Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
Before the
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D.C. 20554
In the Matter of
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services
)
)
)
)
WC Docket No. 12-375
ORDER DENYING STAY PETITIONS AND PETITION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE
Adopted:  November 21, 2013 Released:  November 21, 2013
By the Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Two inmate calling service (ICS) providers, Securus Technologies, Inc. (Securus) and 
Global Tel*Link (GTL) (jointly ICS Providers) have filed Petitions for Stay
1
of the Inmate Calling Report 
and Order and FNPRM.
2
  Securus also filed a Petition to Hold Further Rulemaking Proceeding in 
Abeyance.
3
  We deny the three petitions for the reasons set forth below.
II. BACKGROUND
2. The Commission initiated its inquiry into inmate calling services in 2002 by seeking 
comment on, among other things, cost and revenue data related to the provision of ICS, site commission 
payment demands made by correctional facilities, states’ use of rate ceilings on local calling, and 
alternatives to collect calling (including the use of debit calling).
4
  In 2003, the Wright Petitioners filed a 
rulemaking petition with the Commission to address ICS practices.
5
  The petition requested that the 
Commission prohibit exclusive ICS contracts and collect-call-only restrictions in correctional facilities.
6
  
In 2007, the same petitioners filed an alternative rulemaking petition, requesting that the Commission 
                                                     
1
See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Securus Technologies, Inc. Petition for Stay of Report and Order 
Pending Appeal (FCC 13-113), WC Docket No. 12-375 (filed Oct. 22, 2013) (Securus Petition); see also Rates for 
Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Petition of Global Tel*Link for Stay Pending Judicial Review, WC Docket No. 
12-375 (filed Oct. 30, 2013) (GTL Petition).
2
See Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
WC Docket No. 12-375, FCC 13-113 (rel. Sept. 26, 2013) (Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM or 
Order).  The Order was published in the Federal Register on Nov. 13, 2013.  See 78 FR 67956 (Nov. 13, 2013) 
(final rules summary); see also 78 FR 68005 (Nov. 13, 2013) (proposed rules summary).
3
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Securus Technologies, Inc. Petition to Hold Further Rulemaking 
Proceeding in Abeyance, WC Docket No. 12-375 (filed Oct. 22, 2013) (Abeyance Petition).
4
See Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Remand and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-128, 
17 FCC Rcd 3248 at 3276-79, paras. 73-79 (2002) (Inmate Calling Services Order on Remand and NPRM).
5
See generally Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petition of Martha Wright et al. for Rulemaking or, in the Alternative, Petition to 
Address Referral Issues in Pending Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-128 at 3 (filed Nov. 3, 2003) (First Wright 
Petition).
6
Id.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
2
reform high ICS rates by requiring a debit-calling option in correctional facilities, prohibiting per-call 
charges, and establishing rate caps for interstate, interexchange ICS.
7
  The Commission sought and 
received comment on both petitions.
8
  In 2008, certain ICS providers placed in the record a cost study that 
quantified their interstate ICS costs.
9
  In December 2012, the Commission adopted a notice of proposed 
rulemaking seeking comment on the two Wright petitions.
10
  Specifically, the Commission sought 
comment on the Alternative Wright Petition’s proposed rate caps, and on possible variations on the rate 
caps, seeking comment throughout the 2012 ICS NPRM on ways of regulating ICS rates based on the 
costs of providing ICS.
11
  The 2012 ICS NPRM also sought comment on issues affecting the ICS market, 
including the 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission; collect, debit, and prepaid ICS calling options; site 
commission payments; and the Commission’s statutory authority to regulate ICS.
12
  On June 26, 2013, the 
Wireline Competition Bureau (Bureau) released a Public Notice seeking additional comment on ancillary 
charges, that is, charges ancillary to those directly related to the recovery of the cost to provision 
telephone service, such as the costs of initiating or closing a debit or prepaid ICS account.
13
The 
Commission adopted the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM on August 9, 2013.
14
  As 
described further below, the Order adopted several interim reforms regarding the rates for interstate ICS 
calls, which reportedly constitute no more than 15 percent of all ICS traffic handled by the ICS 
Providers.
15
  
III. DISCUSSION
3. Section 201 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Act) requires that all 
carriers’ interstate rates be just and reasonable.
16
  To be just and reasonable, rates must be related to the 
                                                     
7
See Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petitioners’ Alternative Rulemaking Proposal, CC Docket No. 96-128 (filed Mar. 
1, 2007) (Alternative Wright Petition).
8
See Petition For Rulemaking Filed Regarding Issues Related to Inmate Calling Services Pleading Cycle 
Established, CC Docket No. 96-128, Public Notice, DA 03-4027, 2003 WL 23095474 (Wireline Comp. Bur. 2003);
Comment Sought on Alternative Rulemaking Proposal Regarding Issues Related to Inmate Calling Services, CC 
Docket No. 96-128, Public Notice, 22 FCC Rcd 4229 (Wireline Comp. Bur. 2007) (2007 Public Notice).  
9
See generally Don J. Wood, Inmate Calling Services Interstate Call Cost Study (WOOD &WOOD 2008),  CC 
Docket No. 96-128 (filed Aug. 15, 2008); Letter from Stephanie A. Joyce, Counsel to Securus Technologies, Inc., to 
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 96-128 (filed Aug. 22, 2008) (Joyce Aug. 22, 2008 Ex Parte
Letter) (attaching supplemental cost and usage data); record submission by “several providers of inmate telephone 
service,” CC Docket No. 96-128 (filed Oct. 15, 2008) (amending supplemental cost and usage data) (collectively 
2008 ICS Provider Data Submission).  
10
See generally Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 27 FCC Rcd 16629 (2012) (2012 ICS NPRM).  The 2012 ICS NPRM incorporated relevant comments, 
reply comments and ex parte filings from the prior ICS docket, CC Docket No. 96-128, into WC Docket No. 12-
375.  See 2012 ICS NPRM, 27 FCC Rcd at 16636, para. 15.
11
See 2012 ICS NPRM, 27 FCC Rcd at 16637-38, paras. 18-21; 16639, paras. 25-26; 16642-43, para. 37; 16642, 
para. 35.  
12
See generally 2012 ICS NPRM.  
13
See More Data Sought on Extra Fees Levied on Inmate Calling Services, WC Docket No. 12-375, Public Notice, 
28 FCC Rcd 9080, 9080-81 (Wireline Comp. Bur. rel. June 26, 2013).
14
See generally Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM.  In the accompanying FNPRM, the Commission 
sought comment on the possible regulation of intrastate ICS rates, as well as certain other matters.  Data and 
information gathered through the FNPRM will be used to establish final ICS rules.
15
See infra para. 35.
16
See 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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cost of providing service.
17
  Section 276 additionally requires that payphone rates be fair.
18
  Yet for many 
years, interstate ICS rates have been unreasonably high, unfair, and far in excess of the cost of providing 
service.
19
  Excessive rates have been driven largely by substantial commission payments ICS providers 
have agreed to make to prison authorities.
20
  The Commission relies in the first instance on competition 
when it can do so to ensure just and reasonable rates.  In the Inmate Calling Report and Order and 
FNPRM the Commission found that “competition for ICS contracts may actually tend to increase the rate 
levels in ICS contract bids where site commission size is a factor in evaluating bids.”
21
As such, the
Commission found that the market forces in the interstate ICS market actually fail to constrain ICS 
rates.
22
  In fact, because the benefits of any “competition” in the ICS market ran to the facility rather than 
the inmate or their family (i.e., the party who actually paid for the service), rates in many cases were 
being driven higher.
23
  In the absence of competition ensuring just and reasonable rates, the Commission 
has used benchmarks to establish the appropriate rates for services.
24
  Here, however, the Commission did 
not have adequate information to establish an interstate ICS benchmark rate.  The Commission thus 
utilized the data in the record – that is, cost data from ICS providers – to adopt interim rules that required
interstate ICS rates be cost-based and established, as described below, an interim two-tiered framework to 
bring rates closer in line with costs with defined waiver processes.  
4. In light of the Commission’s finding of market failure, the Order required that interstate 
ICS rates be cost-based.
25
Based on this guiding principle,
26
the Order established “safe harbor” rate 
                                                     
17
Although in principle the Commission can specify a different approach to ensuring just and reasonable rates that 
departs from cost-based ratemaking, it never has done so in the context of ICS.  Inmate Calling Report and Order 
and FNPRM at para. 45.
18
See 47 U.S.C. § 276(b).  
19
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM Section III.B.3.
20
“[U]nder most contracts the commission is the single largest component affecting the rates for inmate calling 
service.” Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 41 (citing Inmate Calling Services Order on 
Remand and NPRM, 17 FCC Rcd at 3252-53, para. 10).
21
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 41.
22
See id.
23
“While the process of awarding contracts to provide ICS may include competitive bidding, such competition in 
many instances benefits correctional facilities, not necessarily ICS consumers – inmates and their family and friends 
who pay the ICS rates, who are not parties to the agreements, and whose interest in just and reasonable rates is not 
necessarily represented in bidding or negotiation.”  Id. at para. 40 (internal citations omitted).
24
47 C.F.R. § 61.26(c) (“The benchmark rate for a CLEC’s switched exchange access services will be the rate 
charged for similar services by the competing ILEC.  If an ILEC to which a CLEC benchmarks its rates, pursuant to 
this section, lowers the rate to which a CLEC benchmarks, the CLEC must revise its rates to the lower level within 
15 days of the effective date of the lowered ILEC rate.”).
25
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 50-52; see also id. at App. A (§64.6010). Such a 
requirement is a commonplace aspect of the regulation of interstate communications services and enables the 
Commission to fulfill its core statutory responsibility that rates be just and reasonable.  The requirement does not 
alter the fundamental nature of the rate cap regime instituted by the Order.  It is primarily an enforcement 
mechanism which provides an objective and time-tested standard by which to assess the reasonableness of rates in 
response to a complaint or an investigation.  The impact of this requirement on ICS providers is consequently 
narrow.  Providers need not cost-justify their rates prior to setting them.  They are not required to cost-justify to the 
Commission rates at or below the safe harbors, unless and until a challenger successfully bears the burden of 
proving those rates are unreasonable.  See infra n.31.  And they are not required to cost-justify in the first instance 
rates subject to an informal complaint unless Commission initiates an investigation.  Providers must cost-justify 
their rates to the Commission only if those rates are above the safe harbors and are subject to a formal complaint or 
a Commission investigation.
(continued….)
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
4
levels.  Rates set at or below the safe harbors will be presumed lawful,
27
“unless and until the Commission 
makes a finding to the contrary.”
28
  The safe harbor rate levels are based on substantial data in the record 
and were set conservatively – i.e., at levels that are likely over-compensatory – to ensure cost recovery for 
services provided at the vast majority of correctional facilities.
29
The safe harbor rate levels do not 
mandate specific rates or even rate structures, but instead, allow providers flexibility in setting rates 
within the limits established by the safe harbor rate levels.
30
  The safe harbor creates protections for 
providers because any party wishing to challenge a rate that complies with the safe harbor will bear the 
burden of production and persuasion to overcome the presumption of lawfulness, and unless a challenger 
overcomes that presumption, the ICS provider need not demonstrate its costs.
31
Further, rates charged 
within the safe harbor levels will not be subject to refunds should a complainant establish that the 
challenged rates are not just and reasonable.
32
  Nor in the course of a Commission investigation will
providers whose rates are within the safe harbors be subject to forfeiture or refund if their rates are found 
to be unjust and unreasonable.  Such providers would be required to charge lower, cost-based, and 
compensatory rates on a prospective basis only.  
5. Recognizing that ICS providers operate in some facilities where the costs of service are 
exceptionally high, the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM established interim hard rate caps, 
substantially higher than the safe harbor rates, which allow ICS providers flexibility in setting their rates
to reflect their individual costs.  The hard caps represent the outside range of what the Commission found, 
based on data in the record, a high cost ICS provider may be able to cost justify.
33
  The hard caps give ICS 
providers even more flexibility in setting their interstate ICS rates, helping to ensure that the majority of 
ICS providers will be able to recover their costs without a significant administrative burden prior to 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
It is not clear, moreover, how the Commission would enforce its ICS rate caps short of requiring such a cost 
showing.  Such cost showings are standard practice in formal complaints filed at the Commission under sections 201 
and 208 and pursuant to the Commission’s complaint procedures.  47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 208; 47 C.F.R. § 1.720(ff).  
Providers’ interstate ICS rates were subject to such complaint filings even prior to the adoption of ICS-specific rate 
regulation.  Such complaint proceedings would unavoidably involve cost showings similar to those that ICS 
providers would make under the ICS rules. The Order’s requirement that rates be cost-based can therefore hardly be 
said to represent a “novel” requirement on ICS providers.  See Securus Petition at 5.  
26
As the Order noted, “the Commission typically focuses on the costs of providing the underlying service when 
ensuring that rates for service are just and reasonable under section 201(b).”  Inmate Calling Report and Order and 
FNPRM at para. 50.  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 61.49(d) (cost showing required for rates that exceed price cap indices); 
47 C.F.R. § 52.33 (allowing price cap carriers to recover local number portability costs through a cost showing).
27
See generally Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM Section III.C.3.a.; id. at para. 49 (rates at or below 
safe harbor rates will be presumed to be “just, reasonable, fair and cost-based”).  
28
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 60; see also id. App. A, §64.6020(c).
29
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 61.
30
For example, the Order allows ICS providers to employ a rate structure that includes both per call and per minute 
charges as long as the resulting rates calculated for a 15 minute call remain under the safe harbor rates.  See Inmate 
Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 88.  
31
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 60; id. at para. 120.  While the Order made the process
clear from the outset, the type of burden-shifting is not substantially different than would occur in an enforcement 
proceeding absent these rules. Moreover, the rules give ICS providers that avail themselves of the safe harbor the 
additional protections that parties challenging such rates have to overcome a rebuttable presumption that such rates 
are just, reasonable and fair. See id.; see also supra para. 45.
32
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 60; id. at para. 120.
33
See generally id. at Section III.C.3.b.  To address the theoretical possibility of outliers, the Commission also made 
clear that providers could seek waiver of the hard caps if they could show that their costs necessitated rates above 
that level.  Id. at paras. 82-84.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
5
setting their rates.  In the event of a formal complaint or rate investigation, however, ICS providers that 
elect to set rates above the interim safe harbor rate levels and at or below the interim rate caps will bear 
the burden of production and persuasion and could be subject to refunds.
34
  
6. Finally, the Commission recognized that there may be rare occasions where a particular 
ICS provider was serving only extremely high cost facilities and believed that its cost-based rates would 
be higher than even the hard caps.  The Order provided the flexibility to deal with such situations by 
creating a waiver process whereby such an ICS provider could establish its costs and receive a waiver 
necessary to charge rates above the hard cap.
35
7. To qualify for the extraordinary remedy of a stay, a petitioner must show that: (1) it is 
likely to prevail on the merits; (2) it will suffer irreparable harm absent the grant of preliminary relief; 
(3) other interested parties will not be harmed if the stay is granted; and (4) the public interest would 
favor grant of the stay.
36
  For the reasons described below, the ICS Providers have failed to meet the test 
for extraordinary equitable relief.
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
8. Adequacy of Notice.  Securus and GTL both claim that the Commission unlawfully failed 
to provide notice that it was contemplating a requirement that interstate ICS rates be cost-based.
37
  
Securus states that the Order “adopts a novel ‘cost-based’ ratemaking methodology that was neither 
raised in the NPRM nor discussed in the record . . . .”
38
  GTL characterizes the requirement as “rate-of-
return regulation” and claims that no notice was provided for such an approach.
39
    
9. The Commission provided adequate notice
40
that it contemplated a cost-based rate cap 
structure.
41
  As noted in the Order, the 2012 ICS NPRM sought comment on various aspects of rate caps 
such as “how any caps should be set,” “how they should operate,” “the benefits to per-minute rate caps,” 
                                                     
34
See id. at para. 89; id. at para. 121. This requirement makes clear what the burdens and potential remedies will be, 
a determination normally made in the course of an enforcement action.  Importantly, the burden in such an 
enforcement proceeding is no higher than it would have been absent the Commission’s actions at issue here.
35
See id. at paras. 82-84. 
36
See Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Holiday 
Tours); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Federal Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (VA 
Petroleum Jobbers).
37
Securus and GTL differ in their arguments for stay on which portions of the Order lacked adequate notice.  
Securus’ claim is limited to the requirement that rates be cost-based.  Securus Petition at 5.  “There simply was no 
indication there that the Commission was considering the potential of requiring ICS providers to prove that their 
rates were cost-based . . . .”  GTL’s claim challenges the same requirement but also challenges the safe harbor rule 
that “derives from” or “follows from” it.  GTL Petition at 5, 6.  Apart from these passing references, however, GTL 
neither explains nor supports this assertion elsewhere in its petition.  As explained below, the safe harbor rates are an 
integral part of the Order’s two-tier rate cap system.  We therefore find that GTL is not likely to succeed on its claim 
there was inadequate notice for the Order’s safe harbor rates.  
38
Securus Petition at 5.  
39
GTL Petition at 7.  GTL’s assertion that the requirement that ICS rates be cost-based effectively transforms the 
Order’s rate cap regulation into traditional rate of return regulation misses the fact that the Commission’s price cap 
rules require that a carrier’s initial price caps are set based on such carrier’s costs and, once set, continue to require 
cost showings in certain circumstances.  See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 61.49(e) (requiring an explanation of cost allocations 
and assignments for proposed rates that exceed price cap indices.). 
40
The Commission provided a description of the subjects and issues involved as required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
41
See generally 2012 ICS NPRM, 27 FCC Rcd at 16636-47, paras. 16-48. 
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
6
and “perceived problems or challenges associated with” such caps.
42
  Moreover, the 2012 ICS NPRM
discusses costs throughout.  For example, the Commission asked commenters to provide “specific, 
detailed cost information and other relevant data” to support their proposals.
43
  Not surprisingly, 
numerous commenters provided data on service costs and suggested rate caps.  The public thus had notice 
and an opportunity to comment on cost-based rate caps.  Although the 2012 ICS NPRM did not expressly 
discuss the specific two-tiered cap system of the type ultimately adopted, that system is at the least a 
logical outgrowth of the 2012 ICS NPRM.  As the Commission stated, its rules are “the kind of variant on 
rate caps that was contemplated in the NPRM.”
44
  The Commission explained further that the 2012 ICS 
NPRM “made clear that we were contemplating such a rule; at a minimum, it plainly left open the 
possibility that we would implement rate caps in a manner that addressed concerns about the variability in 
ICS costs.”
45
The Commission thus “‘adequately frame[d] the subjects for discussion.’”
46
    
10. Contrary to GTL’s characterization, the adopted regulatory framework does not 
constitute traditional rate of return regulation.
47
  Traditional rate of return regulation involves rates 
established in a complex tariff filing process.  At the Commission, the process is governed by Part 61 of 
the Commission’s rules which require the use of the Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts in Part 
32, the allocation of costs between regulated and non-regulated categories pursuant to Part 64 of the 
Commission’s rules, the separation of costs between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions under the Part 
36 rules, and the apportionment of interstate costs to the appropriate services using the Part 69 rules.
48
Nothing of the sort is required by the Order.  Rather, the Order adopted rate caps based on costs, and is 
actually closer to the price cap regime for LECs that replaced rate of return.  Other than in an enforcement 
proceeding, a carrier need not demonstrate its costs or justify its rates.  GTL therefore is wrong that the 
Order requires ex ante review of ICS rates.  Neither does the requirement that ICS providers annually file 
rate information, so that the Commission may monitor compliance with our rules and determine the 
appropriate future regulatory course, meaningfully resemble typically voluminous cost-supported tariff 
filings.
49
  
11. GTL asserts that such requirements are not “definitional elements of rate of return [but] 
regulatory methods.”
50
The Commission has a long history as of rate of return regulation, which 
unavoidably entails the aforementioned complex of rules and procedures traditionally used to regulate the 
rates of incumbent local exchange carriers and interexchange carriers.  These rules and procedures are 
integral to rate of return regulation and cannot be separated from it.  GTL’s reasoning, by contrast, would 
require that every Commission attempt to foster cost-based rates be analyzed under an ill-defined sliding 
scale to determine when it is or is not rate of return regulation.  Indeed, GTL does not describe how to 
reliably distinguish between a “definitional element” and a “regulatory method.”  That the rate caps 
                                                     
42
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 59 n.222.
43
2012 ICS NPRM, 27 FCC Rcd at 16637, para. 20; see also id. at 16645-6, para. 44 (asking whether proposed rate 
caps were supported by cost data); id. at 16633, para. 7 (questioning “whether ICS rates accurately reflect the costs 
of providing ICS”); id. at 16639, para. 25 (asking whether a rate proposal was supported by “sufficient cost,
demand, and revenue detail to allow the Commission to determine whether the proposed rates are just and 
reasonable”).  
44
Id.  
45
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.222.
46
Id. (citing Omnipoint v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Mine Safety and 
Health Admin., 512 F.3d 696, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).   
47
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.195.  
48
These requirements occupy more than 150 pages of the Commission’s rules.  
49
See infra paras. 12-13.
50
GTL Petition at 10.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
7
adopted by the Order include a cost-based requirement simply reflects that all ratemaking methods 
attempt to adopt rates that approach cost.  In the context of the ICS market, which the Order determined 
is subject to market failures, we cannot rely on market mechanisms to achieve that goal.
51
12. To be sure, should an ICS provider face a formal complaint proceeding or a Commission 
investigation, it may at that point be required to demonstrate that its rates are cost-based.  That 
requirement does not turn the rate cap regime into rate-of-return regulation, however, because it is an 
aspect of the Commission’s longstanding complaint process.
52
  Given the basic requirement of section 
201of the Act that all interstate rates be just and reasonable, any provider may, upon complaint, be 
required to show that its rates are based on its costs.
53
  Moreover, as a practical matter, we expect that the 
cost-based requirement adopted in the Order will impose little burden on ICS providers to which they are 
not already subject through the Commission’s existing complaint and investigation procedures.
54
  GTL’s 
position boils down to the erroneous claim that any form of cost-based rate regulation that does not fully 
insulate providers’ rates from a cost-based challenge automatically amounts to rate of return regulation.
13. The enforcement mechanisms adopted in the Order streamline the enforcement process.  
The Act requires just, reasonable, and fair interstate ICS rates, and the Commission determined in the 
Order that this requirement would be fulfilled by requiring that rates be cost based, subject to a 
presumption that rates within the safe harbor would be presumed to be cost based unless and until the 
Commission made a contrary finding.
55
  In reality, that presumption, along with the pleading requirements 
of the formal complaint process, would make it difficult for a challenger to mount a successful case 
against a safe harbor rate.  The Commission also determined that in a formal complaint challenging ICS 
rates above the interim safe harbor, the burden of production and persuasion would fall on the ICS 
provider.  In any complaint proceeding challenging whether interstate ICS rates are just, reasonable, and 
fair under sections 201 and 276 of the Act, however, evidence of the costs of providing interstate ICS 
would be relevant to resolving the complaint.  Where, as here, the Commission has made a finding that 
competition does not work to ensure just and reasonable rates, such evidence becomes essential and can 
only come from the ICS provider, with or without the explicit burden shift adopted in the Order. The 
enforcement mechanisms adopted in the Order merely recognize the need for cost information and the 
fact that such information must be provided by the party in possession of the data.  Adopting such 
enforcement processes does not convert a rate evaluation in a complaint proceeding into rate-of-return 
regulation.  Any associated burdens will not rise to the level the ICS Providers fear.
14. The ICS Providers also assert that the Order’s requirement that rates be cost-based 
eliminated the incentives to improve efficiency that are inherent in rate cap regulation.
56
  The ICS 
Providers, however, fail to note that the Order’s interim safe harbor rates provide precisely this kind of 
incentive.  Rates set at or below the safe harbors benefit from a presumption of lawfulness.
57
  Thus, a 
provider that sets its rates at the safe harbor level but whose costs are lower will keep all profits earned 
even if the Commission eventually were to issue an order finding those rates to be unjust and 
                                                     
51
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM Section III.B.4.
52
Because the Commission did not adopt rate of return regulation, GTL cannot succeed on its claim that the 
Commission had an obligation to justify its adoption of rate-of-return regulation after having abandoned that 
regulatory methodology for interexchange carriers in the late 1980s.  See GTL Petition at 14-19; see also Securus 
Petition at 6-10.  The Commission had no obligation to explain a “return” to a system of regulation it did not adopt.  
53
We note that rates compliant with existing Commission rules adopted to ensure rates are just and reasonable may 
be subject to specific standards for evaluation.  See generally 47 C.F.R. § 61.49.  See also supra n.17.
54
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 50-52.
55
See id. 
56
See Securus Petition at 8; GTL Petition at 14-17.  
57
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 60.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
8
unreasonable.  In this sense, the safe harbor truly is safe: i.e., profits earned prior to a Commission order 
finding a provider’s rates to be unjust can be retained without risk of refund or forfeiture, provided the 
rate is below the safe harbor.  By contrast, a provider whose rates fall outside the safe harbor runs the risk 
that any profit above a reasonable return will have to be remitted in the form of refunds plus possible 
forfeitures.  In this way, the safe harbor rates and hard rate caps adopted in the Order combine cost-based 
regulation with a strong incentive to increase operating efficiencies.  
15. GTL also claims the Commission provided inadequate notice for its requirement that 
charges for ancillary services be cost-based.
58
  As the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM
pointed out, however, the 2012 ICS NPRM sought comment on “outstanding questions with prepaid 
calling such as:  how to handle monthly fees; how to load an inmate’s account; and minimum required 
account balance” – that is, ancillary charges.
59
  The Order also notes that “many commenters properly 
understood that ancillary charges were part of the cost-based reform being considered.”
60
  These 
commenters submitted multiple examples of excessive fees and proposals for regulating them.
61
  The 
Order also makes clear that regulating ancillary fees “was a necessary aspect of our cost-based reforms, 
as otherwise providers could simply increase their ancillary charges to offset lower rates subject to our 
caps.”
62
  The adopted system is at the least a logical outgrowth of the 2012 ICS NPRM.
63
  For the reasons 
described above, we find that the ICS Providers fail to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits 
of their inadequacy of notice claim.  
16. Vagueness.  Securus asserts that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the 
Order is “fatally vague in describing the rate regulation it imposes.”
64
  But there is nothing vague about 
the approach that the Commission adopted.  A provider can set its rates either at or below the safe harbor 
level.  Alternatively, if it believes its reasonable and direct costs of providing service exceed that level, 
the provider may set its rates up to the hard cap.  And the Commission described in the Order the 
particular types of costs that would be considered:  “the cost of capital (reasonable return on investment); 
expenses for originating, switching, transporting, and terminating ICS calls; and costs associated with 
security features relating to the provision of ICS.”
65
  The Commission has previously imposed rate cap 
regulation with a similar degree of specificity.
66
  
                                                     
58
“Nor did the Commission’s proposals indicate that it was considering regulation of ancillary charges . . . .”  GTL 
Petition at 8.
59
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 90.  Although the 2012 ICS NPRM did not expressly 
refer to such charges as “ancillary charges,” it is clear that the term as used in the Order encompasses such charges.
60
Id. at n.338.
61
Id. 
62
Id.; see also Transcript of Reforming ICS Rates Workshop at 136, WC Docket 12-375 (filed July 16, 2013) 
(Transcript of Reforming ICS Rates Workshop) (Cheryl Leanza, President, A Learned Hand, LLC (“I think the FCC 
absolutely has to look at all the other corresponding fees because those will definitely go up if the rate – if only the 
rate is addressed.”)).
63
See, e.g., CSX Trans. v. Surface Trans. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  See also, e.g., Petitioners 2013 
Comments at 3, 24-27; Pay Tel 2013 Reply at 2-3 & n.6; Telmate 2013 Reply at 3.
64
Securus Petition at 6-10.
65
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 53 & n.196. 
66
In a previous effort to impose a price cap regime less complex than the IXC or ILEC price cap regimes, the 
Commission imposed a price cap regime on providers of IP Relay service based generally on the price cap plan 
implemented for incumbent LECs but without specifying much of the detail required by that plan.  See
Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech
Disabilities, CG Docket No. 03-123, Report and Order and Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd 20140, 20158-60, 
paras. 39-46 (2007).
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
9
17. It is of no consequence that the Commission did not adopt a specific return on investment 
such as the prescribed 11.25 percent rate of return used in traditional rate-of-return regulation of smaller 
local exchange carriers.
67
  Securus claims that the Order leaves providers “without sufficient guidance” as 
to what a “reasonable profit” means,
68
but the Commission has a long history of determining reasonable 
costs of capital, including in the payphone context,
69
and the Order clearly identifies a “reasonable return 
on investment” as a compensable cost that is “reasonably and directly related to the provision of ICS.”
70
  
The Commission also states that the rate caps it adopts will ensure “fair compensation (including a 
reasonable profit).”
71
  The Order made clear that the absence of a prescribed rate of return (and other 
more technical elements of rate of return regulation) are examples of the flexibility inherent in the 
Order’s rate cap approach.
72
  The rate cap approach adopted here is by nature less burdensome and more 
flexible for providers to comply with and for the Commission to administer.  Securus mistakes flexibility 
for vagueness.  We therefore find Securus fails to demonstrate it is likely to succeed on the merits of its 
claim of vagueness.
73
  
18. In a related vein, GTL contends that it faces severe penalties for failure to comply with 
the rate caps and the Commission failed to provide sufficient guidance to enable ICS providers to comply 
with the caps.
74
  To the contrary, we find that the Order provided ample guidance to enable ICS providers 
to set cost-based rates in compliance with the interim rate caps established by the Order and created no 
undue risk of enforcement fines or penalties for entities that act in good faith.  
19. As discussed above, the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM provided general 
guidance in assessing the costs that are recoverable through interstate ICS rates, that is, “only costs that 
are reasonably and directly related to the provision of ICS.”
75
  The Order then provided numerous 
specific examples of costs that would likely be compensable and non-compensable, giving providers 
granular guidance that includes no less than twenty specific examples of cost categories that the 
                                                     
67
See Securus Petition at 7.  
68
Id.
69
See Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Docket No. 96-128, Third Report and Order, and Order on Reconsideration of 
the Second Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 2545 at 2620-23, paras. 165-169 (1999).  
70
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 53.
71
Id. at para. 61.
72
Id. at n.195.
73
In its arguments on vagueness, Securus includes assertions that its costs “must be reviewed on a contract-by-
contract basis” and not on a holding company basis as the Order directs.  Securus Petition at 10 & n.26.  It claims 
that a review at the holding company level is arbitrary and capricious “because it ignores the reality of this market . . 
. that rates are derived on a contract-by-contract basis.”  Id. at n.26. The Order, however, finds that analyzing costs 
at the holding company level more accurately captures the operational realities of the ICS market.  Inmate Calling 
Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 83.  ICS providers typically make use of centralized calling platforms which 
realize very significant efficiencies and scale economies but which also may indicate that many of the costs of 
providing ICS are joint and common costs that would be difficult to allocate with accuracy on a facility-by-facility 
basis.  See id. at para. 29.  Moreover, the Order notes that the Commission previously determined that analyzing ICS 
costs on a holding company basis was appropriate.  Inmate Calling Services Order on Remand and NPRM, 17 FCC 
Rcd at 3257-58, para. 23 (“Unless an ICS provider can show that . . . the overall profitability of its payphone 
operations is deficient because the provider fails to recover its total costs from its aggregate revenues . . . then we 
would see no reason to conclude that the provider has not been ‘fairly compensated.’”) (emphasis in original); see 
also infra para. 28.  
74
See GTL Petition at 17-19.
75
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 53.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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Commission would likely find compensable and eight examples of costs that it would not.
76
  To have 
included additional detail or to have mandated uniform compliance with those details would have risked 
creating a formalized system of cost accounts inappropriately detailed and rigid for the interim rate cap 
regime adopted by the Order.  A central goal of the Commission was to provide a significant degree of 
flexibility to allow providers to utilize their existing accounting systems and conventions and not to 
impose a single set of mandated cost categories to which providers would have to expend time and 
resources conforming their internal accounting systems and data.   
20. GTL is not likely to face “severe penalties” should it rates be found – after formal 
complaint or investigation proceedings – to be above its reasonable costs.
77
  While the Order referred to 
the Commission’s authority to assess fines, it did so with regard to “existing rules” that already applied to 
interstate ICS providers, such as disclosure requirements.
78
  The Order did not indicate that carriers would 
face penalties for good faith efforts to set cost-based rates that are subsequently found to exceed 
permissible limits.  Indeed, in almost all cases of new rule regimes, the Commission typically works with 
providers to help guide them through the implementation of the rules
79
and would be unlikely to assess 
penalties on ICS providers that make good faith efforts to comply with these rules during this process.
80
  
Moreover, if a provider’s rates fall within the safe harbor, no matter what its costs are, those rates will be 
treated retrospectively as just and reasonable and cannot give rise to forfeiture or other penalty.  Even if 
the Commission were to investigate those rates and find them to be above the provider’s compensable 
costs, the sole result of the investigation would be the prospective prescription of a lower cost-based rate.  
There would be no penalty associated with those rates prior to the effective date of the new rate 
prescription.  In this way, the safe harbor creates a true zone of safeness that is free from the risk of any 
penalty, much less the “severe penalties” cited by GTL.  
21. GTL is also wrong that the Commission gave inadequate guidance on apportioning costs 
between interstate and intrastate calls.
81
  ICS providers routinely distinguish between interstate and 
intrastate costs and traffic in the normal course of business, for example, to accurately price and monitor 
the different services they offer.  This was evident in the record as the 2008 ICS Provider Data 
Submission and the Securus cost study were both based, in whole or in part, on jurisdictionally separated 
                                                     
76
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 53, nn.196, 198.
77
GTL Petition at 17.  
78
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 118.  Moreover, GTL does not cite a single instance of an 
ICS provider being fined for violating the rules referenced in this section of the Order.  
79
See, e.g., Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd 5370, para. 1 
(1993) (“clarify[ing] certain issues on which guidance is needed before the LECs file their initial transport rates”); 
Amendment of Part 69 of the Commission's Rules to Ensure Application of Access Charges to All Interstate Toll 
Traffic, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Request For Supplemental Comments, 102 FCC 2d 1243, 1257-58, 
para. 28 (1985) (providing “sufficient guidance to permit the exchange carriers or NECA to develop the necessary 
tariff provisions, if they do not already exist, and to permit the proper billing and collection of access charges”); 
Material To Be Filed In Support Of 2013 Annual Access Tariff Filings, Order, 28 FCC Rcd 5224, 5228, paras. 11-12
(Wir. Comp. Bur. 2013) (providing guidance on the transition from intrastate switched access rates and rate 
structures to interstate switched access rates and rate structures in light of questions that had been raised); Letter 
from Sharon E. Gillett, Chief, Wireline Competition Bureau, to Regina McNeil, Vice President and General 
Counsel, NECA, 27 FCC Rcd 5801 (2012) (describing Bureau staff discussions with NECA regarding the 
implementation of intercarrier compensation reform, and providing certain formal guidance in that regard).
80
Due process would preclude the Commission from imposing a penalty insofar as the regulation at issue “‘fails to 
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.’”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) 
(internal citations omitted).
81
See GTL Petition at 18. 
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
11
cost data.
82
  Providers clearly were not hampered by a lack of guidance from the Commission in preparing 
these studies and the Commission did not question the allocations made in either case.  The Commission 
in fact relied on one of these studies to set its interim rate caps.
83
  The Order allowed providers to 
determine their own jurisdictional separations of costs to ensure providers have flexibility in 
implementing this requirement.
84
  Moreover, the relatively burdensome nature of a formal separations
process specified by the Commission makes it less well-suited to the interim rate cap regime instituted by 
the Order.  GTL has not alleged that it does not or cannot separate its costs, the Commission is not 
requiring that ICS providers develop a new separations methodology for this purpose, and there is no 
indication that the Commission would find providers’ current separations methodology to be 
unreasonable.  
22. We therefore conclude that the ICS Providers are not likely to prevail on their claims that 
the Order unlawfully failed to provide sufficient guidance in describing and implementing the rate 
regulation it imposed.
23. Contract Impairment.  Securus also claims that the Commission unlawfully interfered 
with its contracts with prison authorities.
85
  It first invokes the Sierra-Mobile doctrine,
86
under which an 
agency may modify or abrogate a valid contract “only if it harms the public interest.”
87
  This doctrine 
does not apply for at least two reasons.  First, as the Commission explained, the new rules “do not … 
explicitly abrogate any agreements between ICS providers and correctional facilities,”
88
nor do they 
modify any provisions within those contracts. Instead, the rules prohibit unjust, unreasonable, and unfair 
rates paid by ICS end users: i.e., prisoners and their friends and family.  End users are not parties to any 
existing ICS contracts, which are between ICS providers and correctional facilities.
89
  Moreover, to the 
extent that contracts between ICS providers and correctional facilities have change of law provisions, a 
change in the law is by definition not an abrogation or modification of the contract.  Because the 
Commission has not abrogated or modified any contract, Sierra-Mobile does not apply here.  
                                                     
82
See 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission; see Siwek Report.  
83
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 78-80.
84
Id. at para. 53, n.195.  
85
Securus Petition at 10-12.
86
Id. at 11-12.
87
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 548 (2008) 
(Morgan Stanley).  See also Western Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1495, 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Under the 
Sierra-Mobile doctrine, the Commission has the power to prescribe a change in contract rates when it finds them to 
be unlawful, . . . and to modify other provisions of private contracts when necessary to serve the public interest[.]”) 
(citing FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 353–55 (1956); United Gas Co. v. Mobile Gas Corp., 350 
U.S. 332, 344 (1956)); id. at 1501, n.2 (explaining that “[a]though the legal standard for changing contract rates 
(they must be ‘unlawful’) differs from the standard for changing other contract provisions (they must disserve ‘the 
public interest’), in fact the two standards are not very different.”); Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 546 (holding that 
the public interest standard under Sierra-Mobile is not at odds with the just-and-reasonable rate standard, but rather 
defines “what it means for a rate to satisfy the just-and-reasonable standard in the contract context”).
88
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 101. As explained more fully below, not only does the 
Order not modify, abrogate, or require the renegotiation of any contract, nor does it prohibit contractual provisions 
obligating providers to pay site commissions to correctional facilities, but to the extent there are any indirect effects 
on particular contracts, change of law provisions and/or routine amendment processes should be sufficient to address 
those effects without impairing the contracts.  See infra para. 40.
89
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 100 (observing that existing ICS agreements were not 
between sellers and purchasers of ICS, but rather between sellers (i.e., ICS providers) and correctional facilities, 
with the purchasers of ICS not being parties to those agreements).
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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24. Second (and relatedly), “Sierra was grounded in the commonsense notion that ‘[i]n 
wholesale markets, the party charging the rate and the party charged [are] often sophisticated businesses 
enjoying presumptively equal bargaining power, who could be expected to negotiate a ‘just and 
reasonable’ rate as between the two of them.”
90
  Here, however, the parties charged – prisoners and their 
friends and family – are not even parties to the agreements and thus have no bargaining power 
whatsoever.  Consequently, the Sierra-Mobile doctrine does not apply here. 
25. But, as the Commission concluded in the Order, even if Sierra-Mobile were relevant, the 
Order is consistent with that doctrine.
91
  Indeed, insofar as “[t]he doctrine directs the Commission to 
reject a contract rate that ‘seriously harms the consuming public,’”
92
the reforms adopted in the Order
were both appropriate and necessary to fulfill that directive.  In adopting those reforms, the Commission 
relied on ample record evidence that existing ICS rates were inflicting serious harms on the consuming 
public.  For instance, the Commission found that the high ICS rates currently in place “discourage 
communication between inmates and their families and larger support networks, which negatively impact 
the millions of children with an incarcerated parent, contribute to the high rate of recidivism in our 
nation’s correctional facilities, and increase the costs of our justice system,” and that “[f]amilial contact is 
made all the more difficult because ‘mothers are incarcerated an average of 160 miles from their last 
home, so in-person visits are difficult for family members on the outside to manage.’”
93
  Given the 
extensive record of serious harm to the consuming public, the Commission found that the reforms 
adopted in the Order were necessary “to ensure that rates and charges for interstate ICS are just, 
reasonable, and fair under the Act and consistent with the public interest,” and that 
[t]o the extent that a contract between a facility and an ICS provider contains a rate 
that not meet those legal standards, it would be in the public interest to mandate that
the contracts be modified so that they reflect rates that comply with the relevant legal 
requirements. . . . even if we were understood to be directly modifying existing contracts.
94
The Order also emphasized repeatedly that unjust, unreasonable, and unfair ICS rates were inflicting 
substantial and clear harm on the general public (and not merely on private interests),
95
and that to the 
extent interstate ICS rates exceeded providers’ costs directly and reasonably related to the provision of
ICS, those rates were unlawful under sections 201(b) and 276 of the Act.
96
Therefore, even if Sierra-
Mobile were relevant (which it is not), the Commission satisfied its requirements by making appropriate 
                                                     
90
Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 546 (quoting Verizon v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 (2002)) (emphasis added).
91
See Western Union, 815 F.2d at 1501; see also Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.365 (noting 
that “[e]ven if our actions today were somehow construed as modifying particular contractual provisions or 
abrogating particular contracts, we still would be acting within our lawful authority”).
92
NRG Power Marketing, LLC v. Maine Public Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 175 (2010) (quoting Morgan Stanley, 
554 U.S. at 545-546).  
93
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 42 (citations omitted).  See also id. at paras. 1-3.
94
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.365.  See also id. at paras. 42-46 (describing the societal 
impacts of high ICS rates, and the need to adopt reforms that will ensure that interstate ICS rates are just, reasonable, 
and fair). 
95
See, e.g., Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 1 (ICS reforms will “provide relief to the 
millions of Americans who have borne the financial burden of unjust and unreasonable interstate inmate phone 
rates”); id. at para. 2 (“This Order will promote the general welfare of our nation by making it easier for inmates to 
stay connected to their families and friends while taking full account of the security needs of correctional 
facilities.”); id. at para. 8 (“The Communications Act (Act) requires that interstate rates be just and reasonable for all 
Americans . . . . The Act further requires that our payphone regulations ‘benefit . . . the general public,’ not just 
some segment of it.  Our actions in this Order, while long overdue, fulfill these statutory mandates . . . .”) (emphases 
in original).
96
See, e.g., Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 12, 45-53, 59, n.222. 
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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findings in the Order.
26. The Record Supports the Adopted Rates.  Securus is incorrect when it claims that the 
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM ignored record evidence of smaller, higher-cost facilities’ 
costs in setting its rate caps, resulting in below cost rates.
97
  In fact, the Commission expressly addressed 
such evidence and used it as the basis for the interim rate caps which establish the outside level of rates 
ICS providers may be able to cost justify.  The interim rate cap for prepaid and debit ICS calls was set 
based on the detailed cost data submitted by Pay Tel, which serves exclusively jails, “which providers 
claim are more costly to serve than prisons.”
98
  The rate cap for collect ICS calls was based on the 2008 
ICS Provider Data Submission which consisted of cost data from 25 correctional institutions (including 
some served by Securus), the majority of which were higher-cost jails.
99
  With regard to the interim rate 
caps, the Commission stated that it adopted the “highest cost data available in the record, which we 
anticipate will ensure fair compensation for providers serving jails and prisons alike.”
100
  In fact, the cost 
data used to establish both interim rate caps were data for the very kind of higher cost jails that Securus 
asserts the Commission ignored.
101
  Notably, the Commission relied on these high cost showings even 
though they contained types of costs that the Commission identified as costs that are not reasonably and 
directly related to the provision of ICS because the intended purpose of the interim rate cap is to mark the 
outer boundary of such costs to ensure reasonable compensation for all providers.  The safe harbor rate 
cap levels, by contrast, were based on data from state prisons, which more closely approximated actual 
costs.  That is why rates within the safe harbor are given a presumption of reasonableness.
102
  Even the 
safe harbor rate levels were set conservatively to ensure that they accorded a reasonable recovery to the 
majority of ICS providers, including many serving higher-cost populations.
103
  
27. While Securus faults the Order for ignoring record evidence that the cost of serving some 
of its facilities is higher than the interim rate caps,
104
Securus’ own cost study underscores the fact that 
averaged pricing is commonplace among ICS providers, as it is among communications providers 
generally.
105
  The Siwek Report shows that the rates Securus charges for the highest cost institutions fail 
to recover its self-identified costs of serving those institutions.  It indicates that the average cost for “Low 
10” group of institutions it serves is $1.71 per minute
106
but that on average Securus charges only $1.10 
per minute for calls from these same institutions.
107
  Securus does not contend that it is not profitable as a 
                                                     
97
See Securus Petition at 14-16.
98
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 76-77; see also Letter from Marcus W. Trathen, Counsel 
for Pay Tel Communications, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 (filed July 23, 2013).  
99
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 78-80.  See also 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission.  
100
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 81; see also id. at para. 62 (“We set our interim safe 
harbor at conservative levels to account for the fact that there may be cost variances among correctional facilities.”).
101
See id. at paras. 76, 78.
102
See id. at paras. 61-65.  
103
See id. at para. 65 (citing several benchmarks confirming the conservative nature of the Order’s safe harbor 
rates); see also id. at para. 63, n.235 (citing the inclusion of two states’ rate data that are significantly higher than 
rate data from the other states in the sample, the effect of which was to increase the average rate for prepaid and 
debit calling from $0.054 per minute to $0.12 per minute).   
104
Specifically, the average per minute rates for Securus’ Medium 10 and Low 10 groups are higher than the 
Order’s rate caps.  See Siwek Report at 3, Tbl. 2.  
105
See, e.g., HRDC 2013 Comments, Rev. Exh. B.
106
Siwek Report at 3, Tbl. 2.  These are costs for all local, intrastate and interstate calling.  Costs for Securus’ 
interstate calls would likely be higher than this average cost.  
107
Id. at 8, Tbl. 10.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
14
whole or that because its current rates do not cover the cost of serving its Low 10 facilities, it will be 
obliged to cease serving these locations.  
28. Securus further asserts it is likely to succeed in its claim that the “Commission’s failure 
to address Securus’s evidence . . . is a failure of ‘reasoned decisionmaking.’”
108
  This claim is factually 
inaccurate.  As discussed above, the Commission used the 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission, which 
was based in part on Securus’ own cost data, to set the Order’s interim collect call rate cap.
109
  The 
Commission also used the 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission and the average cost data reported by 
Securus’ own cost study for all call types, net of commissions to benchmark the reasonableness of Pay 
Tel’s debit calling cost data, and found the Pay Tel data yielded a higher interim rate cap for providers.
110
  
Securus contends that its cost study “demonstrated that smaller facilities are orders of magnitude more 
expensive to serve than larger facilities” and that the Order “dismisses these differences in cost 
structure.”
111
  Securus’ cost study does show that the smaller institutions it serves may be more costly to 
serve.
112
  Yet, as the Order noted, when a provider’s costs are reviewed in the context of a complaint, it 
will be “on the basis either of the whole of its ICS business or by groupings that reflect reasonably related 
cost characteristics, and not on the basis of a single facility it serves.”
113
  An ICS provider will therefore 
be able to choose how its cost support is reviewed.  On that basis, Securus’ average per minute cost 
(without commissions) for all the institutions included in its study was significantly below even the 
lowest interim safe harbor rate level set by the Order.
114
  Ultimately, Securus’ own data suggest that, far 
from being harmed by the rates set by the Order, Securus likely will be overcompensated by such rates on 
a company-wide basis.
115
  We find therefore that Securus is unlikely to succeed in its claim that the 
Commission failed to engage in “reasoned decisionmaking.”
29. The Order Does Not Violate the Takings Clause.  Securus also contends that the 
Commission failed to consider record evidence that site commissions are imposed by contract or state 
law, which failure “caused the Commission to set rate caps that are confiscatory in violation of the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
116
  The Commission, however, considered and rejected ICS 
providers’ record assertions that it “must defer to states on any decision about site commission 
payments.”
117
  Rather, the Commission stated “[w]e do not conclude that ICS providers and correctional 
facilities cannot have arrangements that include site commissions.  We conclude only that, under the Act, 
such commission payments are not costs that can be recovered through interstate ICS rates.”
118
  The 
                                                     
108
Securus Petition at 15 (emphasis added).
109
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 78.  The Commission found that the resulting cap 
exceeded the average costs for collect calls reflected in Securus’ more recent cost data submission. Id. 
110
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 77.
111
Securus Petition at 15.
112
The Commission accepted Securus’ cost study for purposes of its analysis in the Inmate Calling Report and 
Order and FNPRM.  This did not prejudge how the Commission would review Securus’ cost study in a cost 
proceeding.  
113
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 123.  See also id. at para. 83 (waiver petitions to be 
judged on a holding company basis).  Providers whose costs for the whole of their ICS business exceed the Order’s
rate caps may seek a waiver.  See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 82-84.
114
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 26.  
115
We also remind the ICS Providers that the reforms adopted in the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM 
are limited to interstate ICS only.  
116
Securus Petition at 15-16.  
117
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 56, n.211.
118
Id. at para. 56.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
15
Order also noted that the Commission previously held that site commission payments are an 
apportionment of profit, not a cost of providing ICS.
119
  Additionally, the financial impact of our reforms 
on ICS providers is limited due to the fact that they affect only interstate ICS rates, which comprise only 
about 15 percent of all ICS traffic.
120
  Finally, the Order also addressed and rejected the claim that the rate 
regulations it adopted effectuated unconstitutional takings.
121
  Securus’ petition provides no additional 
substantiation for this claim.  We therefore find that Securus is not likely to succeed on this claim.  
30. The Order Does Not Mandate Cross-Subsidization.  Securus finally asserts it is likely to 
succeed on its claim that the Commission failed to take into consideration the differences in cost to serve 
smaller facilities, effectively mandating cross-subsidization between different correctional institutions.
122
  
Securus states that the “Commission ignored the record evidence”
123
and cites a “lack of reasoned 
analysis.”
124
  As previously discussed, however, the Commission took into account differences in the cost 
of serving smaller facilities.
125
  Securus may disagree with the Commission’s analysis but it cannot 
contend the Commission did not undertake it.    
31. Securus asserts that the adoption of a single set of rates for all correctional facilities 
“requires nationwide cross-subsidization of ICS services.”
126
  Securus claims that the Order “never even 
acknowledges that [cross subsidization] is the necessary outcome of its new rules.”
127
  To the contrary, 
the Order squarely addressed this issue.
128
  It is a given that when a regulatory pricing structure is 
established, providers subject to those rates will serve higher and lower cost customers or locations and 
will effectively be required to average its costs among those customers.
129
  The Order cited both wireline 
and CMRS providers as examples.
130
  Both types of providers use regional and nationwide prices to serve 
end users with a wide range of cost and traffic characteristics.
131
  Likewise, no regulatory rate structure is 
precise enough to account for the differences between all providers let alone all the locations served by 
                                                     
119
Id. at para. 54 n.199.
120
See infra nn. 145-50.  Rules that affect such a small portion of traffic cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a 
taking.  See, e.g., Full Value Advisors, LLC v. SEC, 633 F.3d 1101 at 1109 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (government action 
must “amount to a deprivation of all or most economic use” of property in order to constitute an unconstitutional 
regulatory taking).  
121
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 103-07.  
122
Securus Petition at 16-18.
123
Id. at 17.
124
Securus Petition at 18.
125
See supra paras. 26-28.  
126
Id. at 17.
127
Id.
128
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.280.
129
See Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 168 F.3d 1344, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The use of industry-wide 
averages in setting rates is not novel. Indeed, the Supreme Court has affirmed ratemaking methodologies employing 
composite industry data or other averaging methods on more than one occasion. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 
U.S. 380, 387, 94 S.Ct. 2315, 41 L.Ed.2d 141 (1974) (noting that agency ratemaking does not “require that the cost 
of each company be ascertained and its rates fixed with respect to its own costs”); In re Permian Basin Area Rate 
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769, 88 S.Ct. 1344, 20 L.Ed.2d 312 (1968).”).
130
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.280.  
131
Id. (“[B]oth wireline and CMRS providers routinely offer regional or nationwide service at a single rate, in spite 
of the fact that offering service in this manner necessarily involves averaging of higher and lower per-customer 
costs.”).
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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each provider.
132
  Additionally, the extent to which the averaging of costs among different facilities may 
actually be taking place is dependent on how joint and common costs are allocated among facilities.
133
  
This commonplace practice of averaging among locations of differing cost characteristics is 
distinguishable from what is traditionally described as cross subsidization and which the statute and the 
Commission’s rules prohibit.
134
  
32. The Order also noted that ICS providers commonly engage in this same kind of 
averaging of costs under single rates.
135
  Securus participated in the 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission 
which produced average cost figures for both prepaid and collect ICS calling notwithstanding the fact that 
participating ICS providers would not recover their costs if the study’s average cost figures were adopted 
as rates in the majority of locations included in the study.
136
  Also, as previously discussed, Securus’ cost 
study shows that the per minute rates Securus charges for its “Low 10” group of facilities are significantly 
below the per-minute costs Securus identified for those facilities.
137
  As also previously discussed, the 
Order provided a mechanism for ICS providers to charge higher rates for higher cost facilities if it elects 
to establish (and justify in an enforcement proceeding if necessary) cost based rates for all of its 
facilities.
138
  The Order provided that an ICS provider cost study supporting its rates in an investigation or 
formal complaint may be made “on the basis either of the whole of its ICS business or by groupings that 
reflect reasonably related cost characteristics, and not on the basis of a single facility it serves.”
139
  
33. Securus asserts that the cost averaging implicitly required by the rate caps “contravene[ ] 
the mandate of section 276, which expressly requires fair compensation for ‘each and every’ call.”
140
  In 
the context of ICS, however, the Commission has previously interpreted this statutory requirement to 
apply on a whole company basis, not on the basis of an individual call or service location.
141
  Given the 
foregoing, we find Securus is not likely to succeed in its claim that the Commission’s adoption of a single 
set of interim rate caps ignored evidence of higher costs among smaller correctional institutions, thereby 
mandating cross subsidization between correctional facilities.  
                                                     
132
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.230 (“it would not be possible, much less practical, to set this 
kind of exquisitely granular rate”).
133
Given the highly centralized nature of ICS networks, a substantial portion of ICS costs are joint and common.  
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.301.  Providers will have flexibility to allocate joint and 
common costs in a way that will help them charge rates at or below the caps and in compliance with the cost-based 
requirement.  
134
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(k).  
135
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.280 (“ICS providers typically use uniform rates when they 
serve multiple correctional facilities with differing cost and demand characteristics under a single contract.  See, e.g.,
State of California, California Technology Agency, IWTS/MASS Agreement Number OTP 11-126805 (listing 
approximately 80 correctional facilities served through a common rate structure) (available at 
http://prisonphonejustice.org/Prison-Phone-Kickbacks.aspx?state=California) (last visited Sept. 17, 2013).”).  
136
See 2008 ICS Provider Data Submission.  The August 22, 2008 and October 15, 2008 subsequent ex parte filings 
by the study’s participants contain additional data that enable the calculation that 17 out of 25 locations included in 
the study had costs higher than the study’s average cost for both debit and collect calling.  See Joyce Aug. 22, 2008 
Ex Parte Letter.
137
See supra para. 27.
138
See supra para. 6.
139
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 123.
140
Securus Petition at 17.  
141
See Inmate Calling Services Order on Remand and NPRM, 17 FCC Rcd at 3257-58, para. 23.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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B. ICS Providers will not Suffer Irreparable Injury
34. The ICS Providers have failed to prove that they will suffer irreparable injury absent a 
grant of their stay petitions.  We reject their claims for the reasons described below.
35. The Adopted Reform Applies to a Small Portion of the Petitioners’ ICS Business. 
Securus argues that it will suffer significant lost revenues under the new ICS rate regime.
142
  The new 
rules may reduce Securus’ revenue compared to pre-reform levels.  But, to the extent that is true, it is 
because its current revenues are the product of unlawfully high rates.
143
  Securus has no right to charge 
unjust and unreasonable rates that violate sections 201 and 276 of the Communications Act, and a 
requirement that it bring its rates to levels consistent with statutory requirements creates no cognizable 
irreparable injury.
144
  Additionally, the Commission has created procedures such as third party complaints
to determine, if necessary, whether Securus’ interstate ICS rates are just and reasonable (should Securus 
believe that its lawful rates are between the safe harbor and the cap).  And, as discussed above, if Securus 
sets rates that it believes in good faith are lawful and the Commission ultimately disagrees, Securus is 
unlikely to owe any more than a refund, which is not a penalty of any kind.  There is thus no cognizable 
injury here, much less the kind of severe and imminent injury necessary to support the extraordinary relief 
of a stay. Moreover, the interim rate regime applies only to interstate calls, which constitute about 15 
percent of Securus’ traffic
145
(and about 10 percent of GTL’s).
146
Thus, any loss of revenue will be minor 
in the context of Securus’s entire business.  That does not constitute irreparable injury of the sort that 
justifies a stay.
147
  
36. As a factual matter, moreover, there is insufficient evidence that Securus will lose money 
on its operations, even if it chooses the safe harbor rates.  Its 2012 cost data filing shows that costs for 99 
percent of the ICS minutes included in the filing come from high volume/low-cost facilities and are 
significantly below the safe harbor levels.
148
Although Securus also serves smaller, higher-cost jails,
149
                                                     
142
See generally Securus Petition at Section II.
143
See e.g., HRDC 2013 Comments, Rev. Exh. B. 
144
A provider’s recoverable costs include a reasonable return (or profit) and therefore any lost revenues would 
consist of revenues above a reasonable profit on the costs reasonably and directly associated with the provision of 
ICS.  See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 61.  The ICS Providers have not made the case that 
the loss of such revenues can justify a finding of irreparable harm.  See, e.g., Wisc. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (to 
demonstrate irreparable harm “the injury must be both certain and great” and “it is . . . well settled that economic 
loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm”); Davis v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 571 F.3d 
1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“in the absence of special circumstances, . . . recoverable economic losses are not 
considered irreparable”) (ellipsis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
145
Securus provided data for a representative sample of 38 of the correctional facilities it serves.  Table 2 in this data 
filing provides all ICS minutes from those 38 facilities.  Table 9 of the data filing provides the total interstate 
minutes for those 38 correctional facilities.  Dividing total interstate minutes by all ICS minutes reveals that only 
approximately 15 percent of Securus’ annual ICS minutes are interstate.  See Siwek Report at 3, 8, Tbls. 2 and 9.  
146
See Letter from Michael K. Kellogg, Counsel for Global Tel*Link to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC 
Docket No. 12-375 at 2 (filed Nov. 7, 2013) (estimating that interstate ICS accounts for 10 percent of ICS provider 
GTL’s ICS traffic) (GTL Nov. 7, 2013 Ex Parte Letter); see also Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at 
n.444. 
147
See, e.g., Wisc. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (to demonstrate irreparable harm “the injury must be both certain and 
great”); Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d at 843 n.2 (referring to a “severe” injury as “destruction of a business” and holding 
that “‘mere’ economic injuries” are not sufficient for a stay).  Nor have petitioners demonstrated that they lack a 
way to recover lost revenue if the Order were to be reversed by a court, as they allege, see Securus Petition at 28; 
GTL Petition at 19, for example through subsequently negotiated agreements with correctional facilities.
148
When site commission payments are removed (as ordered by the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM) 
from Securus’ sample per-minute rates provided in its 2012 cost data filing, its average per-minute rate level is 
$0.044.  See Siwek Report at 3, Tbl. 2.  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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those facilities account for a smaller proportion of its overall business.
150
It also appears that small, high-
cost jails have an especially low volume of interstate calls because the offenders held there are primarily 
local to the jail.  Data in the record show that jails have weekly population turnover rates averaging more 
than 60 percent.
151
  We thus expect that the vast majority of calls made from jails are intrastate and 
therefore not impacted by reforms adopted in the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM.
152
37. GTL also claims it will suffer significantly reduced revenues from the Commission’s 
action,
153
but it fails to substantiate that claim, and in any event it fails for all the same reasons discussed 
above as to Securus.
154
While GTL has asserted it stands to lose millions of dollars, the assertion is 
irrelevant to the extent that those revenues reflect unlawful rates. Moreover, GTL has declined to provide 
requested data throughout this proceeding.
155
  GTL may not now complain that the Commission used the 
data that were available to it.
156
  We also note that the rate reform adopted in the Order is interim in 
(Continued from previous page)                                                            
149
See Siwek Report at 3.
150
Securus’ data show that for all of 2012, its highest cost, lowest volume facilities had between 885 and 1,668 ICS 
minutes.  Securus says this minute volume represents between 113 and 284 calls from the facilities they detailed for 
an entire year.  See Siwek Report at 2-3.
151
Letter from Marcus W. Trathen, Counsel to Pay Tel, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-
375 at 1 (filed July 3, 2013) (“The national turnover average for jails is 62.2% per week – meaning that over one-
half of the inmate population changes in the course of a single week.”).  See also Transcript of Reforming ICS Rates 
Workshop at 262 (Timothy Woods, National Sheriffs’ Association, noting the turnover differences between jail 
populations and prison populations).
152
See, e.g., Pay Tel 2007 Comments at 6 (Pay Tel, an ICS provider that serves primarily jail facilities, stated that in 
2007 81 percent of its calls in jail facilities were local calls).  See also Pay Tel 2013 Comments at 7 (in 2012 Pay Tel 
asserts that 84 percent of its revenue calls were intrastate).
153
See GTL Petition at 19.  
154
See supra para. 36.
155
GTL 2013 Comments at 26 (“Because GTL has more than 1,900 correctional facilities customers, each with 
unique procurement requirements and individualized contractual terms, it would be extraordinarily difficult and 
time-consuming to extract the summary information the Commission has requested for each of those correctional 
facility customers.”).  
156
See, e.g., American Public Communications Council v. FCC, 215 F.3d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Industrial 
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 n. 18 (D.C.Cir.1974)) (“[W]e cannot require an agency to 
enter precise predictive judgments on all questions as to which neither its staff nor interested commenters have been 
able to supply certainty. ‘Where existing methodology or research in a new area of regulation is deficient, the 
agency necessarily enjoys broad discretion to attempt to formulate a solution to the best of its ability on the basis of 
available information.’”); Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“Throughout the 
rulemaking process, moreover, petitioners withheld the very cost data that would have enabled the Commission to 
establish precise, cost-based rates. In its published notice proposing the TCP methodology [at issue in the case], the 
Commission repeatedly invited commenters to suggest alternative methods for calculating settlement rates. . . . At 
one point, agreeing with petitioners’ view that ‘the appropriate cost standard for establishing benchmark settlement 
rates is the incremental cost of terminating international traffic,’ . . . the Commission explicitly stated: ‘We 
encourage foreign and U.S. carriers to submit data on their costs.’ . . . Yet in its final rule, the Commission reported 
that ‘no commenter has provided cost data in the record about the costs of providing international termination 
services.’ . . . Since petitioners refused to let the Commission see their cost data, and since the Commission 
thoroughly explained why ‘the TCP methodology provides a reasonable basis for establishing settlement rate 
benchmarks in the absence of carrier-specific cost data,’ . . . we have no firm basis for accepting petitioners’ claim 
that the benchmark rates are not fully compensatory.”) (citations omitted).  Cf. Wright Petitioners Opposition to 
GTL Petition at 4 (“[I]t is inconceivable that the ICS providers are incapable of immediately preparing reports that 
‘record and document its costs of providing service.’”).  
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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nature
157
and that GTL is free to charge up to the hard cap (subject to refunds if the Commission 
ultimately disagrees that such a rate reflects costs) and even take advantage of the waiver process to 
establish that it should be allowed to charge rates above the interim rate caps, should its costs justify that 
outcome.
158
  Again, therefore, there is no evidence of severe, imminent, and irreparable injury.
38. The Adopted Rate Reform Allows for Full Cost Recovery.  We also reject Securus’ 
argument that it “will be forced to provide below-cost service”
159
under the requirements adopted in the 
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM. According to Securus’ own cost data, the interim safe 
harbor rate levels and rate caps adopted in the Order should allow for full recovery of Securus’ costs,
including a reasonable return.  As the Commission discussed, the 2012 cost data Securus filed in this 
proceeding show that Securus’ per-minute ICS costs, exclusive of the costs of disallowed site 
commissions but inclusive of costs and minutes of use (MOU) from their highest cost facilities, were 
$0.04/minute, which is well below the interim safe harbor rate levels and rate caps adopted by the 
Commission.
160
  Specifically, Securus’ cost study establishes that its costs of providing ICS are less than 
40 percent of the interim safe harbor rate levels and less than 30 percent of the interim rate caps.  There is 
thus little likelihood that Securus, which can charge up to the hard cap without prior Commission 
permission (and subject, assuming good faith, only to refunds) will be forced to offer below-cost service, 
and, in any event, as discussed above, can even seek a waiver to go above the hard cap.
39. Securus complains that the rates adopted in the Inmate Calling Report and Order and 
FNPRM preclude it “from recovering the costs of mandatory site commission payments.”
161
  Here, too, 
however, this prohibition applies only to the 15 percent of Securus traffic that is jurisdictionally interstate.  
In addition, the Order builds upon prior Commission precedent when it states “that site commission 
payments are not part of the cost of providing ICS and therefore not compensable in interstate ICS 
rates.”
162
  And in the Order, the Commission made clear that actual costs reasonably and directly related 
to the provision of ICS, such as security costs, incurred by the correctional facilities and reimbursed by 
ICS providers could be recoverable.
163
  As fully explained by the Commission, “our regulations are 
designed to allow providers to recover their costs of providing ICS, including a reasonable return on 
investment.”
164
40. Minimal Effect on Contracts.  We reject the ICS Providers’ unsubstantiated arguments
165
that the changes adopted in the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM will require the 
comprehensive renegotiation of almost every ICS contract they have with correctional facilities.
166
  In the
Order the Commission neither required the renegotiation of contracts, directed parties to modify contract 
                                                     
157
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 47-49.
158
See id. at paras. 82-84.
159
Securus Petition at 21.
160
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 26.  See also supra n.148.
161
See Securus Petition at 18-19.
162
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 54 (citing the Inmate Calling Services Order on Remand 
and NPRM, 17 FCC Rcd at 3254-55, para. 15).  
163
For example, the Commission will include the “costs associated with security features in the compensable costs 
recoverable in ICS rates.”  Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 58.
164
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 103.
165
See, e.g., Wright Petitioners Opposition to GTL Petition at 4.
166
See Securus Petition at 19-21; GTL Petition at 20-21. According to the record, the average contract term is three 
to five years and ICS providers therefore renegotiate contracts in the regular course of business.  See Inmate Calling 
Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 98.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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terms, nor prohibited site commission payments by ICS providers under existing contract terms.
167
  The 
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM made clear that site commission payments do not 
constitute a cost of providing ICS and thus cannot be used to justify unreasonable rates charged to 
inmates and their friends and families.
168
  In addition, the rates at issue are charged to end users that are 
not parties to the ICS contracts.
169
  While Securus notes that such rates are “generally included as express 
terms of service contracts,”
170
it does not demonstrate that those contracts compel it to charge only those 
rates and nothing lower.  The record further indicates that many ICS contracts include change of law 
provisions
171
and the ICS Providers do not claim otherwise in their petitions.
172
  In fact, the record 
contains examples of Securus’ ICS contracts that contemplate Commission action lowering ICS rates and 
describe, within the contract, how that rate change will be accomplished.
173
  The record also indicates that 
ICS contracts are amended on a regular basis
174
and it is reasonable to believe that changing, or even 
renegotiating, the applicable rates does not rise to the level of injury necessary to justify a stay.
175
As 
such, we reject the ICS Providers’ claims that they will suffer irreparable harm as the result of 
renegotiating numerous ICS contracts.
41. The Commission Adopted a Reasonable Reporting Requirement.  Securus has not shown 
it will suffer irreparable harm from the reporting requirements adopted in the Inmate Calling Report and 
Order and FNPRM.
176
  First, we note that the reporting and certification requirement, as well as the one-
time mandatory data collection, adopted in the Order are not effective until the Commission receives 
approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
177
  There is thus no imminent irreparable 
                                                     
167
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 100-102.
168
See id. at paras. 54-58, 133.
169
Id.
170
Securus Petition at 19-20.
171
The record shows that state contracts for ICS as well as county contracts for ICS include language “wherein the 
respective parties also agreed to conform their agreements in the future to take into account possible changes in the 
regulatory landscape.”  Letter from Lee G. Petro, Counsel to Wright Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, 
FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 at 2 (filed Aug. 2, 2013) (Wright Petitioners Aug. 2, 2012 Ex Parte Letter).
172
ICS Providers may not now complain about the potential for renegotiating some of their ICS contracts after they 
previously made business decisions to exclude change of law provisions in their negotiated contracts.  Specifically, 
if some of ICS contracts do not include change of law provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that this omission was
a business decision made by sophisticated companies.
173
See, e.g., Wright Petitioners Aug. 2, 2012 Ex Parte Letter at Exh. B at 2 (“These rates shall remain firm during 
the term of the contract, and any renewals, unless:  The Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) or the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) issues regulations that mandate lower rates (individually or collectively, 
“Regulations”).  If this occurs, and such Regulations are applicable to this Contract, the Contractor shall be required 
to decrease the affected rates in accordance with the time period required by such Regulations.”).  
174
“[T]he State of Florida and Securus have amended their agreement on four occasions since its execution in 2007. 
. . .  Among the modifications in the amendments are the rates to be charged inmates for telephone service.”  Letter 
from Lee G. Petro, Counsel to Wright Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 96-128, at 
3 (filed June 28, 2012).  
175
In fact, ICS contracts often include a one-page rate sheet that is easily modified.  See, e.g., Letter from Lee G. 
Petro, Counsel to Wright Petitioners, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375, at Exh. B., 
Attach. 1 at 34; Exh. C at 2; Exh. D, Attach. 1 at 24 (filed July 18, 2013).
176
See Securus Petition at 23.  If Securus’ claim is true, we find that hiring employees, by itself, is not an irreparable 
harm that meets the test to satisfy the second prong of the VA Petroleum Jobbers test.  VA Petroleum Jobbers, 259 
F.2d at 925 (“The key word in this consideration is irreparable.  Mere injuries, however, substantial, in terms of 
money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, are not enough.”).  
177
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 188; App. A (§ 64.6060).
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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harm under any scenario as there is no danger such requirements will be implemented absent a 
comprehensive review by the OMB of the reasonableness of the burden such requirements will impose.  
For this reason alone, this claim is neither imminent nor certain and thus fails. 
42. Additionally, Securus overstates the burden of these reporting requirements.
178
  Securus’ 
2012 cost data filing shows that it already maintains much of the requested information.  Specifically, the 
Siwek Report makes reference to Securus maintaining “data that includes costs incurred, revenue brought 
in, and call traffic volumes such as number of minutes and number of distinct calls.”
179
  Securus also 
complains about having to provide the Commission with its ICS rates and costs.
180
  We reject the validity 
of these concerns because we find it reasonable that a large business, with “the largest team in the 
industry” that has provided ICS for 25 years
181
would maintain a comprehensive list of its ICS rates and 
costs in the normal course of business.  Finally, the Commission was careful to ask only for the data it 
needs to establish a baseline and to provide itself with information necessary to determine trends and 
therefore inform future interstate and intrastate ICS rate regulation.
182
  Securus will have an opportunity 
through the PRA process to make its claim regarding the burden of the Commission’s data collection and 
record –keeping requirement.
183
  We thus reject Securus’ claims that they will suffer irreparable harm as 
the result of having to comply with the Order’s reporting requirements.
43. Petitioners Misunderstand the Applicable Enforcement Mechanisms and Safety Valves.  
The ICS Providers’ concerns about the enforcement mechanisms detailed in the Inmate Calling Report 
and Order and FNPRM are misplaced.
184
  Specifically, interstate ICS has always been subject to the 
section 201 requirement that rates be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, and ICS providers have 
always been subject to the Commission’s informal and formal complaint processes. The Inmate Calling 
Report and Order and FNPRM merely enunciated these pre-existing standards
185
and established how 
burdens would be placed in a formal complaint proceeding, including reducing some burdens on ICS 
providers in certain circumstances.
186
  
44. With regard to the informal complaint process explained in the Order, no additional 
burden is placed on ICS providers by the Order.  Further, the Commission’s existing informal complaint 
process does not impose significant procedural burdens
187
on complainants or respondents and does not 
automatically trigger the formal complaint process.
188
  
                                                     
178
We agree with the Wright Petitioners’ opinion that “it is inconceivable that the ICS providers are incapable of 
immediately preparing reports reflecting ‘rates, costs, minutes of use as well as average call duration,’ and claims 
that companies might have to hire up to 10 new employees are unsupported as well.”  Rates for Interstate Inmate 
Calling Services, Opposition to Petition for Stay of Report and Order Pending Appeal, WC Docket No. 12-375 at 3-
4 (filed Oct. 29, 2013) (Wright Petitioners Opposition to Securus Petition). 
179
Siwek Report at 2.
180
See Securus Petition at 22.
181
See Securus Technologies, Inc. Company Fast Facts, available at  https://securustech.net/web/securus/company-
profile (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
182
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNRPM at paras. 124-26.
183
See Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13.
184
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at Section III.H.
185
See supra para. 20.
186
See supra para. 4.
187
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.716-.719.
188
“If the complainant is not satisfied by the carrier’s response and the Commissions’ disposition, it may file a 
formal complaint in accordance with § 1.721 of this part.”  47 C.F.R. § 1.717.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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45. With regard to the formal complaint process explained in the Order, the Commission 
addressed how the burdens of production and persuasion would be placed in certain circumstances and 
limited the burden and potential financial exposure of ICS providers where they elect to take advantage of 
the safe harbor rate levels.
189
  Specifically, the burdens of production and persuasion fall on the ICS 
provider only when its rates are above the safe harbor levels.
190
  This is because the ICS providers are 
best-suited to supply the information and analysis needed to conduct a complaint proceeding.  In addition, 
the Order establishes that the complaining party will have the burdens of production and persuasion when 
challenging ICS rates that are below the safe harbor levels.
191
As a practical matter, that burden allocation 
will likely insulate ICS providers with rates at or below the safe harbor levels from formal complaints.  
This is a protection that did not exist prior to the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM.  Absent 
this explicit burden shift, the formal complaint process would be more burdensome for an ICS provider.
46. With regard to forfeitures, the risk of incurring enforcement penalties is mitigated 
because the Order set interim safe harbor rates at conservatively high levels and thus reduced the risk that 
providers would run afoul of the Order’s guidance on compensable costs.  This is likely to be particularly 
true for the two petitioning ICS Providers.  Securus submitted cost data into the record (data submitted to 
the Commission using the company’s own internal accounting processes with no guidance from the 
Commission) that yielded average per-minute costs, net of commission revenues, significantly below the 
adopted safe harbors.
192
  GTL did not submit any of its own cost data in the record,
193
despite having the 
opportunity to do so, but did claim in its comments that it is “one of the largest providers” of ICS and thus 
has “economies of scale and efficiency”
194
that make its costs lower than other providers.
195
  As a result, 
the risk that GTL (or Securus) will incur enforcement penalties if they act in good faith seems remote –
and thus not the kind of imminent or certain injury that could justify a stay.
196
  
C. The Requested Stays Will Result in Harm to Others
47. The ICS Providers have failed to prove that third parties will not suffer if the 
                                                     
189
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 121.  See also 47 C.F.R. § 1.720 (“Formal complaint 
proceedings are generally resolved on a written record consisting of a complaint, answer, and joint statement of 
stipulated facts, disputed facts and key legal issues, along with all associated affidavits, exhibits and other 
attachments.  Commission proceedings may also require or permit other written submissions such as briefs, written 
interrogatories, and other supplementary documents or pleadings.”).  
190
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 121.
191
See id. at paras. 120-21.
192
See Securus 2013 Comments, Expert Report of Stephen E. Siwek (Siwek Report) at 3, 5, Tbls. 2, 5 (enabling the 
calculation of an average minute-weighted cost net of commissions of all facilities included in the study of $0.044 
per minute).
193
GTL stated “it would be extraordinarily difficult and time-consuming to extract the summary information the 
Commission has requested . . . .”  GTL 2013 Comments at 26.  The Wright Petitioners stated “ICS providers such as 
GTL flatly refused to actively participate in the FCC’s rulemaking” and “flatly refused to supply cost data.”  Rates 
for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Opposition to Petition for Stay of Report and Order Pending Appeal, WC 
Docket No. 12-375 at 3 (filed Nov. 6, 2013) (Wright Petitioners Opposition to GTL Petition). 
194
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 80 & n.296.  
195
GTL serves the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision-run correctional facilities at a 
rate of $0.048/minute.  See Letter from Anthony J. Annucci, Acting Commissioner, NY DOCCS to Gregory V. 
Haledjian, Attorney-Advisor, FCC, WC Docket No. 12-375 at 2 (filed July 8, 2013).
196
See, e.g., Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir.1985) (per curiam) (Wisc. Gas) (To demonstrate 
irreparable harm “the injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical. . . .  [T]he party 
seeking injunctive relief must show that ‘[t]he injury complained of [is] of such imminence that there is a ‘clear and 
present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.’”) (citations omitted).
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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Commission grants their stay petitions.  We reject their claims for the reasons described below.
48. As the Commission stated in the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM, current 
interstate ICS rates are, in most cases, greatly above costs,
197
and as such, “place an unreasonable burden 
on some of the most economically disadvantaged people in our nation.”
198
  The Commission noted that 
excessively high ICS rates “discourage communication between inmates and their families and larger 
support networks.”
199
  This lack of contact in turn negatively impacts recidivism rates, increases costs to 
our criminal justice system, harms the children of prisoners by depriving them of parental love and 
guidance, and discourages adequate access to counsel for inmates.
200
  If these petitions are granted and a 
stay is issued, these “third parties,” that is, perhaps millions of ICS customers and their family members, 
will continue to suffer the negative effects of existing unjust, unreasonable, and unfair interstate ICS rates.  
In addition, members of the public would continue to be harmed by the greater recidivism, and attendant 
crime, that would likely persist during a stay.  The reforms implemented in the Inmate Calling Report and 
Order and FNPRM have been delayed long enough.  They should not be delayed any further, and we 
reject petitioners’ assertion that third parties will not continue to be harmed by a stay.
201
  
49. Additionally, Securus and GTL are incorrect that the Wright Petitioners will not be 
harmed by a stay because they “did not envision or advocate the ongoing, cost-based rate review that the 
Commission has established here.”
202
  The objective of the Wright Petitioners, and of the Commission in 
adopting its Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM, was to reduce excessive ICS rates and the 
harms that resulted from such rates.  As explained above and further below, the record shows that many, 
perhaps millions, of third parties will be harmed by a stay through the continued imposition of highly 
excessive rates, as the Wright Petitioners themselves observe in opposing a stay.
203
  In any event, as the 
Commission noted from the outset, “[p]etitioners made clear that their proposed rate caps were designed 
to ensure that ICS rates better reflected the costs of providing ICS service.”
204
  The Commission sought
comment on Wright Petitioners’ proposed cost-based caps, and on possible variations to the caps, in the 
2012 ICS NPRM, and sought comment throughout on ways to regulate ICS rates based on costs.
205
  In the 
2012 ICS NPRM, the Commission also “sought comment on the competitive nature of the ICS market and 
whether such competition constrains ICS rates.”
206
  Prior to that time, the Commission requested 
comment on “fair compensation under section 276 with reference to the costs of providing the relevant 
service, including in the context of ICS.”
207
  The ICS Providers’ contention that the Wright Petitioners did 
not envision cost-based rates is incorrect and does not support the adoption of a stay.
50. We also disagree with the ICS Providers’ argument that third parties will be harmed due 
to correctional facilities’ “deprivation” of site commissions, which would lead to compromised “security 
                                                     
197
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 38-41.
198
Id. at para. 2.
199
Id. at paras. 42-44.
200
Id. 
201
See Wright Petitioners Opposition to Securus Petition at 4.
202
Securus Petition at 24; GTL Petition at 22 (the Wright Petitioners “did not ask for that complex and disfavored 
regulatory approach,” nor did they ask for “rate caps as superior regulatory solution”).
203
Wright Petitioners Opposition to Securus Petition at 4-5.
204
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.222, citing Alternative Wright Petition at 4, 16-18.
205
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at n.222, citing 2012 ICS NPRM at 16637, para. 20; id. at 16638, 
para. 22; id. at 16638, para. 23.
206
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 39.
207
See Inmate Calling Services Order on Remand and NPRM, 17 FCC Rcd 3248 at 3276-79, paras. 73-79.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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features and functionalities necessary to maintain public safety inside and outside the correctional 
facility.”
208
  In the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM, the Commission recognized the 
“critical security needs to correctional facilities.”
209
  The Commission took into account “security needs 
as part of the ICS rates” as well as its “statutory commitment to fair compensation.”
210
  The Order allows 
ICS providers to recover costs associated with security features in the overall category of compensable 
ICS costs.
211
  It also recognized that ICS systems include “important security features, such as call 
recording and monitoring, that advance the safety and security of the general public, inmates, their loved 
ones, and correctional facility employees.”
212
  What the Commission disallowed is the recovery of site 
commission payments “because they are payments made to correctional facilities or departments of 
corrections for a wide range of purposes, most or all of which have no reasonable and direct relation to 
the provision of ICS.”
213
  In contrast, the Commission specifically allowed for the inclusion of costs 
related to the provision of ICS that are incurred by correctional facilities and reimbursed by ICS 
providers.  Such allowable costs include security costs.
214
  Securus therefore has failed to show that a stay 
is necessary to ensure that costs related to security will be recovered or that a stay otherwise is needed to 
maintain those security measures.
215
51. We also disagree with GTL’s assertion that inmates at lower-cost facilities will suffer 
because they will subsidize higher-cost facilities and may ultimately suffer loss of services due to such 
cross-subsidization.
216
  As discussed above,
217
the Order did not mandate what is traditionally called 
“cross-subsidization.”
218
  What the Order did, however, was adopt a single set of interim safe harbor rate 
levels and interim rate caps based on averaged data that will ensure fair compensation for all providers.
219
  
It also held that an ICS provider may cost justify its rates on “the basis of either the whole of its ICS 
business or by groupings that reflect reasonably related cost characteristics, and not on the basis of a 
single facility it serves[,]” thereby providing a  mechanism for ICS providers to elect to charge higher 
rates for high cost facilities where it can cost justify such rates and it makes business sense to do so 
company-wide.
220
  As stated in the Order, no regulatory rate structure is granular enough to account for 
all differences between providers, let alone all locations served.
221
  These assertions of loss of service,
with no substantive support, provide an inadequate basis for stay. 
D. The Public Interest Does Not Support a Grant
52. The ICS Providers have failed to prove that the public interest supports grant of their stay 
petitions.  We reject their arguments for the reasons described below.
                                                     
208
Securus Petition at 26; see also GTL Petition at 24.
209
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 58.
210
Id. at para. 58.
211
Id. at para. 58 & n.196.
212
Id. at para. 2.
213
Id. at para 54. 
214
Id. at para 58 & n.196.
215
See Securus Petition at 25.
216
See GTL Petition at 22-23.
217
See supra paras. 30-33.
218
See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 254(k).
219
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at paras. 60, 62-64.
220
Id. at para. 123.
221
Id.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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53. We disagree with GTL and Securus’ assertions that the public interest favors a stay, 
pursuant to the fourth prong of the Virginia Petroleum Jobbers test.
222
  Specifically, the ICS Providers 
assert that the reforms adopted in the Order will harm the public interest by eliminating cost recovery in 
the form of site commission payments,
223
and by negatively affecting inmate and public safety,
224
victims’ 
rights and inmate welfare,
225
and inmates’ access to ICS.
226
  
54. First, as discussed above, the Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM allows ICS 
providers to recover their just, reasonable, and fair costs, including reasonable security costs.
227
  And, as 
stated in the Order, the Commission’s statutory obligations relate only to the rates charged to end users—
the inmates and the parties whom they call.
228
  While objectives such as education and societal reentry are 
worthy goals, Congress has determined that the public interest demands rates that are just, reasonable, and 
fair, and the Commission is bound by that statutory mandate.
229
  The Act does not provide a mechanism 
for funding social welfare programs or other costs unrelated to the provision of ICS, “no matter how 
successful or worthy.”
230
  
55. Additionally, as discussed above, the Commission did not address “how correctional 
facilities spend their funds or from where they derive.”
231
  The ICS Providers offer no proof in support of 
their arguments that correctional facilities will have to change their budgets or program decisions as a 
result of interstate ICS rate reform.
232
  In addition, affordable access to telecommunications service itself 
provides ample benefits that will justify continuation in the absence of site commissions.  The ICS 
Providers’ vague speculations about purported effects of the reforms adopted in the Inmate Calling 
Report and Order and FNPRM are insufficient reason to grant a stay.  
56. We also dispute Securus and GTL’s assertion that the new rules adopted in the Order will 
harm the public interest by discouraging competition and innovation.
233
  The Commission stated that it 
believes that “innovation will continue to drive down costs through automation and centralization of the 
security features” that correctional facilities require, which will lead to increased efficiencies.
234
  The 
Commission found, as did several commenters to the 2012 ICS NPRM, including Securus, that robust 
                                                     
222
See GTL Petition at 23-24; Securus Petition at 28.
223
See GTL Petition at 23; Securus Petition at 25-26.
224
See Securus Petition at 25-26; see also GTL Petition at 23-24.
225
See Securus Petition at 25-26; see also GTL Petition at 23.
226
See Securus Petition at 25-27; see also GTL Petition at 23-26.
227
See supra para. 39; Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 58 and n.196.
228
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 56.
229
Id. at para. 57. 
230
Id.
231
Id. at para. 56.
232
As discussed above, the Commission did not preclude ICS providers from paying site commissions to 
correctional facilities, but only held that such commission payments are not costs that can be recovered through 
interstate ICS rates.  See supra para. 31.  In this regard, we note that interstate ICS accounts for only a small portion 
of total ICS (including just 15 percent of Securus’s traffic and about 10 percent of GTL’s).  See supra para. 37.  
Finally, the ICS Providers’ assertions of harm to inmates in this regard absent a stay clearly cannot extend to the use 
of site commissions for things unrelated to correctional facilities.  See Inmate Calling Report and Order and 
FNPRM at para. 34 & n.132 (discussing the use of site commissions for things unrelated to correctional facilities 
including, for example, states’ general revenue funds).
233
Securus Petition at 9, 27; GTL Petition at 23-24.
234
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 71.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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competition exists among ICS providers during the bidding process.
235
  The ICS Providers have offered 
insufficient evidence for us to find otherwise.
57. Finally, we disagree with the ICS Providers’ general assertions that the public interest 
will be harmed by “enforcing a rate regulation that is later vacated,” as it will lead to a waste of time and 
energy that is “ultimately borne by subscribers of the service.”
236
  As discussed above, the cost-based 
requirement and interim implementing framework adopted in the Order is based on significant data in the 
record and provides a means for ICS providers to seek a waiver if their costs support rates outside the 
boundaries established by such framework.  Additionally, delay of implementation of the reforms adopted 
in the Order will perpetuate the significant harms that third parties are currently subject to in the form of 
unjust, unreasonable and unfair ICS rates and the various secondary harms that those excessive rates 
cause, such as a higher rate of recidivism and emotional harm to prisoners’ children.
237
  Finally, the cases 
cited by Securus are unavailing.
238
  They merely demonstrate that the Commission may hold applications, 
waiver requests and the like in abeyance when the balance of interests favors such an outcome. We do 
not find that to be the case here.  We affirm that the reforms adopted in the Inmate Calling Report and 
Order and FNPRM were reasonable, and that the ICS Providers have not otherwise demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits of their petitions.
239
These reforms have been delayed long enough 
and should not be delayed any further due to the providers’ speculative claims.
240
  
IV. PETITION TO HOLD FNPRM IN ABEYANCE
58. Securus also filed a Petition to Hold Further Rulemaking Proceeding in Abeyance.
241
  
Specifically, Securus argues that “taking and considering comments on the FNPRM, the great majority of 
which is expressly premised on the findings and conclusions in the Report and Order, would not be an 
appropriate use of Commission resources. . . .”
242
  While we appreciate Securus’ concerns over 
Commission resources, we reject Securus’ arguments.  Contrary to Securus’ claims, the Commission’s 
ICS rules are not “unsettled.”
243
  In addition, the questions in the FNPRM do not undermine the reforms 
adopted in the Order, but rather seek further comment on the interim reforms adopted in the Order
244
and 
the possible applicability of the reforms adopted in the Order to intrastate ICS rates.
245
59. In addition, the comments received as a result of the information sought by the FNPRM
                                                     
235
Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 40 & n.156 (citing comments by, inter alia, Securus, 
which states that “The competition for service contracts is, to put it mildly, robust.”).  As the Commission found in 
the Order, however, competition during the bidding process does not sufficiently exert downward pressure on rates 
for ICS consumers.  Id. at para. 41.
236
Securus Petition at 28; see also GTL Petition at 24-25 (“A stay will forestall the expense and confusion – in the 
ICS industry and among correctional facilities – that would result from efforts to implement” the reforms.).
237
See supra para. 48; see also Wright Petitioners Opposition to GTL Petition at 5 & n.21 (noting that the record to 
the Order reflects that “just a 1% decrease in the recidivism rate would result in savings of more than 250 million 
dollars for state, county and local jurisdictions”).
238
See Securus Petition at 28.
239
See supra Section III.A.
240
See supra para. 48.
241
See generally Abeyance Petition.
242
Abeyance Petition at 1.
243
Id. at 2.
244
See Inmate Calling Report and Order and FNPRM at para. 152.
245
See id. at para. 129.
Federal Communications Commission DA 13-2236
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will be extremely valuable to the Commission regardless of the outcome of any pending litigation.
246
  For 
example, such comments will help inform the adoption of permanent interstate ICS rates, whether they 
are higher or lower than the interim rates adopted, and will help determine the appropriateness of 
intrastate ICS rate regulation.  Finally, just as staying the reforms adopted in the Inmate Calling Report 
and Order and FNPRM will harm third parties and is counter to the public interest,
247
preventing or 
delaying the receipt of additional information will not help inform further ICS rate reform.  As such, we 
reject Securus’ arguments that we should hold in abeyance the FNPRM in this proceeding.
V. OTHER
60. We note that the Commission recently received a third petition for stay of the Inmate 
Calling Report and Order and FNPRM.
248
  Given that the Correctional Institutions’ Petition was received 
significantly after the Securus and GTL petitions we will address the Correctional Institutions petition in a 
separate order.
VI. ORDERING CLAUSES
61. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to the authority contained in sections 1, 4(i),
4(j), 201, 225, 276, and 303(r) and of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 
154(i)-(j), 201, 225, 276, and 303(r) and the authority delegated pursuant to sections 0.91 and 0.291 of the 
Commission’s rules, 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91 and 0.291, this Order Denying Stay Petitions and Petition to Hold 
in Abeyance in WC Docket No. 12-375 IS ADOPTED.  
62. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Securus Technologies, Inc. Petition for Stay of 
Report and Order Pending Appeal (FCC 13-113), the Securus Technologies, Inc. Petition to Hold Further 
Rulemaking Proceeding in Abeyance, and the Petition of Global Tel*Link for Stay Pending Judicial 
Review ARE DENIED.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Julie A. Veach
Chief
Wireline Competition Bureau
                                                     
246
See Securus Technologies, Inc. v. FCC, No. 13-1280 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 15, 2013).
247
See supra Sections III.C and III.D.
248
Rates for Interstate Inmate Calling Services, Correctional Institutions Petition for Stay Pending Judicial Review, 
WC Docket No. 12-375 (filed Nov. 12, 2013) (Correctional Institutions’ Petition).