WilliAM M.' MAC" 'THuON& ·RRY, TEXA~i. CliA!RMAi~ \VAL TER A. JONES. I\ORTH CAROU.'\~A J. RANDY FORBES, V;RGIWA JEF MiLlFR. H ORiDA JOI: WILSON SOUl H CAROLINA FHAt'~~ A. LoBIONOO. NEWJF-RS Y BOB HISHUP. UTAH M!CHAEl R. 11JRNER, OH!O JOHN KliNE. MI'JNESOTA MlKf ROGERS. ALABAMA TR!:~T FR:I.NKS. ARI70NA BILL suusrtn. PENNS'y'LVANIt.. 1(.MIU1Af::lLONAWAY, TtXAS DOl ~G LAMBORN. COLORAOO ROBERT J. W MAN, VIRGINIA DUNCAN HUN'iF.H. CALIFORNIA .IOHN f1 fMINf3, LOIIIS1A~A M,KE COFFMAN CO!..ORADO ';HHlSTOPHER f', :-;IBSON, Nf.\:\' YOH"- V!C, HAWAIl TIMOTIIY.1. WAlZ. MU'4]'\;C50Tl'1 HElu (J'fmUHKE, TEXAS Oo;:AlD NORCROSS. MW JERSEY ReBEN GAllEGO. AR ZC!.JA MARK TAKA!. HAWAII G·WEN (jR~\I1A!',1, FLORIDA ORAD ASHFORD. NFBRI\$KJ\ SETH MOl JlTQ\l. MA!:)SAC •..•US!:TfS PE"l F AGutLAR, CAliFORNIA As we're sure you will agree, it is the paramount obligation of the federal government to provide for the common defense. It is in that vein that we write to share with you our objections to proposals under consideration by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to permit the "E911" emergency response system to use the Russian Federation's GLONASS system. From our positions as Chairman and Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, we have serious concerns about this proposal and the threat it poses to U.S. national security. As you may know, one of us wrote to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on January 21,2015, sharing concerns regarding this proposal and asking a series of questions. We have recently received the classified response of the DNI stating his position on the proposal. Having reviewed that response and the detailed analysis provided by the DNI, we write today to ask that the Commission end its consideration of any proposal that would create reliance on the undependable GLONASS system or dependency on any system in the control of the kleptocracy run by Russia's Vladimir Putin. We urge you to obtain the Director's classified response and ensure that the full Commission is briefed on it and other related classified threat briefings. Further, we request that you immediately direct the FCC (together with the Department of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence) to investigate (including through hardware and software testing) whether there is an alternative technological approach that would achieve similar improvements to emergency response efforts but that would not create the same risks as relying on the Russian Federation or GLONASS. We ask that the Commission also evaluate whether it should promulgate a policy to ensure that future generations of personal Chairman Wheeler September 10, 2015 Page 2 communications devices do not include GLONASS chip sets or other technology from other likely adversaries. You have likely seen press reports on the "hack" by the Russian Federation on the unclassified networks ofthe U.S. military's Joint Staff. We ask that you consider what message would be sent by the FCC agreeing to rely on the Russian GLONASS system after such actions. Surely, you agree that the FCC cannot allow itself to be used to undermine U.S. foreign policy with respect to Putin's Russia, nor should it create new national security vulnerabilities or risks that play into that country's hands. Cooper Ranking Member Strategic Forces Subcommittee Mike Rogers Chairman Strategic Forces Subcommittee CC: Commissioner Mignon Clyburn, Federal Communications Commission Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel, Federal Communications Commission Commissioner Ajit Pai, Federal Communications Commission Commissioner Michael O'Rielly, Federal Communications Commission Assistant Secretary Lawrence E. Strickling, National Telecommunications & Information Administration The Honorable Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense General James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence