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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275
July 20, 2011
The Honorable Eric Holder
Attorney General
United States Department ofJustice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
The Honorable Julius Genachowski
Chairman
Federal Communications Commission
445 12th Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20554
Dear Attorney General Holder and Chairman Genachowski:
I write to you concerning the proposed acquisition by AT&T ofT-Mobile USA, now under
review at the Justice Department and the Federal Communications Commission. The Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights recently held a hearing to
examine the competitive issues surrounding this transaction, and we have now completed our
examination ofthis deal. I have concluded that this acquisition, ifpermitted to proceed, would
likely cause substantial harm to competition and consumers, would be contrary to antitrust law and
not in the public interest, and therefore should be blocked by your agencies.
This acquisition would have enormous consequences for consumers. Cell phones are now
ubiquitous in American life, with over 274 million subscribers, and have become almost a utility
necessary for daily life. Therefore, in this industry, perhaps more than any other, full and vibrant
competition is essential so that all consumers realize the benefits ofthis technology at the best
prices and with the most choices. Much more than for voice calling, consumers now rely on their
cell phones to access the Internet, exchange e-mail, watch TV and movies, and manage their busy
lives. As you know, AT&T and T-Mobile are direct head-to-head competitors) and two ofthe only
four wireless phone providers with national networks in the United States? Ifthis acquisition were
to proceed, it would amount to a four-to-three merger among national cell phone providers in an
already highly concentrated market. Today, the top four competitors - AT&T, Verizon, Sprint and
T-Mobile - control over 90% ofthe cell phone market as measured by revenue. Should this
proposed acquisition proceed, AT&T and Verizon will control nearly 80% ofthis market.
I The CEOs of T-Mobile and AT&T both acknowledged at our hearing that they were direct competitors ofeach other.
Phillip Humm, CEO ofT-Mobile, stated that "we are competing in the same markets." RandaIl Stephenson ofAT&T,
when asked ifthe two companies were "major competitors," stated "yes, sir, we are."
2 Each ofthese four nationwide service providers have mobile networks that cover more than 87.5 % ofthe U.S.
population. FCC "Annual Report and Analysis ofCompetitive Market Conditions With Respect to Mobile Wireless,
Including Commercial Mobile Service" (released June 24, 2011) (hereinafter "2011 Wireless Competition Report") '\I
27.
0900
T-Mobile has been a price leader in the cell phone market, offering prices and rate plans
significantly less expensive than the other three national cell phone providers. According to a
recent price analysis survey ofvoice and data plans conducted by Consumer Reports, "T-Mobile
wireless plans typically cost $15 to $50 per month less than comparable plans from AT&T."J
Removal ofsuch a maverick price competitor from such a highly concentrated market - a
competitor that disciplines price increases from all three other national cell phone competitors, not
only AT&T - raises a substantial likelihood that prices will rise following this merger. Such a
result is unacceptable under antitrust law and as a matter ofcommunications policy.
Under antitrust law, a merger or acquisition from four to three main competitors in an
already significantly concentrated market is highly suspect under Section 7 ofthe Clayton Act, the
statute that forbids mergers and acquisitions which "may tend to substantially lessen competition."
Indeed, just last year in comments to the FCC on the proposed national broadband plan, the Justice
Department stated that "based on its extensive experience in evaluating horizontal mergers, the
Department starts from the presumption that in highly concentrated markets consumers can be
significantly harmed when the number ofstrong competitors declines from four to three...,,4 There
can be no doubt that the wireless phone market - with four national competitors controlling over
90% ofthe market - is a highly concentrated market. 5
An acquisition which would decrease the number ofnational competitors from foliI' to three
in an already highly concentrated market, and one that eliminates the low price competitor from this
market, is in my view highly dangerous to competition and consumers. It will likely tend to
substantially lessen competition, lead to consumers paying high prices with fewer choices, as well
as lessen the innovation that has been the keystone ofthis industry in the last decade. It is my
judgment that this acquisition in such a vital consumer service should be blocked by your agencies
as contrary to antitrust law and not in the public interest under communications law.
AT&T and T-Mobile defend this acquisition on several grounds, all which are without merit
in my view. First, they contend that this acquisition should not be evaluated on a national basis, but
instead on a local market-by-market basis. They contend that there are several other mobile phone
. providers in many local markets beyond the four national carriers, so that this is not a four to three
merger in the majority of local markets.
6
3 Blyskal, Jeff, CR analysis: T-Mobile is cheaper than AT&T, Consumer Reports Online (April 8, 2011) found at
http://news.consumerreports.org/electronics/2011 /04/cr-analysis-t-mobile-is-cheaper-than-att.htmiI
4 Ex Parte Submission ofthe U.S. Department ofJustice," In the Matter ofEconomic Issues in Broadband
Competition: A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, FCC GN Docket No. 09-51 (Jan. 4, 2010), at page 15. The
leading antitrust treatise, summarizing the existing case law and government precedents, notes that significant mergers
in highly concentrated markets "bear a strong presumption ofillegality." It adds that mergers "reducing the number of
'significant' firms from four to three, or five to four, typically fall into this classification." Areeda and Hovl;lnkamp,
Antitrust Law, VoLIV,~925c at p. 131 (3d Ed. 2009).
5 Under the joint Justice DepartmentlFederal Trade Commission merger guidelines, a market is considered "highly
concentrated" when the Hirschman-Hirschfeld Index (HHI, the standard measure ofmarket concentration) is over 2500.
U.S. Department ofJusticelFederal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (issued Aug. 19,
201O)(hereinafter "DOJIFTC Merger Guidelines") at p.131. According to the FCC, the weighted average HHI index for
the cell phone industry was 2848. 2011 Wireless Competition Report~52.
6 However, in prior wireless mergers, AT&T and its predecessor companies strongly argued that the wireless market
was properly considered to be a national market. In its FCC filings, AT&T Wireless argued that its 2004 merger with
Cingular "should be analyzed as national," and AT&T argued that, in its 2008 merger with Centennial that "the
evidence shows that the predominate forces driving competition among wireless carriers operate at the national level."
2
However, I believe the market is properly evaluated on a national basis, and that the local
competitors are not competitively significant players in this national market. Unlike landline
phones, which are fixed in one location, consumers purchase wireless phone service because the
phones are mobile and travel with the consumer. Therefore wireless phone companies must provide
service throughout the United States, not merely in the localities in which they are based.
No other cell phone companies beyond the four national carriers have their own national
networks on which to provide nationwide coverage. Therefore, when a local or regional carrier  
such as Leap/Cricket, Metro PCS, US Cellular, or Cellular South - seeks to provide service to
customers travelling outside that company's local or regional service area, it must "roam" on the
network ofanother carrier, typically one ofthe four national carriers, and pay substantial roaming
fees to these carriers.
In addition, the local and regional cell phone companies have stated that they often have
difficulties in gaining roaming agreements with the national carriers, despite these carriers' legal
obligations to do so. Until recently, there was not even a legal right to roam for non-voice
applications such as internet connections (so-called "data roaming") so vital for the operation of
smartphones. Although the FCC in April enacted new rules requiring the national carriers to offer
limited data roaming at commercially reasonable rates, these rules have been challenged by Verizon
in court as being outside the FCC's authority. Even ifthe FCC's authority is upheld, it is unclear
what will constitute "commercially reasonable" rates.
7
The bottom line is that the smaller local and
regional cell phone companies will be paying their national competitors large sums ofmoney in
order to provide their customers nationwide cell phone service. Placing such a key input in the
hands oftheir national competitors unquestionably will hamstring these smaller carriers in their
efforts to compete with the national cell phone companies.
A similar issue arises with respect the local wireless carriers' need to connect to the
incumbent phone companies' (principally AT&T and Verizon) landline networks in order to
complete phone calls. In order to do so, they must pay large amounts in what is known as "special
access" charges. In fact, one industry expert estimated that AT&T and Verizon collect profits ofat
least $ 10 billion in special access charges annually.
8
It has been estimated that AT&T and Verizon
collectively collect 81 % ofall special access revenues within their service territories.
9
Indeed, at
See Cingular and AT&T Wireless Public Interest Statement in the Cingular/AT&T Wireless Merger (March 2004) at p.
30; AT&T Public Interest Filing, Merger of AT&T, Inc. and Centennial Communications, November 21, 2008 at p. 28.
7 It is also highly questionable under the FCC Order whether data roaming rights will extend to the next generation of
smartphones. "In the Matter ofthe Reexamination ofRoaming Obligations ofCommercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers and Other Providers ofMobile Data Services (FCC April 7, 2011)~47 ("it is also commercially reasonable
for a provider to refuse to enter into a data roaming arrangement for a particular data service where it is not technically
feasible to provide roaming for such service and where any changes to its network that are necessary to accommodate
such data roaming are economically unreasonable").
8 Declaration ofLee 1. Selwin on behalfofThe Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee, "In the Matter of
Application ofAT&T Inc. and Deutsche Telekom AG For Consent to Assign or Transfer Contol ofLicenses and
Authorization," FCC WT Docket No. 11-65 (hereinafter "FCC AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding")~33 (filed May
31,2011).
9 Written Testimony ofPaul Schieber, Vice President ofAccess and Roaming, Sprint Nextel, Hearing ofthe House
Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the Internet On An Examination ofCompetition in the Wireless
Industry, May 7, 2009, atp. 5 (citing 2007 FCC ARMIS Report 43-01, Table 1). Even T-Mobile complained last year
regarding special access charges, stating "in areas where ILECs continue to enjoy a monopoly, backhaul costs remain
unreasonably high." May 6,2010 Letter from Kathleen O'Brien Ham, Vice President, T-Mobile to Marlene H. Dortch,
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our hearing, Dan Hesse ofSprint testified that "30 percent ofthe cost ofputting in a new cell site
goes back to a locallandline carrier in the form ofpayments for special access, and those rates are
very, very high." The fact that the local and regional wireless phone companies effectively
subsidize their national competitors to access their landline networks is another factor that strongly
restrains these local and regional competitors from serving as full-fledged competitors.
Additionally, the local and regional phone companies are further handicapped from
competing fully with the national competitors because they cannot offer consumers many ofthe
most in-demand smartphones, including for example, the iPhone. Cell phones have undergone
substantial technological advancements in recent years. Consumers now rely on their wireless
devices for far more than making phone calls, but use them instead to search the Internet, to
exchange emails, and to run numerous applications. According to the 2011 FCC Wireless
Competition Report, in April 2009, 69% ofAmerican adults had used some type ofnon-voice,
mobile data service. Wireless Competition Report,~164.Further, during the third quarter of2010,
an estimated 41 % ofrecent handset purchases were ofadvanced smartphones, and this number is
growing. Id.~2, p. 20. Offering the most up to date smartphones is crucially important to being a
competitive cell phone carrier, and these smaller carriers cannot get access to many ofthese devices
because only the national carriers have the subscriber base and the leverage to get multi-year
exclusive contracts for these smartphones. The fact that many ofthe most in-demand smartphones
are not available to carriers other than the four national cell companies is, therefore, another reason
that the local and regional companies cannot be considered to be full-fledged competitors.
Another important indication that competition occurs on the national, and not local, level is
the fact that the major carriers all have national pricing plans. T-Mobile forthrightly admitted this
in its answers to my written follow-up questions after the hearing, stating that "T-Mobile's pricing
plans have historically been set on a nationwide basis."Io Likewise AT&T's pricing plans for voice
and data services are set on a national basis. This is strong evidence that competition for cell phone
services is national. Common sense dictates that iflocal competition was relevant, one would see
different pricing plans offered in different localities. The absence ofsuch local price competition
belies the parties' contention that the cell phone market is a local, not national, market. II
In summary, on the issue ofnational vs. local market, I believe this acquisition is properly
analyzed on a national basis as a merger oftwo ofthe four national cell phone companies. The
local competitors that AT&T cites are not full-fledged competitors to the four national carriers, as
they are hamstrung by their need to pay their national competitors large sums in roaming and
special access charges (and their ability to obtain data roaming for new technologies is seriously in
question) and their inability to access many ofthe most in-demand smartphones. Moreover, the
Secretary, FCC (Re: Notice ofEx Parte Communication: Special Access Ratesfor Price Cap Local Exchange Carriers,
WC Docket No. 05-25).
10 Phillipp Humm Answer to Question # 3, "Follow-Up Questions of Sen. Herb Kohl to Hearing on 'The AT&Trr 
Mobile Merger: Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?" "
II AT&T and Verizon contend that they offer local promotions for such items as new phone pricing. T-Mobile asserts
that they have created "locally-focused operations teams in 23 discrete local areas." Phillipp Humm Answer to
Question 3, "Follow-Up Questions ofSen. Herb Kohl to Hearing on 'The AT&Trr-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty
Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?'" Whatever the companies' occasional local promotions with respect to
telephone handsets or their creation of"locally-focused operations teams" in their corporate bureaucracy, the fact
remains that the pricing ofthe fundamental service at issue here - the price ofvoice minutes and internet data
connections - is set on a national, not local, level.
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fact that prices for the basic components ofcell phone service - voice and data connections - are set
on a uniform national basis is strong support for analyzing this acquisition on a national basis.
AT&T and T-Mobile also justify this acquisition by arguing that it will improve the service
offered to current customers ofboth AT&T and T-Mobile. Specifically they claim the deal will (i)
solve the alleged problem ofT-Mobile not having a "clear path" to the newest wireless technology,
so-called 4G LTE, (ii) enable AT&T to serve more customers in rural areas, and (iii) enable AT&T
to better serve customers in urban areas, where it contends AT&T is running out of spectrum. I
find none ofthese arguments convincing to justify such a clearly anti-competitive acquisition.
We must be mindful ofthe fact that in evaluating these asserted merger efficiencies, under
the Justice Department/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, antitrust enforcers "credit only those
efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in
the absence ofeither the proposed merger or another means having comparable anticompetitive
effects... Efficiency claims will not be considered ifthey are vague, speculative, or otherwise
cannot be verified by reasonable means.,,12 In my view, AT&T and T-Mobile have not made the
requisite showing and many oftheir asserted efficiencies are highly speculative at best.
First, the argument that T-Mobile does not have a sufficient plan to serve consumers with
4G LTE services is contrary to T-Mobile's own business plans immediately prior to the
announcement ofthe acquisition. On January 20,2011, at an investor conference, T-Mobile's Chief
Technology Officer Neville Ray stated, "I think there has been a beliefthat there is spectrum
shortage at T-Mobile. That is not the case in the near term or the medium term. Ifyou look at
your volume ofspectrum that T-Mobile has today, our ability to grow in the wireless data space is
much stronger than our competition. So we are in a good spot, and do not have a shortage of
spectrum." It appears that T-Mobile indeed has a well developed plan to serve consumers with 4G
services, and extensive spectrum holdings to do so, without the need to enter into this acquisition. 13
Second, AT&T's claim that it needs this acquisition to serve rural areas with advanced
wireless services is not a sufficient reason to support this merger. While we ofcourse recognize
the vital importance ofwide broadband deployment to underserved rural communities, the record
simply does not support the notion that this acquisition is necessary to achieve this goal.
Specifically, AT&T claims it will be able to serve 97% ofthe nation's population with the next
generation 4G LTE's services within six years after this acquisition
l4
, up from the 80% it now
plans to serve in the future. AT&T's assertion that the deal will help it expand by 17% a new
generation ofcell phone service not yet deployed six yearsfrom now is plainly too speculative and
uncertain to justify this merger under the antitrust laws. Further, it appears that much ofthe
spectrum to be acquired by AT&T does not even serve the rural areas that AT&T claims will
12 DOJIFTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Aug. 19,2010) at p. 30.
13 Moreover, it is clear that T-Mobile is a highly profitable company. The FCC reports that T-Mobile had an EBITDA
(Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization, a common industry measure ofprofits) margin of
29.1% for the fourth quarter of2009. FCC Wireless Competition Report at p. 137. T-Mobile reported an OrnDA
(Operating Income Before Depreciation and Amortization) margin of29% for all of201O. See
http://www.tmobile.com/Cms/Files/Published/OOOOBDF20016F5DDO 10312E2BDE4AE9B/5657114502E70FF3012FD
6A0635D5CAB/file/TMUS%20Q I%2020 11 %20Press%20Release-FinaI.pdf
14 Randall Stephenson Answer to Question 1(d), Questions for the Record of Sen. AI Franken, Hearing on "The
AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty-Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?"
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benefit from the transaction. IS Thus the deployment ofrural wireless cannot be considered a
"merger specific" efficiency under the Merger Guidelines. The FCC national broadband plan
shows that there are many ways to achieve the laudable goal ofwidespread broadband deployment
to rural areas without the market consolidation and risks to competition inherent in AT&T's
acquisition ofT-Mobile.
AT&T's claims regarding the enhancement ofservice in urban areas as a result ofthis
acquisition are likewise unpersuasive. There was considerable testimony at our hearing that service
enhancements could be achieved by investing in new equipment and cell sites and other
technological upgrades. 16 It seems that AT&T could achieve the goal ofimproving service by
spending a portion ofthe $39 billion it plans to spend to acquire T-Mobile, and without seriously
injuring competition in the process.
Another serious concern posed by this proposed acquisition is the future ofthe third national
competitor - Sprint - should this deal take place. There is considerable doubt as to whether Sprint
could survive as an independent competitor should AT&T and Verizon capture a combined 80%
market share after this acquisition. The CEO ofSprint, Dan Hesse, testified at our hearing that this
acquisition would make "the competitive environment... much more difficult for Sprint" and that
Sprint would be "much more ofa takeover target." When asked directly if, after this acquisition,
there was a danger in the market going "from three to two," Hesse replied "[t]hat is correct,
Senator." Hesse pointed out Sprint would be at a significant disadvantage in getting access to
advanced smartphones, as AT&T and Verizon would have ''tremendous scale advantages" over
Sprint with the device manufacturers. Further, he argued, Sprint would be subsidizing its
competition substantially with special access fees paid to AT&T and Verizon.
17
While we recognize that antitrust policy is not designed to protect any specific competitor,
but competition generally, we cannot tum a blind eye to the dangerous possibility that this
acquisition could ultimately result in a duopoly in the national cell phone market. In my view, a
duopoly in this crucial marketplace would be a wholly unacceptable outcome.
Having concluded that this proposed acquisition would seriously harm competition, I find no
feasible or practical merger conditions that could significantly remedy this harm. Further, placing
far reaching conditions on this deal would involve extensive regulatory supervision and interference
with the complex, on-going business operations ofAT&T. A structural solution to the competition
problems posed by the proposed acquisition - that is, simply prohibiting the proposed acquisition -
15 According to the Consumers Union and other public interest groups' FCC filing, T-Mobile's spectrum holdings
"would appear to be largely duplicative ofAT&T's holdings when it comes to geographic coverage." Joint Petitition to
Deny ofCenter for Media Justice, Consumers Union, et. al., FCC AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding at p. 33 (filed
May 31, 2011). And according to Sprint Nextel, "AT&T's spectrum footprint already covers 97 percent ofthe U.s.
population; the addition ofT-Mobile's spectrum would produce very little further coverage." Reply Comments of
Sf,rint Nextel, FCC AT&T/T-Mobile Merger Proceeding at p. 69 (filed June 20, 2011).
I For example, Gigi Sohn ofPublic Knowledge asserted that "Verizon has fewer spectrum holdings compared to
AT&T and has more customers, but it has clearly stated that it does not envision having capacity issues until 2015 at the
earliest. ... AT&T still has significant amounts ofunused spectrum capacity available and has not taken full advantage
oftechnologies that would make more efficient use ofits existing spectrum assets and capacity." Gigi Sohn Answer to
Question 7, "Follow-Up Questions ofSen. Herb Kohl to Hearing on 'The AT&T/T-Mobile Merger: Is Humpty
Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?'"
17 See also, New York Times Dealbook, "T-Mobile Deal Leaves Sprint's Future Unclear," (March 20, 2011)
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/20ll/03/20/t-mobile-deal-Ieaves-sprints-future-unclear/?pagemode=orint
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is far preferable. In general, taking necessary action to preserve competition is a much better course
ofaction than extensive governmental regulation and entanglement with complicated and quickly
changing technology markets.
In sum, the proposed acquisition ofT-Mobile by AT&T would, in my view, create a
substantially lessening ofcompetition, and therefore is contrary to antitrust law and should be
enjoined. It will eliminate the head-to-head competition between AT&T and T-Mobile, reduce an
already concentrated national cell phone market from four to three competitors, and result in two of
these competitors - AT&T and Verizon - controlling about 80% ofthe cell phone market. It will
pose a substantial danger to consumers ofhigher cell phone bills and fewer choices for service at
exactly the wrong time - when consumers are relying more and more every day on wireless phone
services to make and receive voice calls, exchange emails and text messages, search the Internet,
and use many other applications.
Approval ofthis acquisition would also reverse the historic triumph ofcompetition policy of
three decades ago - the breaking up ofthe AT&T phone monopoly into numerous competitors,
unleashing an explosion ofinnovation that led to such technologies as cell phones and the Internet.
To replace the AT&T phone monopoly ofthe last century with a near-duopoly ofAT&T and
Verizon today would be harmful to consumers, contrary to antitrust law and not in the public
interest under communications law, and I therefore urge your agencies to take all necessary actions
to deny approval ofthis merger.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
m~JJ
HERB KOHL
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Consumer Rights
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