Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991
Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005
Petitions for Declaratory Ruling and Retroactive Waiver of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) Regarding the Commission’s Opt-Out Notice Requirement for Faxes Sent with the Recipient’s Prior Express Permission

To: Office of the Secretary
Attention: The Commission
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

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Summary

The granting of a retroactive waiver by the Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau in its August 28, 2015 Order, DA 15-976, to Senco Brands, Inc. is arbitrary and capricious. The Bureau’s case support is misplaced. Its action violates the separation of powers. It is also against public policy.
Before the
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of )
Rules and Regulations Implementing the ) CG Docket No. 02-278
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 )
Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005 ) CG Docket No. 05-338

Petitions for Declaratory Ruling and Retroactive ) Re: Waiver Request by Senco
Waiver of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) Brand, Inc.
Regarding the Commission’s Opt-Out Notice )
Requirement for Faxes Sent with the Recipient’s )
Prior Express Permission )

To: Office of the Secretary
Attention: The Commission
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau

APPLICATION FOR REVIEW

Craftwood Lumber Company ("Craftwood"), by its attorneys, and pursuant to Section 1.115 of the Commission’s rules, seeks review of the August 28, 2015, Order, DA 15-976 ("August 28 Order"), of the Acting Chief, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau ("Bureau"). The order grants a retroactive waiver to Senco Brands, Inc. ("SBI") of the Commission’s regulation requiring an opt-out disclosure on fax advertisements sent with the prior express permission of recipients. As will be demonstrated, the August 28 Order is arbitrary and capricious. The Bureau’s case support for granting the waiver is misplaced. The Commission’s actions violate the separation of powers. Furthermore, the August 28 Order sets a precedent that is against public policy. In support, Craftwood submits the following:
Craftwood’s Lawsuit Against SBI for Sending Junk Faxes

Craftwood is a Highland Park, Illinois hardware store that serves the North Shore area of Chicago. Craftwood commenced an action on September 5, 2014, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against SBI for sending fax ads in direct violation of the TCPA and the Commission’s regulations. Craftwood commenced the action to stop junk faxes that regularly interfere with its business and to obtain damages to compensate it and other junk fax victims and deter future violations. Craftwood alleges that SBI violated the TCPA in two independent ways: (1) by failing to obtain prior express permission from targeted recipients to send its fax ads; and (2) by failing to include an opt-out notice, required by the Act and the Commission’s regulations, advising recipients of their right to stop future defendants’ fax ads and informing them how to make a valid opt-out request. 1

SBI is a national and international distributor of power tools and fastners. SBI also maintains a website (www.senco.com) which itself is a service and advertisement for the company and its products. The website is interactive and invites visitors to locate retailers across the United States and internationally that sell SBI products. SBI has resorted to large-scale junk fax program to promote its products and its website. SBI sent one of its fax ads to Craftwood on January 12, 2012. Craftwood did not give SBI permission to send it any faxes and did not have an established business relationship with SBI. There is no opt-out notice whatsoever contained on the fax ad Craftwood received.

SBI’s Petition for Waiver

In its Petition, SBI ambiguously requests a waiver with respect to “faxes that have been transmitted by Senco with the prior express consent or permission of the recipients or their agents . . .” 2 SBI baldly asserts that Craftwood “expressly provided permission to Senco in 2007

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1 § 227(b)(1)(C)(iii), (b)(2)(D), (b)(2)(E), (d)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)-(vi). SBI’s violations of the opt-out notice requirements are not limited to violations of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv); they also include violations of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii) with respect to faxes sent on the basis of established business relationships.

2 Petition of Senco Brands, Inc. for Waiver (“Petition”), 1.
to receive fax advertisements.” But this is impossible because SBI did not even exist in 2007. SBI wasn’t formed until two and a half years later, in June 2009.3

One month later, in July 2009, SBI bought the assets of the bankrupt Senco Products. The bankruptcy court order approving the deal makes clear, however, that SBI was not an affiliate of or successor to Senco Products, and is “not holding itself out as a continuation of the Debtors.”4 SBI does not assert in its Petition that it, since its creation in June 2009, obtained prior express permission to send fax ads to anyone.

In its Petition, SBI implies, but does not expressly claim, that it had an established business relationship with Craftwood, asserting that Craftwood placed an order with it in 2006.5 But that order was to the now-defunct Senco Products, not SBI. As stated above, SBI was not formed until June 2009 and therefore no established business relationship was created between SBI and Craftwood.6

SBI never alleged in its Petition that it misunderstood or was confused by the opt-out notice requirement for fax ads sent with prior express permission. SBI did not claim in its Petition that the two sources of “confusion” and “misplaced confidence” identified in the Anda Commission Order (i.e., the notice of ruling making for, and footnote 154 of, the 2006 Junk Fax Order)7 influenced it in any way. Indeed, SBI did not contend that it was even aware of the requirements of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), let alone of the rulemaking for the 2006 Junk Fax Order or footnote 154 from that order. Only after Craftwood pointed out these deficiencies in its Comments to SBI’s Petition, SBI in its Reply Comment belatedly claimed, without support or explanation, that it had been confused about the opt-out notice requirements.

Craftwood opposed SBI Petition.

3 SBI was formed as a Delaware corporation on June 15, 2009, and was authorized to do business as a foreign corporation in Ohio on July 9, 2009. (See Declaration of Eric Kennedy (“Kennedy Decl.”), Ex. E, ¶1, submitted by Craftwood concurrently with its Comments to SBI’s Petition.)


5 Petition, 6.

6 See also Junk Fax Order, ¶ 20 (established business relationship exemption applies only to the entity with which the business or subscriber has had a “voluntary two-way communication” and does not extend to affiliates of that entity).

7 Anda Commission Order ¶24.
The August 28 Order

In its August 28 Order, the Bureau summarized the history of fax regulations under the TCPA and recounted the lead-up to the Anda Commission Order\(^8\), namely, “that a footnote contained in the Junk Fax Order caused confusion regarding the applicability of the opt-out notice requirement to faxes sent to recipients who provided prior express permission.”\(^9\) The Commission stated in the Anda Commission Order that “[t]he use of the word ‘unsolicited’ in this one instance may have caused some parties to misconstrue the Commission’s intent to apply the opt-out notice to fax ads sent with the prior express permission of the recipient.”\(^10\) The Commission had also noted a “lack of explicit notice” of the Commission’s intent to impose an opt-out requirement on solicited fax advertisements.\(^11\)

Conspicuously absent from the August 28 Order, however, was the Commission’s admonition in the Anda Commission Order that “simple ignorance of the TCPA or the Commission’s attendant regulations is not grounds for waiver.”\(^12\) In its place, the Bureau found that petitioners, like SBI, “are entitled to a presumption of confusion or misplaced confidence.”\(^13\) There was no such “presumption” contained in the Anda Commission Order. Indeed, this newly-minted presumption is directly contrary to the explicit requirement set forth by the Commission in the Anda Commission Order that a petitioner must show more than “simple ignorance” in order to obtain a waiver.

The Bureau granted waivers to petitioners, like SBI, who merely asserted without explanation that they had sent faxes with prior express permission and/or cannot show that it


\(^9\) August 28 Order ¶ 7.

\(^10\) Anda Commission Order ¶ 24.

\(^11\) Anda Commission Order ¶ 25; August 28 Order ¶¶ 8, 15.

\(^12\) Anda Commission Order ¶ 26.

\(^13\) August 28 Order ¶ 15.
obtained prior express permission. The Bureau took the position that it was sufficient for a waiver recipient to prove prior express permission, if any, later in their pending court cases.\textsuperscript{14}

The Bureau rejected arguments that, by granting waivers while litigation is pending, the Commission violated the separation of powers.\textsuperscript{15}

The Bureau failed to address Craftwood’s argument that it would be against public interest to waive SBI’s liability under § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) in connection with SBI’s failure to provide opt-out notices because those notices were required on all its faxes independent of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv).

**Argument**

As will be demonstrated, the August 28 Order is arbitrary and capricious. The Bureau’s case support for granting the waiver is misplaced. The Commission’s actions violate the separation of powers. Furthermore, the August 28 Order sets a precedent that is against public policy.

**A. The Commission Cannot Retroactively Waive § 64.1200(a)(4)**

In its August 28 Order, the Bureau asserts that it has the authority under 47 C.F.R. § 1.3 to waive section 64.1200(a)(4).\textsuperscript{16} But the Bureau does not even try to justify granting a waiver on a retroactive basis.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, the Bureau’s retroactive waiver of section 64.1200(a)(4) is impermissible. Retroactive waiver is highly disfavored and agency regulations cannot be applied retroactively unless expressly authorized by Congress. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208, 109 S. Ct. 468 (1988). Congress did not authorize retroactive rulemaking in

\textsuperscript{14} August 28 Order ¶ 17.

\textsuperscript{15} August 28 Order ¶ 13.


\textsuperscript{17} WAIT Radio provides no support that the Commission can waive section 64.1200(a)(4) retroactively. WAIT Radio merely stands for the proposition that the Commission can waive its rules. It does not address a retroactive waiver, let alone of a regulation already at issue in active litigation. In the Northern Cellular case, the Commission granted a waiver, but it was not retroactive. Moreover, the case does not support any waiver by the Commission — whether retroactive or otherwise — because the District of Columbia Circuit overturned the Commission’s action as arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, Northern Cellular supports those like Craftwood in challenging the August 28 Order.
either the TCPA or in its 2005 amendment. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2). This alone precludes the retroactive application of any waiver.

Further, in Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court noted the following:

Among the considerations that enter into a resolution of the problem [of retroactivity] are (1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well-established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on the old standard. \(^{18}\)

A retroactive waiver is particularly unfair to those, like Craftwood, who commenced litigation in reliance of the clear and unambiguous language of section 64.1200(a)(4) before the issuance of the Andra Commission Order. \(^{19}\) Craftwood filed suit on September 5, 2014. It is against public policy to apply a waiver retroactively to someone who in good faith relies on the Commission’s regulations. In Greene v. United States, the Supreme Court held that, because the petitioner’s rights “matured” under the 1955 rule, his claim must be evaluated that provision and disallowed retrospective operation of any new rule. The Court applied the 1960 DOD rule only prospectively—despite the construction by the agency that adopted the regulation. Thus, the Court departed from its usual practice of giving deference to an agency’s interpretation of its

\(^{18}\) In Retail, Wholesale, Judge McGowan also noted that “[u]nless the burden of imposing the new standards is de minimis, or the newly discovered statutory design compels its retroactive application, the principles which underlie the very notion of ordered society, in which authoritatively established rules of conduct may fairly be relied upon, must preclude its retroactive effect...” Id. at 392.

\(^{19}\) Indeed, the Commission ruled in the Andra Commission Order that its adoption of section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv) was a valid exercise of Congressional authority granted under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b). Id. ¶ 14. Further, the Commission found that requiring opt-out notices on fax ads sent to recipients who give prior express permission serves highly useful and important purposes: “absent [such] a requirement...recipients could be confronted with a practical inability to make senders aware that their consent is revoked. At best, this could require such consumers to take, potentially, considerable time and effort to determine how to properly opt out...At worse, it would effectively lock in their consent. Moreover...giving consumers a cost-free, simple way to withdraw previous consent is good policy.” Id. at ¶ 20.
Craftwood’s right to rely on section 64.1200(a)(4) matured when it commenced this litigation on September 5 and cannot be abrogated retroactively by the Commission. Craftwood read the Commission’s regulation correctly and sued for its violation. In enacting the TCPA, Congress determined that giving junk fax victims the right to sue for violations, in addition to Commission enforcement, was the best way to achieve the statute’s objectives. It would undermine the statutory objectives if junk fax victims, like Craftwood, after reading and correctly comprehending the Commission’s plain and unambiguous regulations, commenced litigation and invested substantial resources to enforce those regulations, only to have the violation evaporate by agency action. This would seriously weaken the incentive to bring such actions in the first place and incentivize junk fax advertisers to run to the Commission whenever a victim seeks to hold them liable for their illegal conduct. “Pulling rug from underneath” Craftwood is arbitrary and capricious and violates public policy.

B. The Commission does not have the authority to “waive” violations of the regulations prescribed under the TCPA in a private right of action, and doing so would violate the separation of powers

1. The Commission has no authority to “waive” its regulations in a private right of action

The TCPA creates a private right of action for any person to sue “in an appropriate court” for “a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection,” and directs the Commission to “prescribe regulations” to be enforced in those lawsuits. The “appropriate court” then determines whether “a violation” has taken place. If the court finds “a violation,” the TCPA automatically awards a minimum $500 in statutory damages for “each such violation.”

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21 § 227(b)(3).
22 § 227(b)(2).
23 § 227(b)(3)(A)–(B).
violation” and allows the court “in its discretion” to increase the damages up to $1,500 per violation if it finds the violations were “willful[] or knowing[].”

The Commission plays no role in determining whether “a violation” has taken place, whether a violation was “willful or knowing,” whether statutory damages should be increased, or how much the damages should be increased. These duties belong to the “appropriate court” presiding over the lawsuit.

The TCPA does not authorize the Commission to “waive” its regulations in a private right of action. It does not authorize the Commission to intervene in a private right of action. It does not even require a private plaintiff to notify the Commission that it has filed a private lawsuit. Nor does it limit a private plaintiff’s right to sue for violations in situations where the Commission declines to prosecute.

The Communications Act does, however, grant the Commission authority to enforce the TCPA through administrative forfeiture actions. Private citizens have no role in that process. Thus, the TCPA and the Communications Act create a dual-enforcement scheme in which the Commission promulgates regulations that both the Commission and private litigants may enforce, but where the Commission plays no role in the private litigation and private citizens play no role in agency enforcement actions. This is not an unusual scheme. The TCPA is similar to several statutes, including the Clean Air Act, which empowers the EPA to issue

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24 § 227(b)(3).
25 § 227(b)(3).
26 Id.
27 Id.; Cf., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (requiring 60 days prior notice to the EPA to maintain a citizen suit).
29 Id. § 503(b).
30 Id.
31 Ira Holtzman, C.P.A. & Assocs., Ltd v. Turza, 728 F.3d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding TCPA “authorizes private litigation” so consumers “need not depend on the FCC”).
regulations imposing emissions standards\textsuperscript{32} that are enforceable both in private "citizen suits"\textsuperscript{33} and in administrative actions.\textsuperscript{34}

2. A waiver would violate the separation of powers, both with respect to the judiciary and Congress

The seminal separation-of-powers case is \textit{United States v. Klein},\textsuperscript{35} involving a statute passed by Congress intended to undermine a series of presidential pardons issued during and after the Civil War to former members of the Confederacy. The statute directed the courts to treat the pardons as conclusive evidence of guilt in proceedings brought by such persons seeking compensation for the confiscation of private property by the government during the war, thereby justifying the seizure of their property.\textsuperscript{36}

The Supreme Court held the statute violated the separation of powers by forcing a "rule of decision" on the judiciary that impermissibly directed findings and results in particular cases.\textsuperscript{37} The Court held one branch of government cannot "prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way" to the judicial branch and struck down the law.\textsuperscript{38}

But dictating a "rule of decision" is precisely what the "waiver" requested by SBI seeks to accomplish. The goal, as SBI does not hesitate to admit, is to prevent the Northern Illinois District Court from finding "a violation" of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv). If the waiver is granted, the statute will remain the same. This regulation will remain the same. But the federal district court will be told it cannot find "a violation" of the regulation. Such a result would be inappropriate and result in manifest injustice.

SBI might argue that the District Court could still find a violation of the regulation after a waiver; it simply cannot award damages. That does not save its argument because then the

\textsuperscript{32} 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d).

\textsuperscript{33} 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a).

\textsuperscript{34} 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d).

\textsuperscript{35} 80 U.S. 128, 147–48, 13 Wall. 128, 20 L.Ed. 519 (1872).

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{id.}

\textsuperscript{37} \textit{id.} at 146.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{id.}
“waiver” would abrogate Congressional intent. Specifically, when the “appropriate court” finds “a violation,” the private plaintiff is automatically entitled to a minimum of $500 in statutory damages.\(^{39}\) The Commission has no power to “waive” a statute, to take any action inconsistent with statutory mandate, or to take any action inconsistent with statutory mandate.\(^{40}\) From any angle, the Commission cannot encroach on the judiciary or Congress in the manner contemplated by SBI. Thus, the waiver should have been denied.

Indeed, the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, in a private TCPA action involving a defendant that requested a waiver from the FCC, held “[i]t would be a fundamental violation of the separation of powers for [the Commission] to ‘waive’ retroactively the statutory or rule requirements for a particular party in a case or controversy presently proceeding in an Article III court.”\(^{41}\) The court held that “nothing in the waiver—even assuming the FCC ultimately grants it—invalidates the regulation itself” and that “[t]he regulation remains in effect just as it was originally promulgated” for purposes of determining whether the defendant violated the “regulation prescribed under” the TCPA.\(^{42}\) The court concluded that “the FCC cannot use an administrative waiver to eliminate statutory liability in a private cause of action; at most, the FCC can choose not to exercise its own enforcement power.”\(^{43}\)

The decision in Stryker is fully supported by the District of Columbia Circuit decision in Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA (“NRDC”).\(^{44}\) There the circuit court considered whether the EPA had authority to issue a regulation creating an affirmative defense to a private right of action for violations of emissions standards it issued pursuant to the Clean Air Act, in

\(^{39}\) § 227(b)(3).

\(^{40}\) In re Maricopa Comm. College Dist. Request for Experimental Authority to Relax Standards for Public Radio Underwriting Announcements on KJZZ(FM) and KBAQ(FM), Phoenix, Arizona, FID Nos. 40095 & 40096, Mem. Op. & Order (rel. Nov. 24, 2014) (“The Commission’s power to waive its own Rules cannot confer upon it any authority to ignore a statute. While some portions of the Act contain specific language authorizing the Commission to waive provisions thereof, the Act grants no such authority with respect to Section 399B.23.”).


\(^{42}\) Id.

\(^{43}\) Id.

\(^{44}\) 749 F.3d 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
situations where such violations are caused by “unavoidable” malfunctions. The court held the agency did not have such authority and struck the regulation down for three main reasons.

First, the court noted the statute grants “any person” the right to “commence a civil action” against any person for a “violation of” the EPA standards. The statute states a federal district court presiding over such a lawsuit has jurisdiction “to enforce such an emission standard” and “to apply any appropriate civil penalties.” To determine whether civil penalties are appropriate, the statute directs the courts to “take into consideration (in addition to such other factors as justice may require)” a number of factors, including “the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, the violator’s full compliance history and good faith efforts to comply,” etc.

Thus, the court held, although the statute directs the EPA to issue regulations and “creates a private right of action” for their violation, “the Judiciary” “determines ‘the scope’—including the available remedies” of “statutes establishing private rights of action.” The Clean Air Act was consistent with that principle, the court held, because it “clearly vests authority over private suits in the courts, not EPA.” The court held that, by creating an affirmative defense to the statutory private right of action—as opposed to issuing the regulations to be enforced in those actions as directed by the statute—the EPA impermissibly attempted to dictate to the courts the circumstances under which penalties are “appropriate.” Therefore, the court struck down the regulation.

45 NRDC, 749 F.3d at 1062.
46 Id. at 1062–63.
47 Id. at 1063.
48 Id.
50 Id., emphasis added.
51 Id.
52 Id.
Second, the court noted that the EPA has dual enforcement authority over the Clean Air Act, which authorizes both private actions and agency actions to enforce the regulations. It also noted the EPA has the power to “compromise, modify, or remit, with or without conditions, any administrative penalty” for a violation in those proceedings. Under this dual-enforcement structure, the court held, “EPA’s ability to determine whether penalties should be assessed for Clean Air Act violations extends only to administrative penalties, not to civil penalties imposed by a court.” The regulation creating an affirmative defense for “unavoidable” violations ran afoul of that principle.

Third, the court noted that the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to intervene in private litigation. Thus, the court held that “[t]o the extent that the Clean Air Act contemplates a role for EPA in private civil suits, it is only as an intervenor” or “as an amicus curiae.” An intervenor or amicus curiae has no power to create an affirmative defense in the actions in which it intervenes or submits its views, the court held.

The reasoning of NRDC directly applies here. First, like the Clean Air Act, the TCPA creates a private right of action for “any person” to sue for violations of the regulations prescribed under the statute and directs the Commission to issue those regulations, but it vests the “appropriate court” with the power to determine whether “a violation” has occurred. If the court finds a violation, the TCPA imposes automatic minimum statutory damages of $500, but allows the court “in its discretion” to increase the damages. The TCPA creates no role for the

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53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. The statute also requires the private plaintiff to give notice to the EPA so the agency can decide whether to intervene. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(c)(3).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 § 227(b)(3).
61 Id.
Commission in determining whether a violation has occurred, whether it was willful, or whether damages should be increased (and if so, in what amount). Instead, the TCPA "clearly vests authority over private suits in the courts," not the Commission.\(^{62}\) Issuing a "waiver" to prevent the Northern Illinois District Court from determining that "a violation" occurred is no different than the EPA issuing an affirmative defense to prevent courts from determining that civil penalties are "appropriate" because a defendant's violations were "unavoidable."

Second, just as the Clean Air Act grants the EPA authority to enforce the regulations through administrative penalties, the Communications Act grants the Commission authority to determine whether penalties should be assessed for TCPA violations in forfeiture actions brought pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 503(b). Like the EPA's attempt to dictate "whether penalties should be assessed" in private litigation, granting a "waiver" for the purpose of extinguishing SBI's liability in private litigation would run afoul of the bifurcated dual-enforcement structure Congress has created. The Commission is free to choose not to enforce its regulations against SBI, but it cannot make that choice for Craftwood or the putative class.

Third, the Commission has even less authority to grant a waiver than the EPA did to create an affirmative defense because the Clean Air Act at least allows the EPA to intervene in private actions. The TCPA allows the Commission to intervene only in actions brought by state governments to seek civil penalties for violations of the caller-identification requirements.\(^{63}\) It creates no role for the Commission in private TCPA actions. If an agency with express authority to intervene in a private action enforcing its regulations lacks power to create an affirmative defense in that action, then an agency with no authority to intervene cannot grant an outright "waiver" of a defendant's liability. The Commission is limited to participating in private TCPA actions "as amicus curiae," as it often does.\(^{64}\)

In sum, in accordance with NRDC, the Commission could not create an affirmative defense of "confusion" or "misplaced confidence" that the parties seeking waiver could then

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\(^{62}\) NRDC, 749 F.3d at 1063, emphasis added.

\(^{63}\) § 227(e)(6)(C).

\(^{64}\) See, e.g., Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca, Inc. v. Sarris, 771 F.3d 1274, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014) (relying on FCC interpretation of TCPA fax rules in amicus letter submitted at court's request).
attempt to establish in court. If the Commission cannot do that, it cannot take the more radical step of simply “waiving” the violation.

These arguments were laid out in opposition to SBI’s Petition. But the Bureau ignored them, summarily stating:

[W]e dismiss arguments that by granting waivers while litigation is pending violates the separation of powers as several commenter have suggested. As the Commission has previously noted, by addressing requests for declaration ruling and/or waiver, we are interpreting a statute, the TCPA, over which Congress provided the Commission authority as the expert agency. Likewise, the mere fact that the TCPA allows for private rights of action to enforce rule violations does not undercut our authority, as an expert agency, to define the scope of when and how our rules apply.\(^6\)

By merely claiming to be the “expert” and dismissing without any analysis or explanation the argument that granting waivers violates the separation of powers, the Bureau effectively concedes that is exactly what is happening.

C. SBI did not properly allege and cannot show that it obtained prior express permission

In its Petition, SBI ambiguously requested a waiver with respect to “any alleged advertising faxes” it sent with prior express permission. But although SBI baldly alleged that it had obtained prior express permission, SBI never explained how or in what manner it did so. The Commission stresses that prior express permission “requires that the consumer understand that by providing a fax number, he or she is agreeing to receive faxed advertisements.”\(^6\)

Nowhere in the Petition did SBI claim that Craftwood or anyone else provided their fax number after agreeing to receive fax ads. This alone required rejection of SBI’s Petition because “[w]hen

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\(^6\) August 28 Order ¶ 13 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 1.3, Northern Cellular and WAIT Radio).

\(^6\) In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14129, ¶ 193 (“FCC 2003 Order”); see also Jemiola v. XYZ Corp., 802 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ohio C.P. 2003) (“the recipient must be expressly told that the materials to be sent are advertising materials, and will be sent by fax.”)
an applicant seeks a waiver of a rule, it must plead with particularity the facts and circumstances which warrant such."

Moreover, it would have been impossible for Craftwood to provide prior express permission. SBI asserts that Craftwood did so in 2007 but, as explained above, SBI did not even exist in 2007. SBI was not formed until two and a half years later, in June 2009. SBI cannot "borrow" prior express permission from now-defunct Senco Products. The bankruptcy court order makes clear that SBI was not an affiliate of or successor to Senco Products, and is "not holding itself out to the public as a continuation of the Debtors." SBI does not assert in its Petition that it, since its creation in June 2009, obtained prior express permission to send fax ads to anyone.

Accordingly, because SBI cannot even make any showing that it obtained any prior express permission, it is not entitled to a waiver of section 64.1200(a)(4)(iv). Indeed, granting a waiver under such circumstances would give an unfair and unwarranted advantage to SBI in the pending Craftwood litigation and would be arbitrary and capricious. It is one thing for the Bureau to state in the August 28 Order that "the granting of a waiver does not confirm or deny whether the petitioners had the prior express permission of the recipients to send the faxes"; it is an entirely different matter where, as here, SBI cannot maintain consistent with the TCPA and Commission rules that it obtained any prior express permission. The statement wholly ignores the coercive effect in the Craftwood litigation of granting a waiver to SBI now and allowing it only later to try to prove that it obtained prior express permission.

D. SBI did not show that it was "confused" or had "misplaced confidence"

1. It is improper for the Bureau to excuse SBI from pleading specific, detail grounds for confusion or misplaced confidence

In the August 28 Order, the Bureau declared that it "did not require petitioners to plead specific, detailed grounds for individual confusion." The Bureau lacked authority to dispense

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68 August 28 Order ¶ 17.

69 August 28 Order ¶ 19.
with this the requirement that SBI, and all other petitioners, plead with “particularity.” The Commission granted waivers in the Anda Commission Order because it determined that two specific grounds led to “confusion” or “misplaced confidence” by the petitioners about whether the opt-out requirement applied: the rulemaking for, and footnote 154 in, the 2006 Junk Fax Order. The Commission found that these factors taken together justified a waiver. Thus, a party would only be similarly situated to the covered petitioners if it was confused about the opt-out requirement based on both of these grounds.

Here, SBI never claimed in its Petition that it was confused on either of these two grounds. Indeed, SBI did not contend that it was even aware of the requirements of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), let alone of the rulemaking for the 2006 Junk Fax Order or footnote 154 from that order. In its Reply Comment, SBI belatedly claimed that it was confused about these requirements, but it never provided any declaration or other support for this conclusory assertion. Thus, SBI failed to plead or provide facts warranting a waiver and this alone required denial of its Petition.

2. The Bureau’s finding that there is a “presumption” of confusion or misplaced confusion violates due process and is arbitrary and capricious.

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70 Rio Grande, supra.

71 Anda Commission Order ¶ 28 (“Taken together, the inconsistent footnote in the Junk Fax Order and the lack of explicit notice in the Junk Fax NPRM militates in favor of a limited waiver in this instance.”).

72 See Anda Commission Order ¶ 26. If for any reason the Commission finds SBI was “confused” or had “misplaced confidence,” Craftwood has a due process right to investigate the same. It has been denied discovery on this issue to date. See, e.g., Applications of Comcast Corp. and Time Warner Cable Inc. For Consent To Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, MB Docket No. 14-37; Applications of AT&T, Inc. and DIRECTV For Consent To Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, MB Docket No. 14-90, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Pai (arguing Commission violated petitioners’ “due process rights” by denying “serious arguments that merit the Commission’s thoughtful consideration”). The Commission may hold such “proceedings as it may deem necessary” for such purposes and may “subpoena witnesses and require the production of evidence” as the Commission determines “will best serve the purpose of such proceedings.” See 47 C.F.R. § 1.1. In the alternative, Craftwood requests the Commission order that it will not rule on SBI’s’ Petition until Craftwood has completed discovery regarding their knowledge (or lack thereof) of the statute and the Commission’s regulations at the time it sent its fax ads.
In the *Anda Commission Order*, the Commission clearly said that “simple ignorance of the TCPA or the Commission’s attendant regulations is not grounds for waiver.” But the August 28 Order makes no mention of this admonition. It completely disappears. In its place, the Bureau said that petitioners, including SBI, are “entitled to a presumption of confusion or misplaced confidence.” This purported presumption directly conflicts with the requirement in the *Anda Commission Order* that a petitioner must show more than “ignorance of the law.” This shift in the standard by which waivers were determined by the Commission violates due process. See *Blanca Telephone Co. v. FCC*, 743 F.3d 860, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2014); *Morris Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 566 F.3d 184, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The courts have made clear that, when the Commission changes its course, it “must supply a reasoned analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without discussion, it may cross the line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.” See *Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC*, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also, e.g. *Nat’l Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC*, 567 F.3d 659, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing *Greater Boston Television* and explaining that a change to prior precedent requires the agency to deliberately make note of the change). The D.C. Circuit also requires the Commission to support its decisions with at least “a modicum of reasoned analysis. See *Hispanic Info & Telecommunications Network, Inc. v. FCC*, 865 F.2d 1289, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1989). It is also a fundamental tenet of the APA that the Commission is required to treat similarly situated parties the same. This obligation is rooted in the APA’s prohibition of “arbitrary and capricious” agency action. See U.S.C. § 706(2)(a).

Likewise, the shift by the Bureau in its standard is arbitrary and capricious. There is no legitimate reason to grant a waiver if a petitioner was not confused and did not have misplaced confidence. At a minimum, a petitioner must show that it was not merely ignorant of the law, as required by the *Anda Commission Order*.

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73 *Anda Commission Order* ¶ 26.

74 August 28 Order ¶ 15.

75 Indeed, this conclusion is directly support by the *Northern Cellular* case cited by the Commission in the August 28 Order.
E. It would violate public policy to grant SBI a waiver when it was required in all events to provide an opt-out notice on its faxes

Although unnecessary to deny SBI a waiver because SBI failed to carry its burden to demonstrate that it is “similarly situated,” it would be against the public interest to grant SBI the waiver it seeks. In the Anda Commission Order, the Commission recognized two competing public interests—on one hand, an interest in protecting parties from substantial damages if they violated the opt-out requirement due to confusion or misplaced confidence, and on the other hand “an offsetting public interest to consumers through the private right of action to obtain damages to defray the cost imposed on them by unwanted fax ads.”

The interests of consumers like Craftwood in obtaining compensation for SBI’s violations of the regulation, by contrast, are manifest—but they have been completely ignored.

In addition, SBI was required to provide opt-out notices on all of its faxes because SBI relies on the “established business relationship” defense in the Craftwood litigation. In the Anda Commission Order, the Commission reiterated that a “waiver does not extend to the similar requirement to include an opt-out notice on fax ads sent pursuant to an established business relationship, as there is no confusion regarding the applicability of this requirement to their faxes.”

For example, take any one of the faxes received by Craftwood and let’s assume that it was sent to 1,000 recipients. Assume further that 900 recipients gave prior express permission (although SBI makes no showing that any recipient gave permission) and that the remaining 100 recipients had an established business relationship with SBI, or had no relationship with SBI. Without question, the TCPA and the Anda Commission Order required SBI to provide a valid opt-out notice on the fax because at least one person, Craftwood (or 100, in the example) did not give permission.

It would therefore be against public policy (especially in light of the highly useful purposes served by opt-out notices as explained in the Anda Commission Order) to give SBI a

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76 Anda Commission Order ¶ 27.
77 Anda Commission Order ¶ 2, n.2; see also ¶ 29.
waiver of liability for sending a fax without a compliant opt-out notice just because some of the recipients may have given prior express permission, when the statute and FCC regulations required SBI to provide opt-out notices on its faxes entirely independent of § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv).

Finally, Craftwood raised this argument in opposition to SBI’s Petition, but it was completely ignored in the August 28 Order.

Conclusion

The August 28 Order does not withstand scrutiny. Granting of blanket retroactive waivers is inconsistent with the Commission’s Anda Commission Order. The August 28 Order is arbitrary and capricious and should be overturned. Parties must be able to rely on the Commission’s regulations and reliance should not result in harm to them. Maintaining such a result would be a violation of public policy. The granting of the retroactive waiver to SBI must be reversed and its request for waiver rejected.

September 28, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

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78 Accordingly, at most, a waiver can be given only if a petitioner can plead and prove that all recipients of a fax had given prior express permission.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Michael Nuell, do hereby certify that copies of the foregoing "Application for Review" were sent on this 28th day of September, 2015, via US mail, to the following:

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