On February 23, 2005, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking ("NPRM") in the above-entitled proceeding, which was noticed in the Federal Register on March 16, 2005. In the NPRM, the Commission indicated that it is considering the issue of regulatory treatment for prepaid calling card services in a comprehensive manner, and invited comments on various issues concerning regulation of these services. The New York State Department of Public Service ("NYDPS") submits these comments in response to the aforementioned NPRM.

The Commission inquired, among other things, whether there are any circumstances under which the Commission should assert exclusive federal jurisdiction over prepaid calling card services, even if calls made via such services originate and terminate within the same state, in the event that the Commission classifies such services as telecommunications services.\(^1\) The

\(^1\) NPRM at ¶ 42.
Commission also asked whether its recent Vonage Order\(^2\) has any relevance to determining jurisdiction over intrastate prepaid calling card calls in this circumstance.

If the Commission determines that prepaid calling card services are telecommunications services, as it should, the utilization of Internet protocol ("IP") technology in the provision of such services would not affect the traditional jurisdictional legal analysis under Section 2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934\(^3\) ("the Act"). Under that analysis, the only circumstances under which the Commission may assert exclusive jurisdiction over such services would be where it is impossible to separate the intrastate and interstate components of regulation (the "impossibility" exception),\(^4\) or where the Telecommunications Act of 1996\(^5\) ("1996 Act") expressly grants the Commission jurisdiction over the intrastate aspects of prepaid calling services.\(^6\) Further, the Commission would bear the burden of demonstrating,

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\(^3\) 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.

\(^4\) Louisiana Public Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375 n.4.


\(^6\) Section 601(c)(1) of the 1996 Act plainly states that "this Act and the amendments made by this Act shall not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so provided in such Act or amendments." See Cellco Partnership v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 100 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Bell-Atlantic Md. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 307 (4th Cir. 2001) (vacated sub nom. on other grounds, Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635 (2002)) (the 1996 Act
with specificity, that any federal preemption is narrowly tailored to impact only such state law or regulation as would actually negate the Commission’s legitimate exercise of interstate regulation of calling card services.\footnote{See People of the State of California v. F.C.C., 905 F.3d 1217, 1243 (9th Cir. 1990) (“California I”); National Ass’n of Reg. Utility Com’rs v. F.C.C, 880 F.2d 422, 429-430 (D.C. Cir. 1989).}

Moreover, the Vonage Order is inapposite to the jurisdictional analysis of prepaid calling card services. Existing prepaid calling services are plainly outside the scope of the Vonage Order. That order expressly applied to services exhibiting certain basic characteristics including, \textit{inter alia}, a requirement for a broadband connection from the user’s location, and a need for Internet protocol-enabled customer premises equipment.\footnote{Vonage Order at ¶ 32.} Existing prepaid calling card services require neither, and can be accessed from any standard telephone. They are not tied to any particular end-user devices or transport technology. Rather, they are simply cards which entitle the user to make telephone calls for a specified amount of calling time.\footnote{Moreover, even if existing or future prepaid calling card services were to utilize IP technology in a manner similar to Vonage’s Digital Voice service, which we believe would be unlikely, there would be no basis to conclude that it is impossible to separate the interstate and intrastate components of such services.}

Finally, we disagree with the Commission’s presumption that prepaid calling card services would be automatically subject to exclusive federal
The Commission regulates information services pursuant to its ancillary authority under Title I of the Act; specifically, §2(a). Nothing in the Act suggests that Title I may be used either to circumscribe the state-federal jurisdictional boundary created by §2(b) of the Act, nor to upset the dual regulatory system established under the Act. As the Supreme Court clarified in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board, the Commission’s ancillary jurisdiction cannot be utilized to override Section 2(b)’s reservation of explicit state authority over intrastate communications. Therefore, the Commission may not assert exclusive jurisdictional authority over a communications service solely on the basis of that service having been classified as an information service.

Respectfully submitted,

10 See NPRM at ¶ 42.

11 Section 2 (a) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (a)) has been read to confer upon the Commission authority “reasonably ancillary” to its specific statutory responsibilities. See California I, 905 F.2d at 1240-41 n.35 (citing U. S. v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968)).

12 Section 2 (b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (b)) expressly states that “...nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply or to give the Commission jurisdiction with respect to ... charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regulations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of any carrier...” This provision clearly assigns jurisdiction over intrastate communications to the States.

13 California I at 1240-41 n.35.


15 Id. at 381 n.8.
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