported a telephone number to an AT& T customer, BellSouth has erroneously assigned the same number to a new BellSouth customer. 1006 BellSouth acknowledges that it has previously identified two problems that led to instances of duplicate assignment of ported telephone numbers and has addressed both problems. 1007 According to BellSouth, in December 1999, it modified its order negotiation system to correct orders that were issued without a field identifier and, in the last quarter of 2000, BellSouth determined that, due to a software upgrade, when a competitive LEC ported a block of Direct Inward Dialing (DID) numbers, only the lead number would be marked as ported. 1008 BellSouth states that it has implemented an interim manual solution to this problem in January 2001, and a software solution is being pursued. 1009 BellSouth claims that the manual solution will continue to ensure that all future number porting activity will be properly marked in BellSouth's number assignment database to prevent duplicate assignment of numbers. 1010 We therefore conclude that, based on this evidence, the number reassignment problems experienced by AT& T are de minimis and isolated, and thus do not warrant a finding of noncompliance for this checklist item. 261. We also reject AT& T’s claim that loss of inbound service calling attributable to problems with the number portability process warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. AT& T claims that BellSouth fails to perform the necessary switch translations when porting numbers to some customers, and as a result those customers cannot receive calls from BellSouth customers. 1011 AT& T believes that the source of this problem is BellSouth’s failure to perform translation work on its switch, where the switch cannot implement an automatic trigger, at the time the number is ported. 1012 According to BellSouth, however, for the vast majority of its 1004 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 200; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 87. 1005 BellSouth provides permanent number portability in conformance with Commission rules and provides interim number portability to competing carriers through remote call forwarding, direct inward dialing, route- index portability hub, directory numbering routing indexing, and local exchange routing guide (LERG) reassignment. BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at paras. 276, 278. 1006 AT& T GALA I Comments at 36. 1007 BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff. at paras. 173- 76. 1008 See BellSouth GALA I Reply at 105. 1009 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 105; BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Aff. at para. 174. 1010 BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Reply Aff. at para. 91. 1011 AT& T GALA I Comments at 34- 35; AT& T GALA I Berger Decl. at paras. 19- 27. 1012 AT& T GALA I Comments at 34. 150 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 151 orders, the LNP Gateway System automatically issues a trigger order with a zero due date, which does not require manual intervention, and meets or exceeds any national standards for number portability. 1013 We also recognize that, in response to AT& T’s claims, BellSouth has established specific project managers to address those orders that are large or complex to ensure that such orders are worked properly and that conversions are accurately handled. 1014 More significantly, we note that the Georgia Commission considered AT& T’s allegation with respect to this issue and concluded that BellSouth’s approach is “a reasonable one.” 1015 Given BellSouth’s evidence, along with the prior determination of the Georgia Commission, we conclude that these allegations are not indicative of a systemic failure in BellSouth’s provision of number portability. If, however, such loss of inbound calling rises to a level that impedes a carrier’s opportunity to compete, we may take appropriate enforcement action under section 271( d)( 6). 262. AT& T also claims that BellSouth’s number portability process results in customers continuing to receive bills from BellSouth after they have switched their service to AT& T or another competitive carrier. 1016 According to BellSouth, however, an AT& T or competitive LEC customer will receive a duplicate bill for disconnects processed during a current billing period and for any services that BellSouth continues to provide. 1017 BellSouth further states that, to the extent that any double billing problem attributable to BellSouth has arisen, BellSouth has worked with the collaboratives to investigate and resolve, where necessary, these types of issues. 1018 While we do not discount the potential inconvenience of double billing, there is insufficient evidence of double billing in this instance to indicate that BellSouth is in violation of checklist item 11. To the extent that this billing issue increases in magnitude, we are prepared to take the appropriate enforcement action pursuant to section 271( d)( 6). 1019 263. AT& T also argues that there are certain “odd ball” central office codes assigned by BellSouth that are not portable and that cannot be dialed by competitive LEC customers in violation of checklist items 11 and 12. 1020 BellSouth explains that these odd ball central office codes involve four separate types of numbers: the first are codes used for internal BellSouth functions and are never assigned to retail customers; 1021 the second are “choke” codes, 1022 which 1013 See BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at para. 60. 1014 Id. at paras. 60- 61. 1015 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 203. 1016 AT& T GALA I Comments at 35; AT& T GALA I Berger Decl. at para. 23. 1017 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 106- 07; BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Reply Aff. at para. 94. 1018 BellSouth GALA I Ainsworth Reply Aff. at para. 94. 1019 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 6). 1020 AT& T GALA I Berger Decl. at paras. 35- 39. 1021 BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at para. 73. 151 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 152 the Southeastern LNP Operations Team agreed would not be portable to avoid generating additional LNP query load during mass calling events; 1023 the third involves a BellSouth service that pre- dated LNP called ZipConnect, in which there are approximately 312 numbers in service throughout the BellSouth territory; 1024 and the fourth involves another pre- LNP service called Uniserve with 33 numbers in service in Georgia and 30 in Louisiana. 1025 Concerning the first group of numbers, discussed above, BellSouth states that it has begun the work required to use toll free numbers instead of central office or NXX codes for official BellSouth communications. 1026 Given the relatively small number of central office codes involved, the fact competitive LECs can allow their customers to access the majority of these codes, and that the actual numbers that these codes point to are portable, we do not believe these arrangements demonstrate that BellSouth fails to comply with the requirements of checklist items 11 and 12. 264. Commenters argue that BellSouth’s failure to meet the LNP Disconnect Timeliness Measure is evidence of poor performance in Georgia and Louisiana. 1027 For example, KMC and US LEC/ XO accuse BellSouth of modifying its LNP disconnect timeliness measure instead of improving performance under the current measurement. 1028 US LEC/ XO also alleges that BellSouth “refuses” to pay penalties to competitive carriers on this measure. 1029 According to BellSouth, however, the disparate performance results are not the result of discriminatory conduct, but rather the result of a flawed metric. 1030 BellSouth argues that the initial disconnect timeliness measure may not be an accurate indicator of BellSouth’s performance because it does not reflect actual customer experience. 1031 As a result, BellSouth asks us not to rely on this measurement, and, pursuant to an order of the Georgia Commission, BellSouth has not reported performance under this metric since May 2001. 1032 In the interim, the Georgia Commission (Continued from previous page) 1022 Choke codes are used to restrict access to prevent network congestion during mass calling events. See BellSouth GALA I Reply at 108. 1023 Id. 1024 Id. at para. 75. 1025 Id. at para. 76. 1026 See Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President- Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed April 12, 2002) (BellSouth Apr. 12 Ex Parte Letter). BellSouth also plans to discontinue its ZipConnect and Uniserv services in the BellSouth region. Id. BellSouth plans to return all of these codes to the North American Numbering Plan Administrator (NANPA) once it has vacated the codes. Id. 1027 AT& T GALA I Comments at 36; see also Georgia and Louisiana B. 2.31.1 (Disconnect Timeliness, LNP). 1028 KMC GALA I Comments at 7- 8; US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 23- 25. 1029 US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 23- 25. 1030 See BellSouth GALA I Application at 136; BellSouth GALA I Varner Aff. at paras. 45- 48. 1031 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 109. 1032 See BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at para. 117. 152 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 153 granted BellSouth’s motion to modify the disconnect timeliness performance measurement, and directed that BellSouth report results for a modified form of the existing metric, as well as for three new metrics, beginning with June data. 1033 Furthermore, the Georgia Commission held that any penalties associated with this measurement should be held in escrow until the conclusion of a LNP Disconnect Timeliness review. 1034 Similarly, the Louisiana Commission also ordered BellSouth to report results for new LNP disconnect timeliness metrics. 1035 We agree that the modified metrics will more accurately reflect BellSouth’s LNP Disconnect Timeliness performance in Georgia and Louisiana. 265. We recognize that BellSouth’s performance with respect to two of the revised performance metrics appears to be out of parity in Georgia and Louisiana for the five- month period. 1036 We find, however, that this performance does not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. First, upon initial review, BellSouth’s performance with respect to the LNP-Disconnect Timeliness, Non- Trigger metric is out of parity for the five- month period. 1037 In particular, BellSouth reported an aggregate 95 percent error rate for disconnect timeliness in December 2001 in Georgia. 1038 According to BellSouth, however, there were two large LNP conversions in December that resulted in an enormous increase in volume over previous months. 1039 BellSouth also states that it has discovered coding issues, which affected BellSouth’s performance with respect to the non- trigger method. 1040 BellSouth claims that this coding issue does not take into account successful timely LNP disconnects. 1041 BellSouth contends that its 1033 In Georgia, BellSouth reports each month its performance related to LNP Disconnect Timeliness under three metrics: P- 13B (Out of Service< 60 minutes); P- 13C (% LNP Trigger Applied Prior to DD); and P- 13D (Disconnect Timeliness, Non- Trigger). See Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President- Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed April 18, 2002) (BellSouth Apr. 18 Ex Parte Letter). 1034 BellSouth GALA II Varner Reply Aff. at para. 132. 1035 Id. at para. 134. BellSouth reports each month its performance related to LNP Disconnect Timeliness under three modified metrics in Louisiana: P- 10A (LNP Disconnect Timeliness); P- 10C (Out of Service< 60 minutes); and P- 10B (% LNP Trigger Applied Prior to DD). See BellSouth Apr. 18 Ex Parte Letter. 1036 See Georgia P- 13D (Disconnect Timeliness, Non- Trigger); Louisiana P- 10A (LNP Disconnect Timeliness). 1037 See Georgia P- 13D (Disconnect Timeliness, Non- Trigger). 1038 Georgia P- 13D (Disconnect Timeliness, Non- Trigger) (showing that BellSouth only satisfied 4.96% of the Non- Trigger LNP Disconnects in a timely manner). See also US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 25. 1039 BellSouth Varner GALA II Reply Aff. at para. 117. 1040 See BellSouth Apr. 18 Ex Parte Letter. 1041 For December 2001, BellSouth states that it disconnected approximately 3,000 non- trigger orders within the benchmark; however, the information in its database could not identify when the disconnect occurred. See BellSouth Apr. 18 Ex Parte Letter. Furthermore, BellSouth states that, while the disconnects were completed on time, the record keeping did not reflect it, which caused BellSouth’s poor performance for this metric in December. See id. 153 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 154 actual performance on these conversions was excellent, although its reported results reflect otherwise. 1042 We also note that BellSouth’s performance reflected by the other Disconnect Timeliness metrics satisfies the benchmark established by the Georgia Commission for all relevant months. 1043 In light of these facts and the history surrounding the Disconnect Timeliness metric, we give credence to statements made by BellSouth in this proceeding. To the extent that BellSouth’s performance deteriorates with respect to this metric, we are prepared to take appropriate enforcement action under section 271( d)( 6). 266. Second, BellSouth’s performance with respect to the LNP Disconnect Timeliness measure in Louisiana is out of parity during the five- month period. 1044 We note, however, that BellSouth’s performance reflected by the other Disconnect Timeliness metrics satisfies the benchmark established by the Louisiana Commission for all relevant months. 1045 Next, this metric may not be an accurate indicator of BellSouth’s performance. 1046 Finally, even setting aside the questions about the accuracy of this metric, we find that the performance differences reported under this metric do not appear to be competitively significant. Indeed, no commenter has questioned BellSouth’s performance with respect to this modified metric. Therefore, absent further substantiation of systemic problems, we find that BellSouth’s performance does not warrant a finding of noncompliance with this checklist item. If, however, BellSouth’s performance deteriorates with respect to this particular metric, we may take appropriate enforcement action under section 271( d)( 6). 267. In addition, we note that commenters raise other complaints about problems that they attribute to the number portability process. For instance, AT& T claims that BellSouth’s failure to implement ten- digit Calling Name Global Title Translation (GTT) causes some customers that port their numbers to competitive LECs to lose the ability to have their names appear on the caller identification (ID) boxes of the recipients of their calls. 1047 Because BellSouth completed its region- wide implementation of ten- digit Calling Name GTT in its SS7 network on November 9, 2001, we find that AT& T’s allegations do not warrant a finding of noncompliance. 1048 Similarly, KMC claims that BellSouth has problems with the delivery and 1042 Id. 1043 Georgia P- 13B (Out of Service< 60 minutes); Georgia P- 13C (% LNP Trigger Applied Prior to DD). 1044 See Louisiana P- 10A (LNP Disconnect Timeliness). 1045 See Louisiana P- 10C (Out of Service< 60 minutes); Louisiana P- 10B (% LNP Trigger Applied Prior to DD). 1046 As explained above, the Louisiana Commission ordered BellSouth to report each month its performance related to LNP Disconnect Timeliness as measured under three new metrics. The Louisiana Commission, however, is reviewing these metrics to determine if they adequately measure BellSouth’s LNP Disconnect Timeliness. 1047 AT& T GALA I Comments at 37. 1048 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 107; BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at 65. BellSouth completed its implementation of ten- digit GTT in its SS7 network in Georgia and Louisiana on August 17, 2001, and October 12, 2001, respectively. 154 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 155 accuracy of KMC customers’ calling party number and name on caller ID from calls originating from a KMC switch in Louisiana. 1049 As BellSouth explains, there are multiple explanations for KMC’s reported problems, and KMC offers no evidence that BellSouth has caused its customers any problems with caller ID. 1050 Because KMC’s claim appears to be anecdotal and unsupported by any persuasive evidence, we conclude that it does not warrant a finding of noncompliance with this checklist item. H. Checklist Item 12 – Local Dialing Parity 268. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( xii) requires “[ n] on discriminatory access to such services or information as are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section 251( b)( 3).” 1051 BellSouth demonstrates that it provides local dialing parity in accordance with the Commission’s rules. 1052 Like the Commission found in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, and consistent with the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, we find that BellSouth satisfies the requirements of this checklist item. 1053 269. WorldCom claims that BellSouth fails to provide local dialing parity because certain intraLATA toll calls by its UNE- P customers are charged to WorldCom as local calls on DUF bills. 1054 Originally, WorldCom claimed that BellSouth’s DUF bills were inaccurate, or that this was a problem with switch translations. 1055 However, BellSouth demonstrates that the DUF billing records accurately depict the actual call routing 1056 and that there is no systemic problem with inaccurate switch translations. 1057 BellSouth explains that WorldCom’s dispute arises 1049 KMC GALA I Comments at 14; KMC GALA I Demint Aff. at 10; KMC GALA I Braddock Aff. at 8. 1050 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 107- 08; BellSouth GALA I Milner Reply Aff. at paras. 71- 72. 1051 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xii). 1052 BellSouth GALA I Milner Aff. at paras. 287- 89. 1053 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20771- 73, paras. 295- 97; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 205- 07; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 88- 89. 1054 WorldCom GALA II Reply at 7- 8; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 16; Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel, Federal Advocacy, WorldCom, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 at 1- 5 (filed May 10, 2002) (WorldCom May 10 Ex Parte Letter). See also WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 16- 20; WorldCom GALA I Reply at 14- 15; WorldCom Lichtenberg, Desrosiers, Kinard, and Cabe Reply Decl. at paras. 63- 66. 1055 WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 16- 20; WorldCom GALA I Reply at 14- 15; WorldCom Lichtenberg, Desrosiers, Kinard, and Cabe Reply Decl. at paras. 63- 66. 1056 BellSouth GALA I Scollard Reply at paras 2- 3; BellSouth GALA II Application App. A, Vol. 1a, Tab A, Affidavit of John Ruscilli and Cynthia Cox (BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff.) at para. 6. 1057 BellSouth demonstrates that the problem is not a systemic switch translation problem as it has reviewed WorldCom’s complaint, including the examples provided by WorldCom, and found only one instance in which the (continued….) 155 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 156 because, in Georgia, there is a slight geographic difference between flat- rate local calling areas and measured- rate local calling areas. 1058 Currently, because UNE- P is a measured- rate service, BellSouth measures UNE- P switching based on the slightly larger measured- rate local calling area. 1059 BellSouth asserts that very few intraLATA toll calls are affected because this issue is limited to intraLATA toll calls that terminate outside of the flat- rate local calling area but within the measured- rate local calling area – an area smaller than the entire LATA. 1060 BellSouth estimates that the difference between flat- rate and measured- rate local calling areas accounts for approximately 0.17 percent of the minutes- of- use by WorldCom’s UNE- P customers in Georgia. 1061 We note that BellSouth and WorldCom have agreed to settle compensation issues for the call traffic affected by this local calling area differential. 1062 We also note that this does (Continued from previous page) switch translation did not correspond to the customer service record. BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 6; BellSouth April 12 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 1058 BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 7; BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 1 & Attach. at 1- 3 (describing the issue and noting that a difference between flat- rate and measured- rate local calling areas is only a problem in Georgia); Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket 02- 35 at 1- 2 & attach. (filed May 14, 2002) (explaining that the Georgia Commission ordered a difference between flat- rate and measured- rate local calling areas on December 18, 1991 in Georgia Commission Docket No. 3905- U). 1059 BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 7; BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 1 & Attach. at 1- 2. See also WorldCom April 29 Ex Parte Letter at 1- 2 & Attachs. 1- 2. BellSouth also offers to competitive LECs a LATA- wide local calling area to which 17 of the 30 competitive LECs offering UNE- P service in Georgia subscribe, accounting for approximately 45% of all Georgia UNE- P lines. BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 2. BellSouth also asserts that the difference between the flat- rate and measured- rate calling areas does not preclude competing carriers from billing end users according to its own local calling area demarcation map. BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 9. But see WorldCom GALA II Reply at 8; WorldCom GALA II Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 15- 16 (explaining that reprocessing usage records in such a manner would be an arduous undertaking). 1060 Moreover, it is generally limited to those competing carriers that purchase UNE- P in Georgia and have their own intraLATA toll and long distance facilities. See WorldCom May 10 Ex Parte Letter at n. 2 (stating that approximately 10% of WorldCom’s local UNE- P customers choose a carrier other than WorldCom or BellSouth for intraLATA toll calls). Specifically, when a competing carrier’s UNE- P customer makes an intraLATA toll call that terminates outside of the measured- rate local calling area, the call is carried by the customer’s preferred intraLATA toll carrier and billed accordingly. On the other hand, a call that terminates within the measured- rate local calling area, but outside of the flat- rate local calling area is not connected to the carrier’s intraLATA toll facilities but rather is carried over the UNE- P facilities leased from BellSouth and billed as a local call rather than an intraLATA toll call. BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 1 & Attach. at 2. This problem is further limited to only those competing carriers that have not chosen to provide their UNE- P customers with the LATA- wide local calling area. BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 2. 1061 Letter from Kathy B. Levitz, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35 (filed May 10, 2002) (BellSouth May 10 Ex Parte Letter); BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (stating that only 0.15% of WorldCom’s minutes of use are affected when end users that had the larger measured rate as customer of BellSouth are excluded). 1062 BellSouth is reviewing one year’s worth of WorldCom’s calling records and states that the two parties are actively negotiating settlement of this issue. BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 3- 4. See BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 9. 156 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 157 not in any way impair WorldCom’s customers, who are still able to choose WorldCom for their intraLATA toll carrier and have benefited from an expanded local calling area. 1063 Because this dispute has a limited commercial impact and no other competitive LEC raises this issue, we do not find that this problem warrants a finding of noncompliance. Although not decisional to our analysis, we also note that BellSouth plans to remedy its systems to eliminate this problem. 1064 To the extent that WorldCom disputes that this fix was improperly scheduled or is not clearly documented for sufficient understanding, WorldCom should address its concerns through the change management process. 1065 Should this intraLATA routing issue prove to be a systemic problem with BellSouth’s OSS, or should the scheduled July fix prove to cause carriers competitive harm, the Commission may take appropriate enforcement action. 270. AT& T contends that BellSouth fails to satisfy checklist item 12 because BellSouth markets and assigns special “oddball” NXX code numbers to retail customers that cannot be dialed by competitive LEC customers. 1066 We address this concern in our discussion of checklist item 11, supra. I. Checklist Item 13 – Reciprocal Compensation 271. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter into “[ r] eciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section 252( d)( 2).” 1067 In turn, section 252( d)( 2)( A) specifies when a state commission may consider the terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable. 1068 Based on the record, we conclude that BellSouth demonstrates that it provides reciprocal compensation as required by checklist item 13. 272. We reject US LEC’s assertions regarding reciprocal compensation for ISP- bound traffic. 1069 As a preliminary matter, we note the record shows that US LEC and BellSouth 1063 BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 1- 2 & Attach. at 1- 2. 1064 BellSouth May 7 Ex Parte Letter at 1- 2 & Attach. at 3- 4. 1065 WorldCom May 10 Ex Parte Letter at 3- 5. 1066 AT& T GALA I Comments at 38- 39; AT& T GALA II Comments at 1. 1067 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiii); see Appendix C at para. 66. 1068 47 U. S. C. § 252( d)( 2)( A). 1069 See US LEC GALA I Comments at 36- 40; US LEC and XO GALA II Comments at 41- 45; see also Letter from Patrick J. Donovan, Counsel to US LEC, to Magalie R. Salas, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01- 277 (November 29, 2001). In its comments, US LEC cites past disputes with BellSouth regarding reciprocal compensation for ISP- bound traffic and whether the tandem interconnection rate was applicable. US LEC concedes these disputes were resolved by the Georgia Commission. See Complaint of US LEC of Georgia, Inc. Against BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Georgia Public Service Commission, Docket No. 9577- U, Order (June 15, 2000) and Order to Determine Interconnection Rate (May 21, 2001) and Order on Tandem Interconnection Rate in Georgia Commission Docket No. 9577- U (May 21, 2001). To the extent reciprocal compensation disputes remained following the Georgia Orders, US LEC has now settled all such disputes with BellSouth on October 4, (continued….) 157 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 158 entered into a settlement agreement on October 4, 2001, that “resolves all past disputes over reciprocal compensation.” 1070 Regardless, under a prior Commission order, ISP- bound traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation provisions of section 251( b)( 5) and 252( d)( 2). 1071 This decision was reaffirmed by the Commission on remand. 1072 Although the D. C. Court has remanded this latest Commission decision, the court did not vacate it and our rules remain in effect. 1073 Therefore, we continue to find that whether a carrier pays such compensation is “irrelevant to checklist item 13.” 1074 We conclude that BellSouth has met its obligations under checklist item 13. J. Checklist Item 14 – Resale 273. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiv) of the Act requires that a BOC make “telecommunications services . . . available for resale in accordance with the requirements of section 251( c)( 4) and section 252( d)( 3).” 1075 Based on the record in this proceeding, we conclude, as did the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, 1076 that BellSouth satisfies the requirements of this checklist item in Georgia and Louisiana. 1077 BellSouth has a specific legal (Continued from previous page) 2001. See BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 32. In addition, commenters state that an identical issue involving XO is presently being arbitrated before the Georgia Commission. See US LEC and XO GALA II Comments at 44. As we have previously stated, we do not “preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier disputes by state commissions.” Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd. at 9102, para. 203. Accordingly, this information is not relevant to our evaluation of BellSouth’s current compliance with checklist item 13. 1070 BellSouth GALA I Reply at 109- 110; BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at para. 32. 1071 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter- Carrier Compensation for ISP- Bound Traffic, Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96- 98 and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96- 98, 14 FCC Rcd 3689 at 3706, para. 26 n. 87 (1999) (Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F. 3d 1 (D. C. Cir. 2000). 1072 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Inter- Carrier Compensation for ISP- Bound Traffic, CC Docket Nos. 96- 98 and 99- 68, Order on Remand and Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 9151, 9167, 9171- 72, paras. 35, 44 (2001). 1073 WorldCom v. FCC, No. 01- 1218 (D. C. Cir. May 3, 2002). 1074 Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17484, para. 119; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4142, para. 377. 1075 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiv). 1076 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 216; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 91. 1077 In Georgia and Louisiana, BellSouth provisions resale lines in a timely manner, generally meeting the benchmarks for installation timeliness and missed installation appointments for most months from October-February. See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 2.1.1.1.1- A. 2.1.6.2.2 (Order Completion Interval, Resale); Georgia/ Louisiana A. 2.11.1.1.1- A. 2.11.6.2.2 (% Missed Installation Appointments, Resale). Competitors also experienced a lower average of percent trouble reports within 30 days after installation of a resale line compared to BellSouth retail from October- February in Georgia and Louisiana. See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 2.12.1.1.1- A. 2.12.6.2.2 (% Provisioning Troubles within 30 Days, Resale). We also find that BellSouth demonstrates that it provides maintenance and repair for resale lines that afford competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete. Both the mean time to repair and (continued….) 158 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 159 obligation in its interconnection agreements and tariffs to make its retail telecommunications services available for resale to competing carriers at wholesale rates. 1078 None of the commenting parties question BellSouth’s showing of compliance with the requirements of this checklist item except in the area of resale of advanced services, which we discuss below. 274. We disagree with commenters that argue that BellSouth fails to comply with checklist item 14 in its provision of DSL services. 1079 Specifically, AT& T and ASCENT assert that BellSouth does not meets its obligations under checklist item 14 because it does not make DSL transport services available for resale at a wholesale discount. 1080 According to BellSouth, however, it provides two categories of DSL- related service: (1) a wholesale telecommunications services which it offers to Internet Service Providers (ISPs); and (2) a retail information service. 1081 With respect to both categories, BellSouth argues that it is not providing DSL telecommunications service at retail and, thus, has no obligation to make these services available for resale pursuant to the section 251( c)( 4) discount. 1082 275. The category of services subject to the provisions of section 251( c)( 4) is determined by whether those services are: (1) telecommunications services that an incumbent LEC provides (2) at retail, and (3) to subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers. 1083 BellSouth offers a tarriffed DSL telecommunications transport service to ISPs, which we conclude is a wholesale offering as articulated by the Commission in the AOL Bulk Services Order. 1084 Because that offering is not a telecommunications service sold at retail, BellSouth is not required to offer it at a resale discount pursuant to section 251( c)( 4). Accordingly, we (Continued from previous page) the repeat trouble rates are generally in parity, and BellSouth missed fewer repair appointments for competitors for most months reported. See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 3.1.1.1- A. 3.1.6.2 (Missed Repair Appointments, Resale); Georgia/ Louisiana A. 3.3.1.1- A. 3.3.6.2 (Maintenance Average Duration, Resale); Georgia/ Louisiana A. 3.4.1.1- A. 3.4.6.2 (% Repeat Troubles within 30 Days, Resale). In addition, the level of trouble reports for resale lines in Georgia and Louisiana is low. See Georgia/ Louisiana A. 3.2.1.1- A. 3.2.6.2 (Customer Trouble Report Rate, Resale). 1078 BellSouth GALA I Application at 145- 49; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 110. 1079 ASCENT GALA I Comments at 3- 14; AT& T GALA I Comments at 69- 70; AT& T GALA I Reply at 44. 1080 ASCENT GALA I Comments at 2- 8; AT& T GALA I Comments at 69- 70. 1081 BellSouth GALA I Application at 145- 49; BellSouth Fogle GALA I Aff. at paras. 3- 7. 1082 See BellSouth GALA I Application at 145- 49. 1083 47 U. S. C. § 251( c)( 4). 1084 Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98- 147, Second Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 19237 (1999) (AOL Bulk Services Order). In the AOL Bulk Services Order, the Commission analyzed the circumstances under which DSL transport services provided by incumbent LECs to ISPs would be considered services provided “at retail” and concluded that “advanced telecommunications services sold to Internet Service Providers as an input component to the Internet Service Providers’ retail Internet service offering shall not be considered to be telecommunications services offered on a retail basis that incumbent LECs must make available for resale at wholesale rates to requesting telecommunications carriers.” 47 C. F. R. § 51.605( c). 159 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 160 conclude that BellSouth demonstrates compliance with the checklist requirements with regard to DSL resale as articulated in our recent orders. 1085 276. Moreover, we find that there is no violation of checklist item 14 with respect to BellSouth’s high- speed Internet access service. Commenters contend that BellSouth makes this Internet access service available to end users “at retail” and, thus, must also make the underlying DSL transport component available to competitive LECs for resale pursuant to section 251( c)( 4). 1086 In response, BellSouth argues that it provides end users with a retail service that is an information service, not a telecommunications service, and it is accordingly not subject to resale at a wholesale discount under section 251( c)( 4). 1087 277. We conclude, as we did in the SWBT Missouri/ Arkansas Order, 1088 that neither the Act nor Commission precedent explicitly addresses the unique facts or legal issues raised in this case. As the Commission observed in the AOL Bulk Services Order, Congress did not define the term “at retail” as used in section 251( c)( 4) and “the meaning of the term ‘at retail’ is not clear and unambiguous from the language of the [A] ct.” 1089 The Commission has not addressed the situation where an incumbent LEC does not offer DSL transport at retail, but instead offers only an Internet access service. Moreover, as we stated in the SWBT Missouri/ Arkansas Order, we expect that how we decide questions about the regulatory treatment of the underlying transmission facilities provided by incumbent LECs with their own Internet access services could have far- reaching implications for a wide range of issues that would be more appropriately handled separately. 1090 Indeed, many of these issues are being addressed in a pending proceeding before the Commission. 1091 Accordingly, because Commission precedent does not address the specific facts or legal issue raised here, we decline to reach a conclusion in the context of this section 271 proceeding. K. Remaining Checklist Items (3, 9 and 10) 1085 See Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17471, para. 94; Verizon Connecticut Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 14164- 65, para. 39. 1086 See ASCENT GALA I Comments at 14; AT& T GALA I Comments at 69- 70. 1087 BellSouth GALA I Application at 147- 49. 1088 See SWBT Missouri/ Arkansas Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 20759, para. 82. 1089 AOL Bulk Services Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 19243, para. 12. 1090 For example, in an April 1998 Report to Congress, the Commission stated that, because of the complicated issues raised by the self- provisioning of transmission facilities, it would consider in a separate proceeding “the status of entities that provide transmission to meet their internal needs.” Federal- State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, CC Docket No. 96- 45, FCC 98- 67, paras. 66- 75 (rel. Apr. 10, 1998). 1091 See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01- 338, 96- 98, 98- 147, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 FCC Rcd 22781 (2001). 160 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 161 278. In addition to showing that it is in compliance with the requirements discussed above, an applicant under section 271 must demonstrate that it complies with checklist item 3 (access to poles, ducts, and conduits), 1092 item 9 (numbering administration), 1093 and item 10 (databases and associated signaling). 1094 Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that BellSouth demonstrates that it is in compliance with these checklist items in both Georgia and Louisiana. 1095 With the exception of checklist item 9, no parties objected to BellSouth’s compliance with these checklist items. We address commenters concerns with respect to checklist item 9 and in our discussion of checklist item 1. We also note that both the Georgia Commission and the Louisiana Commission concluded that BellSouth complies with the requirements of each of these checklist items. 1096 V. SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 279. Section 271( d)( 3)( B) provides that the Commission shall not approve a BOC’s application to provide LATA services unless the BOC demonstrates that the “requested authorization will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272.” 1097 Based on the record, we conclude that BellSouth has demonstrated that it will comply with the requirements of section 272. 1098 No party challenges BellSouth’s section 272 showing. VI. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS 280. Apart from determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 1099 At the same time, section 271( d)( 4) of the Act states in full that “[ t] he Commission may not, by rule or 1092 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( iii). 1093 Id. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( ix). Nextel and Triton allege that BellSouth has implemented a new interconnection policy whereby BellSouth refuses to activate NXX codes with rating points outside of the BellSouth franchise area in violation of checklist item 9. Nextel GALA II Comments 7- 8, Triton GALA II Comments at 6- 8. We address this concern in our discussion of checklist item 1, supra. 1094 Id. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( x). 1095 See BellSouth GALA I Application at 95- 98 (checklist item 3), 129- 30 (checklist item 9), 130- 33 (checklist item 10). 1096 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 137- 40 (checklist item 3), 189- 90 (checklist item 9), 190- 96 (checklist item 10); Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 54 (checklist item 3), 84- 85 (checklist item 9), 85- 86 (checklist item 10); Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 1; Louisiana Commission GALA II Comments at 1. 1097 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( B). 1098 See BellSouth GALA I Application App. A, Tab E, Affidavit of Guy L. Cochran; Tab B, Affidavit of Pavan Bhalla; Tab K, Affidavit of Nathaniel Jones. 1099 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( C); Appendix C at paras. 70- 72. 161 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 162 otherwise, limit or extend the terms used in the competitive checklist set forth in subsection (c)( 2)( B).” 1100 Accordingly, although the Commission must make a separate determination that approval of a section 271 application is “consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” it may neither limit nor extend the terms of the competitive checklist of section 271( c)( 2)( B). Thus, the Commission views the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review the circumstances presented by the application to ensure that no other relevant factors exist that would frustrate the congressional intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive checklist, and that entry will serve the public interest as Congress expected. 281. We conclude that approval of this application is consistent with the public interest. From our extensive review of the competitive checklist, which embodies the critical elements of market entry under the Act, we find that barriers to competitive entry in the local exchange markets have been removed and the local exchange markets today are open to competition. We further find that the record confirms our view, as noted in prior section 271 orders, that BOC entry into the long distance market will benefit consumers and competition if the relevant local exchange market is open to competition consistent with the competitive checklist. 1101 282. We disagree with those commenters that assert that under our public interest standard we must consider the level of competitive LEC market share, the weakening economy, or the financing difficulties of competitive LECs. 1102 Given an affirmative showing that the competitive checklist has been satisfied, low customer volumes or the financial hardships of the competitive LEC community do not undermine that showing. 1103 We have consistently declined to use factors beyond the control of the BOC, such as the weak economy, or over- investment and poor business planning by competitive LECs to deny an application. 1104 We note that the D. C. Circuit confirmed in Sprint v. FCC that Congress specifically declined to adopt a market share or other similar test for BOC entry into long distance. 1105 A. Price Squeeze Analysis 1100 Id. § 271( d)( 4). 1101 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18558- 59, para. 419. 1102 See Sprint GALA II Comments at 3- 7 (asserting that we must consider the financial status of the competitive LEC industry); El Paso Networks et al GALA I Comments at 43, 47- 49 (arguing that approval not be in the public interest because approval would be premature as local competition is not yet sufficiently developed). 1103 BellSouth GALA I Stockdale Reply Aff. at 3 1104 See Verizon Pennsylvania Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 17487, para. 126; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 83- 4; BellSouth GALA I Stockdale Reply Aff. at 12; BellSouth GALA I Taylor Aff. at 9- 12. 1105 Sprint v. FCC, 274 F. 3d at 559; see also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77. 162 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 163 283. AT& T contends that it cannot profitably enter the Louisiana residential telephone market using the UNE- platform because BellSouth’s UNE rates are allegedly inflated. 1106 Before analyzing these contentions, we begin with a discussion of a pending remand on the issue of how allegations of a price squeeze should be considered under the public interest standard of section 271( d)( 3)( C). In the Commission’s SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, the subject of the Sprint v. FCC ruling, the Commission declined to consider allegations that a section 271 applicant should fail the 14- point checklist because competitors are unable to make a profit in the residential market using the UNE- platform. 1107 The Commission concluded that the Act requires a consideration of whether rates are cost- based, not whether market entry is profitable. 1108 The Commission also stated that if it were to focus on profitability, it would have to consider a state’s retail rates, 1109 which are generally outside its jurisdictional authority. Appellants asserted that their inability to make a profit in the residential market showed that granting the BOC’s section 271 application was not in the public interest. 1110 The court concluded that the Commission’s rejection of the appellants’ profitability argument was not responsive. 1111 The court did not, however, vacate the order. Instead, it remanded the Commission’s rejection of the price squeeze issue for reconsideration. 1112 284. The Commission intends to issue an order addressing the questions posed in the Sprint v. FCC ruling about how we should consider allegations of a price squeeze that are raised in section 271 proceedings. Because we have not yet addressed the issues remanded by the court, we consider the specific allegations presented by the parties in this case. BellSouth disputes both whether a price squeeze analysis is a relevant consideration under the public interest requirement and, if so, the required scope of such an inquiry. 1113 AT& T argues that the analysis is relevant and that the appropriate test is whether a price squeeze exists for competitive LECs using the UNE- platform to provide residential service in Louisiana. 1114 We conclude that 1106 AT& T GALA II Comments at 50- 60. 1107 SWBT Kansas- Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6269, para. 65 and 6280- 81, para. 92. 1108 Id. at 6280- 81, para. 92. 1109 Id. 1110 Sprint v. FCC, 274 F. 3d at 553. 1111 Id. at 554. 1112 Id. at 556. 1113 BellSouth GALA II Application at 37- 43. We note here that we do not rely on the following information in this application: James Eisner, FCC, & Dale Lehman, Fort Lewis College, Regulatory Behavior and Competitive Entry, for presentation at the 14th Annual Western Conference Center for Research in Regulated Industries, June 28, 2001. 1114 AT& T GALA II Comments at 50- 60. 163 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 164 AT& T has not established the existence of a price squeeze because it has not shown that “the UNE pricing [at issue] doom[ s] competitors to failure.” 1115 285. AT& T asserts that evidence of a minimal statewide average margin between the costs associated with providing service utilizing the UNE- platform and the revenues available from potential customers is sufficient to demonstrate that a price squeeze exists in the Louisiana residential market. 1116 AT& T contends that FPC v. Conway, 1117 the Supreme Court decision cited by the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in its comments on price squeeze in Sprint v. FCC, requires this result. 1118 We disagree. As we concluded in the Verizon Vermont Order, the Federal Power Commission was faced with very different circumstances in that proceeding than we face here. 1119 286. Importantly, in the Verizon Vermont Order, we found it significant that the reason the statewide margin was low was not “the result of a mistake or oversight by the Vermont Board. Rather, it [was] the result of an intentional state policy to keep retail rates affordable.” 1120 We find similar circumstances here. While AT& T asserts that the available statewide average margin for the provision of residential service using the UNE- platform is $2.63, that reflects inclusion of negative margins from rural areas of the Louisiana. 1121 In fact, a margin of $8.12, or 29 percent, is available in 67 percent of the state. It is the negative margins alleged, negative $3.38 in 26 percent of the state and negative $29.58 in 7 percent of the state, that lower the statewide average to $2.63. 1122 These negative margins are directly related to the higher loop rates in the rural areas. 1123 Similar to the circumstances we faced in Vermont, the negative 1115 Sprint v. FCC, 274 F. 3d at 554 (emphasis in original). 1116 AT& T GALA II Comments at 50- 60. 1117 FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U. S. 271 (1976). 1118 AT& T GALA II Comments at 51- 54. 1119 Verizon Vermont Order, at para. 67. 1120 Id. 1121 AT& T GALA II Comments at 50; AT& T GALA II Comments, Ex. D, Supplemental Declaration of Michael Lieberman at para. 27 (AT& T GALA II Lieberman Decl). We note a discrepancy between AT& T’s comments and the declaration in support of its comments with regard to the available statewide margin. Because the Lieberman Declaration is the expert analysis relied on by AT& T, we consider the numbers contained therein in our analysis. 1122 AT& T GALA II Lieberman Decl. at para. 27. AT& T also notes that if available intraLATA toll revenues are considered an added source of revenue for this analysis, the available statewide margin would increase by $0.67 per line. We note further that BellSouth has submitted evidence in the record that in Louisiana, 72 percent of the lines are located in zone 1, 23 percent of the lines are located in zone 2, and 6 percent of the lines are located in zone 3. BellSouth GALA II Caldwell Aff. at 56. If these changes in the distribution of lines among zones were taken into account, the available margins alleged by AT& T would be subject to an upward adjustment. 1123 The only rate that changes from zone to zone in the margin analysis AT& T submitted is the loop rate. AT& T GALA II Lieberman Decl. at Exh. D- 1. 164 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 165 margins in rural areas are not the result of a mistake or oversight by the Louisiana Commission. 1124 Rather, as is common in states with significantly rural areas, there appears to be an intentional state policy to keep retail rates affordable. Accordingly, as we found in Vermont, we believe it is appropriate here to look beyond a negative margin for the provision of residential service in high- cost areas using the UNE- platform when examining allegations of price squeeze. 287. We find that the Act contemplates the existence of subsidized local rates in high-cost areas and addresses such potential price squeezes through the availability of resale. AT& T contends that it is inappropriate to consider the availability of resale as a competitive option because the margin is insufficient. 1125 Under the circumstances before us in Louisiana, however, we disagree. As was true in Vermont, the distinction between how UNEs and resale are priced is significant here. 1126 UNEs are priced from the “bottom up,” that is beginning with a BOC’s costs plus a reasonable profit, whereas resale is priced from the “top down,” that is, beginning with a BOC’s retail rate and deducting avoided costs. Such a distinction ensures that resale provides a profit margin where, as is the case here, the costs of individual elements exceed the retail rate. Accordingly, we conclude that it is appropriate to consider the effect of resale on whether a price squeeze exists such that competitors are doomed to failure. AT& T, however, has not provided an analysis of how using a mix of the UNE- platform and resale to provide service would affect its price squeeze arguments. 288. We also find that AT& T has submitted insufficient evidence of the necessary margin for an efficient competitor. For example, AT& T argues that it must earn at least $10.00 to cover its internal costs to enter the Louisiana residential market, but provides no cost and other data to support that assertion. 1127 As we have noted previously, conducting a price squeeze analysis requires a determination of what a “sufficient” profit margin is. 1128 Resolving the issue of what is a sufficient profit requires far more than determining what is sufficient for a particular carrier to make a profit. Although AT& T alleges that it needs to make at least $10.00 per line, the pertinent question here is what is a sufficient profit for an efficient competitor. The evidence demonstrates that competitive LECs in Louisiana can achieve margins of 29 percent in 67 percent of the state. The record evidence does not establish that these profit margins are inadequate for an efficient competitor. Thus, the evidence submitted by AT& T is an inadequate basis for us to determine that a price squeeze exists in the Louisiana residential market. 1124 Verizon Vermont Order, at para. 67. 1125 AT& T GALA II Comments at 57; AT& T GALA II Lieberman Decl. at para. 36. We note that the price squeeze allegations considered herein are directed at the residential voice services market. Neither AT& T, nor any other party, contends that the lack of availability of DSL transport services for resale is relevant to its price squeeze allegations. See supra Section IV. J. 1126 Verizon Vermont Order, at para. 69. 1127 AT& T GALA II Comments, Ex. B, Declaration of David Bickley at paras. 1- 9 (AT& T GALA II Bickley Decl.). 1128 Verizon Vermont Order, at para. 70; Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9008- 09, para. 41. 165 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 166 289. AT& T contends as a separate claim that the evidence it provides of a price squeeze also establishes that BellSouth’s Louisiana UNE rates are discriminatory in violation of checklist item two. 1129 As discussed above, we conclude that AT& T has not established the existence of a price squeeze in the residential market. AT& T submits no separate price squeeze analysis in support of this claim. Accordingly, we need not decide whether the existence of a price squeeze in the residential market would constitute a separate violation of checklist item two. 290. For the reasons stated above, we reject AT& T’s allegations of a price squeeze, and conclude that there is no evidence in the record that warrants disapproval of this application based on such contentions, whether couched as discrimination in violation of checklist item two, or under the public interest standard. 1130 B. Assurance of Future Compliance 291. As set forth below, we find that the existing Service Performance Measurements and Enforcement Mechanisms (SEEM plans) currently in place for Georgia and Louisiana provide assurance that these local markets will remain open after BellSouth receives section 271 authorization. 1131 The combination of these plans, the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions oversight and review of their respective plans and their performance metrics provide additional assurance that the local market will remain open. 1132 In prior orders, the Commission has explained that one factor it may consider as part of its public interest analysis is whether a BOC would have adequate incentives to continue to satisfy the requirements of section 271 after 1129 AT& T GALA II Comments at 50- 51; AT& T GALA II Reply at 43. 1130 Sprint raises profitability concerns, in general, for local market entry via UNEs or resale. Sprint GALA II Comments at 8. WorldCom also claims that UNE TELRIC errors “prevent WorldCom from offering consumers a choice for local service” in Louisiana and part of Georgia. WorldCom GALA II Comments at 35. To the extent this is a price squeeze or profitability argument, neither Sprint nor WorldCom offers sufficient supporting documentation or a specific profitability analysis, and we reject their general assertions based on the reasoning we state above. 1131 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20748- 50, paras. 393- 98. We note that in all of the previous applications that we have granted to date, the applicant was subject to an enforcement plan administered by the relevant state commission to protect against backsliding after BOC entry into the long- distance market. The Louisiana Commission adopted the SEEM plan on May 14, 2001, and the Georgia Commission adopted the Georgia SEEM on January 12, 2001. Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 217; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 94. 1132 BellSouth GALA II Supplemental Appendix – Louisiana, Vol. 1, Tab 27, Louisiana Public Service Commission, Ex Parte, In Re: BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., Service Quality Performance Measurements- Six Month Review, Docket No. U- 22252- C, Filed December 28, 2001 (Louisiana Commission Review); Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 3 and 19; Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Mr. William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35, Attachment, (filed Mar. 21, 2002) (BellSouth March 21 Refiling Ex Parte Letter) at 4; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 217; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 93- 95; Georgia Commission GALA I Reply at 36; Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 10. 166 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 167 entering the long distance market. Although it is not a requirement for section 271 authority that a BOC be subject to such performance assurance mechanisms, the Commission previously has found that the existence of a satisfactory performance monitoring and enforcement mechanism is probative evidence that the BOC will continue to meet its section 271 obligations after a grant of such authority. 1133 292. In prior section 271 orders, the Commission has reviewed performance assurance plans modeled after either the New York Plan or the Texas Plan. 1134 Although similar in some respects, the plans currently in place in Georgia and Louisiana differ significantly from these plans in other respects. 1135 Unlike prior enforcement plans reviewed by the Commission, the plans in Georgia and Louisiana have three Penalty Tiers. 1136 These plans also differ in their attempt to balance the probability of Type I and Type II errors. 1137 293. We conclude that the Georgia and Louisiana SEEM plans provide sufficient incentives to foster post- entry checklist compliance. We note that the Georgia plan was developed in an open proceeding with participation by all sectors of the industry and that concerns raised by commenters in the instant proceeding were considered by the Georgia 1133 See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20806, paras. 363- 64. 1134 In our other section 271 applications, the relevant state commission had adopted either the New York or Texas plans for use in their respective state. See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18560, para. 421; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4166- 67, para. 433. 1135 The plans are very similar as the Georgia SEEM is patterned on the Louisiana SEEM; thus, the criticisms of the SEEMs plans are made generally with respect to both plans. 1136 A Tier 1 penalty is paid, on a transaction basis, directly to each competitive LEC, if BellSouth delivers non-compliant performance on any one of the Tier 1 submetrics. Tier 2 penalties are paid directly to the respective Public Service Commission if there are three consecutive months of non- compliant performance on any of the Tier 2 submetrics. In the Georgia SEEM plan, the Tier 2 submetrics includes all of the Tier 1 submetrics plus twelve additional submetrics. In the Louisiana SEEM plan, the Tier 2 submetrics include all of the Tier 1 submetrics plus twelve additional submetrics. BellSouth March 21 Refiling Ex Parte Letter, Attachment; BellSouth GALA II Application, Appendix A, Vol 9a, Tab U, Affidavit for Alphonso Varner for Georgia (BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff.) at 121, para. 306. BellSouth GALA I Application, Appendix A, Vol 9a, Tab U, Affidavit for Alphonso Varner for Louisiana (BellSouth GALA I Varner Louisiana Aff.) at 127, para. 310. The Tier 3 penalty is a voluntary suspension of additional marketing and sales of long distance services. The Tier 3 penalty occurs if BellSouth fails to meet a specific number of the Tier 3 submetrics for three consecutive months. In Georgia, the Tier 3 penalty is triggered if BellSouth fails to meet twelve of the twenty- six Tier 3 submetrics. The Tier 3 penalty is triggered in Louisiana if BellSouth fails to meet five of the eighteen Tier 3 submetrics. See BellSouth GALA I Varner Georgia Aff. at 121, para. 308; BellSouth GALA I Varner Louisiana Aff. at 127, para. 312. 1137 A Type I error occurs if the hypothesis that no discrimination exists is rejected incorrectly. A Type II error occurs if the hypothesis that no discrimination exists is accepted incorrectly. AT& T GALA I Comments, Ex. K, Declaration of Cheryl Bursh and Sharon Declaration (AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl.) at 60, para. 125. 167 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 168 Commission. The Louisiana plan was similarly developed in workshops and an open proceeding with participation by interested parties. 1138 294. We have not mandated any particular penalty structure, and we recognize different structures can be equally effective. 1139 We also recognize that the development of performance measures and appropriate remedies is an evolutionary process that requires changes to both measures and remedies over time. We note that both the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions anticipate modifications to BellSouth's SQM from their respective pending six-month reviews. 1140 We anticipate that these state Commissions will continue to build on their own work and the work of other states in order for such measures and remedies to most accurately reflect actual commercial performance in the local marketplace. 295. As in prior section 271 orders, our conclusions are based on a review of several key elements in any performance assurance plan: total liability at risk in the plan; performance measurement and standards definitions; structure of the plan; self- executing nature of remedies in the plan; data validation and audit procedures in the plan; and accounting requirements. 1141 We discuss only those issues commenters have raised in the record before us. 296. We disagree with AT& T that the actual amount BellSouth is likely to pay for discriminatory performance to competitive LECs is insufficient to deter backsliding. 1142 The 1138 The basic structure of the SEEM plan was initially developed in workshops conducted by the Louisiana Commission, with active participation by competitive LECs and BellSouth. The Louisiana Commission assures us that they and their staff worked to develop a set of performance metrics and incentives to ensure the detection of discriminatory behavior and the punishment of such behavior with appropriate penalties. Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 19, 24. 1139 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18558- 59, para. 423; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4166- 67, para. 433. The Commission has previously found that the enforcement mechanisms developed in different plans by New York and Texas would be effective in practice. See, e. g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4166- 67, para. 433. We reached this conclusion based on these plans’ having five important characteristics: potential liability that provides a meaningful and significant incentive to comply with the designated performance standards; clearly- articulated, pre- determined measures and standards, which encompass a comprehensive range of carrier- to- carrier performance; a reasonable structure that is designed to detect and sanction poor performance when it occurs; a self- executing mechanism that does not leave the door open unreasonably to litigation and appeal; and reasonable assurances that the reported data are accurate. Id.; see also SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18558- 59, para. 423. 1140 The Louisiana Commission is currently conducting a seven and one- half month detailed review of the performance measurements and penalty plan. The Georgia State Commission provided for a six month review of the plan and has ordered BellSouth to file a “root cause analysis” and a corrective action plan if BellSouth fails any sub- metric twice in any 3 consecutive months. BellSouth GALA I Reply at 86- 7; Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 3, 30; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 4- 5; Louisiana Commission Review; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 15, 217; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 5. 1141 See, e. g., Verizon Massachusetts Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 9121- 25, paras. 240- 247; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6377- 81, paras. 273- 78. 1142 AT& T GALA I Comments at 88; AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 53- 55. 168 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 169 Georgia SEEM plan exposes BellSouth to $336 million in self- executing payments or 44 percent of BellSouth’s net revenue in Georgia. The Louisiana SEEM plan has a $59 million procedural cap or 20 percent of BellSouth‘ s net revenue. According to the Louisiana plan, an expedited hearing will be held if BellSouth reaches the $59 million liability threshold within a rolling twelve month period. In this hearing, BellSouth has the burden of showing why it should not pay remedies in excess of the procedural cap. Thus, absent a finding in favor of BellSouth, BellSouth would be liable for more than $59 million. 1143 We find both of these plans, therefore, provide adequate monetary incentives against backsliding. We also note that the SEEMs are not the only means of ensuring that BellSouth continues to provide nondiscriminatory service to competing carriers. In addition to the monetary payments at stake under this plan, BellSouth faces other consequences if it fails to sustain an acceptable level of service to competing carriers, including: enforcement provisions in interconnection agreements, federal enforcement action pursuant to section 271( d)( 6) and remedies associated with antitrust and other legal actions. 1144 297. AT& T and WorldCom both argue that the effectiveness of the SEEM plans is limited because of flaws in their structure which severely limit BellSouth’s liability. 1145 The elements of the plans criticized by their comments include: the calculation of the affected volume used to calculate payments, 1146 the requirement that there be three consecutive months of poor performance before Tier 2 remedies are levied, 1147 the aggregation of heterogeneous metrics via the “Truncated Z” statistical test, 1148 the value of delta used as part of the balancing 1143 BellSouth GALA I Varner Louisiana Aff. at 125, para. 308; BellSouth GALA I Reply Affidavit of Alphonso Varner (BellSouth GALA I Reply Varner Aff.) at 76. 1144 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4165, para. 430 (stating that the BOC “risks liability through antitrust and other private causes of action if it performs in an unlawfully discriminatory manner”); SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18560, para. 421. 1145 AT& T GALA I Comments at 88- 89; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 48; WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg/ Desrosiers/ Kinard/ Cabe Decl. at 63- 64, paras. 170- 71. 1146 BellSouth uses an ‘affected volume’ methodology to determine the volume of competitive LEC transactions for which a penalty will be paid. The affected volume is found by multiplying a volume proportion by the number of transactions in which there was a negative z- score. AT& T GALA I Comments at 87; AT& T GALA I Declaration of Robert Bell (AT& T GALA I Bell Decl.) at 28- 30, paras. 78- 82; AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 56- 57, paras. 134- 36; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 49; Worldcom Worldcom GALA I Lichtenberg/ Desrosiers/ Kinard/ Cabe Decl. at 65, para. 173. 1147 AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 58, paras. 137- 39. 1148 The SEEM uses a “Truncated Z” statistical test to evaluate BellSouth’s performance for parity measures with retail analogs. As part of this, test modified z scores are calculated for highly disaggregated cells, which are truncated such that positive values are converted to zero, and then aggregated using a weighted average to determine the overall test score, which is compared to a critical value. AT& T argues that the aggregation of heterogeneous cells can permit parity service in some cells to conceal discrimination in other cells (e. g., the aggregation of the completion intervals for DS1 loops and 2- wire analog loops). AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 58- 60, paras. 140- 44; AT& T GALA I Bell Decl. at 23- 4, paras. 68- 71. 169 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 170 methodology, 1149 and the benchmark adjustment table. 1150 AT& T also argues that the SEEMs are not fully developed because the Georgia and Louisiana State Commissions have not yet completely validated the performance measurements and enforcement mechanisms or completed their audits of the performance metrics. 1151 Finally, AT& T and Cbeyond argue that the omission of key metrics severely limits BellSouth’s exposure and the plans’ backsliding effectiveness, 1152 while Mpower argues that there is a need non- monetary penalties to encourage BellSouth to provide good performance. 1153 298. We reject these arguments. We recognize that development and implementation of metrics and inclusion in these SEEMs plans is an ongoing process. As stated above, the Georgia plan structure was developed with input from the Georgia Commission’s staff, BellSouth, and the competitive LECs. 1154 Similarly, the Louisiana SEEMs plan was developed, in part, through collaborative workshops with input from the Louisiana Commission staff, BellSouth and the competitive LECs. 1155 We believe that competitive LECs had sufficient opportunity to raise these issues in the state proceedings, and that the issues were appropriately handled by the workshops and the state commissions. 299. The development of the SEEMs plans in these two states sought to balance the opposing concerns of BellSouth and the competitive LECs. 1156 The achievement of an optimal 1149 Delta is a parameter that determines the alternative hypothesis used for calculating the probability of Type II error, i. e., the probability of incorrectly finding there is parity when discrimination actually exists, as a result of random chance. Delta fixes the alternative hypothesis, which is the minimum material level of difference in performance used for calculating the Type II error probability, at delta times the incumbent LEC standard deviation. AT& T and Worldcom argue that delta should be set at a lower value than that chosen by the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions. The larger the delta, the greater the minimum level of disparity that is used for balancing. In Georgia delta is 0.5 for Tier 1 measures and 0.35 for Tier 2 measures. In Louisiana delta is 1.0 for Tier 1 measures and 0.5 for Tier 2 measures. AT& T asserts that the value for delta accepted by the Florida Commission of 0.25 is more reasonable. AT& T GALA I Comments at 88; AT& T GALA I Bell Decl. at 24- 26, paras. 71- 74; AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 60- 61, paras. 145- 46; WorldCom GALA I Comments at 48; WorldCom GALA I Lichtenberg/ Desrosiers/ Kinard/ Cabe Decl. at 63- 64, paras. 170- 71. 1150 AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 61, para. 147. 1151 AT& T GALA I Comments at 88; AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 53, para. 125. 1152 AT& T GALA I Comments at 88; AT& T GALA I Bursh/ Norris Decl. at 61, para. 148; Letter from Patrick J. Donovan, Counsel for Cbeyond Communications, to Ms. Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35, (filed Apr. 26, 2002). 1153 Mpower GALA II Comments at 19- 21. 1154 Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 219- 20. 1155 Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 93- 94. We expect that the competitive LECs will continue to have input into this process. Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 94- 95; Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 1, 10, 14- 18; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 90. 1156 BellSouth GALA I Reply Varner Aff. at 76- 82; BellSouth GALA I Reply Affidavit of William Taylor (BellSouth GALA I Reply Taylor Aff.) at 60, 65- 66, 68, 74. 170 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 171 balance of these opposing interests can vary across states. We are further encouraged that the ongoing work by the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions to revise the performance measurements and standards, and to evaluate the operation of the plans, will further enhance the operation of the plans and will address any additional concerns of parties as they arise. 1157 300. Finally, we do not agree with Mpower that we should seek supplemental competitive safeguards. 1158 Both the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions will continue to subject BellSouth's performance metrics to rigorous scrutiny in their on- going proceedings and audits; thus, it is not unreasonable for us to expect that these commissions could modify the penalty structure if BellSouth's performance is deficient post approval. 1159 We also stand ready to exercise our various statutory enforcement powers under section 271( d)( 6) quickly and decisively to ensure that the local market remains open in Georgia and Louisiana. C. Allegations of Inappropriate Marketing 301. We also reject commenters’ allegations that BellSouth’s applications are not in the public interest because of the marketing tactics engaged in by BellSouth. A number of commenters allege that BellSouth has engaged in inappropriate winback 1160 or retention marketing. 1161 Winback marketing applies to a situation where a customer has already switched to and is receiving service from another provider, whereas retention marketing refers to a carrier's attempts to persuade a customer to remain with that carrier before the customer's service is switched to another provider. 1162 Other commenters report that the Georgia Commission is investigating allegations of improper retention marketing or that the Georgia and Louisiana 1157 We note that the staff of the Louisiana Commission intends to consider further disaggregation of the SEEMs plan during its current six month review. Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 3, 19; Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 4- 5; Louisiana Commission Review; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 30; Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 9, 17- 19. 1158 Mpower GALA II Comments at 19- 21. 1159 BellSouth March 21 Refiling Ex Parte Letter at 4; Georgia Commission GALA II Comments at 3, 19; Louisiana Commission Review; Georgia Commission GALA I Comments at 217; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 93- 95; Georgia Commission GALA I Reply at 36; Louisiana Commission GALA I Reply at 10. 1160 Letter from Maureen Flood, Director, Regulatory and State Affairs, CompTel, to Ms. Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02- 35, (filed Apr. 24, 2002) at 2 (CompTel April 24 Ex Parte Letter); US LEC/ XO GALA II Comments at 54- 58; Xspedius GALA II Comments at 11; KMC GALA I Comments at 15- 16; El Paso et al GALA I Comments at 45. 1161 CompTel GALA I Comments at 20, 21, 23; Comptel GALA I Affidavit of James Falvey at 6- 8; Allegiance GALA I Reply at 6- 11; XO GALA I Reply at 16; PacWest GALA I Reply at 10. 1162 Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information, CC Docket No. 96- 115; Implementation of the Non- Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, CC Docket, No. 96- 149, Order on Reconsideration and Petitions for Forbearance, 14 FCC Rcd 14409, 14414, para. 7, 14443, para. 65, 14449, para. 77 (1999) (CPNI Order). 171 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 172 Commissions put an order in place to prohibit BellSouth from contacting BellSouth customers within seven days of their switching their service to a competitive LEC. 1163 302. In the CPNI Order we concluded that winback campaigns are consistent with section 222( c)( 1), while retention marketing campaigns can harm competition if a carrier uses carrier- to- carrier information such as switch or presubscribed interexchange carrier (PIC) order to trigger this type of marketing campaign. 1164 Section 222( b) prohibits a carrier from using carrier proprietary information (CPI) 1165 to retain soon- to- be former customers when the carrier gains notice of a customer's imminent cancellation of service through the provision of carrier- to-carrier service. 1166 303. We find that, in the absence of a formal complaint to us that BellSouth has failed to comply with section 222( b), the winback issue in this case has been appropriately handled at the state level, and that the actions undertaken by the state commissions and BellSouth should be sufficient to ensure it does not recur. 1167 The Georgia Commission issued an interim measure to prohibit BellSouth from engaging in any winback activities once a customer switches to another local telephone service provider. 1168 Since the Georgia Commission issued the interim measure, 1163 Xspedius GALA II Comments at 12; Comptel GALA I Comments at 23; El Paso GALA I Comments at 45; Mpower GALA I Comments at iv; Allegiance Telecom GALA I Reply at 6; PacWest GALA I Reply at 10; and Xo GALA I Reply at 16. 1164 CPNI Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 14414, para. 7, 14449, para. 77; Subscriber Carrier Selection changes Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Policies and Rules Concerning Unauthorized Changes in Consumers Long Distance Carriers, CC Docket No. 94- 129, Second Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 1508, 1572, para. 106 (1998), (Slamming Order). 1165 Although our regulation of CPI often falls within the discussion of CPNI, and is included in the same statutory provision, CPI is different from CPNI. CPI, as used in section 222( b) of the Act refers to proprietary information received or obtained “from another carrier for purposes of providing any telecommunications service.” CPNI, on the other hand, refers to information regarding end- users use of telecommunications services. 1166 CompTel reports that the Tennessee Regulatory Authority levied sanctions against BellSouth for violations in that State. We note that neither the Georgia Commission nor the Louisiana Commission have levied sanctions against BellSouth. Moreover, the promotion that CompTel has complained about was discontinued in all BellSouth states when BellSouth learned that the promotion had been implemented without requisite the reviews and approvals. BellSouth GALA II Supplemental Reply Appendix, Vol 1, Tab E, Joint Supplemental Reply Affidavit of John A. Ruscilli and Cynthia K. Cox (BellSouth GALA II Joint Reply of Ruscilli/ Cox Aff.) at 28- 30, paras. 61- 63; CompTel April 24 Ex Parte Letter at 3. 1167 BellSouth denies that it is improperly using CPNI or wholesale information. In response to the allegations brought to the Georgia Commission, BellSouth initiated an internal investigation, fired a number of employees that had violated its marketing policies, and initiated a retraining program to prevent any possible future violations of its marketing policies. BellSouth GALA II Joint Reply Affidavit of John Ruscilli and Cynthia Cox (BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff.). paras. 48- 79; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 90- 91; BellSouth GALA I Joint Reply Affidavit of John Ruscilli and Cynthia Cox (BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff.) at paras. 34, 38- 39, 44- 45, 47- 49. 1168 Interim Order by the Georgia Public Service Commission of the Investigation of BellSouth Telecommunications ‘Win Back’ Activities, Docket No. 14232- U, at 1, (rel. July 23, 2001). 172 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 173 the Georgia Commission has opened a proceeding to investigate the allegations submitted to the state Commission, 1169 and determined that the staff of the Georgia Commission and the interested parties should develop a code of conduct for the industry. 1170 While there have been no formal complaints against BellSouth on this issue in Louisiana, the Louisiana Commission ordered BellSouth to abstain from any winback activities for seven days after a customer switches to another local telephone service provider, prohibited BellSouth's wholesale divisions from sharing information with its retail division, and prohibited the inclusion of marketing information in the final bill sent to a customer that has switched providers. 1171 D. Other Issues 304. We also disagree with Mpower’s assertion that BellSouth improperly uses local service freezes 1172 to stunt competition and aggressive marketing tactics to retain customers during the carrier's three- way telephone call to lift the local service freeze. 1173 BellSouth denies these allegations. It notes that local service freezes are unavailable in Georgia but are available in Louisiana because the Louisiana Commission ordered BellSouth to make the option available. 1174 Mpower has not provided sufficient evidence to support its allegation that BellSouth uses its local service freeze in a discriminatory manner. 305. Finally, DirectTV Broadband’s request that the Commission negotiate commitments from BellSouth to provide tariffed interLATA ATM transport services to ISPs on reasonable terms and conditions is beyond the purpose of this section 271 proceeding. 1175 Pursuant to section 271, a BOC must demonstrate that its local market is open to competition. Concerns such as this one, which relate to the reasonableness of BellSouth's wholesale tariffs, are beyond the scope of a section 271 proceeding. The section 271 process could not function as Congress intended, within the 90- day timetable, if we were required to resolve all complaints, 1169 Investigation by the Georgia Public Service Commission of BellSouth Telecommunications, ''Win- Back'' Activities Set Forth in Docket No. 14232- U. (rel. Aug. 2, 2001); BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at paras. 50- 51. 1170 We note this process has not yet been completed. Letter from Kathleen B. Levitz, Vice President Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Mr. William Caton, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 02-35, Attachment 3, (filed Mar. 14, 2002) (BellSouth March 14 Ex Parte Letter). 1171 Louisiana Commission GALA II Reply at 14- 15; Louisiana Commission GALA I Comments at 92- 93; BellSouth GALA I Ruscilli/ Cox Reply Aff. at paras. 35- 36. 1172 A local service freeze prevents a change in the subscriber’s preferred local service carrier selection until the subscriber gives the carrier from whom the freeze was requested his or her written or oral consent. See, e. g., Slamming Order, 14 FCC Rcd. at 1576, para. 114. 1173 Mpower GALA I Comments at 40, 42. Mpower requests that the Commission consider prohibiting freezes on local telephone services. Id. 1174 BellSouth GALA II Ruscilli/ Cox Aff. at para. 46; BellSouth GALA I Reply at 92. 1175 DirecTV Broadband GALA II Comments at 6. 173 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 174 regardless of whether they relate to local competition, as a precondition to granting a section 271 application. 1176 VII. SECTION 271 (D)( 6) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY 306. Section 271( d)( 6) of the Act requires BellSouth to continue to satisfy the “conditions required for . . . approval” of its section 271 application after the Commission approves its application. 1177 Thus, the Commission has a responsibility not only to ensure that BellSouth is in compliance with section 271 today, but also that it remains in compliance in the future. As the Commission has already described the post- approval enforcement framework and its section 271( d)( 6) enforcement powers in detail in prior orders, it is unnecessary to do so again here. 1178 307. Working in concert with the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions, we intend to closely monitor BellSouth’s post- approval compliance for Georgia and Louisiana to ensure that BellSouth does not “cease [] to meet any of the conditions required for [section 271] approval.” 1179 We stand ready to exercise our various statutory enforcement powers quickly and decisively in appropriate circumstances to ensure that the local market remains open in Georgia and Louisiana. We are prepared to use our authority under section 271( d)( 6) if evidence shows market opening conditions have not been maintained. 308. We require BellSouth to report to the Commission all Georgia and Louisiana carrier- to- carrier performance metrics results and Performance Assurance Plan monthly reports beginning with the first full month after the effective date of this Order, and for each month thereafter for one year unless extended by the Commission. These results and reports will allow us to review, on an ongoing basis, BellSouth’s performance to ensure continued compliance with the statutory requirements. We are confident that cooperative state and federal oversight and enforcement can address any backsliding that may arise with respect to BellSouth’s entry into the Georgia and Louisiana long distance markets. 1180 VIII. CONCLUSION 1176 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18366- 67, paras. 22- 27. 1177 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 6). 1178 SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6382- 84, paras. 283- 85; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18567- 68, paras. 434- 36; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174, paras. 446- 53. See Appendix D. 1179 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 6)( A). 1180 See, e. g., Bell Atlantic- New York, Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, File No. EB- 00- IH- 0085, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413 (2000) (adopting consent decree between the Commission and Bell Atlantic that included provisions for Bell Atlantic to make a voluntary payment of $3,000,000 to the United States Treasury, with additional payments if Bell Atlantic failed to meet specified performance standards and weekly reporting requirements to gauge Bell Atlantic’s performance in correcting the problems associated with its electronic ordering systems). 174 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 175 309. For the reasons discussed above, we grant BellSouth’s joint application for authorization under section 271 of the Act to provide in- region, interLATA services in the states of Georgia and Louisiana. IX. ORDERING CLAUSES 310. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4( i), 4( j), and 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U. S. C. §§ 154( i), 154( j) and 271, BellSouth’s joint application to provide in- region, interLATA service in the states of Georgia and Louisiana, filed on February 14, 2002, IS GRANTED. 311. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE May 24, 2002. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Marlene H. Dortch Secretary 175 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 Appendix A Commenters in CC Docket No. 02- 35 Comments Abbrevation Allegiance Telecom of Georgia, Inc. Allegiance Alliance for Public Technology APT Association of Communications Enterprises ASCENT AT& T Corp. AT& T Birch Telecomm of the South, Inc. Birch Telecom BTI Telecom Corporation BTI Competitive Telecommunications Association CompTel Covad Communications, Inc. Covad DirecTV Broadband, Inc. DirecTV Broadband Georgia Public Service Commission Georgia PSC KMC Telecom, Inc. KMC Louisiana Public Service Commission Louisiana PSC Mpower Communications Mpower Network Telephone Corporation Network Telephone New South Communications New South Nextel Communications, Inc. Nextel Sprint Corporation Sprint Triton PCS License Company, LLC Triton PCS US LEC Corp. & XO Georgia, Inc. Worldcom Xspedius Corporation Xspedius Reply Commenters Replies Association for Local Telecommunications Services ALTS AT& T Corp. AT& T BellSouth Corporation BellSouth Birch Telecom of the South, Inc. Birch Telecom Georgia Public Service Commission Georgia PSC Louisiana Public Service Commission Louisiana PSC Mpower Communications Corp. Mpower Nextel Communications, Inc. Nextel WorldCom, Inc. WorldCom Xspedius Corporation Xspedius 176 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 Appendix B Georgia Performance Metrics All data included here is taken from the Georgia Monthly State Summary (MSS) Reports provided by BellSouth, calculated according to the Georgia Service Quality Measurement (SQM) business rules. This table is provided as a reference tool for the convenience of the reader. No conclusions are to be drawn from the raw data contained in this table. Our analysis is based on the totality of the circumstances, such that we may use non- metric evidence, and may rely more heavily on some metrics more than others, in making our determination. The inclusion of these particular metrics in this table does not necessarily mean that we relied on all of these metrics, or that other metrics may not also be important in our analysis. Some metrics that we have relied on in the past and may rely on for a future application were not included here because there was no data provided for them (usually either because there was no activity, or because the metrics are still under development). Metrics with no retail analog provided are usually compared with a benchmark. Note that for some metrics during the period provided there may be changes in the metric definition, or changes in the retail analog applied, making it difficult to compare data over time. 177 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 Appendix C Louisiana Performance Metrics All data included here is taken from the Louisiana Monthly State Summary (MSS) Reports provided by BellSouth, calculated according to the Georgia Service Quality Measurement (SQM) business rules, as explained in the text. This table is provided as a reference tool for the convenience of the reader. No conclusions are to be drawn from the raw data contained in this table. Our analysis is based on the totality of the circumstances, such that we may use non- metric evidence, and may rely more heavily on some metrics more than others, in making our determination. The inclusion of these particular metrics in this table does not necessarily mean that we relied on all of these metrics, or that other metrics may not also be important in our analysis. Some metrics that we have relied on in the past and may rely on for a future application were not included here because there was no data provided for them (usually either because there was no activity, or because the metrics are still under development). Metrics with no retail analog provided are usually compared with a benchmark. Note that for some metrics during the period provided there may be changes in the metric definition, or changes in the retail analog applied, making it difficult to compare data over time. 226 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 Appendix D Statutory Requirements I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 1. The 1996 Act conditions BOC entry into the market for provision of in- region interLATA services on compliance with certain provisions of section 271. 1181 BOCs must apply to the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) for authorization to provide interLATA services originating in any in- region state. 1182 The Commission must issue a written determination on each application no later than 90 days after receiving such application. 1183 Section 271( d)( 2)( A) requires the Commission to consult with the Attorney General before making any determination approving or denying a section 271 application. The Attorney General is entitled to evaluate the application “using any standard the Attorney General considers appropriate,” and the Commission is required to “give substantial weight to the Attorney General’s evaluation.” 1184 2. In addition, the Commission must consult with the relevant state commission to verify that the BOC has one or more state- approved interconnection agreements with a facilities-based competitor, or a Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT), and that either the agreement( s) or general statement satisfy the “competitive checklist.” 1185 Because the Act does not prescribe any standard for the consideration of a state commission’s verification under section 271( d)( 2)( B), the Commission has discretion in each section 271 proceeding to 1181 For purposes of section 271 proceedings, the Commission uses the definition of the term “Bell Operating Company” contained in 47 U. S. C. § 153( 4). 1182 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 1). For purposes of section 271 proceedings, the Commission utilizes the definition of the term “in- region state” that is contained in 47 U. S. C. § 271( i)( 1). Section 271( j) provides that a BOC’s in- region services include 800 service, private line service, or their equivalents that terminate in an in- region state of that BOC and that allow the called party to determine the interLATA carrier, even if such services originate out- of-region. Id. § 271( j). The 1996 Act defines “interLATA services” as “telecommunications between a point located in a local access and transport area and a point located outside such area.” Id. § 153( 21). Under the 1996 Act, a “local access and transport area” (LATA) is “a contiguous geographic area (A) established before the date of enactment of the [1996 Act] by a [BOC] such that no exchange area includes points within more than 1 metropolitan statistical area, consolidated metropolitan statistical area, or State, except as expressly permitted under the AT& T Consent Decree; or (B) established or modified by a [BOC] after such date of enactment and approved by the Commission.” Id. § 153( 25). LATAs were created as part of the Modification of Final Judgment’s (MFJ) “plan of reorganization.” United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D. D. C. 1983), aff’d sub nom. California v. United States, 464 U. S. 1013 (1983). Pursuant to the MFJ, “all [BOC] territory in the continental United States [was] divided into LATAs, generally centering upon a city or other identifiable community of interest.” United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990, 993- 94 (D. D. C. 1983). 1183 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3). 1184 Id. § 271( d)( 2)( A). 1185 Id. § 271( d)( 2)( B). 268 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 2 determine the amount of weight to accord the state commission’s verification. 1186 The Commission has held that, although it will consider carefully state determinations of fact that are supported by a detailed and extensive record, it is the FCC’s role to determine whether the factual record supports the conclusion that particular requirements of section 271 have been met. 1187 3. Section 271 requires the Commission to make various findings before approving BOC entry. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC’s application to provide in- region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate, with respect to each state for which it seeks authorization, that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271( c)( 1)( A) (Track A) or 271( c)( 1)( B) (Track B). 1188 In order to obtain authorization under section 271, the BOC must also show that: (1) it has “fully implemented the competitive checklist” contained in section 271( c)( 2)( B); 1189 (2) the requested authorization will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272; 1190 and (3) the BOC’s entry into the in- region interLATA market is “consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” 1191 The statute specifies that, unless the Commission finds that these criteria have been satisfied, the Commission “shall not approve” the requested authorization. 1192 1186 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3962, para. 20; Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 97- 137, 12 FCC Rcd 20543, 20559- 60 (1997) (Ameritech Michigan Order). As the D. C. Circuit has held, “[ a] lthough the Commission must consult with the state commissions, the statute does not require the Commission to give State Commissions’ views any particular weight.” SBC Communications Inc. v. FCC, 138 F. 3d 410, 416 (D. C. Cir. 1998). 1187 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20560; SBC Communications v. FCC, 138 F. 3d at 416- 17. 1188 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( A). See Section III, infra, for a complete discussion of Track A and Track B requirements. 1189 Id. §§ 271( c)( 2)( B), 271( d)( 3)( A)( i). 1190 Id. § 272; see Implementation of the Non- Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 96- 149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (Non- Accounting Safeguards Order), recon., Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997), review pending sub nom., SBC Communications v. FCC, No. 97- 1118 (D. C. Cir., filed Mar. 6, 1997) (held in abeyance pursuant to court order filed May 7, 1997), remanded in part sub nom., Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC, No. 97- 1067 (D. C. Cir., filed Mar. 31, 1997), on remand, Second Order on Reconsideration, FCC 97- 222 (rel. June 24, 1997), petition for review denied sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC, 113 F. 3d 1044 (D. C. Cir. 1997); Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Accounting Safeguards Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996). 1191 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( C). 1192 Id. § 271( d)( 3); see SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 138 F. 3d at 416. 269 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 3 II. PROCEDURAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 4. To determine whether a BOC applicant has met the prerequisites for entry into the long distance market, the Commission evaluates its compliance with the competitive checklist, as developed in the FCC’s local competition rules and orders in effect at the time the application was filed. Despite the comprehensiveness of these rules, there will inevitably be, in any section 271 proceeding, disputes over an incumbent LEC’s precise obligations to its competitors that FCC rules have not addressed and that do not involve per se violations of self- executing requirements of the Act. As explained in prior orders, the section 271 process simply could not function as Congress intended if the Commission were required to resolve all such disputes as a precondition to granting a section 271 application. 1193 In the context of section 271’s adjudicatory framework, the Commission has established certain procedural rules governing BOC section 271 applications. 1194 The Commission has explained in prior orders the procedural rules it has developed to facilitate the review process. 1195 Here we describe how the Commission considers the evidence of compliance that the BOC presents in its application. 5. As part of the determination that a BOC has satisfied the requirements of section 271, the Commission considers whether the BOC has fully implemented the competitive checklist in subsection (c)( 2)( B). The BOC at all times bears the burden of proof of compliance with section 271, even if no party challenges its compliance with a particular requirement. 1196 In demonstrating its compliance, a BOC must show that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish the item upon request pursuant to state- approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices and other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it is currently furnishing, or is ready to furnish, the checklist items in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an acceptable level of quality. 1197 In particular, the BOC must demonstrate that it is offering interconnection and access to network elements on a 1193 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6246, para. 19; see also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 220 F. 3d 607, 631 (D. C. Cir. 2000). 1194 See Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under New Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, 11 FCC Rcd 19708, 19711 (1996); Revised Comment Schedule For Ameritech Michigan Application, as amended, for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In- Region, InterLATA Services in the State of Michigan, Public Notice, DA 97- 127 (rel. Jan. 17, 1997); Revised Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 17457 (1997); Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, DA 99- 1994 (rel. Sept. 28, 1999); Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, DA 01- 734 (CCB rel. Mar. 23, 2001) (collectively “271 Procedural Public Notices”). 1195 See, e. g., SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order 16 FCC Rcd at 6247- 50, paras. 21- 27; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18370- 73, paras. 34- 42; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3968- 71, paras. 32- 42. 1196 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18374, para. 46; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 46. 1197 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973- 74, para. 52. 270 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 4 nondiscriminatory basis. 1198 Previous Commission orders addressing section 271 applications have elaborated on this statutory standard. 1199 First, for those functions the BOC provides to competing carriers that are analogous to the functions a BOC provides to itself in connection with its own retail service offerings, the BOC must provide access to competing carriers in “substantially the same time and manner” as it provides to itself. 1200 Thus, where a retail analogue exists, a BOC must provide access that is equal to (i. e., substantially the same as) the level of access that the BOC provides itself, its customers, or its affiliates, in terms of quality, accuracy, and timeliness. 1201 For those functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must demonstrate that the access it provides to competing carriers would offer an efficient carrier a “meaningful opportunity to compete.” 1202 6. The determination of whether the statutory standard is met is ultimately a judgment the Commission must make based on its expertise in promoting competition in local markets and in telecommunications regulation generally. 1203 The Commission has not established, nor does it believe it appropriate to establish, specific objective criteria for what constitutes “substantially the same time and manner” or a “meaningful opportunity to compete.” 1204 Whether this legal standard is met can only be decided based on an analysis of specific facts and circumstances. Therefore, the Commission looks at each application on a case- by- case basis and considers the totality of the circumstances, including the origin and quality of the information in the record, to determine whether the nondiscrimination requirements of the Act are met. A. Performance Data 7. As established in prior section 271 orders, the Commission has found that performance measurements provide valuable evidence regarding a BOC’s compliance or noncompliance with individual checklist items. The Commission expects that, in its prima facie case in the initial application, a BOC relying on performance data will: 1198 See 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( i), (ii). 1199 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6250- 51, paras. 28- 29; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971- 72, paras. 44- 46. 1200 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18373, para. 44; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44. 1201 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618- 19. 1202 Id. 1203 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18374, para. 46; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 46. 1204 Id. 271 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 5 a) provide sufficient performance data to support its contention that the statutory requirements are satisfied; b) identify the facial disparities between the applicant’s performance for itself and its performance for competitors; c) explain why those facial disparities are anomalous, caused by forces beyond the applicant’s control (e. g., competing carrier- caused errors), or have no meaningful adverse impact on a competing carrier’s ability to obtain and serve customers; and d) provide the underlying data, analysis, and methodologies necessary to enable the Commission and commenters meaningfully to evaluate and contest the validity of the applicant’s explanations for performance disparities, including, for example, carrier specific carrier- to- carrier performance data. 8. The Commission has explained in prior orders that parity and benchmark standards established by state commissions do not represent absolute maximum or minimum levels of performance necessary to satisfy the competitive checklist. Rather, where these standards are developed through open proceedings with input from both the incumbent and competing carriers, these standards can represent informed and reliable attempts to objectively approximate whether competing carriers are being served by the incumbent in substantially the same time and manner, or in a way that provides them a meaningful opportunity to compete. 1205 Thus, to the extent there is no statistically significant difference between a BOC’s provision of service to competing carriers and its own retail customers, the Commission generally need not look any further. Likewise, if a BOC’s provision of service to competing carriers satisfies the performance benchmark, the analysis is usually done. Otherwise, the Commission will examine the evidence further to make a determination whether the statutory nondiscrimination requirements are met. 1206 Thus, the Commission will examine the explanations that a BOC and others provide about whether these data accurately depict the quality of the BOC’s performance. The Commission also may examine how many months a variation in performance has existed and what the recent trend has been. The Commission may find that statistically significant differences exist, but conclude that such differences have little or no competitive significance in the marketplace. In such cases, the Commission may conclude that the differences are not meaningful in terms of statutory compliance. Ultimately, the determination of whether a BOC’s performance meets the statutory requirements necessarily is a contextual decision based on the totality of the circumstances and information before the Commission. 9. Where there are multiple performance measures associated with a particular checklist item, the Commission would consider the performance demonstrated by all the measurements as a whole. Accordingly, a disparity in performance for one measure, by itself, may not provide a basis for finding noncompliance with the checklist. The Commission may 1205 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6252, para. 31; SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18377, para. 55 & n. 102. 1206 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3970, para. 59. 272 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 6 also find that the reported performance data are affected by factors beyond a BOC’s control, a finding that would make it less likely to hold the BOC wholly accountable for the disparity. This is not to say, however, that performance discrepancies on a single performance metric are unimportant. Indeed, under certain circumstances, disparity with respect to one performance measurement may support a finding of statutory noncompliance, particularly if the disparity is substantial or has endured for a long time, or if it is accompanied by other evidence of discriminatory conduct or evidence that competing carriers have been denied a meaningful opportunity to compete. 10. In sum, the Commission does not use performance measurements as a substitute for the 14- point competitive checklist. Rather, it uses performance measurements as valuable evidence with which to inform the judgment as to whether a BOC has complied with the checklist requirements. Although performance measurements add necessary objectivity and predictability to the review, they cannot wholly replace the Commission’s own judgment as to whether a BOC has complied with the competitive checklist. B. Relevance of Previous Section 271 Approvals 11. In some section 271 applications, the volumes of the BOC’s commercial orders may be significantly lower than they were in prior proceedings. In certain instances, volumes may be so low as to render the performance data inconsistent and inconclusive. 1207 Performance data based on low volumes of orders or other transactions are not as reliable an indicator of checklist compliance as performance based on larger numbers of observations. Indeed, where performance data are based on a low number of observations, small variations in performance may produce wide swings in the reported performance data. It is thus not possible to place the same evidentiary weight upon – and to draw the same types of conclusions from – performance data where volumes are low, as for data based on more robust activity. 12. In such cases, findings in prior, related section 271 proceedings may be a relevant factor in the Commission’s analysis. Where a BOC provides evidence that a particular system reviewed and approved in a prior section 271 proceeding is also used in the proceeding at hand, the Commission’s review of the same system in the current proceeding will be informed by the findings in the prior one. Indeed, to the extent that issues have already been briefed, reviewed and resolved in a prior section 271 proceeding, and absent new evidence or changed circumstances, an application for a related state should not be a forum for re- litigating and reconsidering those issues. Appropriately employed, such a practice can give us a fuller picture of the BOC’s compliance with the section 271 requirements while avoiding, for all parties involved in the section 271 process, the delay and expense associated with redundant and unnecessary proceedings and submissions. 1207 The Commission has never required, however, an applicant to demonstrate that it processes and provisions a substantial commercial volume of orders, or has achieved a specific market share in its service area, as a prerequisite for satisfying the competitive checklist. See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77 (explaining that Congress had considered and rejected language that would have imposed a “market share” requirement in section 271( c)( 1)( A)). 273 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 7 13. However, the statute requires the Commission to make a separate determination of checklist compliance for each state and, accordingly, we do not consider any finding from previous section 271 orders to be dispositive of checklist compliance in current proceedings. While the Commission’s review may be informed by prior findings, the Commission will consider all relevant evidence in the record, including state- specific factors identified by commenting parties, the states, the Department of Justice. However, the Commission has always held that an applicant’s performance towards competing carriers in an actual commercial environment is the best evidence of nondiscriminatory access to OSS and other network elements. 1208 Thus, the BOC’s actual performance in the applicant state may be relevant to the analysis and determinations with respect to the 14 checklist items. Evidence of satisfactory performance in another state cannot trump convincing evidence that an applicant fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to a network element in the applicant state. 14. Moreover, because the Commission’s review of a section 271 application must be based on a snapshot of a BOC’s recent performance at the time an application is filed, the Commission cannot simply rely on findings relating to an applicant’s performance in an anchor state at the time it issued the determination for that state. The performance in that state could change due to a multitude of factors, such as increased order volumes or shifts in the mix of the types of services or UNEs requested by competing carriers. Thus, even when the applicant makes a convincing showing of the relevance of anchor state data, the Commission must examine how recent performance in that state compares to performance at the time it approved that state’s section 271 application, in order to determine if the systems and processes continue to perform at acceptable levels. III. COMPLIANCE WITH ENTRY REQUIREMENTS — SECTIONS 271( c)( 1)( A) & 271( c)( 1)( B) 15. As noted above, in order for the Commission to approve a BOC’s application to provide in- region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271( c)( 1)( A) (Track A) or 271( c)( 1)( B) (Track B). 1209 To qualify for Track A, a BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more competing providers of “telephone exchange service . . . to residential and business subscribers.” 1210 The Act states that “such telephone service may be offered . . . either exclusively over [the competitor’s] own telephone exchange service facilities or predominantly over [the competitor’s] own telephone exchange facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications services of another carrier.” 1211 The Commission concluded in the Ameritech Michigan Order 1208 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18376, para. 53; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53. 1209 See 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( A). 1210 Id. 1211 Id. 274 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 8 that section 271( c)( 1)( A) is satisfied if one or more competing providers collectively serve residential and business subscribers. 1212 16. As an alternative to Track A, Section 271( c)( 1)( B) permits BOCs to obtain authority to provide in- region, interLATA services if, after 10 months from the date of enactment, no facilities- based provider, as described in subparagraph (A), has requested the access and interconnection arrangements described therein (referencing one or more binding agreements approved under Section 252), but the state has approved an SGAT that satisfies the competitive checklist of subsection (c)( 2)( B). Under section 271( d)( 3)( A)( ii), the Commission shall not approve such a request for in- region, interLATA service unless the BOC demonstrates that, “with respect to access and interconnection generally offered pursuant to [an SGAT], such statement offers all of the items included in the competitive checklist.” 1213 Track B, however, is not available to a BOC if it has already received a request for access and interconnection from a prospective competing provider of telephone exchange service. 1214 IV. COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMPETITIVE CHECKLIST – SECTION 271( c)( 2)( B) A. Checklist Item 1– Interconnection 17. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( i) of the Act requires a section 271 applicant to provide “[ i] nterconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections 251( c)( 2) and 252( d)( 1).” 1215 Section 251( c)( 2) imposes a duty on incumbent LECs “to provide, for the facilities and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier, interconnection with the local exchange carrier’s network . . . for the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and exchange access.” 1216 In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission concluded that interconnection referred “only to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic.” 1217 Section 251 contains three requirements for the provision of interconnection. First, an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection “at any technically 1212 See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20589, para. 85; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20633- 35, paras. 46- 48. 1213 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( A)( ii). 1214 See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20561- 62, para. 34. Nevertheless, the above- mentioned foreclosure of Track B as an option is subject to limited exceptions. See 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 1)( B); see also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20563- 64, paras. 37- 38. 1215 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( i); see Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3977- 78, para. 63; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640, para. 61; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20662, para. 222. 1216 47 U. S. C. § 251( c)( 2)( A). 1217 Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15499, 15590, para. 176 (1996) (Local Competition First Report and Order). Transport and termination of traffic are therefore excluded from the Commission’s definition of interconnection. See id. 275 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 9 feasible point within the carrier’s network.” 1218 Second, an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection that is “at least equal in quality to that provided by the local exchange carrier to itself.” 1219 Finally, the incumbent LEC must provide interconnection “on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in accordance with the terms of the agreement and the requirements of [section 251] and section 252.” 1220 18. To implement the equal- in- quality requirement in section 251, the Commission’s rules require an incumbent LEC to design and operate its interconnection facilities to meet “the same technical criteria and service standards” that are used for the interoffice trunks within the incumbent LEC’s network. 1221 In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission identified trunk group blockage and transmission standards as indicators of an incumbent LEC’s technical criteria and service standards. 1222 In prior section 271 applications, the Commission concluded that disparities in trunk group blockage indicated a failure to provide interconnection to competing carriers equal- in- quality to the interconnection the BOC provided to its own retail operations. 1223 19. In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission concluded that the requirement to provide interconnection on terms and conditions that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” means that an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection to a competitor in a manner no less efficient than the way in which the incumbent LEC provides the comparable function to its own retail operations. 1224 The Commission’s rules interpret this obligation to include, among other things, the incumbent LEC’s installation time for interconnection service 1225 and its provisioning of two- way trunking arrangements. 1226 Similarly, 1218 47 U. S. C. § 251( c)( 2)( B). In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission identified a minimum set of technically feasible points of interconnection. See Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15607- 09, paras. 204- 11. 1219 47 U. S. C. § 251( c)( 2)( C). 1220 Id. § 251( c)( 2)( D). 1221 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15613- 15, paras. 221- 225; see Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 64; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20641- 42, paras. 63- 64. 1222 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15614- 15, paras. 224- 25. 1223 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 64; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20648- 50, paras. 74- 77; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20671- 74, paras. 240- 45. The Commission has relied on trunk blockage data to evaluate a BOC’s interconnection performance. Trunk group blockage indicates that end users are experiencing difficulty completing or receiving calls, which may have a direct impact on the customer’s perception of a competitive LEC’s service quality. 1224 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612, para. 218; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 65; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642, para. 65. 1225 47 C. F. R. § 51.305( a)( 5). 276 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 10 repair time for troubles affecting interconnection trunks is useful for determining whether a BOC provides interconnection service under “terms and conditions that are no less favorable than the terms and conditions” the BOC provides to its own retail operations. 1227 20. Competing carriers may choose any method of technically feasible interconnection at a particular point on the incumbent LEC’s network. 1228 Incumbent LEC provision of interconnection trunking is one common means of interconnection. Technically feasible methods also include, but are not limited to, physical and virtual collocation and meet point arrangements. 1229 The provision of collocation is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating compliance with item 1 of the competitive checklist. 1230 In the Advanced Services First Report and Order, the Commission revised its collocation rules to require incumbent LECs to include shared cage and cageless collocation arrangements as part of their physical collocation offerings. 1231 In response to a remand from the D. C. Circuit, the Commission adopted the Collocation Remand Order, establishing revised criteria for equipment for which incumbent LECs must permit collocation, requiring incumbent LECs to provide cross- connects between collocated carriers, and establishing principles for physical collocation space and configuration. 1232 To show compliance with its collocation obligations, a BOC must have processes and procedures in place to ensure that all applicable collocation arrangements are available on terms and conditions that are “just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” in accordance with section 251( c)( 6) and the FCC’s implementing rules. 1233 Data showing the (Continued from previous page) 1226 The Commission’s rules require an incumbent LEC to provide two- way trunking upon request, wherever two-way trunking arrangements are technically feasible. 47 C. F. R. § 51.305( f); see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978- 79, para. 65; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642, para. 65; Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 15612- 13, paras. 219- 20. 1227 47 C. F. R. § 51.305( a)( 5). 1228 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779, paras. 549- 50; see Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640- 41, para. 61. 1229 47 C. F. R. § 51.321( b); Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779- 82, paras. 549- 50; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640- 41, para. 62. 1230 47 U. S. C. § 251( c)( 6) (requiring incumbent LECs to provide physical collocation); Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640- 41, paras. 61- 62. 1231 Deployment of Wireline Services offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761, 4784- 86, paras. 41- 43 (1999), aff’d in part and vacated and remanded in part sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 205 F. 3d 416 (D. C. Cir. 2000), on recon., Collocation Reconsideration Order, 15 FCC Rcd 17806 (2000); on remand, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 15435 (2001) (Collocation Remand Order), petition for recon. pending. 1232 See Collocation Remand Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 15441- 42, para. 12. 1233 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20643, para. 66; BellSouth Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 649- 51, para. 62. 277 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 11 quality of procedures for processing applications for collocation space, as well as the timeliness and efficiency of provisioning collocation space, help the Commission evaluate a BOC’s compliance with its collocation obligations. 1234 21. As stated above, checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide “interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections 251( c)( 2) and 252( d)( 1).” 1235 Section 252( d)( 1) requires state determinations regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of interconnection to be based on cost and to be nondiscriminatory, and allows the rates to include a reasonable profit. 1236 The Commission’s pricing rules require, among other things, that in order to comply with its collocation obligations, an incumbent LEC provide collocation based on TELRIC. 1237 22. To the extent pricing disputes arise, the Commission will not duplicate the work of the state commissions. As noted in the SWBT Texas Order, the Act authorizes the state commissions to resolve specific carrier- to- carrier disputes arising under the local competition provisions, and it authorizes the federal district courts to ensure that the results of the state arbitration process are consistent with federal law. 1238 Although the Commission has an independent statutory obligation to ensure compliance with the checklist, section 271 does not compel us to preempt the orderly disposition of intercarrier disputes by the state commissions, particularly now that the Supreme Court has restored the Commission’s pricing jurisdiction and has thereby directed the state commissions to follow FCC pricing rules in their disposition of those disputes. 1239 23. Consistent with the Commission’s precedent, the mere presence of interim rates will not generally threaten a section 271 application so long as: (1) an interim solution to a particular rate dispute is reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the state commission has demonstrated its commitment to the Commission’s pricing rules; and (3) provision is made for refunds or true- ups once permanent rates are set. 1240 In addition, the Commission has determined 1234 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640- 41, paras. 61- 62. 1235 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( i) (emphasis added). 1236 Id. § 252( d)( 1). 1237 See 47 C. F. R. §§ 51.501- 07, 51.509( g); Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812- 16, 15844- 61, 15874- 76, 15912, paras. 618- 29, 674- 712, 743- 51, 826. 1238 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; see also 47 U. S. C. §§ 252( c), (e)( 6); American Tel. & Tel Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999) (AT& T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.). 1239 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; AT& T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. at 377- 86. 1240 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 258 (explaining the Commission’s case- by- case review of interim prices). 278 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 12 that rates contained within an approved section 271 application, including those that are interim, are reasonable starting points for interim rates for the same carrier in an adjoining state. 1241 24. Although the Commission has been willing to grant a section 271 application with a limited number of interim rates where the above- mentioned three- part test is met, it is clearly preferable to analyze a section 271 application on the basis of rates derived from a permanent rate proceeding. 1242 At some point, states will have had sufficient time to complete these proceedings. The Commission will, therefore, become more reluctant to continue approving section 271 applications containing interim rates. It would not be sound policy for interim rates to become a substitute for completing these significant proceedings. B. Checklist Item 2 – Unbundled Network Elements 1. Access to Operations Support Systems 25. Incumbent LECs use a variety of systems, databases, and personnel (collectively referred to as OSS) to provide service to their customers. 1243 The Commission consistently has found that nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of meaningful local competition. 1244 For example, new entrants must have access to the functions performed by the incumbent’s OSS in order to formulate and place orders for network elements or resale services, to install service to their customers, to maintain and repair network facilities, and to bill customers. 1245 The Commission has determined that without nondiscriminatory access to the BOC’s OSS, a competing carrier “will be severely disadvantaged, if not precluded altogether, from fairly competing” in the local exchange market. 1246 26. Section 271 requires the Commission to determine whether a BOC offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii) requires a BOC to provide “nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of sections 251( c)( 3) and 252( d)( 1).” 1247 The Commission has determined that access to OSS functions falls squarely within an incumbent LEC’s duty under section 251( c)( 3) to provide unbundled network elements (UNEs) under terms and conditions that are nondiscriminatory and just and reasonable, and its duty under section 251( c)( 4) to offer resale services without imposing any limitations or 1241 SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6359- 60, para. 239. 1242 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 260. 1243 Id. at 3989- 90, para. 83; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 585. 1244 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 83; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 547- 48, 585; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653. 1245 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 83. 1246 Id. 1247 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii). 279 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 13 conditions that are discriminatory or unreasonable. 1248 The Commission must therefore examine a BOC’s OSS performance to evaluate compliance with section 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii) and (xiv). 1249 In addition, the Commission has also concluded that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions is embodied in other terms of the competitive checklist as well. 1250 Consistent with prior orders, the Commission examines a BOC’s OSS performance directly under checklist items 2 and 14, as well as other checklist terms. 1251 27. As part of its statutory obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions, a BOC must provide access that sufficiently supports each of the three modes of competitive entry envisioned by the 1996 Act – competitor- owned facilities, UNEs, and resale. 1252 For OSS functions that are analogous to those that a BOC provides to itself, its customers or its affiliates, the nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer requesting carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality, accuracy, and timeliness. 1253 The BOC must provide access that permits competing carriers to perform these functions in “substantially the same time and manner” as the BOC. 1254 The Commission has recognized in prior orders that there may be situations in which a BOC contends that, although equivalent access has not been achieved for an analogous function, the access that it provides is nonetheless nondiscriminatory within the meaning of the statute. 1255 28. For OSS functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must offer access “sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.” 1256 In assessing whether the quality of access affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, the Commission will examine, in the first instance, whether specific performance 1248 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 84. 1249 Id. 1250 Id. As part of a BOC’s demonstration that it is “providing” a checklist item (e. g., unbundled loops, unbundled local switching, resale services), it must demonstrate that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to the systems, information, and personnel that support that element or service. An examination of a BOC’s OSS performance is therefore integral to the determination of whether a BOC is offering all of the items contained in the competitive checklist. Id. 1251 Id. at 3990- 91, para. 84. 1252 Id. at 3991, para. 85. 1253 Id. 1254 Id. For example, the Commission would not deem an incumbent LEC to be providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS if limitations on the processing of information between the interface and the back office systems prevented a competitor from performing a specific function in substantially the same time and manner as the incumbent performs that function for itself. 1255 See id. 1256 Id. at 3991, para. 86. 280 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 14 standards exist for those functions. 1257 In particular, the Commission will consider whether appropriate standards for measuring OSS performance have been adopted by the relevant state commission or agreed upon by the BOC in an interconnection agreement or during the implementation of such an agreement. 1258 If such performance standards exist, the Commission will evaluate whether the BOC’s performance is sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. 1259 29. The Commission analyzes whether a BOC has met the nondiscrimination standard for each OSS function using a two- step approach. First, the Commission determines “whether the BOC has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them.” 1260 The Commission next assesses “whether the OSS functions that the BOC has deployed are operationally ready, as a practical matter.” 1261 30. Under the first inquiry, a BOC must demonstrate that it has developed sufficient electronic (for functions that the BOC accesses electronically) and manual interfaces to allow competing carriers equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS functions. 1262 For example, a BOC must provide competing carriers with the specifications necessary for carriers to design or modify their systems in a manner that will enable them to communicate with the BOC’s systems and any relevant interfaces. 1263 In addition, a BOC must disclose to competing carriers any 1257 Id. 1258 Id. As a general proposition, specific performance standards adopted by a state commission in an arbitration decision would be more persuasive evidence of commercial reasonableness than a standard unilaterally adopted by the BOC outside of its interconnection agreement. Id. at 20619- 20. 1259 See id. at 3991- 92, para. 86. 1260 Id. at 3992, para. 87; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 592- 93. In making this determination, the Commission “consider[ s] all of the automated and manual processes a BOC has undertaken to provide access to OSS functions,” including the interface (or gateway) that connects the competing carrier’s own operations support systems to the BOC; any electronic or manual processing link between that interface and the BOC’s OSS (including all necessary back office systems and personnel); and all of the OSS that a BOC uses in providing network elements and resale services to a competing carrier. Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20615; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654 n. 241. 1261 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88. 1262 Id. at 3992, para. 87; see also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616, para. 136 (The Commission determines “whether the BOC has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them.”). For example, a BOC must provide competing carriers the specifications necessary to design their systems interfaces and business rules necessary to format orders, and demonstrate that systems are scalable to handle current and projected demand. Id. 1263 Id. 281 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 15 internal business rules 1264 and other formatting information necessary to ensure that a carrier’s requests and orders are processed efficiently. 1265 Finally, a BOC must demonstrate that its OSS is designed to accommodate both current demand and projected demand for competing carriers’ access to OSS functions. 1266 Although not a prerequisite, the Commission continues to encourage the use of industry standards as an appropriate means of meeting the needs of a competitive local exchange market. 1267 31. Under the second inquiry, the Commission examines performance measurements and other evidence of commercial readiness to ascertain whether the BOC’s OSS is handling current demand and will be able to handle reasonably foreseeable future volumes. 1268 The most probative evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready is actual commercial usage. 1269 Absent sufficient and reliable data on commercial usage, the Commission will consider the results of carrier- to- carrier testing, independent third- party testing, and internal testing in assessing the commercial readiness of a BOC’s OSS. 1270 Although the Commission does not require OSS testing, a persuasive test will provide us with an objective means by which to evaluate a BOC’s OSS readiness where there is little to no evidence of commercial usage, or may otherwise strengthen an application where the BOC’s evidence of actual commercial usage is weak or is otherwise challenged by competitors. The persuasiveness of a third- party review, however, is dependent upon the qualifications, experience and independence of the third party and the conditions and scope of the review itself. 1271 If the review is limited in scope or depth or is not independent and blind, the Commission will give it minimal weight. As noted above, to the extent the Commission reviews performance data, it looks at the totality of the circumstances and generally does not view individual performance disparities, particularly if they are isolated and slight, as dispositive of whether a BOC has satisfied its checklist obligations. 1272 Individual performance disparities may, nevertheless, result in a finding of checklist noncompliance, particularly if the disparity is substantial or has endured for a long time, or if it is accompanied 1264 Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure uniformity in the format of orders and include information concerning ordering codes such as universal service ordering codes (USOCs) and field identifiers (FIDs). Id.; see also Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n. 335. 1265 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88. 1266 Id. 1267 See id. 1268 Id. at 3993, para. 89. 1269 Id. 1270 Id. 1271 See id.; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659 (emphasizing that a third- party review should encompass the entire obligation of the incumbent LEC to provide nondiscriminatory access, and, where applicable, should consider the ability of actual competing carriers in the market to operate using the incumbent’s OSS access). 1272 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6301- 02, para. 138. 282 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 16 by other evidence of discriminatory conduct or evidence that competing carriers have been denied a meaningful opportunity to compete. a. Relevance of a BOC’s Prior Section 271 Orders 32. The SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order specifically outlined a non- exhaustive evidentiary showing that must be made in the initial application when a BOC seeks to rely on evidence presented in another application. 1273 First, a BOC’s application must explain the extent to which the OSS are “the same” – that is, whether it employs the shared use of a single OSS, or the use of systems that are identical, but separate. 1274 To satisfy this inquiry, the Commission looks to whether the relevant states utilize a common set of processes, business rules, interfaces, systems and, in many instances, even personnel. 1275 The Commission will also carefully examine third party reports that demonstrate that the BOC’s OSS are the same in each of the relevant states. 1276 Finally, where a BOC has discernibly separate OSS, it must demonstrate that its OSS reasonably can be expected to behave in the same manner. 1277 Second, unless an applicant seeks to establish only that certain discrete components of its OSS are the same, an applicant must submit evidence relating to all aspects of its OSS, including those OSS functions performed by BOC personnel. b. Pre- Ordering 33. A BOC must demonstrate that: (i) it offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a loop is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies; (ii) competing carriers successfully have built and are using application-to- application interfaces to perform pre- ordering functions and are able to integrate pre- ordering and ordering interfaces; 1278 and (iii) its pre- ordering systems provide reasonably prompt response times and are consistently available in a manner that affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. 1279 1273 See id. at 6286- 91, paras. 107- 18 1274 See id. at 6288, para. 111. 1275 The Commission has consistently held that a BOC’s OSS includes both mechanized systems and manual processes, and thus the OSS functions performed by BOC personnel have been part of the FCC’s OSS functionality and commercial readiness reviews. 1276 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, id. at 6287, para. 108. 1277 See id. at 6288, para. 111. 1278 In prior orders, the Commission has emphasized that providing pre- ordering functionality through an application- to- application interface is essential in enabling carriers to conduct real- time processing and to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functions in the same manner as the BOC. SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18426, para. 148. 1279 The Commission has held previously that an interface that provides responses in a prompt timeframe and is stable and reliable, is necessary for competing carriers to market their services and serve their customers as (continued….) 283 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 17 34. The pre- ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities that a carrier undertakes to gather and verify the information necessary to place an order. 1280 Given that pre-ordering represents the first exposure that a prospective customer has to a competing carrier, it is critical that a competing carrier is able to accomplish pre- ordering activities in a manner no less efficient and responsive than the incumbent. 1281 Most of the pre- ordering activities that must be undertaken by a competing carrier to order resale services and UNEs from the incumbent are analogous to the activities a BOC must accomplish to furnish service to its own customers. For these pre- ordering functions, a BOC must demonstrate that it provides requesting carriers access that enables them to perform pre- ordering functions in substantially the same time and manner as its retail operations. 1282 For those pre- ordering functions that lack a retail analogue, a BOC must provide access that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. 1283 In prior orders, the Commission has emphasized that providing pre- ordering functionality through an application- to- application interface is essential in enabling carriers to conduct real- time processing and to integrate pre- ordering and ordering functions in the same manner as the BOC. 1284 (i) Access to Loop Qualification Information 35. In accordance with the UNE Remand Order, 1285 the Commission requires incumbent carriers to provide competitors with access to all of the same detailed information about the loop that is available to the incumbents, 1286 and in the same time frame, so that a (Continued from previous page) efficiently and at the same level of quality as a BOC serves its own customers. See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4025 and 4029, paras. 145 and 154. 1280 See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20660, para. 94 (referring to “pre- ordering and ordering” collectively as “the exchange of information between telecommunications carriers about current or proposed customer products and services or unbundled network elements or some combination thereof”). In prior orders, the Commission has identified the following five pre- order functions: (1) customer service record (CSR) information; (2) address validation; (3) telephone number information; (4) due date information; (5) services and feature information. See Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4015, para. 132; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20660, para. 94; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 619, para. 147. 1281 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129. 1282 Id.; see also BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 623- 29 (concluding that failure to deploy an application- to- application interface denies competing carriers equivalent access to pre- ordering OSS functions). 1283 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129. 1284 See id. at 4014, para. 130; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661- 67, para. 105. 1285 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885, para. 426 (determining “that the pre- ordering function includes access to loop qualification information”). 1286 See id. At a minimum, a BOC must provide (1) the composition of the loop material, including both fiber and copper; (2) the existence, location and type of any electronic or other equipment on the loop, including but not limited to, digital loop carrier or other remote concentration devices, feeder/ distribution interfaces, bridge taps, load coils, pair- gain devices, disturbers in the same or adjacent binder groups; (3) the loop length, including the length (continued….) 284 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 18 competing carrier can make an independent judgment at the pre- ordering stage about whether an end user loop is capable of supporting the advanced services equipment the competing carrier intends to install. 1287 Under the UNE Remand Order, the relevant inquiry is not whether a BOC’s retail arm accesses such underlying information but whether such information exists anywhere in a BOC’s back office and can be accessed by any of a BOC’s personnel. 1288 Moreover, a BOC may not “filter or digest” the underlying information and may not provide only information that is useful in provisioning of a particular type of xDSL that a BOC offers. 1289 A BOC must also provide loop qualification information based, for example, on an individual address or zip code of the end users in a particular wire center, NXX code or on any other basis that the BOC provides such information to itself. Moreover, a BOC must also provide access for competing carriers to the loop qualifying information that the BOC can itself access manually or electronically. Finally, a BOC must provide access to loop qualification information to competitors within the same time intervals it is provided to the BOC’s retail operations or its advanced services affiliate. 1290 As the Commission determined in the UNE Remand Order, however, “to the extent such information is not normally provided to the incumbent’s retail personnel, but can be obtained by contacting back office personnel, it must be provided to requesting carriers within the same time frame that any incumbent personnel are able to obtain such information.” 1291 c. Ordering 36. Consistent with section 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii), a BOC must demonstrate its ability to provide competing carriers with access to the OSS functions necessary for placing wholesale orders. For those functions of the ordering systems for which there is a retail analogue, a BOC must demonstrate, with performance data and other evidence, that it provides competing carriers with access to its OSS in substantially the same time and manner as it provides to its retail operations. For those ordering functions that lack a direct retail analogue, a BOC must demonstrate that its systems and performance allow an efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity (Continued from previous page) and location of each type of transmission media; (4) the wire gauge( s) of the loop; and (5) the electrical parameters of the loop, which may determine the suitability of the loop for various technologies. Id. 1287 As the Commission has explained in prior proceedings, because characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the presence of various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder certain advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to “pre- qualify” a loop by accessing basic loop makeup information that will assist carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, either with or without the removal of the impediments, can support a particular advanced service. See id., 15 FCC Rcd at 4021, para. 140. 1288 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885- 3887, paras. 427- 431 (noting that “to the extent such information is not normally provided to the incumbent’s retail personnel, but can be obtained by contacting back office personnel, it must be provided to requesting carriers within the same time frame that any incumbent personnel are able to obtain such information.”). 1289 See SWBT Kansas Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6292- 93, para. 121. 1290 Id. 1291 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885- 3887, paras. 427- 31. 285 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 19 to compete. As in prior section 271 orders, the Commission looks primarily at the applicant’s ability to return order confirmation notices, order reject notices, order completion notices and jeopardies, and at its order flow- through rate. 1292 d. Provisioning 37. A BOC must provision competing carriers’ orders for resale and UNE- P services in substantially the same time and manner as it provisions orders for its own retail customers. 1293 Consistent with the approach in prior section 271 orders, the Commission examines a BOC’s provisioning processes, as well as its performance with respect to provisioning timeliness (i. e., missed due dates and average installation intervals) and provisioning quality (i. e., service problems experienced at the provisioning stage). 1294 e. Maintenance and Repair 38. A competing carrier that provides service through resale or UNEs remains dependent upon the incumbent LEC for maintenance and repair. Thus, as part of its obligation to provide nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions, a BOC must provide requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair systems. 1295 To the extent a BOC performs analogous maintenance and repair functions for its retail operations, it must provide competing carriers access that enables them to perform maintenance and repair functions “in substantially the same time and manner” as a BOC provides its retail customers. 1296 Equivalent access ensures that competing carriers can assist customers experiencing service disruptions using the same network information and diagnostic tools that are available to BOC personnel. 1297 Without equivalent access, a competing carrier would be placed at a significant competitive disadvantage, as its customer would perceive a problem with a BOC’s network as a problem with the competing carrier’s own network. 1298 1292 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18438, para. 170; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035- 39, paras. 163- 66. The Commission examines (i) order flow- through rates, (ii) jeopardy notices and (iii) order completion notices using the “same time and manner” standard. The Commission examines order confirmation notices and order rejection notices using the “meaningful opportunity to compete” standard. 1293 See Bell Atlantic New York, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196. For provisioning timeliness, the Commission looks to missed due dates and average installation intervals; for provisioning quality, the Commission looks to service problems experienced at the provisioning stage. 1294 Id. 1295 Id. at 4067, para. 212; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613, 20660- 61. 1296 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196; see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692- 93. 1297 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196. 1298 Id. 286 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 20 f. Billing 39. A BOC must provide nondiscriminatory access to its billing functions, which is necessary to enable competing carriers to provide accurate and timely bills to their customers. 1299 In making this determination, the Commission assesses a BOC’s billing processes and systems, and its performance data. Consistent with prior section 271 orders, a BOC must demonstrate that it provides competing carriers with complete and accurate reports on the service usage of competing carriers’ customers in substantially the same time and manner that a BOC provides such information to itself, and with wholesale bills in a manner that gives competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete. 1300 g. Change Management Process 40. Competing carriers need information about, and specifications for, an incumbent’s systems and interfaces to develop and modify their systems and procedures to access the incumbent’s OSS functions. 1301 Thus, in order to demonstrate that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, a BOC must first demonstrate that it “has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS functions and . . . is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them.” 1302 By showing that it adequately assists competing carriers to use available OSS functions, a BOC provides evidence that it offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete. 1303 As part of this demonstration, the Commission will give substantial consideration to the existence of an adequate change management process and evidence that the BOC has adhered to this process over time. 1304 41. The change management process refers to the methods and procedures that the BOC employs to communicate with competing carriers regarding the performance of, and changes in, the BOC’s OSS. 1305 Such changes may include updates to existing functions that impact competing carrier interface( s) upon a BOC’s release of new interface software; technology changes that require competing carriers to meet new technical requirements upon a BOC’s software release date; additional functionality changes that may be used at the competing 1299 See SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18461, para. 210. 1300 See id.; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6316- 17, at para. 163. 1301 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999- 4000, para. 102; First BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 6279 n. 197; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 625 n. 467; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n. 334; Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19742. 1302 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999, para. 102. 1303 Id. at 3999- 4000, para. 102 1304 Id. at 4000, para. 102. 1305 Id. at 4000, para. 103. 287 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 21 carrier’s option, on or after a BOC’s release date for new interface software; and changes that may be mandated by regulatory authorities. 1306 Without a change management process in place, a BOC can impose substantial costs on competing carriers simply by making changes to its systems and interfaces without providing adequate testing opportunities and accurate and timely notice and documentation of the changes. 1307 Change management problems can impair a competing carrier’s ability to obtain nondiscriminatory access to UNEs, and hence a BOC’s compliance with section 271( 2)( B)( ii). 1308 42. In evaluating whether a BOC’s change management plan affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, the Commission first assesses whether the plan is adequate. In making this determination, it assesses whether the evidence demonstrates: (1) that information relating to the change management process is clearly organized and readily accessible to competing carriers; 1309 (2) that competing carriers had substantial input in the design and continued operation of the change management process; 1310 (3) that the change management plan defines a procedure for the timely resolution of change management disputes; 1311 (4) the availability of a stable testing environment that mirrors production; 1312 and (5) the efficacy of the documentation the BOC makes available for the purpose of building an electronic gateway. 1313 After determining whether the BOC’s change management plan is adequate, the Commission evaluates whether the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this plan. 1314 2. UNE Combinations 43. In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a BOC must show that it is offering “[ n] ondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of section 251( c)( 3).” 1315 Section 251( c)( 3) requires an incumbent LEC to 1306 Id. 1307 Id. at 4000, para. 103. 1308 Id. 1309 Id. at 4002, para. 107. 1310 Id. at 4000, para. 104. 1311 Id. at 4002, para. 108. 1312 Id. at 4002- 03, paras. 109- 10. 1313 Id. at 4003- 04, para. 110. In the Bell Atlantic New York Order, the Commission used these factors in determining whether Bell Atlantic had an adequate change management process in place. See id. at 4004, para. 111. The Commission left open the possibility, however, that a change management plan different from the one implemented by Bell Atlantic may be sufficient to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of section 271. Id. 1314 Id. at 3999, para. 101, 4004- 05, para. 112. 1315 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii). 288 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 22 “provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier . . . nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 1316 Section 251( c)( 3) of the Act also requires incumbent LECs to provide UNEs in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide a telecommunications service. 1317 44. In the Ameritech Michigan Order, the Commission emphasized that the ability of requesting carriers to use UNEs, as well as combinations of UNEs, is integral to achieving Congress’ objective of promoting competition in local telecommunications markets. 1318 Using combinations of UNEs provides a competitor with the incentive and ability to package and market services in ways that differ from the BOCs’ existing service offerings in order to compete in the local telecommunications market. 1319 Moreover, combining the incumbent’s UNEs with their own facilities encourages facilities- based competition and allows competing providers to provide a wide array of competitive choices. 1320 Because the use of combinations of UNEs is an important strategy for entry into the local telecommunications market, as well as an obligation under the requirements of section 271, the Commission examines section 271 applications to determine whether competitive carriers are able to combine network elements as required by the Act and the Commission’s regulations. 1321 3. Pricing of Network Elements 45. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide “nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with sections 251( c)( 3) and 252( d)( 1)” of the Act. 1322 Section 251( c)( 3) requires incumbent LECs to provide “nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.” 1323 Section 252( d)( 1) requires that a state commission’s determination of the just and reasonable rates for network elements shall be based on the cost of providing the network elements, shall be 1316 Id. § 251( c)( 3). 1317 Id. 1318 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20718- 19; BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 646. 1319 BellSouth South Carolina Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 646; see also Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15666- 68. 1320 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4077- 78, para. 230. 1321 Id. The Supreme Court on May 13, 2002, upheld the Commission’s combination rules finding that the requirement “is consistent with the Act’s goals of competition and nondiscrimination, and imposing it is a sensible way to reach the result the statute requires.” Verizon v. FCC, Nos. 00- 511, 00- 555, 00- 587, 00- 590, and 00- 602, 2002 WL 970643 at *36 (Sup. Ct. May 13, 2002) (Verizon v. FCC). 1322 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii). 1323 Id. § 251( c)( 3). 289 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 23 nondiscriminatory, and may include a reasonable profit. 1324 Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Commission has determined that prices for UNEs must be based on the total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) of providing those elements. 1325 The Commission also promulgated rule 51.315( b), which prohibits incumbent LECs from separating already combined elements before providing them to competing carriers, except on request. 1326 The Commission has previously held that it will not conduct a de novo review of a state’s pricing determinations and will reject an application only if “basic TELRIC principles are violated or the state commission makes clear errors in factual findings on matters so substantial that the end result falls outside the range that the reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce.” 1327 46. Although the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the Commission’s pricing rules in 1996, 1328 the Supreme Court restored the Commission’s pricing authority on January 25, 1999, and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of the merits of the challenged rules. 1329 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that while TELRIC is an acceptable method for determining costs, certain specific requirements contained within the Commission’s pricing rules were contrary to Congressional intent. 1330 The Eighth Circuit has stayed the issuance of its mandate pending review by the Supreme Court. 1331 The Supreme Court on May 13, 2002, upheld the Commission’s forward- looking pricing 1324 47 U. S. C. § 252( d)( 1). 1325 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15844- 46, paras. 674- 79; 47 C. F. R. §§ 51.501 et seq.; see also Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98- 147, and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96- 98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912, 20974, para. 135 (Line Sharing Order) (concluding that states should set the prices for line sharing as a new network element in the same manner as the state sets prices for other UNEs). 1326 See 47 C. F. R. § 51.315( b). 1327 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244; SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6266, para. 59. 1328 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F. 3d 753, 800, 804, 805- 06 (8 th Cir. 1997). 1329 AT& T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999). In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that section 201( b) “explicitly grants the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act applies.” Id. at 380. Furthermore, the Court determined that section 251( d) also provides evidence of an express jurisdictional grant by requiring that “the Commission [shall] complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the requirements of this section.” Id. at 382. The Court also held that the pricing provisions implemented under the Commission’s rulemaking authority do not inhibit the establishment of rates by the states. The Court concluded that the Commission has jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local competition under the 1996 Act, including pricing for interconnection and unbundled access, as “it is the States that will apply those standards and implement that methodology, determining the concrete result.” Id. 1330 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F. 3d 744 (8 th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications v. FCC, 121 S. Ct. 877 (2001). 1331 Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, No. 96- 3321 et al. (8 th Cir. Sept. 25, 2000). 290 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 24 methodology in determining costs of UNEs and “reverse[ d] the Eighth Circuit’s judgment insofar as it invalidated TELRIC as a method for setting rates under the Act.” 1332 Accordingly, the Commission’s pricing rules remain in effect. C. Checklist Item 3 – Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way 47. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( iii) requires BOCs to provide “[ n] ondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and rights- of- way owned or controlled by the [BOC] at just and reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section 224.” 1333 Section 224( f)( 1) states that “[ a] utility shall provide a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or right- of- way owned or controlled by it.” 1334 Notwithstanding this requirement, section 224( f)( 2) permits a utility providing electric service to deny access to its poles, ducts, conduits, and rights- of- way, on a nondiscriminatory basis, “where there is insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes.” 1335 Section 224 also contains two separate provisions governing the maximum rates that a utility may charge for “pole attachments.” 1336 Section 224( b)( 1) states that the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and conditions governing pole attachments to ensure that they are “just and reasonable.” 1337 Notwithstanding this general grant of authority, section 224( c)( 1) states that “[ n] othing in [section 224] shall be construed to apply to, or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits and rights- of- way as provided in [section 224( f)], for pole 1332 Verizon v. FCC, 2002 WL 970643 at *22. 1333 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( iii). As originally enacted, section 224 was intended to address obstacles that cable operators encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights- of- way owned or controlled by utilities. The 1996 Act amended section 224 in several important respects to ensure that telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators have access to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights- of- way owned or controlled by utility companies, including LECs. Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, n. 574. 1334 47 U. S. C. § 224( f)( 1). Section 224( a)( 1) defines “utility” to include any entity, including a LEC, that controls “poles, ducts, conduits, or rights- of- way used, in whole or in part, for any wire communications.” 47 U. S. C. § 224( a)( 1). 1335 47 U. S. C. § 224( f)( 2). In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission concluded that, although the statutory exception enunciated in section 224( f)( 2) appears to be limited to utilities providing electrical service, LECs should also be permitted to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and rights- of- way because of insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes, provided the assessment of such factors is done in a nondiscriminatory manner. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16080- 81, paras. 1175- 77. 1336 Section 224( a)( 4) defines “pole attachment” as “any attachment by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right- of- way owned or controlled by a utility.” 47 U. S. C. § 224( a)( 4). 1337 47 U. S. C. § 224( b)( 1). 291 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 25 attachments in any case where such matters are regulated by a State.” 1338 As of 1992, nineteen states, including Connecticut, had certified to the Commission that they regulated the rates, terms, and conditions for pole attachments. 1339 D. Checklist Item 4 – Unbundled Local Loops 48. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive checklist, requires that a BOC provide “[ l] ocal loop transmission from the central office to the customer’s premises, unbundled from local switching or other services.” 1340 The Commission has defined the loop as a transmission facility between a distribution frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and the demarcation point at the customer premises. This definition includes different types of loops, including two- wire and four- wire analog voice- grade loops, and two- wire and four- wire loops that are conditioned to transmit the digital signals needed to provide service such as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, and DS1- level signals. 1341 49. In order to establish that it is “providing” unbundled local loops in compliance with checklist item 4, a BOC must demonstrate that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish loops and that it is currently doing so in the quantities that competitors demand and at an acceptable level of quality. A BOC must also demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to unbundled loops. 1342 Specifically, the BOC must provide access to any functionality of the loop requested by a competing carrier unless it is not technically feasible to condition the loop facility to support the particular functionality requested. In order to provide the requested loop functionality, such as the ability to deliver xDSL services, the BOC may be required to take affirmative steps to condition existing loop facilities to enable competing carriers to provide services not currently provided over the facilities. The BOC must provide competitors with access to unbundled loops regardless of whether the BOC uses digital loop 1338 Id. § 224( c)( 1). The 1996 Act extended the Commission’s authority to include not just rates, terms, and conditions, but also the authority to regulate nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights- of- way. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U. S. C. § 224( f). Absent state regulation of terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory attachment access, the Commission retains jurisdiction. Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U. S. C. § 224( c)( 1); see also Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4093, para. 264. 1339 See States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole Attachments, Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992); 47 U. S. C. § 224( f). 1340 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( iv). 1341 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691, para. 380; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772- 73, paras. 166- 67, n. 301 (retaining definition of the local loop from the Local Competition First Report and Order, but replacing the phrase “network interconnection device” with “demarcation point,” and making explicit that dark fiber and loop conditioning are among the features, functions and capabilities of the loop). 1342 SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18481- 81, para. 248; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20637, para. 185. 292 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 26 carrier (DLC) technology or similar remote concentration devices for the particular loops sought by the competitor. 50. On December 9, 1999, the Commission released the Line Sharing Order, which introduced new rules requiring BOCs to offer requesting carriers unbundled access to the high-frequency portion of local loops (HFPL). 1343 HFPL is defined as “the frequency above the voiceband on a copper loop facility that is being used to carry traditional POTS analog circuit-switched voiceband transmissions.” This definition applies whether a BOC’s voice customers are served by cooper or by digital loop carrier equipment. Competing carriers should have access to the HFPL at either a central office or at a remote terminal. However, the HFPL network element is only available on a copper loop facility. 1344 51. To determine whether a BOC makes line sharing available consistent with Commission rules set out in the Line Sharing Order, the Commission examines categories of performance measurements identified in the Bell Atlantic New York and SWBT Texas Orders. Specifically, a successful BOC applicant could provide evidence of BOC- caused missed installation due dates, average installation intervals, trouble reports within 30 days of installation, mean time to repair, trouble report rates, and repeat trouble report rates. In addition, a successful BOC applicant should provide evidence that its central offices are operationally ready to handle commercial volumes of line sharing and that it provides competing carriers with nondiscriminatory access to the pre- ordering and ordering OSS functions associated with the provision of line shared loops, including access to loop qualification information and databases. 52. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( iv) also requires that a BOC demonstrate that it makes line splitting available to competing carriers so that competing carriers may provide voice and data service over a single loop. 1345 In addition, a BOC must demonstrate that a competing carrier, either alone or in conjunction with another carrier, is able to replace an existing UNE- P configuration used to provide voice service with an arrangement that enables it to provide voice and data service to a customer. To make such a showing, a BOC must show that it has a legal obligation to provide line splitting through rates, terms, and conditions in interconnection agreements and that it offers competing carriers the ability to order an unbundled xDSL- capable 1343 See Line Sharing Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 20924- 27, paras. 20- 27. 1344 See Deployment of Wireline Services offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 98- 147, Fourth Report and Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96- 98, 16 FCC Rcd 2101, 2106- 07, para. 10 (2001). 1345 See generally SWBT Texas Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18515- 17, paras. 323- 329 (describing line splitting); 47 C. F. R. § 51.703( c) (requiring that incumbent LECs provide competing carriers with access to unbundled loops in a manner that allows competing carriers “to provide any telecommunications service that can be offered by means of that network element”). 293 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 27 loop terminated to a collocated splitter and DSLAM equipment, and combine it with unbundled switching and shared transport. 1346 E. Checklist Item 5 – Unbundled Local Transport 53. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC to provide “[ l] ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other services.” 1347 The Commission has required that BOCs provide both dedicated and shared transport to requesting carriers. 1348 Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission facilities dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide telecommunications between wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by BOCs or requesting telecommunications carriers. 1349 Shared transport consists of transmission facilities shared by more than one carrier, including the BOC, between end office switches, between end office switches and tandem switches, and between tandem switches, in the BOC’s network. 1350 F. Checklist Item 6 – Unbundled Local Switching 54. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide “[ l] ocal switching unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other services.” 1351 In the Second 1346 See SWBT Kansas/ Oklahoma Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6348, para. 220. 1347 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( v). 1348 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719, para. 201. 1349 Id. A BOC has the following obligations with respect to dedicated transport: (a) provide unbundled access to dedicated transmission facilities between BOC central offices or between such offices and serving wire centers (SWCs); between SWCs and interexchange carriers points of presence (POPs); between tandem switches and SWCs, end offices or tandems of the BOC, and the wire centers of BOCs and requesting carriers; (b) provide all technically feasible transmission capabilities such as DS1, DS3, and Optical Carrier levels that the competing carrier could use to provide telecommunications; (c) not limit the facilities to which dedicated interoffice transport facilities are connected, provided such interconnections are technically feasible, or restrict the use of unbundled transport facilities; and (d) to the extent technically feasible, provide requesting carriers with access to digital cross- connect system functionality in the same manner that the BOC offers such capabilities to interexchange carriers that purchase transport services. Id. at 20719. 1350 Id. at 20719, n. 650. The Commission also found that a BOC has the following obligations with respect to shared transport: (a) provide shared transport in a way that enables the traffic of requesting carriers to be carried on the same transport facilities that a BOC uses for its own traffic; (b) provide shared transport transmission facilities between end office switches, between its end office and tandem switches, and between tandem switches in its network; (c) permit requesting carriers that purchase unbundled shared transport and unbundled switching to use the same routing table that is resident in the BOC’s switch; and (d) permit requesting carriers to use shared (or dedicated) transport as an unbundled element to carry originating access traffic from, and terminating traffic to, customers to whom the requesting carrier is also providing local exchange service. Id. at 20720, n. 652. 1351 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( vi); see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722. A switch connects end user lines to other end user lines, and connects end user lines to trunks used for transporting a call to another central office or to a long- distance carrier. Switches can also provide end users with “vertical features” such (continued….) 294 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 28 BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission required BellSouth to provide unbundled local switching that included line- side and trunk- side facilities, plus the features, functions, and capabilities of the switch. 1352 The features, functions, and capabilities of the switch include the basic switching function as well as the same basic capabilities that are available to the incumbent LEC’s customers. 1353 Additionally, local switching includes all vertical features that the switch is capable of providing, as well as any technically feasible customized routing functions. 1354 55. Moreover, in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission required BellSouth to permit competing carriers to purchase UNEs, including unbundled switching, in a manner that permits a competing carrier to offer, and bill for, exchange access and the termination of local traffic. 1355 The Commission also stated that measuring daily customer usage for billing purposes requires essentially the same OSS functions for both competing carriers and incumbent LECs, and that a BOC must demonstrate that it is providing equivalent access to billing information. 1356 Therefore, the ability of a BOC to provide billing information necessary for a competitive LEC to bill for exchange access and termination of local traffic is an aspect of unbundled local switching. 1357 Thus, there is an overlap between the provision of unbundled local switching and the provision of the OSS billing function. 1358 56. To comply with the requirements of unbundled local switching, a BOC must also make available trunk ports on a shared basis and routing tables resident in the BOC’s switch, as necessary to provide access to shared transport functionality. 1359 In addition, a BOC may not limit the ability of competitors to use unbundled local switching to provide exchange access by requiring competing carriers to purchase a dedicated trunk from an interexchange carrier’s point of presence to a dedicated trunk port on the local switch. 1360 (Continued from previous page) as call waiting, call forwarding, and caller ID, and can direct a call to a specific trunk, such as to a competing carrier’s operator services. 1352 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722, para. 207. 1353 Id. 1354 Id. at 20722- 23, para. 207. 1355 Id. at 20723, para. 208. 1356 Id. at 20723, para. 208 (citing Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20619, para. 140). 1357 Id. 1358 Id. 1359 Id. at 20723, para. 209 (citing the Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20705, para. 306). 1360 Id. (citing the Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20714- 15, paras. 324- 25). 295 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 29 G. Checklist Item 7 – 911/ E911 Access and Directory Assistance/ Operator Services 57. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii) of the Act requires a BOC to provide “[ n] ondiscriminatory access to – (I) 911 and E911 services.” 1361 In the Ameritech Michigan Order, the Commission found that “section 271 requires a BOC to provide competitors access to its 911 and E911 services in the same manner that a BOC obtains such access, i. e., at parity.” 1362 Specifically, the Commission found that a BOC “must maintain the 911 database entries for competing LECs with the same accuracy and reliability that it maintains the database entries for its own customers.” 1363 For facilities- based carriers, the BOC must provide “unbundled access to [its] 911 database and 911 interconnection, including the provision of dedicated trunks from the requesting carrier’s switching facilities to the 911 control office at parity with what [the BOC] provides to itself.” 1364 Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II) and section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( III) require a BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to “directory assistance services to allow the other carrier’s customers to obtain telephone numbers” and “operator call completion services,” respectively. 1365 Section 251( b)( 3) of the Act imposes on each LEC “the duty to permit all [competing providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service] to have nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing delays.” 1366 The Commission concluded in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order that a BOC must be in compliance with the regulations implementing section 251( b)( 3) to satisfy the requirements of sections 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II) and 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( III). 1367 In the Local Competition Second Report and Order, the Commission 1361 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii). 911 and E911 services transmit calls from end users to emergency personnel. It is critical that a BOC provide competing carriers with accurate and nondiscriminatory access to 911/ E911 services so that these carriers’ customers are able to reach emergency assistance. Customers use directory assistance and operator services to obtain customer listing information and other call completion services. 1362 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256. 1363 Id. 1364 Id. 1365 47 U. S. C. §§ 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II), (III). 1366 Id. § 251( b)( 3). The Commission implemented section 251( b)( 3) in the Local Competition Second Report and Order. 47 C. F. R. § 51.217; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 (1996) (Local Competition Second Report and Order) vacated in part sub nom. People of the State of California v. FCC, 124 F. 3d 934 (8th Cir. 1997), overruled in part, AT& T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999); see also Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Provision of Directory Listings Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 15550 (1999) (Directory Listings Information NPRM). 1367 While both sections 251( b)( 3) and 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( II) refer to nondiscriminatory access to “directory assistance,” section 251( b)( 3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to “operator services,” while section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( III) refers to nondiscriminatory access to “operator call completion services.” 47 U. S. C. (continued….) 296 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 30 held that the phrase “nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance and directory listings” means that “the customers of all telecommunications service providers should be able to access each LEC’s directory assistance service and obtain a directory listing on a nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding: (1) the identity of a requesting customer’s local telephone service provider; or (2) the identity of the telephone service provider for a customer whose directory listing is requested.” 1368 The Commission concluded that nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4- 1- 1 and 5- 5- 5- 1- 2- 1- 2 to access directory assistance were technically feasible, and would continue. 1369 The Commission specifically held that the phrase “nondiscriminatory access to operator services” means that “a telephone service customer, regardless of the identity of his or her local telephone service provider, must be able to connect to a local operator by dialing ‘0, ’ or ‘0 plus’ the desired telephone number.” 1370 58. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory assistance by reselling the BOC’s services, outsourcing service provision to a third- party provider, or using their own personnel and facilities. The Commission’s rules require BOCs to permit competitive LECs wishing to resell the BOC’s operator services and directory assistance to request the BOC (Continued from previous page) §§ 251( b)( 3), 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii)( III). The term “operator call completion services” is not defined in the Act, nor has the Commission previously defined the term. However, for section 251( b)( 3) purposes, the term “operator services” was defined as meaning “any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call.” Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19448, para. 110. In the same order the Commission concluded that busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator- assisted directory assistance are forms of “operator services,” because they assist customers in arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of a telephone call. Id. at 19449, para. 111. All of these services may be needed or used to place a call. For example, if a customer tries to direct dial a telephone number and constantly receives a busy signal, the customer may contact the operator to attempt to complete the call. Since billing is a necessary part of call completion, and busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator- assisted directory assistance can all be used when an operator completes a call, the Commission concluded in the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order that for checklist compliance purposes, “operator call completion services” is a subset of or equivalent to “operator service.” Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20740, n. 763. As a result, the Commission uses the nondiscriminatory standards established for operator services to determine whether nondiscriminatory access is provided. 1368 47 C. F. R. § 51.217( c)( 3); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19456- 58, paras. 130- 35. The Local Competition Second Report and Order’s interpretation of section 251( b)( 3) is limited “to access to each LEC’s directory assistance service.” Id. at 19456, para. 135. However, section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii) is not limited to the LEC’s systems but requires “nondiscriminatory access to . . . directory assistance to allow the other carrier’s customers to obtain telephone numbers.” 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii). Combined with the Commission’s conclusion that “incumbent LECs must unbundle the facilities and functionalities providing operator services and directory assistance from resold services and other unbundled network elements to the extent technically feasible,” Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15772- 73, paras. 535- 37, section 271( c)( 2)( B)( vii) ’s requirement should be understood to require the BOCs to provide nondiscriminatory access to the directory assistance service provider selected by the customer’s local service provider, regardless of whether the competitor; provides such services itself; selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party to provide such services. See Directory Listings Information NPRM. 1369 Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19464, para. 151. 1370 Id. at 19464, para. 151. 297 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 31 to brand their calls. 1371 Competing carriers wishing to provide operator services or directory assistance using their own or a third party provider’s facilities and personnel must be able to obtain directory listings either by obtaining directory information on a “read only” or “per dip” basis from the BOC’s directory assistance database, or by creating their own directory assistance database by obtaining the subscriber listing information in the BOC’s database. 1372 Although the Commission originally concluded that BOCs must provide directory assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis pursuant to sections 251 and 252, the Commission removed directory assistance and operator services from the list of required UNEs in the UNE Remand Order. 1373 Checklist item obligations that do not fall within a BOC’s obligations under section 251( c)( 3) are not subject to the requirements of sections 251 and 252 that rates be based on forward- looking economic costs. 1374 Checklist item obligations that do not fall within a BOC’s UNE obligations, however, still must be provided in accordance with sections 201( b) and 202( a), which require that rates and conditions be just and reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory. 1375 H. Checklist Item 8 – White Pages Directory Listings 59. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( viii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide “[ w] hite pages directory listings for customers of the other carrier’s telephone exchange service.” 1376 Section 251( b)( 3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive providers of 1371 47 C. F. R. § 51.217( d); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19463, para. 148. For example, when customers call the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically hear a message, such as “thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company.” Competing carriers may use the BOC’s brand, request the BOC to brand the call with the competitive carriers name or request that the BOC not brand the call at all. 47 C. F. R. § 51.217( d). 1372 47 C. F. R. § 51.217( C)( 3)( ii); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19460- 61, paras. 141- 44; Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Provision of Directory Listing Information Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Third Report and Order, Second Order on Reconsideration, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 15550, 15630- 31, paras. 152- 54 (1999); Provision of Directory Listing Information Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 2736, 2743- 51 (2001). 1373 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3891- 92, paras. 441- 42. 1374 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3905, para. 470; see generally 47 U. S. C. §§ 251- 52; see also 47 U. S. C. § 252( d)( 1)( A)( i) (requiring UNE rates to be “based on the cost (determined without reference to a rate- of- return or other rate- based proceeding) of providing the … network element”). 1375 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3905- 06, paras. 470- 73; see also 47 U. S. C. §§ 201( b), 202( a). 1376 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( viii). 298 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 32 telephone exchange service and telephone toll service to have nondiscriminatory access to directory listing. 1377 60. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission concluded that, “consistent with the Commission’s interpretation of ‘directory listing’ as used in section 251( b)( 3), the term ‘white pages’ in section 271( c)( 2)( B)( viii) refers to the local alphabetical directory that includes the residential and business listings of the customers of the local exchange provider.” 1378 The Commission further concluded, “the term ‘directory listing, ’ as used in this section, includes, at a minimum, the subscriber’s name, address, telephone number, or any combination thereof.” 1379 The Commission’s Second BellSouth Louisiana Order also held that a BOC satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by demonstrating that it: (1) provided nondiscriminatory appearance and integration of white page directory listings to competitive LECs’ customers; and (2) provided white page listings for competitors’ customers with the same accuracy and reliability that it provides its own customers. 1380 I. Checklist Item 9 – Numbering Administration 61. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( ix) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide “nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to the other carrier’s telephone exchange service customers,” until “the date by which telecommunications numbering administration, guidelines, plan, or rules are established.” 1381 The checklist mandates compliance with “such guidelines, plan, or rules” after they have been established. 1382 A BOC must demonstrate that it adheres to industry numbering administration guidelines and Commission rules. 1383 1377 Id. § 251( b)( 3). 1378 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20748, para. 255. 1379 Id. In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission stated that the definition of “directory listing” was synonymous with the definition of “subscriber list information.” Id. at 20747 (citing the Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19458- 59). However, the Commission’s decision in a later proceeding obviates this comparison, and supports the definition of directory listing delineated above. See Implementation of the Telecommunications Carriers’ Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer Information, CC Docket No. 96- 115, Third Report and Order; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96- 98, Second Order on Reconsideration; Provision of Directory Listing Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934, As Amended, CC Docket No. 99- 273, FCC 99- 227, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, para. 160 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999). 1380 Id. 1381 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( ix). 1382 Id. 1383 See Second Bell South Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20752; see also Numbering Resource Optimization, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 7574 (2000); Numbering Resource Optimization, Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 99- 200 and Second Further (continued….) 299 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 33 J. Checklist Item 10 – Databases and Associated Signaling 62. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( x) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide “nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling necessary for call routing and completion.” 1384 In the Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, the Commission required BellSouth to demonstrate that it provided requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access to: “( 1) signaling networks, including signaling links and signaling transfer points; (2) certain call-related databases necessary for call routing and completion, or in the alternative, a means of physical access to the signaling transfer point linked to the unbundled database; and (3) Service Management Systems (SMS).” 1385 The Commission also required BellSouth to design, create, test, and deploy Advanced Intelligent Network (AIN) based services at the SMS through a Service Creation Environment (SCE). 1386 In the Local Competition First Report and Order, the Commission defined call- related databases as databases, other than operations support systems, that are used in signaling networks for billing and collection or the transmission, routing, or other provision of telecommunications service. 1387 At that time the Commission required incumbent LECs to provide unbundled access to their call- related databases, including but not limited to: the Line Information Database (LIDB), the Toll Free Calling database, the Local Number Portability database, and Advanced Intelligent Network databases. 1388 In the UNE Remand Order, the Commission clarified that the definition of call- related databases “includes, but is not limited to, the calling name (CNAM) database, as well as the 911 and E911 databases.” 1389 K. Checklist Item 11 – Number Portability 63. Section 271( c)( 2)( B) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to comply with the number portability regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant to section 251. 1390 Section 251( b)( 2) requires all LECs “to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with requirements prescribed by the Commission.” 1391 The 1996 Act defines number (Continued from previous page) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99- 200, CC Docket Nos. 96- 98; 99- 200 (rel. Dec. 29, 2000); Numbering Resource Optimization, Third Report and Order and Second Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96- 98 and CC Docket No. 99- 200 (rel. Dec. 28, 2001). 1384 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( x). 1385 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20753, para. 267. 1386 Id. at 20755- 56, para. 272. 1387 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741, n. 1126; UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403. 1388 Id. at 15741- 42, para. 484. 1389 UNE Remand Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403. 1390 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xii). 1391 Id. at § 251( b)( 2). 300 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 34 portability as “the ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at the same location, existing telecommunications numbers without impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching from one telecommunications carrier to another.” 1392 In order to prevent the cost of number portability from thwarting local competition, Congress enacted section 251( e)( 2), which requires that “[ t] he cost of establishing telecommunications numbering administration arrangements and number portability shall be borne by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as determined by the Commission.” 1393 Pursuant to these statutory provisions, the Commission requires LECs to offer interim number portability “to the extent technically feasible.” 1394 The Commission also requires LECs to gradually replace interim number portability with permanent number portability. 1395 The Commission has established guidelines for states to follow in mandating a competitively neutral cost- recovery mechanism for interim number portability, 1396 and created a competitively neural cost- recovery mechanism for long- term number portability. 1397 L. Checklist Item 12 – Local Dialing Parity 64. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( xii) requires a BOC to provide “[ n] ondiscriminatory access to such services or information as are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section 251( b)( 3).” 1398 Section 251( b)( 3) imposes upon all LECs “[ t] he duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of 1392 Id. at § 153( 30). 1393 Id. at § 251( e)( 2); see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20757, para. 274; In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability, Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701, 11702- 04 (1998) (Third Number Portability Order); In the Matter of Telephone Number Portability, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Rcd 16459, 16460, 16462- 65, paras. 1, 6- 9 (1999) (Fourth Number Portability Order). 1394 Fourth Number Portability Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 16465, para. 10; Telephone Number Portability, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409- 12, paras. 110- 16 (1996) (First Number Portability Order); see also 47 U. S. C. § 251( b)( 2). 1395 See 47 C. F. R. §§ 52.3( b)-( f); Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; First Number Portability Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 8355, 8399- 8404, paras. 3, 91; Third Number Portability Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 11708- 12, paras. 12- 16. 1396 See 47 C. F. R. § 52.29; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; First Number Portability Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 8417- 24, paras. 127- 40. 1397 See 47 C. F. R. §§ 52.32, 52.33; Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; Third Number Portability Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 11706- 07, para. 8; Fourth Number Portability Order at 16464- 65, para. 9. 1398 Based on the Commission’s view that section 251( b)( 3) does not limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any particular form of dialing parity (i. e., international, interstate, intrastate, or local), the Commission adopted rules in August 1996 to implement broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing parity. Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19407; Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket No. 95- 185, Further Order On Reconsideration, FCC 99- 170 (rel. July 19, 1999). 301 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 35 telephone exchange service and telephone toll service with no unreasonable dialing delays.” 1399 Section 153( 15) of the Act defines “dialing parity” as follows: [A] person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications services provider of the customer’s designation. 1400 65. The rules implementing section 251( b)( 3) provide that customers of competing carriers must be able to dial the same number of digits the BOC’s customers dial to complete a local telephone call. 1401 Moreover, customers of competing carriers must not otherwise suffer inferior quality service, such as unreasonable dialing delays, compared to the BOC’s customers. 1402 M. Checklist Item 13 – Reciprocal Compensation 66. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter into “[ r] eciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section 252( d)( 2).” 1403 In turn, pursuant to section 252( d)( 2)( A), “a state commission shall not consider the terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and reasonable unless (i) such terms and conditions provide for the mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on each carrier’s network facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the other carrier; and (ii) such terms and conditions determine such costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls.” 1404 N. Checklist Item 14 – Resale 67. Section 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make “telecommunications services . . . available for resale in accordance with the requirements of sections 251( c)( 4) and 252( d)( 3).” 1405 Section 251( c)( 4)( A) requires incumbent LECs “to offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service that the carrier provides at retail to 1399 47 U. S. C. § 251( b)( 3). 1400 Id. § 153( 15). 1401 47 C. F. R §§ 51.205, 51.207. 1402 See 47 C. F. R. § 51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be dialed); Local Competition Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 19400, 19403. 1403 47 U. S. C. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiii). 1404 Id. § 252( d)( 2)( A). 1405 Id. § 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiv). 302 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 36 subscribers who are not telecommunications carriers.” 1406 Section 252( d)( 3) requires state commissions to “determine wholesale rates on the basis of retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be avoided by the local exchange carrier.” 1407 Section 251( c)( 4)( B) prohibits “unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or limitations” on service resold under section 251( c)( 4)( A). 1408 Consequently, the Commission concluded in the Local Competition First Report and Order that resale restrictions are presumed to be unreasonable unless the LEC proves to the state commission that the restriction is reasonable and nondiscriminatory. 1409 If an incumbent LEC makes a service available only to a specific category of retail subscribers, however, a state commission may prohibit a carrier that obtains the service pursuant to section 251( c)( 4)( A) from offering the service to a different category of subscribers. 1410 If a state creates such a limitation, it must do so consistent with requirements established by the Federal Communications Commission. 1411 In accordance with sections 271( c)( 2)( B)( ii) and 271( c)( 2)( B)( xiv), a BOC must also demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to operations support systems for the resale of its retail telecommunications services. 1412 The obligations of section 251( c)( 4) apply to the retail telecommunications services offered by a BOC’s advanced services affiliate. 1413 V. COMPLIANCE WITH SEPARATE AFFILIATE REQUIREMENTS – SECTION 272 68. Section 271( d)( 3)( B) requires that the Commission shall not approve a BOC’s application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC demonstrates that the “requested authorization will be carried out in accordance with the requirements of section 272.” 1414 The 1406 Id. § 251( c)( 4)( A). 1407 Id. § 252( d)( 3). 1408 Id. § 251( c)( 4)( B). 1409 Local Competition First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 15966, para. 939; 47 C. F. R. § 51.613( b). The Eighth Circuit acknowledged the Commission’s authority to promulgate such rules, and specifically upheld the sections of the Commission’s rules concerning resale of promotions and discounts in Iowa Utilities Board. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F. 3d at 818- 19, aff’d in part and remanded on other grounds, AT& T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U. S. 366 (1999). See also 47 C. F. R. §§ 51.613- 51.617. 1410 47 U. S. C. § 251( c)( 4)( B). 1411 Id. 1412 See, e. g., Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4046- 48, paras. 178- 81 (Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS ordering functions for resale services and therefore provides efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete). 1413 See Verizon Connecticut Order, 16 FCC Rcd 14147, 14160- 63, paras. 27- 33 (2001); Association of Communications Enterprises v. FCC, 235 F. 3d 662 (D. C. Cir. 2001). 1414 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( B). 303 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 37 Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the Accounting Safeguards Order and the Non- Accounting Safeguards Order. 1415 Together, these safeguards discourage and facilitate the detection of improper cost allocation and cross- subsidization between the BOC and its section 272 affiliate. 1416 In addition, these safeguards ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in favor of their section 272 affiliates. 1417 69. As the Commission stated in the Ameritech Michigan Order, compliance with section 272 is “of crucial importance” because the structural, transactional, and nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272 seek to ensure that BOCs compete on a level playing field. 1418 The Commission’s findings regarding section 272 compliance constitute independent grounds for denying an application. 1419 Past and present behavior of the BOC applicant provides “the best indicator of whether [the applicant] will carry out the requested authorization in compliance with section 272.” 1420 VI. COMPLIANCE WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST – SECTION 271( D)( 3)( C) 70. In addition to determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 1421 Compliance with the competitive checklist is itself a strong indicator that long distance entry is consistent with the public interest. This approach reflects the Commission’s many years of 1415 See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96- 150, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (Accounting Safeguards Order), Second Order On Reconsideration, FCC 00- 9 (rel. Jan. 18, 2000); Implementation of the Non- Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, CC Docket No. 96- 149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (Non- Accounting Safeguards Order), petition for review pending sub nom. SBC Communications v. FCC, No. 97- 1118 (filed D. C. Cir. Mar. 6, 1997) (held in abeyance May 7, 1997), First Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997) (First Order on Reconsideration), Second Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997) (Second Order on Reconsideration), aff’d sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC, 131 F. 3d 1044 (D. C. Cir. 1997), Third Order on Reconsideration, FCC 99- 242 (rel. Oct. 4, 1999) (Third Order on Reconsideration). 1416 Non- Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914; Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 17550; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725. 1417 Non- Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914, paras. 15- 16; Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725, para. 346. 1418 Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725, para. 346; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402. 1419 Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20785- 86, para. 322; Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402. 1420 Bell Atlantic New York Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402. 1421 47 U. S. C. § 271( d)( 3)( C). 304 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 D- 38 experience with the consumer benefits that flow from competition in telecommunications markets. 71. Nonetheless, the public interest analysis is an independent element of the statutory checklist and, under normal canons of statutory construction, requires an independent determination. 1422 Thus, the Commission views the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review the circumstances presented by the application to ensure that no other relevant factors exist that would frustrate the congressional intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive checklist, and that entry will therefore serve the public interest as Congress expected. Among other things, the Commission may review the local and long distance markets to ensure that there are not unusual circumstances that would make entry contrary to the public interest under the particular circumstances of the application at issue. 1423 Another factor that could be relevant to the analysis is whether the Commission has sufficient assurance that markets will remain open after grant of the application. While no one factor is dispositive in this analysis, the overriding goal is to ensure that nothing undermines the conclusion, based on the Commission’s analysis of checklist compliance, that markets are open to competition. 1422 In addition, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that would have stipulated that full implementation of the checklist necessarily satisfies the public interest criterion. See Ameritech Michigan Order, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747 at para. 360- 66; see also 141 Cong. Rec. S7971, S8043 (June. 8, 1995). 1423 See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805- 06, para. 360 (the public interest analysis may include consideration of “whether approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant telecommunications markets”). 305 Federal Communications Commission FCC 02- 147 Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps Re: Joint Application by BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., and BellSouth Long Distance, Inc., for Provision of In- Region, InterLATA Services in Georgia and Louisiana With today’s grant of BellSouth’s application to provide long- distance services, consumers in Georgia and Louisiana now have the opportunity to benefit from the expanded competition envisioned by Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996. At the outset, let me commend BellSouth for the progress it has made to open its local markets to competition, and the Georgia and Louisiana Commissions for their significant efforts to promote competition. That being said, this application does not earn a grade of “A.” In a number of areas, including in particular the operations support systems and the process for updating those systems, BellSouth only minimally passes the statutory checklist. Given that this is a close call, the statutory duty to ensure that BellSouth continues to comply with its obligations under the Act takes on even greater importance. Our expectation is that BellSouth’s performance will continue to improve and that it will work cooperatively with other carriers through their business- to-business relationships to resolve any issues that develop. To the extent that backsliding occurs, the Commission and our state colleagues have a shared responsibility under the Act to ensure that carriers continue to meet their statutory market- opening obligations. As this is the first grant of a BellSouth 271 application, it affords us the opportunity to institute better follow- up on what happens in a state following a successful application. Our data on whether competition is taking hold is sketchy and non- integrated and we therefore lack good information for judging the process and evaluating future applications that are coming our way. We need better data, and we need to ensure that carriers continue to comply with their obligations after the grant of a Section 271 application, as Congress required. I again urge the Commission to collect specific and concrete data and to undertake a detailed analysis to support our conclusions in future proceedings. It is only with good data and continued vigilance that we can ensure that consumers reap the benefits of competition -- greater choice, lower prices, and better services. 306