BEFORE THE
Federal Communications Commission
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of
Petitions for Declaratory Ruling and Retroactive Waiver of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) Regarding the Commission’s Opt-Out Notice Requirement for Faxes Sent with the Recipients’ Prior Express Invitation or Permission

CG Docket No. 05-338

RESPONSE OF SUNWING AIRLINES INC., VACATION EXPRESS USA CORP., AND SUNWING VACATIONS INC. IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICATIONS FOR FULL COMMISSION REVIEW.

The Applicants for full Commission review (“Applicants”) improperly seek to have the Commission consider the same arguments it has already considered and rejected. Specifically, the Applicants argue that: 1) the Commission has no authority to waive violations of the TCPA regulations; 2) the record does not support a “presumption of confusion”; and 3) certain entities—not the Petitioners here—had actual knowledge that the opt-out requirement applied to solicited faxes. Both the Commission and the Bureau already gave proper consideration to each of these arguments and rejected them in their Orders dated October 30, 2014 and August 28, 2015. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed by the Commission and Bureau in those Orders, the Applications for Full Review should be denied.

Indeed, the Applicants concede that they “filed comments on 48 post-order waiver petitions from November 18, 2014 to June 12, 2015.” See Application for Review of Beck Simmons, LLC et al. at 3. As such, the Applicants admit that they made each of these arguments on prior occasions and that the Commission already considered them.
I. **The Commission has already decided that it has authority to grant retroactive waivers regarding opt-out requirements.**

As they did in their prior responses to individual Petitioners' waiver requests, the Applicants spend much of their Applications arguing that the Commission had no authority to grant retroactive waivers of the opt-out requirements as applied to solicited faxes and that the Commission's grant of such waivers violates the separation of powers. *See Application at 4-9; TCPA Plaintiffs' Jan. 13, 2015 Comments on Petitions for Waiver, attached as Exhibit A. But, as was noted in several replies in support of Petitions for Retroactive Waiver, the full Commission already considered and rejected this exact argument in its October 30, 2014 Order:*

> Finally, we reject any implication that by addressing the petitions filed in this matter while related litigation is pending, we have "violate[d] the separation of powers vis-à-vis the judiciary," as one commenter has suggested. By addressing requests for declaratory ruling and/or waiver, the Commission is interpreting a statute, the TCPA, over which Congress provided us authority as the expert agency. Likewise, the mere fact that the TCPA allows for private rights of action based on violations of our rules implementing that statute in certain circumstances does not undercut our authority, as the expert agency, to define the scope of when and how our rules apply.

October 30, 2014 Commission Order, ¶ 21; *see also August 28, 2015 Bureau Order at ¶ 13* (citing the same). As the Commission and Bureau correctly indicated, if the Commission had the power to make the rule regarding opt-out requests, it must also have had the power to grant waivers of the rule. The Applicants' argument to the contrary is as flawed now as it was when the Commission and Bureau originally rejected it. The Commission and Bureau considered the Commission's own rules and its October 30, 2014 Order to determine that certain Petitioners were entitled to a retroactive waiver of the TCPA regulations' opt-out requirements. Each court still has the authority to determine how the waiver impacts the factual scenario before the court. *See August 28, 2015 Order at ¶ 17 ("We reiterate the Commission's statement that the granting
of a waiver does not confirm or deny whether the petitioners had the prior express permission of
the recipients to send the faxes. That remains a question of fact for triers of fact in the private
litigation.”) The Commission and Bureau correctly granted waivers regarding the regulations’
opt-out requirements, and there is no need for full Commission review of the grant of those
waivers.

II. THE COMMISSION AND BUREAU ALREADY PROPERLY CONSIDERED AND RULLED UPON
WHETHER THE FOOTNOTE TO THE 2006 ORDER CAUSED CONFUSION.

A. THE APPLICANTS’ REFERENCES TO 2006 RECONSIDERATION PROCEEDINGS
HAVE NO BEARING ON THE OCTOBER 2014 ORDER OR THE BUREAU’S RULING
ON THE PETITIONS FOR RETROACTIVE WAIVER.

As in their prior filings with the Commission, the Applicants include in their Application
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a lengthy discussion of reconsideration proceedings that took place almost a decade ago,
following the Commission’s release of the 2006 regulations. See Application, at p. 9-13.
Specifically, the Applicants refer to a petition filed on behalf of CBS for reconsideration of those
regulations, and various comments on that petition, for the proposition that petitioners were
aware that the regulations applied to solicited as well as unsolicited faxes. Id. The Applicants do
not, however, explain how CBS’s mental state and knowledge in 2006 could have any impact on
the Petitions for Retroactive Waiver.

Nor do they explain how those proceedings are relevant to the October 30, 2014
Commission Order. Although that Order specifically acknowledged that it was the
Commission’s intent to make the 2006 regulations applicable to solicited and unsolicited faxes,
the Commission noted that there was confusion and misplaced confidence caused by the
language of the regulations, in particular footnote 154 (21 FCC Rcd at 3810, n. 154), and by the
manner of notice provided. October 30, 2014 Order, ¶1, ¶¶ 24-25. This confusion was the basis
for the grant of retroactive waivers in the Order and permission for other similarly situated petitioners to seek the same relief. *Id.* ¶¶ 27-28.

The Applicants’ references to the 2006 proceedings are at best another attempt to seek reconsideration of the October 30, 2014 Order, by challenging the Bureau’s August 28, 2015 Order. Procedurally, such a motion is improper here because the Applicants—whose counsel was extensively involved in the proceedings leading up to the Order—could have raised the issue of the 2006 proceedings with the Commission prior to the entry of the Order. If they did so, then there is no need to raise it for at least the third time in seeking full Commission review (the Applicants also raised this issue in response to certain Petitions for Retroactive Waiver. See, *e.g.*, Exhibit A, at 33-37). If the Applicants did not raise the 2006 proceedings prior to entry of the 2006 Order, then they have waived that argument and it should not be considered here. In any event, the Applicants do not assert that any of the Petitioners for Retroactive Waiver had any involvement in or filed their own comments in the 2006 reconsideration proceedings—because they did not. The Applicants’ request to revisit the Commission and Bureau Orders based on 2006 proceedings that the Commission had full opportunity to consider should be rejected.

**B. APPLICANTS AGAIN IMPROPERLY SEEK INDIVIDUAL FACT-FINDING ON WHETHER PARTICULAR PETITIONERS WERE CONFUSED BY FOOTNOTE 154 OF THE 2006 ORDER.**

The Applicants assert that there is no evidence that any person was actually confused by Footnote 154 of the 2006 Order. (Application, at 13-15) But as the Bureau Order acknowledges, the October 30, 2014 Order does not purport to require the Commission to make factual findings and hold an evidentiary hearing or other fact-finding process to determine who at what level of a petitioner’s organization had “actual knowledge” of the correct interpretation of the Regulations. *See* August 28, 2015 Order at ¶ 19 (“[W]e reject arguments that the Commission made actual,
specific claims of confusion a requirement to obtain the waiver...the Commission found that petitioners who referenced the confusing, contradictory language at issue are entitled to a presumption of confusion.”). Nor should it – such a standard would require extensive investigation and factual determinations for each petitioner, with the potential for inconsistent results. Rather, the Commission has already made a finding regarding the “[c]onfusion or misplaced confidence about the rule”, which “warrants some relief from its potentially substantial consequences.” October 30, 2014 Order, ¶ 27. Moreover, the Commission and Bureau both note that all Petitioners who were granted a retroactive waiver referenced Footnote 154 in their Petitions. See August 28, 2015 Order ¶¶ 15-16; October 30, 2014 Order at ¶ 24. Accordingly, the Commission and Bureau both found that there was sufficient confusion to require a grant of retroactive waivers, and the Applications for Full Review should be denied.

Date: October 13, 2015

SUNWING AIRLINES INC., VACATION EXPRESS USA CORP., AND SUNWING VACATIONS INC.

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EXHIBIT A
Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of

Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005  )  CG Docket No. 05-338
Rules and Regulations Implementing the  )  CG Docket No. 02-278
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991


January 13, 2015

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Executive Summary

On October 30, 2014, the Commission granted “retroactive waivers” of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) to defendants in private TCPA litigation and allowed “similarly situated” persons to seek waivers. The Commission stated “all future waiver requests will be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis” and did not “prejudge the outcome of future waiver requests in the order.” The Commission should deny the current petitions for four reasons.

First, the Commission has no authority to “waive” violations of the regulations “prescribed under” the TCPA in a private right of action. Doing so would violate the separation of powers because the courts have exclusive authority to determine whether “a violation” of the regulations has taken place, and because Congress has determined that “each such violation” gives rise to $500 in statutory damages.

Second, the current petitioners are not “similarly situated” to the prior petitioners. McKesson had actual knowledge of the opt-out regulations for at least two years before it sent its faxes, after the Commission’s Enforcement Bureau cited McKesson for TCPA violations and provided it with a copy of § 64.1200, advising it to comply. Also, McKesson’s potential damages are not “significant” when compared to its massive financial resources.

PCH does not claim it was “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required or even state whether it was aware of the Commission’s rules, making it just as likely PCH had actual knowledge of the rules when it sent its faxes. PCH also has not established it faces “significant” liability in the litigation.

St. Luke’s claims it was “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required when it sent its faxes, but it does not claim its confusion stemmed from the two sources of
"confusion" identified in the October 30 order (the 2005 notice of rulemaking and footnote 154). Plus, St. Luke's has provided no evidence that its potential liability is "crushing," "ruinous," or "catastrophic," as it claims.

Sunwing does not claim actual "confusion," and it has failed to demonstrate it faces "significant" potential liability in the private litigation.

ZocDoc does not claim it was actually "confused" over whether opt-out notice was required, and it fails to demonstrate that it faces "significant" liability.

Third, the record on the petitions for reconsideration of the 2006 order demonstrates that regulated parties immediately understood the new rules required "all faxed advertisements" to include opt-out notice, and that the "plain language" extended to "solicited facsimile advertisements." These parties were not "confused" by the notice of rulemaking or footnote 154. This record was not raised in the petitions addressed in the October 30 order or the comments on those petitions, and it rebuts any "presumption" of confusion on the part of the current petitioners.

Fourth, even if the Commission grants retroactive waivers, it should not grant prospective waivers to McKesson, PCH, St. Luke's, Sunwing, and ZocDoc because it would endanger public health and safety. These petitioners have a history of targeting physicians and other medical-care providers with fax advertisements, and granting a prospective waiver of the opt-out requirements would allow them to "lock in" any permission they hold today simply by not including opt-out notice on their faxes until April 30, 2015.
Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of

Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991


Commenters are plaintiffs in private TCPA actions against petitioners EatStreet, Inc. ("EatStreet"), McKesson Corp. ("McKesson"), Philadelphia Consolidated Holding Corp. ("PCH"), St. Luke's Center for Diagnostic Imaging, LLC ("St. Luke's"), Sunwing Airlines, Inc. ("Sunwing"), and ZocDoc, Inc. ("ZocDoc"). Petitioners seek "retroactive waivers" of the regulation requiring opt-out notice on fax advertisements sent with "prior express invitation or permission," which they intend to present to the courts presiding over the private litigation, asking the courts to excuse any violations of the opt-out regulation.1 The Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau sought comments on December 30, 2014.2

1 See Petition of EatStreet, Inc. for Waiver of Section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) of the Commission's Rules, CG Docket Nos. 02-278, 05-338 (Dec. 12, 2014) (EatStreet Petition); Petition for Waiver of McKesson Corp., CG Docket Nos. 02-278, 05-338 (Nov. 25, 2014) (McKesson Petition); Petition for Waiver of PCH, CG Docket Nos. 02-278, 05-338 (Dec. 19, 2014) (PCH Petition); Petition of St. Luke's Center for Diagnostic Imaging, LLC for Retroactive Waiver, CG Docket No. 05-338 (Dec. 8, 2014) (St. Luke's Petition); Petition for Retroactive Waiver of Sunwing, CG Docket No. 05-338 (Nov. 26, 2014) (Sunwing Petition); Petition for Waiver by ZocDoc, Inc., CG Docket Nos. 02-278, 05-338 (Dec. 4, 2014) (ZocDoc Petition).

Procedural History

On October 30, 2014, the Commission issued the Opt-Out Order, granting “retroactive waivers” intended to relieve the covered TCPA defendants of liability in private TCPA actions for past violations of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) as well as prospective waivers for any future violations through April 30, 2015. The Commission invited “similarly situated” parties to petition for similar waivers.

Undersigned counsel filed comments on two post-order petitions on November 18, 2014, and another five petitions on December 12, 2014, asking the Commission to clarify whether the standard for a waiver is that the petitioner was actually confused about whether opt-out notice was required when it sent its faxes or whether the Commission created a

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4 Plaintiff’s counsel opposed these “waivers,” arguing the Commission has no authority to interfere in private TCPA litigation and that such an order would violate the separation of powers and due process and constitute a taking without just compensation. On November 10, 2014, Plaintiffs appealed the waiver portion of the order to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Sandusky Wellness Center, LLC v. FCC, No. 14-1235 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 10, 2014).

3 Opt-Out Order ¶ 30.


8 Opt-Out Order ¶ 26 (stating waiver was justified because footnote 154 of the 2006 Junk Fax Order “led to confusion or misplaced confidence on the part of petitioners”); id. ¶ 32 (stating Commission granted waivers “to parties that have been confused by the footnote”).
presumption that petitioners are confused in the absence of evidence they were “simply ignorant” or knowingly violated the law.9

Plaintiffs’ counsel explained they expect dozens of defendants in TCPA fax litigation to petition the Commission for waivers before April 30, 2015, and that the Commission should expect waiver requests from defendants in non-fax TCPA litigation, as well. Counsel noted a defendant in a text-message case had already sought a waiver and that a commenter on a separate petition had suggested the Commission create a “path for retroactive waiver” from the telemarketing rules in private TCPA litigation.10 Plaintiffs noted that, on December 5, 2014, Wells Fargo filed comments citing the Opt-Out Order as authority for a retroactive waiver absolving TCPA defendants of liability for cellular-phone calls where the “called party” is not the “intended recipient.”11

By one estimate, there were 2,069 private TCPA lawsuits filed in 2014 (as of October 31).12 If the standard for a waiver from TCPA liability is that the law is “confusing” and that the petitioner is subject to “substantial” damages, the Commission should expect a waiver

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9 Id. (stating combination of footnote 154 and lack of notice “presumptively establishes good cause for retroactive waiver,” finding no evidence “that the petitioners understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement,” and “emphasiz[ing]” that “simple ignorance” of the law “is not grounds for a waiver”).


petition to be filed in the majority of TCPA cases. Plaintiffs reiterate their request that the Commission clarify the standards it applied in the Opt-Out Order.

**Factual Background**

**A. The *EatStreet* litigation.**

The *EatStreet* litigation has been resolved by agreement.

**B. The *McKesson* litigation.**

On May 9, 2008, the Commission served McKesson with a Citation, attached hereto as Exhibit A, warning McKesson that it “apparently sent one or more unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of” the TCPA. The Citation advised McKesson that an “unsolicited” advertisement is one sent without the recipient’s “prior express invitation or permission” and that “mere distribution or publication of a fax number does not establish consent to receive advertisements by fax.” The Citation informed McKesson that an advertiser may send faxes pursuant to an established business relationship (“EBR”), but only if the requirements of 47 U.S.C. § 227 and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 are met. The Citation attached “[a] copy of these provisions” and warned, “in the event of a complaint or dispute, the burden rests with the fax sender to demonstrate that it either obtained prior express invitation or permission to send the facsimile advertisement

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13 Ex. A at 1.
14 *Id.*
15 *Id.* at 2.
16 *Id.* at 1, n.1.
or satisfied all the criteria necessary to invoke the established business relationship exemption.”

The copy of § 64.1200 the Commission provided McKesson in May 2008 stated, as it does today, that one of the criteria for the EBR exemption is that “the advertisement contains a notice that informs the recipient of the ability and means to avoid future unsolicited advertisements.” The regulation also stated, as it does today, that “[a] facsimile advertisement that is sent to a recipient that has provided prior express invitation or permission to the sender must include an opt-out notice that complies with” the same requirements as EBR faxes.


In addition, the SAC alleges McKesson is precluded from raising an affirmative defense based on EBR or “prior express invitation or permission” because the faxes do not

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17 Id. at 3.
18 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iii) (2008) (since recodified as § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)).
19 Id. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iv) (2008) (since recodified as § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv)).
21 McKesson, Second Amended Compl. (Doc. 90).
22 Id. ¶¶ 12–13.
comply with the opt-out-notice requirements. The SAC alleges McKesson sent fax advertisements to "at least forty" persons during the class period and that class certification is appropriate. Plaintiffs also attached the Commission's Citation letter from May 2008, alleging that "approximately two years prior to Plaintiffs' receipt of Defendant's unsolicited facsimiles, McKesson Corporation was served with a citation from the FCC informing it of violations of the TCPA and demanding it cease and desist the violations."

The faxes attached to the SAC promote McKesson's electronic-health records software, "Medisoft," stating the product allows practitioners to "bill more accurately, resulting in higher levels of reimbursement" and offering, respectively, a "$1,500 cash rebate" on purchases, a "limited-time" offer to purchase the software with "0% financing" and "cash-back rebates," and a "40% discount on Medisoft version 16." The faxes contain no opt-out notice of any kind.

On August 22, 2014, McKesson answered the SAC, asserting as affirmative defenses that "Plaintiffs cannot recover damages under the TCPA because they gave their express prior consent" and that "Plaintiffs cannot recover damages under the TCPA because Plaintiffs have an established business relationship with McKesson."

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23 Id. ¶ 33–34.
24 Id. ¶ 22.
25 Id. ¶ 20.
27 Id., Ex. B-1.
29 Id., Exs. A–B-3.
30 McKesson, Answer (Doc. 103) at 6, Second & Fourth Aff. Defenses.
McKesson claims Plaintiffs gave “prior express invitation or permission” to receive McKesson fax advertisements because they purchased the Medisoft product and provided their fax numbers “in their registration of the software.” The registration forms, attached hereto as Exhibit B, provide spaces for name, address, email, phone, and fax number and boxes to select “Do not . . . Mail, e-Mail, Call, Fax.” The registration forms say nothing about receiving “advertisements” by fax or any other method. McKesson claims that, by providing their fax numbers on the registration forms, Plaintiffs gave “prior express invitation or permission” to receive McKesson fax advertisements and that by not checking the “Do not . . . Fax” box, they failed to “opt out” of receiving fax advertisements.

On November 25, 2014, McKesson filed its petition for a waiver, arguing it “provides valuable information about discounted products and other offers via fax to commercial enterprises that specifically asked to receive such offers.” McKesson does not identify any person who ever “specifically asked to receive” its fax advertisements or claim that Plaintiffs ever made such a request. McKesson’s petition does not advance its theory that providing a fax number on a software-registration form constitutes “prior express invitation or permission” to receive fax advertisements.

31 McKesson, Defs.’ Mot. Stay (Doc. 84) at 3.
32 Id. Ex. B, RS-TRUEHEALTH-000001, 000003, 000005, 000007, 0000227.
33 Id.
34 Id.
36 Id. at 1–5.
37 Id.
McKesson claims it “did not believe that these solicited facsimiles required opt-out notices.” McKesson does not say why it had that mistaken belief or claim it ever read footnote 154 or the 2005 public notice. McKesson does mention that the Commission cited it for sending unsolicited fax advertisements in May 2008 and that the Commission provided McKesson with copies of the TCPA and § 64.1200, advising it that “the burden rests with the fax sender” to demonstrate compliance with the requirements for EBR faxes and faxes sent with permission.

McKesson complains that Plaintiffs seek “millions of dollars in statutory damages,” which it claims is “substantial,” but it does not compare the potential damages to its financial resources. McKesson has refused to produce fax-transmission logs showing the number of faxes sent, in violation of the magistrate judge’s order that it do so by December 12, 2014. McKesson is “a Fortune 15 corporation” that reported net income of $1.26 billion in fiscal year 2014 on revenues of $137 billion. McKesson holds $3.8 billion in “cash and cash equivalents” on hand. McKesson does not disclose Plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a “material” risk

38 Id. at 2.
39 Id.
40 Ex. A at 3.
41 McKesson, Order (Doc. 143) at 3–5. The district court judge denied McKesson’s objections to the order on December 19, 2014, holding it was “well-reasoned, thorough, and correct in all respects.” McKesson, Order (Doc. 148) at 1.
42 McKesson Pet. at 2.
factor to investors. McKesson denies it sent unsolicited faxes to more than forty persons and denies the numerosity element for class certification is satisfied.

C. The PCH litigation.

On June 21, 2013, undersigned counsel filed suit against PCH on behalf of True Health Chiropractic, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging PCH sent an unsolicited fax advertisement to True Health on March 28, 2011. In addition, Plaintiff alleges that, even if PCH claims it had "prior express invitation or permission" to send the fax, it violated the opt-out regulations. The complaint alleges PCH sent the same or similar fax advertisements to "at least forty" persons, and that class certification is appropriate.

The fax attached to the complaint states that PCH "has a product designed specifically for Chiropractor's Professional Liability" insurance and offers to provide "a competitive quote at your next insurance renewal." The fax contains no opt-out notice of any kind.

On September 16, 2013, PCH filed its Answer, asserting as affirmative defenses that Plaintiff's claims "are barred to the extent that Plaintiff provided Defendants with consent

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45 McKesson Corp. 2014 Form 10-K at 104–06.
46 McKesson, Answer to Second Amended Compl. (Doc. 103) ¶¶ 17, 22.
48 Id. ¶ 32.
49 Id. ¶ 20.
50 Id., Ex. A.
51 Id.
for the alleged fax.\textsuperscript{52} PCH denies there are “at least forty” class members.\textsuperscript{53} On September 18, 2014, the district court stayed the case pending the Commission’s ruling on the opt-out petitions.\textsuperscript{54}

On December 19, 2014, PCH filed its petition for a waiver, arguing that a PCH representative called Plaintiff by telephone prior to sending the fax and that one of Plaintiff’s employees gave PCH permission to send the fax.\textsuperscript{55} PCH does not state whether it had actual knowledge of the opt-out-notice regulation when it sent its faxes.\textsuperscript{56} PCH does not claim it was “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required or that it read footnote 154 or the 2005 public notice.\textsuperscript{57}

PCH argues it faces “substantial remedies” in the lawsuit but does not state how many faxes it sent or attempt to estimate its potential liability.\textsuperscript{58} PCH does not discuss its financial resources.\textsuperscript{59} In 2008, the last year in which PCH reported financial data before it went private, PCH reported net income over $326 million with $106 million in cash and cash equivalents on hand.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{52} PCH, Answer (Doc. 19) at 8.
\textsuperscript{53} Id. ¶ 20.
\textsuperscript{54} PCH, Order (Doc. 52).
\textsuperscript{55} PCH Pet. at 3–4.
\textsuperscript{56} Id. at 1–8.
\textsuperscript{57} Id.
\textsuperscript{58} Id. at 6.
\textsuperscript{59} Id.
\textsuperscript{60} PCH 2007 Form 10-K at 65, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/909109/000089322008000559/w50354e10vk.htm#110

On April 30, 2014, undersigned counsel filed suit in Missouri state court against St. Luke's on behalf of Alan Presswood, D.C., P.C., a chiropractic practice in St. Charles, Missouri, alleging St. Luke’s sent unsolicited fax advertisements to Plaintiff on February 28, 2012, and May 14, 2012. In addition, Plaintiff alleged that, even if St. Luke’s claims it had “prior express invitation or permission,” the faxes violated the opt-out regulations. The complaint alleges St. Luke's sent the same or similar fax advertisements to “more than forty” persons, and that class certification is appropriate.

The faxes attached to the complaint advertise “same day” MRI and CT scans at the “Center for Diagnostic Imaging” at St. Luke’s locations in Missouri. The faxes contain no opt-out notice of any kind.

On August 8, 2014, St. Luke's answered the complaint, asserting as affirmative defenses that “[o]n information and belief . . . Defendant had established business relationships with or the permission of one or more of the recipients who may have received the faxes” and asserting “upon information and belief, that some or all of the alleged facsimile transmissions were sent with the permission of the recipient or his or her agents.”

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62 Id. ¶¶ 18–19.
63 Id. ¶ 32.
64 Id., Exs. A & B.
65 Id.
67 Id. at 11, Aff. Def. No. 12.
In discovery, St. Luke’s asserted Plaintiff gave “prior express invitation or permission” to send fax advertisements because “Plaintiff is a referring physician who continues to have a relationship with CDI” and “Plaintiff transmitted a facsimile to Defendant within months of receiving the Two Facsimiles, and the facsimile transmitted to Defendant bears Plaintiff’s facsimile number.” St. Luke’s denied it “maintains a record of persons who provided any form of consent, invitation, or permissions to receive advertisements by facsimile machine and the dates such consent, invitation, or permissions.” Regarding the number of faxes at issue, St. Luke’s admitted “that the Two Facsimiles were transmitted to more than 1000 persons” but denied “that the Two Facsimiles were sent to more than 3000.”

On December 8, 2014, St. Luke’s filed its petition for a waiver, arguing that it “is currently facing a putative class action lawsuit seeking potentially multi-millions of dollars in damages because it allegedly sent faxes to its referring physicians who had consented to receive them.” The petition does not cite any paragraph of the complaint alleging St. Luke’s obtained permission from any recipient; the complaint alleges that “Defendant faxed the same and other facsimile advertisements to the members of the proposed classes

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68 St. Luke’s, Def.’s Answers to Pl.’s First Interrog., Resp. No. 10.
72 Id. at 1–8.
in Missouri and throughout the United States without first obtaining the recipients’ prior express permission or invitation.”

St. Luke’s claims it is “similarly situated” to the petitioners covered by the Opt-Out Order because St. Luke’s was “confused as to whether Solicited Faxes must include an opt-out notice” when it sent the faxes at issue in the underlying litigation. St. Luke’s does not say why it was “confused” about the requirement or claim that it read footnote 154 or the 2005 public notice. St. Luke’s claims it had “express permission” to send fax advertisements because Plaintiff had “repeated communication with its assigned St. Luke’s account executives over several years” and Plaintiff “never asked St. Luke’s to refrain from sending it faxes.”

St. Luke’s claims it is subject to potentially “crushing,” “ruinous,” or “catastrophic” damages, but it does not state how many faxes are at issue. St Luke’s does not give any indication of its financial resources. St. Luke’s is not a publicly traded corporation.

E. The Sunwing litigation.

On July 17, 2014, undersigned counsel filed suit against Sunwing, a Canadian airline, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on behalf of Carradine Chiropractic Center, Inc., a chiropractic practice near Youngstown, Ohio, alleging Sunwing

75 St. Luke’s, Compl. ¶ 21 (emphasis added).
75 Id. at 1–8.
76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. at 7–8.
78 Id.
sent an unsolicited fax advertisement to Plaintiff on March 5, 2012. In addition, the complaint alleges that, even if Sunwing claims it had “prior express invitation or permission” to send the fax, it violated the opt-out regulations. The complaint alleges Sunwing sent the same or similar fax advertisements to “over forty” persons and that class certification is appropriate.

The fax attached to the Complaint promotes an “exclusive offer” to “save $100” on “NEW Non-Stop Champagne Flights on Sunwing Airlines” to locations in Mexico and Jamaica. The opt-out notice at the bottom of the fax states, “[t]o be unsubscribed from this list please call 1.866.996.6329 or 1.877.90NOFAX or 1.866.615.5568 or 1.905.366.1333 or 1.905.366.1357 or via email REMOVE@PROINFOTECH.CA or per fax at 1.905.361.0789 or mail PRO INFO TECH 141-2550 Matheson Blvd, Mississauga, ON CANADA L4W 4Z1.” The notice does not (1) state the consumer has a legally enforceable right to opt out, (2) state a sender’s failure to comply within 30 days is unlawful, (3) state the consumer must follow the opt-out instructions in the fax to make an enforceable request, or (4) state the consumer must identify the fax number to which the request relates to make an enforceable request, as required by § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii).

80 Id. ¶ 31.
81 Id. ¶ 20.
82 Id., Ex. A.
83 Id.
84 Id.
On September 5, 2014, Sunwing answered the Complaint, asserting as affirmative defenses that “[a]ny faxes sent to the Plaintiff or putative class members were solicited and therefore not subject to the provisions of the TCPA” and that “Plaintiff and purported class members had an established business relationship with Defendants that precludes liability under the TCPA.” Sunwing denies it sent the same or similar faxes to “over forty” persons and asserts that numerosity is not satisfied.

On September 15, 2014, Sunwing served its initial disclosures identifying “Prominent Information Technologies Inc.,” a Canadian company, as “the company that, upon information and belief, may have sent the facsimile attached as Exhibit A to Plaintiff’s complaint.” Sunwing stated its “investigation for relevant documents is continuing” but produced no documents showing Plaintiff or any other person gave Sunwing express permission to send fax advertisements. On October 3, 2014, Sunwing supplemented its disclosures, identifying another fax broadcaster, “5 Star Fax,” with relevant information, but producing no evidence of permission.

On November 26, 2014, Sunwing filed its petition for a waiver, asserting it sent its faxes with “prior express invitation or permission,” but providing no details of how it obtained such permission or explaining why a chiropractic practice in Ohio would give such permission to a Canadian airline. Sunwing asserts that it “did not understand the opt-out requirement to apply to solicited faxes” at the time it sent its faxes. Sunwing does not

85 Sunwing, Answer (Doc. 14) at 16.
86 Id. ¶ 20.
87 Sunwing Pet. at 5.
88 Id.
explain why it “did not understand” the requirements or claim it read footnote 154 or the 2005 notice of rulemaking.  

Sunwing complains it is “potentially subject to massive liability” in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, but it does not state how many faxes it sent or provide any evidence of its financial resources. Sunwing claims on its website to have seen “a 179% increase in sales volume” in 2013, “with 1,776 employees and sales in excess of $1 Billion.” Sunwing claims it “understand[s] the importance of compliance with the Commission’s rules, including the 2006 Order as clarified by Order FCC 1[4]-164, and [has] implemented procedures to ensure compliance.”

F. The ZocDoc litigation.

On January 10, 2014, undersigned counsel filed suit against ZocDoc in Missouri state court on behalf of Radha Geismann, M.D., P.C., a medical practice in St. Louis, Missouri. ZocDoc removed to the Eastern District of Missouri, which transferred the case to the Southern District of New York, where Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). The FAC alleges ZocDoc sent Plaintiff unsolicited fax advertisements on July 24, 2012, and October 2, 2012. In addition, the FAC alleges that, even if ZocDoc claims it obtained “prior express invitation or permission” to send the faxes, the faxes violated the opt-out-

89 Id. at 1–6.
90 Id. at 5.
92 Id. at 6.
94 Id. ¶ 11.
notice requirements. The complaint alleges ZocDoc sent the same or similar fax advertisements to “more than 40 persons” and that class certification is appropriate.

The faxes attached to the FAC advertise ZocDoc’s “patient matching service,” providing a phone number and email address to “learn more about our service and how to participate” in the service. The opt-out notice at the bottom of the faxes states, “[t]o stop receiving faxes, please call (866) 975-3308.” The notice does not (1) state the recipient has a right to demand the sender not send future advertisements, (2) state a sender’s failure to comply within 30 days is unlawful, (3) set forth the information the consumer must include to make an opt-out request legally enforceable, or (4) provide both a fax number and domestic telephone number for requests, as required by § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii).

ZocDoc has never answered Plaintiff’s allegations or produced any discovery because the district court allowed it to “pick off” Plaintiff’s individual claim and avoid class certification with an offer for $6,000 and dismissed the case as moot, a decision that is currently on appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In its motion to dismiss, ZocDoc did not claim it obtained “prior express invitation or permission” from Dr. Geismann or any other class member.

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95 Id. ¶ 44.
96 Id. ¶ 33.
97 Id., Exs. A & B.
98 Id.
99 Id.
On December 4, 2014, ZocDoc filed its petition for a waiver, arguing it "made efforts to ensure that its faxes were sent only to individuals who consented to their receipt."\textsuperscript{102} ZocDoc does not explain what "efforts" it took or provide any evidence for this assertion.\textsuperscript{103}

ZocDoc does not claim it was "confused" about the law when it sent its faxes.\textsuperscript{104} ZocDoc does not claim it "did not understand" the law when it sent its faxes.\textsuperscript{105} ZocDoc does not deny that it had actual knowledge of the law when it sent its faxes.\textsuperscript{106}

ZocDoc claims it could be subject to a "significant damages award" in the underlying litigation, but it does not state how many faxes are issue or attempt to quantify its risk.\textsuperscript{107} ZocDoc is not a publicly traded corporation, and there has been no discovery in the case into ZocDoc's financial resources. ZocDoc filed a certificate with the State of Delaware on May 30, 2014, stating it had raised funding of $152 million and valuing the company at $1.6 billion.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{102} ZocDoc Pet. at 1.
\textsuperscript{103} Id.
\textsuperscript{104} Id. at 1–4.
\textsuperscript{105} Id.
\textsuperscript{106} Id.
\textsuperscript{107} Id. at 4.
Argument

I. The Commission has no authority to “waive” violations of the regulations prescribed under the TCPA in a private right of action, and doing so would violate the separation of powers.

The TCPA creates a private right of action for any person to sue “in an appropriate court” for “a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection,” and directs the Commission to “prescribe regulations” to be enforced in those lawsuits. The “appropriate court” then determines whether “a violation” has taken place. If the court finds “a violation,” the TCPA automatically awards a minimum $500 in damages for “each such violation” and allows the court “in its discretion” to increase the damages up to $1,500 per violation if it finds they were “willful[] or knowing[].”

The TCPA does not authorize the Commission to “waive” its regulations in a private right of action. It does not authorize the Commission to intervene in a private right of action. It does not require a private plaintiff to notify the Commission it has filed a private lawsuit. Nor does it limit a private plaintiff’s right to sue to cases where the Commission declines to prosecute. The Commission plays no role in determining whether “a violation” has taken place, whether a violation was “willful or knowing,” whether statutory damages

110 Id. § 227(b)(2).
111 Id. § 227(b)(3)(A)–(B).
112 Id. § 227(b)(3).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.; Cf., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (requiring 60 days prior notice to the EPA to maintain a citizen suit).
should be increased, or how much the damages should be increased. These duties belong to the “appropriate court” presiding over the lawsuit.\textsuperscript{117}

The Communications Act does, however, grant the Commission authority to enforce the TCPA through administrative forfeiture actions.\textsuperscript{118} Private citizens have no role in that process, such as determining whether a violator acted “willfully or repeatedly.”\textsuperscript{119} Thus, the TCPA and the Communications Act create a dual-enforcement scheme in which the Commission promulgates regulations that both the Commission and private litigants may enforce but where the Commission plays no role in the private litigation and private citizens play no role in agency enforcement.\textsuperscript{120} This scheme is similar to several other statutes, including the Clean Air Act, which empowers the EPA to issue regulations imposing emissions standards\textsuperscript{121} that are enforceable both in private “citizen suits”\textsuperscript{122} and in administrative actions.\textsuperscript{123}

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recently held the EPA could not issue a regulation creating an affirmative defense for “unavoidable” violations in private litigation under the Clean Air Act in \textit{Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA},\textsuperscript{124} holding it is “the Judiciary” that “determines 'the scope'—including the available remedies” of “statutes establishing private rights

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{117} Id. § 227(b)(3).
\item \textsuperscript{118} Id. § 503(b).
\item \textsuperscript{119} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. v. Turza}, 728 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding TCPA “authorizes private litigation” and agency enforcement, so consumers “need not depend on the FCC”).
\item \textsuperscript{121} 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).
\item \textsuperscript{122} 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).
\item \textsuperscript{123} 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d).
\item \textsuperscript{124} 749 F.3d 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
\end{itemize}
of action”\(^{125}\) and that, consistent with that principle, the Clean Air Act “vests authority over private suits in the courts, not EPA.”\(^{126}\) TCPA Plaintiffs discussed NRDC extensively in a letter to the Commission after it was issued April 18, 2014,\(^{127}\) and in subsequent comments on waiver petitions.\(^{128}\) The Opt-Out Order does not cite NRDC.

On December 12, 2014, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan became the first court in the country to rule on whether a Commission “waiver” from § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) is enforceable in private TCPA litigation.\(^{129}\) The district court held “[i]t would be a fundamental violation of the separation of powers for the administrative agency to ‘waive’ retroactively the statutory or rule requirements for a particular party in a case or controversy presently proceeding in an Article III court.”\(^{130}\) The district court held that “nothing in the waiver—even assuming the FCC ultimately grants it—invalidates the regulation itself” and that “[t]he regulation remains in effect just as it was originally promulgated” for purposes of determining whether a defendant violated the “regulations prescribed under” the TCPA, as directed by § 227(b)(3).\(^{131}\) The district court concluded, “the

\(^{125}\) Id. (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, --- U.S. ---, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1871 n.3 (2013); Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 650 (1990)).

\(^{126}\) Id.

\(^{127}\) Letter of Brian J. Wanca, CG Docket No. 05-338 (May 19, 2014).


\(^{130}\) Id., at *14.

\(^{131}\) Id.
FCC cannot use an administrative waiver to eliminate statutory liability in a private cause of action; at most, the FCC can choose not to exercise its own enforcement power.”

The Commission should deny any further waiver requests. Plaintiffs recognize the Commission issued waivers in the Opt-Out Order, but the fact that an improper action has been taken once is no justification for doing it again. Plaintiffs respect that some members of the Commission maintain the 2006 opt-out regulation was ultra vires. But the principled stance would be to state that position clearly (as these Commissioners did in their statements dissenting in part from the Opt-Out Order), while denying any additional waivers as beyond the Commission’s power. Two wrongs do not make a right, and taking unauthorized action to rectify another perceived unauthorized action does not reflect the rule of law.

II. McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc are not “similarly situated” to the petitioners covered by the Opt-Out Order.

A. McKesson is not “similarly situated.”

1. McKesson had actual knowledge of the regulation requiring opt-out notice on faxes sent with permission, provided by the Commission itself.

If the standard for a “waiver” is that petitioners are “presumptively” considered confused in the absence of evidence they “understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement,” then that presumption is rebutted with respect to McKesson. The Commission furnished McKesson with a copy of § 64.1200 on May 9, 2008, warning McKesson that it appeared to have violated the rules and that it must comply in the

\[132\] Id.

\[133\] Opt-Out Order ¶ 26.
The copy of § 64.1200 the Commission provided McKesson in May 2008 stated, as it does today, that “[a] facsimile advertisement that is sent to a recipient that has provided prior express invitation or permission to the sender must include an opt-out notice that complies with” the same requirements as EBR faxes. The language of the regulation is unambiguous. The regulations themselves do not contain footnote 154 of the Junk Fax Order or the 2005 notice of rulemaking.

McKesson did not heed the Commission’s warning. Instead, in 2012, it sent faxes to Plaintiffs and an unknown number of other class members with no opt-out notice whatsoever. The Commission granted waivers in the Opt-Out Order on the basis that the combination of footnote 154 and the lack of notice in the 2005 notice of rulemaking “presumptively establishes good cause for retroactive waiver” and that there was no evidence “that the petitioners understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement.” That presumption is rebutted with respect to McKesson. If the Commission is going to presume anything, it should be that when the Commission personally serves a fax advertiser with a copy of the Commission’s rules and advises the advertiser to comply, the advertiser “understands” the plain language of those rules.

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134 Ex. A at 3.
135 Id. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iv) (2008) (since recodified as § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv)).
136 See Nack v. Walling, 715 F.3d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding “plain language” of the regulation “extends the opt-out notice requirement to solicited as well as unsolicited fax advertisements”).
137 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.
2. McKesson does not claim it was actually “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required on faxes sent with permission.

If the standard for a waiver is that the petitioner was actually confused about whether opt-out notice was required when it sent its faxes, then the McKesson petition must be denied. McKesson claims it “did not believe that . . . solicited facsimiles required opt-out notices” when it sent it faxes.\textsuperscript{139} It does not claim it was “confused” or claim that its mistaken belief was based on footnote 154 or the 2005 notice of rulemaking.\textsuperscript{140}

3. McKesson’s potential liability is not “significant” in comparison to its financial resources.

The Opt-Out Order states the Commission granted waivers, in part, because the petitioners were “subject to significant damage awards under the TCPA’s private right of action,” ruling that “the risk of substantial liability,” although not dispositive, was “a factor” in its decision.\textsuperscript{141} McKesson’s petition does not state how many faxes it sent or estimate its potential liability,\textsuperscript{142} and McKesson has refused to produce the documents necessary to make that calculation, in violation of a court order to produce those documents by December 12, 2014.\textsuperscript{143} In its answer, however, McKesson denies it sent unsolicited faxes to forty or more persons and denies the numerosity element for class certification is satisfied.\textsuperscript{144} On this

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{139} Id. at 2.
\textsuperscript{140} Id.
\textsuperscript{141} Opt-Out Order ¶¶ 27–28.
\textsuperscript{142} McKesson Pet. at 1–5.
\textsuperscript{143} McKesson, Order (Doc. 143) at 3–5; id. (Doc. 148) at 1 (upholding order as “well-reasoned, thorough, and correct in all respects”).
\textsuperscript{144} McKesson, Answer to Second Amended Compl. (Doc. 103) ¶¶ 17, 22.
\end{footnotesize}
record, in the absence of any evidence from McKesson in its reply comments, McKesson is liable for a maximum of $58,500 (39 faxes at $1,500 per fax).

McKesson is "a Fortune 15 corporation," reporting net income of $1.26 billion in fiscal year 2014 on revenues of $137 billion. McKesson holds $3.8 billion in "cash and cash equivalents" on hand. The potential damages of $58,500 amount to 0.0046% of McKesson’s profits in 2014 and 0.0015% of its cash on hand. That is why McKesson does not disclose Plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a “material” risk factor that a reasonable investor would consider relevant in the overall mix of information in deciding whether to invest in the company. McKesson’s exposure is negligible compared to its financial resources.

B. PCH is not “similarly situated.”

1. PCH does not claim it was “confused” about the Commission’s rules.

PCH does not state indicate one way or the other whether it was aware of the Commission’s rules when it sent the fax advertisements at issue. PCH does not, for example, claim it was “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required on faxes it

145 McKesson Pet. at 2.
148 McKesson Corp. 2014 Form 10-K at 104–06.
149 PCH Pet. at 1–8.
believed were sent with “prior express invitation or permission” or claim that it read footnote 154 or the 2005 notice of rulemaking.\textsuperscript{150}

Based on the record before the Commission, it is just as likely that PCH had actual knowledge of the plain language of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) when it sent its faxes and chose not to comply. If the standard is actual “confusion” about the law resulting from footnote 154 and the notice of rulemaking, then the Commission should deny the PCH petition on this basis alone.

2. Plaintiff has a due-process right to inquire into whether PCH had actual knowledge of the rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action.

If the standard for a waiver is that petitioners are “presumptively” considered confused in the absence of evidence they “understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement,”\textsuperscript{151} then True Health has no evidence of actual knowledge at this time with which to rebut the presumption. PCH has been silent on that issue in the underlying litigation and before the Commission, and PCH did not respond to discovery before the district court stayed the case in September 2014.

True Health has a due-process right to investigate whether PCH was aware of the opt-out rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action under the TCPA.\textsuperscript{152} The Commission may hold such “proceedings as it may deem necessary” for such purposes and

\textsuperscript{150} Id.
\textsuperscript{151} Opt-Out Order ¶ 26.
\textsuperscript{152} See, e.g., Applications of Comcast Corp. and Time Warner Cable Inc. For Consent To Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, MB Docket No. 14-57; Applications of AT&T, Inc. and DIRECTV For Consent To Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, MB Docket No. 14-90, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pai (arguing Commission violated petitioners’ “due process rights” by denying “serious arguments that merit the Commission’s thoughtful consideration”).
may "subpoena witnesses and require the production of evidence" as the Commission determines "will best serve the purposes of such proceedings."153 In the alternative, True Health requests the Commission stay a ruling on the PCH petition until Plaintiff has completed discovery regarding PCH’s actual knowledge (or lack thereof) of the law prior to sending its faxes before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

3. PCH has failed to demonstrate its potential liability is "substantial" when compared to its financial resources.

PCH claims it is subject to "substantial remedies" in the private litigation, but it does not attempt to estimate its liability or demonstrate it would be "substantial" in comparison to its financial resources.154 PCH denies there are "at least forty" class members.155 On this record, in the absence of any evidence from PCH in its reply comments, PCH is liable for a maximum of $58,500 (39 faxes at $1,500 per fax).

Regarding whether $58,500 would be "substantial" when compared with PCH’s financial resources, in 2008, the year it went private, PCH reported net income over $326 million with $106 million in cash and cash equivalents on hand.156 On this record, in the absence of any contrary evidence, PCH’s potential liability is 0.018% of its 2007 profits and 0.055% of its cash on hand in 2007, which is not a "substantial" risk to the company.

153 47 C.F.R. § 1.1.
154 PCH Pet. at 6.
155 PCH, Answer ¶ 20.
156 PCH 2007 Form 10-K at 65, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/909109/000089322008000559/w50354e10vk.htm#110
C. St. Luke’s is not “similarly situated.”

1. St. Luke’s claims it was “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required, but it does not claim its confusion resulted from footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking.

Unlike McKesson, PCH, Sunwing, and ZocDoc, St. Luke’s claims it was actually “confused as to whether Solicited Faxes must include an opt-out notice” when it sent the faxes at issue in the underlying litigation. But St. Luke’s does not say why it was “confused” about the requirement or claim it read footnote 154 or the 2005 public notice. It is just as likely St. Luke’s was “confused” because it obtained bad legal advice or ignored good legal advice. In the absence of additional evidence on this point, if the standard is actual “confusion” resulting from the “combination of factors” identified in the Opt-Out Order (footnote 154 and the notice of rulemaking), then the Commission should deny the St. Luke’s petition on this ground alone.

2. Plaintiff has a due-process right to inquire into whether St. Luke’s had actual knowledge of the rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action.

If the standard for a waiver is that petitioners are considered “presumptively” confused in the absence of evidence they “understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement,” then Plaintiff has no evidence of actual knowledge at this time with which to rebut the presumption. St. Luke’s has been silent on that issue in the underlying litigation and before the Commission.

\[158\] Id. at 1–8.
\[159\] Opt-Out Order ¶ 26.
Plaintiff has a due-process right to investigate whether St. Luke’s had actual knowledge of the opt-out rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action under the TCPA, and the Commission should hold such “proceedings as it may deem necessary” for that purpose. In the alternative, Plaintiff requests the Commission stay a ruling on the St. Luke’s petition until Plaintiff has completed discovery regarding St. Luke’s actual knowledge (or lack thereof) before the Missouri state court.

3. St. Luke’s has provided no evidence it faces “crushing” potential liability in the private litigation.

St. Luke’s claims it is subject to potentially “crushing,” “ruinous,” or “catastrophic” damages, but it does not state how many faxes are at issue. In discovery, St. Luke’s admitted it sent faxes to “more than 1000 persons” but denied it sent them “to more than 3000.” On this record, in the absence of any contrary evidence in St. Luke’s reply comments, St. Luke’s is potentially liable for a maximum of $4.5 million (2,999 faxes at $1,500 per fax).

St. Luke’s does not give any indication of its financial resources. Since St. Luke’s is not a publicly traded corporation and it has produced no discovery on the subject, the Commission cannot meaningfully evaluate whether a $4.5 million damage award would be “significant” to St. Luke’s. Therefore, St. Luke’s has failed to meet its burden on this issue.

160 47 C.F.R. § 1.1.
D. Sunwing is not “similarly situated.”

1. Sunwing claims it “did not understand” the regulations, not that it was “confused.”

Sunwing asserts that it “did not understand the opt-out requirement to apply to solicited faxes,” but it does not explain why it had that misunderstanding. If Sunwing does not, for example, claim its misunderstanding resulted from reading footnote 154 or the 2005 notice of rulemaking. If the standard for a waiver is actual “confusion” about the law, then the Commission should deny Sunwing’s petition on this ground alone.

2. Plaintiff has a due-process right to inquire into whether Sunwing had actual knowledge of the rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action.

If the standard for a waiver is that petitioners are considered “presumptively” confused in the absence of evidence they “understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement,” then Plaintiff has no evidence of actual knowledge at this time with which to rebut the presumption. Sunwing has been silent on that issue in the underlying litigation and before the Commission.

Plaintiff has a due-process right to investigate whether Sunwing was aware of the opt-out rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action under the TCPA. The Commission should hold such “proceedings as it may deem necessary” for that purpose or stay a ruling on the Sunwing petition until Plaintiff has completed discovery regarding

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164 Sunwing Pet. at 5.
165 Id. at 1–6.
167 47 C.F.R. § 1.1.
Sunwing’s actual knowledge (or lack thereof) before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

3. Sunwing has not demonstrated its potential liability is “massive” in comparison to its financial resources.

Sunwing complains it is “potentially subject to massive liability” in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, but it does not state how many faxes it sent or estimate its potential liability. In its Answer, Sunwing denied it sent the same or similar faxes to “over forty” persons and asserted that numerosity is not satisfied. On this record, in the absence of any evidence from Sunwing in its reply, Sunwing is liable for a maximum of $60,000 (40 faxes at $1,500 per fax).

Sunwing does not discuss its financial resources, and it is not a publicly traded corporation. Sunwing claims on its website, however, to have “sales in excess of $1 Billion” in 2013. Plaintiff submits it is highly unlikely that Sunwing makes so little profit on $1 billion in annual sales that $58,500 would be a “massive” drain on its resources.

E. ZocDoc is not “similarly situated.”

1. ZocDoc does not claim it was actually “confused” about the law when it sent its faxes.

ZocDoc does not claim it was “confused” about whether opt-out notice was required on faxes sent with permission when it sent its faxes. ZocDoc does not claim it “did not

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168 Sunwing Pet. at 5.
169 Sunwing, Answer ¶ 20.
171 Id. at 1–4.
understand” the law when it sent its faxes.\textsuperscript{172} ZocDoc does not claim it read footnote 154 or the 2005 notice of rulemaking.\textsuperscript{173}

Based on the record before the Commission, it is just as likely that ZocDoc had actual knowledge of the plain language of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) when it sent its faxes. If the standard is actual “confusion” about the law resulting from footnote 154 and the notice of rulemaking, then the Commission should deny the ZocDoc petition on this ground alone.

2. Plaintiff has a due-process right to inquire into whether ZocDoc had actual knowledge of the rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action.

If the standard for a waiver is that petitioners are considered “presumptively” confused in the absence of evidence they “understood that they did, in fact, have to comply with the opt-out notice requirement,”\textsuperscript{174} then Plaintiff has no evidence of actual knowledge at this time with which to rebut the presumption. ZocDoc has been silent on that issue in the underlying litigation and before the Commission.

Plaintiff has a due-process right to investigate whether ZocDoc was aware of the opt-out rules if that factor is dispositive of its private right of action under the TCPA. The Commission should hold such “proceedings as it may deem necessary” for that purpose\textsuperscript{175} or stay a ruling on the ZocDoc petition until Plaintiff has completed discovery on the issue before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

\textsuperscript{172} Id.
\textsuperscript{173} Id.
\textsuperscript{174} Opt-Out Order ¶ 26.
\textsuperscript{175} 47 C.F.R. § 1.1.
3. ZocDoc has not demonstrated its potential liability is “significant” in comparison to its financial resources.

ZocDoc claims it could be subject to a “significant damages award” in the underlying litigation, but it does not state how many faxes are issue or attempt to quantify its risk.176 ZocDoc has never answered Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the number of faxes it sent, leaving the operative allegation that ZocDoc sent the same or similar fax advertisements to “more than 40 persons.”177 On this record, in the absence of any evidence from ZocDoc in its reply comments, the Commission should presume ZocDoc’s potential liability to be $61,500 (41 faxes at $1,500 per fax).

ZocDoc is not a publicly traded corporation, but ZocDoc claimed in a May 2014 filing with the State of Delaware that it had raised funding of $152 million and that the value of the company was $1.6 billion.178 Plaintiff submits that a company with $152 million in capital valued at $1.6 billion would not find a damages award of $61,500 “significant” in relation to its financial resources.

III. The proceedings on reconsideration of the 2006 Junk Fax Order—which the Commission has not yet considered on a waiver petition—demonstrate interested parties immediately understood the opt-out rules and were not “confused” by footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking.

The proceedings following the 2006 Junk Fax Order were not discussed in any of the petitions covered by the Opt-Out Order or any of the comments on those petitions. The record of those proceedings demonstrates that regulated parties immediately understood that

176 Id. at 4.
177 ZocDoc, FAC (Doc. 39) ¶ 33.
the plain language of the 2006 rules required opt-out notice on faxes sent with permission and that no one was “confused” by footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking. There were two petitions for reconsideration of the 2006 Junk Fax Order, one of which was filed by the law firm of Levanthal Senter & Lerman (“LSL”) on behalf of CBS and other broadcasting clients on June 2, 2006.179

The LSL petition noted that the new rules required “that all faxed advertisements include an opt-out notice,” including those sent with permission.180 The LSL petition did not seek reconsideration of the rule; it sought clarification that it could place the opt-out notice on a cover page, arguing consumers who previously gave permission would still be able to “exercise their right to opt-out of unwanted faxed advertisements.”181 Public notice of the LSL petition for reconsideration was published in the Federal Register pursuant to Rule 1.429(e) on June 28, 2006.182

Three parties filed comments on the LSL petition, including the American Society of Association Executives (“ASAE”) and the Named State Broadcasters Associations (“NSBA”).183 The ASAE acknowledged that the 2006 Junk Fax Order states, “entities that send facsimile advertisements to consumers from whom they obtained permission, must

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180 Id. at 2.

181 Id. at 7.


183 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Nos. 02-278, 05-338, Comments of American Society of Association Executives (July 12, 2006); National Association Broadcasters Comments (July 13, 2006); Joint Comments of the Named State Broadcasters Associations (July 13, 2006).
include on the advertisements their opt-out notice and contact information to allow consumers to stop unwanted faxes in the future.” 184

The ASAE argued the “plain language” of this rule inappropriately extended to “solicited facsimile advertisements” and asked the Commission to “vacate” it. 185 The relevant section of ASAE’s 2006 comments reads as follows in its entirety:

The plain language of this provision imposes the opt-out notice requirement on both unsolicited and solicited facsimile advertisements. The Fax Act requires advertisers to include such notices only on any unsolicited facsimile advertisement, but neither the Fax Act nor the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“TCPA”) authorizes the Commission to impose any notice requirement on solicited facsimile advertisements.

By applying the notice requirement to solicited facsimile advertisements, the Commission has exceeded its authority, especially with respect to nonprofit associations. In the Fax Act, Congress explicitly authorized the Commission to exempt nonprofit professional and trade associations from any notice requirement whatsoever. This provision demonstrates that Congress recognized the favored, unique position of nonprofit associations and did not intend for the Commission to impose additional requirements on such associations — especially requirements unauthorized by Congress through the Fax Act, the TCPA, or otherwise.

Accordingly, ASAE respectfully urges the Commission to vacate the portion of the Report and Order that imposes a notice requirement with respect to solicited facsimile advertisements. 186

The ASAE did not argue footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking made the ruling “confusing.” 187 It argued the “plain language” was clear. 188

184 ASAE Comments at 4.
185 Id. at 2.
186 Id. at 4–5.
187 Id.
188 Id.
The NSBA raised the same arguments, asking the Commission to “vacate the notice requirement to the extent it applies to solicited facsimile advertisements” on the basis that the Commission “lack[ed] the authority” to issue it under the TCPA.\textsuperscript{189} The NSBA argued the Commission should “on its own motion” correct this “critical flaw” in the 2006 Junk Fax Order.\textsuperscript{190}

Following the ASAE and NSBA comments, either of the two parties that filed timely petitions for reconsideration of the 2006 order (the Direct Marketing Association and LSL) could have sought to “supplement” their petitions to argue that the rules were “confusing” via a “separate pleading stating the grounds for acceptance of the supplement,” as allowed by Rule 1.429.\textsuperscript{191} Neither petitioner did so.

On October 14, 2008, the Commission decided the two petitions for reconsideration, which it granted in part and denied in part.\textsuperscript{192} The Commission denied LSL’s request to allow opt-out notice to appear on a cover page.\textsuperscript{193} The order does not expressly address the challenges to the Commission’s statutory authority to require opt-out notice on faxes sent with permission raised in in the ASAE and NSBA comments.\textsuperscript{194}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{189} Named State Broadcasters Associations Comments at 3.  
\textsuperscript{190} Id. at 5–6.  
\textsuperscript{191} 47 C.F.R. § 1.429; see also 21st Century Telesis Joint Venture v. FCC, 318 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider constitutional challenge on appeal where party sought to supplement a timely petition for reconsideration but failed to explain why argument was omitted from petition).  
\textsuperscript{193} Id. ¶ 15.  
\textsuperscript{194} Id. ¶¶ 1–24.}
No party petitioned for reconsideration of the 2008 order pursuant to Rule 1.429 on the basis that the rules were “confusing.” No party appealed the 2006 order or the 2008 order under the Communications Act and the Hobbs Act on the basis that the rules were “confusing” or violated the notice requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. No party filed a petition to “clarify” the rule until more than two years later, when Anda filed its petition November 30, 2010. No party petitioned to repeal or amend the opt-out-notice rule until nearly five years later, when Staples filed its petition July 19, 2013.

In sum, the record of proceedings demonstrates that regulated parties immediately understood the plain language of the rules and were not confused by footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking. Contemporaneous legal observers immediately understood the rule. The courts understood the plain language of the rule. There is no evidence in the record of anyone in particular ever actually being “confused” by footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking. There is now affirmative evidence in the record that regulated parties were not confused. Based on this record, the Commission cannot reasonably find that McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, or ZocDoc were “presumptively” confused about the law.

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195 47 C.F.R. § 1.429; see N. Am. Telecomm’ns Ass’n v. FCC, 772 F.2d 1282, 1286 (7th Cir. 1985) (telecommunications association could obtain review of FCC orders by appealing from FCC’s subsequent reconsideration decision within appropriate time, even though association’s prior appeal of substantive FCC order had been dismissed as untimely).

196 See, e.g., FCC Issues Regulations Implementing Junk Fax Prevention Act, 60 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 401 (Fall 2006) (“The opt-out notice must be included in all facsimile advertisements, including those based on an established business relationship or in response to a recipient’s prior express invitation or permission.”).

197 See, e.g., In re Sandusky Wellness Ctr., LLC, 570 F. App’x 437 (6th Cir. 2014) (ordering district court to apply the rule); Nack v. Walling, 715 F.3d 680, 687 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing “plain language” of the rule); Ira Halpert, C.P.A. v. Tversky, 728 F.3d 682, 683 (7th Cir. 2013) (applying plain language of the rule in affirming class certification and summary judgment).
IV. Allowing McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc to send opt-out-free fax advertisements until April 30, 2015, would endanger public health and safety.

Even if the Commission grants McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc retroactive waivers for past conduct, it should not grant them prospective waivers immunizing them from future violations of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) through April 30, 2015. These petitioners have a history of targeting doctors and other medical professionals with their faxes.

Congress found in the TCPA that “when an emergency or medical assistance telephone line is seized,” unrestricted advertising can be “a risk to public safety.”198 Two doctors commented in these proceedings that they use fax technology to transmit and receive time-sensitive patent information and that unwanted fax advertisements disrupt patient care.199

The Opt-Out Order ruled that the “interplay” between the notice requirement and the requirement that an opt-out request is enforceable only if it uses the instructions on the fax did not counsel against a retroactive waiver under the “particular circumstances” at issue.200 But it did not expressly address the interplay of those rules with respect to a prospective waiver. Plaintiffs request the Commission do so with respect to the current petitions out of concern for public health and safety.

Unbound by § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc would be free to send faxes with no opt-out mechanisms to their preferred targets until April


199 See Comments of Dr. John Lary, M.D., CG Docket No. 05-338 (Feb. 19, 2014) (stating Dr. Lary’s office “receives many unsolicited and unwanted faxes” and that it is “disruptive and potentially dangerous”); TCPA Pls.’ Ex Parte Notice, CG Docket No. 05-338 (Aug. 27, 2014) (summarizing Dr. Richard Maynard’s comments in meeting with Commission staff that his office is often required to send and receive patient information by fax and that fax advertisements disrupt his practice).

200 Opt-Out Order ¶ 25, n.91.
30, 2015. They could “effectively lock in” any permission they have today by making it impossible to revoke permission, which is precisely what the Commission sought to avoid in the Opt-Out Order.201 If, for example, a doctor agreed to receive one fax advertisement for a particular product from one of the petitioners, the petitioner could then program its software (or instruct its fax broadcaster) to send fax advertisements to the doctor’s fax line continuously until 11:59 p.m. on April 30, 2015. The doctor’s fax machine would be useless for anything but printing advertisements for months, and there would be nothing the doctor could do to stop it. Not even filing a lawsuit under the TCPA’s private right of action would revoke permission, because that is not an authorized opt-out mechanism.202

TCPA defendants typically respond that all faxes must include header information, and fax advertisements usually include some kind of contact information to purchase a product, sign up for a “free seminar,” etc., so the recipient could use these avenues to communicate an opt-out request. The problem is that the Commission has already ruled that permission may be revoked only by “using the telephone number, facsimile number, website address or email address provided by the sender in its opt-out notice.”203 If there is no opt-out notice, there is no way to revoke permission. The Opt-Out Order recognized this problem and expressly declined to change the rule or grant a reciprocal “waiver” of the fax recipient’s obligations.204

201 Id. ¶ 20.
202 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(v).
203 2006 Junk Fax Order ¶ 34.
204 Opt-Out Order ¶ 25, n.91.
Thus, if McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, and ZocDoc choose not to include opt-out notice on fax advertisements they contend are sent with permission until April 30, 2015, then the recipients will have no way to revoke permission. The Opt-Out Order concluded this was an acceptable trade-off with respect to faxes sent in the past, but the parties who sent those faxes were ostensibly “confused” about whether their faxes were legal, which would have tempered the faxing activity of a reasonable person. Granting immunity for faxes sent in the future by McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc, in contrast, would give these parties free reign to send as many “locked in” fax advertisements as possible for the next several months, threatening public health and safety.

**Conclusion**

The Commission should deny the McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc petitions for waivers because the Commission has no authority to “waive” a regulation in a private right of action under the TCPA and doing so would violate the separation of powers. These petitioners are also not “similarly situated” to the petitioners covered by the Opt-Out Order, since (1) the Commission put McKesson on notice of the rules by serving McKesson with a copy and advising it to comply in 2008, (2) only St. Luke’s claims it was “confused” about the rules, and it does not claim to have read footnote 154 or the 2005 notice of rulemaking, and (3) none of the petitioners have established that they face “significant” potential liability.

In addition, the Commission should consider the 2006 proceedings after the opt-out regulation was issued, which demonstrate that regulated parties immediately understood the

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205 *Id.*
plain language of the opt-out rules and were not “confused” by footnote 154 or the notice of rulemaking, rebutting any presumption of “confusion” (if that is indeed the standard).

Finally, the Commission should not grant prospective waivers to McKesson, PCH, St. Luke’s, Sunwing, and ZocDoc because these petitioners target doctors and other medical-care providers with fax advertisements, and a prospective waiver would allow them to “effectively lock in” permission by sending opt-out-free fax advertisements until April 30, 2015, threatening public health and safety.

Respectfully submitted,

By: s/Brian J. Wanca
Brian J. Wanca
Glenn L. Hara
Anderson + Wanca
3701 Algonquin Road, Suite 760
Rolling Meadows, IL 60008
Telephone: (847) 368-1500
Facsimile: (847) 368-1501
VIA CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

McKesson Corporation
f/k/a Relay Health Corporation
Attn: Giovani Colella, MD, CEO
1 Post Street, Floor 19
San Francisco, CA 94104

RE: EB-08-TC-2410

Dear Dr. Colella:

This is an official CITATION, issued pursuant to section 503(b)(5) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (the Act), 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(5), for violations of the Act and the Federal Communications Commission’s rules that govern telephone solicitations and unsolicited advertisements.1 As explained below, future violations of the Act or Commission’s rules in this regard may subject you and your company to monetary forfeitures.

It has come to our attention that your company, acting under your direction, apparently sent one or more unsolicited advertisements to telephone facsimile machines in violation of Section 227(b)(1)(C) of the Communications Act, as described in the attached complaint(s). 2 Section 227(b)(1)(C) makes it “unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States . . . to use a telephone facsimile machine,

1 47 U.S.C. § 227; 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200. A copy of these provisions is enclosed for your convenience. Section 227 was added to the Communications Act by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 and is most commonly known as the TCPA. The TCPA and the Commission’s parallel rules restrict a variety of practices that are associated with telephone solicitation and use of the telephone network to deliver unsolicited advertisements, including fax advertising. 47 U.S.C. § 64.1200(a)(3); Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 — Junk Fax Protection Act of 2005, Report and Order and Third Order on Reconsideration, 21 FCC Red 3787 (2006) (2006 TCPA Report and Order).

2 We have attached one complaint at issue in this citation. The complaint addresses a facsimile advertisement that contains the telephone number 516-491-1891, which your business utilized during the time period at issue.

EXHIBIT A
computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a “telephone facsimile machine.” 3

As relevant here, an “unsolicited advertisement” is “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission.” 4 Mere distribution or publication of a fax number does not establish consent to receive advertisements by fax. 5 Fax advertisements may be sent to recipients with whom the sender has an established business relationship, as long as the fax number was provided voluntarily by the recipient. 6 An established business relationship is defined as a prior or existing relationship formed by a voluntary two-way communication between a person or entity and a business or residential subscriber with or without an exchange of consideration, based on a purchase, inquiry, application or transaction by that subscriber regarding products or services offered by such person or entity. This relationship must not have been previously terminated by either party. 7 A fax advertisement may be sent to a recipient with whom the sender has an established business relationship only if the sender also: 8

(i) obtains the fax number directly from the recipient; 9 or

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3 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C); see also 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3) (providing that no person or entity may . . . use a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine). Both the TCPA and the Commission’s rules define “telephone facsimile machine” as “equipment which has the capacity to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal received over a regular telephone line onto paper.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(11). The Commission has stated that “[t]he TCPA’s definition of ‘telephone facsimile machine’ broadly applies to any equipment that has the capacity to send or receive text or images.” Thus, “faxes sent to personal computers equipped with, or attached to, modems and to computerized fax servers are subject to the TCPA’s prohibition on unsolicited faxes. . . . [although] the prohibition does not extend to facsimile messages sent as email over the Internet.” Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 18 FCC Red 14014, 14131-32 (2003) (2003 TCPA Report and Order).

4 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(3) (defining “unsolicited advertisement” to specify that prior express invitation or permission may be “in writing or otherwise”).


7 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(f)(5); see also 2006 TCPA Report and Order, 21 FCC Red at 3797-3799. An inquiry about a store location or merely visiting a company website does not create an established business relationship; an inquiry must seek information about the products or services offered by the company. Once established, nonetheless, a business relationship will permit an entity to send facsimile advertisements until the recipient “terminates” the relationship by making a request not to receive future faxes. 2006 TCPA Report and Order, 21 FCC Red at 3798.

8 If a valid EBR existed between the fax sender and recipient prior to July 9, 2005, and the sender also possessed the facsimile number prior to July 9, 2005, the sender may send the facsimile advertisements to that recipient without demonstrating how the number was obtained or verifying it was provided voluntarily by the recipient. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(ii)(C); see also 2006 TCPA Report and Order, 21 FCC Red at 3796.

(ii) obtains the fax number from the recipient’s own directory, advertisement, or site on the Internet, unless the recipient has noted on such materials that it does not accept unsolicited advertisements at the fax number in question;\(^\text{10}\) or

(iii) has taken reasonable steps to verify that the recipient agreed to make the number available for public distribution, if obtained from a directory or other source of information compiled by a third party.\(^\text{11}\)

Finally, in the event of a complaint or dispute, the burden rests with the fax sender to demonstrate that it either obtained prior express permission to send the facsimile advertisement or satisfied all the criteria necessary to invoke the established business relationship exemption.\(^\text{12}\)

If, after receipt of this citation, you or your company violate the Communications Act or the Commission’s rules in any manner described herein, the Commission may impose monetary forfeitures not to exceed $11,000 for each such violation or each day of a continuing violation.

You may respond to this citation within thirty (30) days from the date of this letter either through (1) a personal interview at the Commission’s Field Office nearest to your place of business, (2) a written statement, or (3) a teleconference interview with the Commission’s Telecommunications Consumers Division in Washington, DC. Your response should specify the actions that you are taking to ensure that you do not violate the Commission’s rules governing telephone solicitation and unsolicited advertisements, as described above.

Please contact Delores Browder at (202) 418-2861 to arrange for an interview at the closest field office, if you wish to schedule a personal interview. You should schedule any interview to take place within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter. You should send any written statement within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter to:

Kurt A. Schroeder  
Deputy Chief  
Telecommunications Consumers Division  
Enforcement Bureau  
Federal Communications Commission  
445-12th Street, S.W., Rm. 4-C222  
Washington, D.C. 20554

Reference EB-08-TC-2410 when corresponding with the Commission.

Reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities are available upon request. Include a description of the accommodation you will need including as much detail as you can.

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\(^\text{11}\) 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C)(ii)(II); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (a)(ii)(B); see also 2006 TCPA Report and Order, 21 FCC Red at 3795 (“[i]f the sender obtains the number from sources of information compiled by third parties—e.g., membership directories, commercial databases, or internet listings—the sender must take reasonable steps to verify that the recipient consented to have the number listed, such as calling or emailing the recipient.”).

Also include a way we can contact you if we need more information. Please allow at least 5 days advance notice; last minute requests will be accepted, but may be impossible to fill. Send an e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau:

For sign language interpreters, CART, and other reasonable accommodations: 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (tty);

For accessible format materials (braille, large print, electronic files, and audio format): 202-418-0531 (voice), 202-418-7365 (tty).

Under the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(e)(3), we are informing you that the Commission’s staff will use all relevant material information before it, including information that you disclose in your interview or written statement, to determine what, if any, enforcement action is required to ensure your compliance with the Communications Act and the Commission’s rules.

The knowing and willful making of any false statement, or the concealment of any material fact, in reply to this citation is punishable by fine or imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation.

Sincerely,

Kurt A. Schroeder
Deputy Chief, Telecommunications Consumers Division
Enforcement Bureau
Federal Communications Commission

Enclosures
Version 16 – Product Registration

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Registration Version: 5
Product Version: 11290908

Product Name: **Office Hours Professional for Networks (NT)**
Registration Name: **TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC**
Contact: **Jeffrey R. Shope, D.C.**
Street: **2511 W. Schock Rd**
City: **Westerville**
State: **OH**
Zip Code: **43081**

Practice Specialty: **Chiropractor**
Email: **truehealth@midohio.fwcc.net**
Phone: **614/794-1379**
Fax: [ ]
Registration Date: **11/10/10**
Number of Users: **3**

Upgraded from: [ ]
Upgraded to: [ ]
Registration Number: [ ]

RS: TRUEHEALTH-000003
Version 17 – Product Registration

Registered User: (new) Medsoft

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Product Version: 17

TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC

Jeffrey R. Shope, D.C.

2511 W. Schrock Rd

Worthington

Registration Version: 5

Product Name: NDCH Medisoft Network Professional

Registration Name: TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC

Contact: Jeffrey R. Shope, D.C.

Street: 2511 W. Schrock Rd

City: Worthington

State: OH

Zip Code: 43081

Phone: (614) 794-1379

Fax: (614) 794-1379

e-Mail: truehealth@medshio.twcbo.com

Registration Date: 08/29/11

Number of Users: 3

Upgraded from: 19160121420859

Upgraded to:

Registration Number: RS-TRUEHEALTH-000005
Registered User: (new)MediSoft

Registered Name: TRUE HEALTH CHIROPRACTIC

Contact: Shopa, Jeffery

Street: 2511 W. Schrock Rd

City: Westerville

State: OH

Zip Code: 43081

Practice Specialty: Chiropractor

e-mail: truehealth@midohio.webc.com

Phone: (614)794-1379

Fax:

Registration Date: 10/31/13

Number of Users: 3

Upgraded from:

Upgraded to:

Registration Number: 85109212398199

RS-TRUEHEALTH-000007